plete instrument; and it is equally clear that the words "current funds," which were inserted, are utterly repugnant to the printed terms "drafts to the order of," which were erased by black lines. Bank v. Douglas, 31 Conn. 180.

Properly applied, that case is decisive of the present case. It appears that the defendant in that case put his name upon an inchoate bill of exchange, drawn and signed by the maker, on a certain firm, blanks being left for the date, amount, time of payment, and the name of the payee; and that the defendant delivered the paper, thus indorsed, to the maker of the same, who struck out the name of the place where it was made, and the name of the firm on which it was drawn, and filled out the instrument, so as to make it a promissory note for $3,500, payable to the order of another party. Upon these facts the court held that an inference arose, which, in favor of a bona fide holder of the paper, was irresistible, that the person to whom the paper was intrusted was authorized, by filling the existing blanks, to complete the instrument and to fill the blanks so as to bind the defendant as indorser of a bill of exchange, drawn by him on the firm therein named, for any sum, payable at any time and place. But, say the court, no inference, or presumption of authority, can arise that he might turn the bill drawn on one firm into a bill drawn on another, or to turn it into a promissory note. Neither dictum nor decision, say the court, has been cited to warrant such a claim; and they add, that they suppose that none such can be found. Suit in that case was brought by the bank, claiming to be an innocent holder; but the court held, that, notwithstanding the erasures, unmistakable evidence of the original character of the instrument remained, and that the evidence was amply sufficient to excite distrust, and make it the duty of any one to whom the paper was offered to inquire when and by what authority such erasures and alterations had been made. Gardner v. Walsh, 32 Eng. L. & Eq. 162.

Where blanks exist in negotiable securities, delivered to another for use, the custody of the paper, under such circumstances, gives the custodian the right to fill the blanks; but it does not confer authority to make any addition to the terms of the note; and if any such of a material character are made by such a party, without the consent of the party from whom the

paper was received, it will avoid the note, even in the hands of an innocent holder. Ivory v. Michael, 33 Mo. 400.

Proof was given in that case that the parties had for many years been in the habit of indorsing for each other; that the defendant indorsed the note, which was in blank, as to the time of payment, and was payable without defalcation or discount. Before using it, the other party filled the blank with thirty days, and added, after the word "discount," "bearing ten per cent after maturity." Attempt was made in argument to sustain the right to make the addition to the note, because it was delivered before the blank was filled; but the court held that the insertion of the words, "bearing ten per cent after maturity," was not the filling of a blank, and that it rendered the note invalid. Wood v. Steele, 6 Wall. 80.

Persons intrusted with negotiable securities for use by the parties to it may, if it contains blanks, fill the same: but Mr. Parsons, though he admits that rule to its fullest extent, adds, that, if one materially changes words which are printed or written, the note by such change would be rendered invalid; and certainly it must be so if the change substantially varies the scope of the instrument, to the prejudice of the party from whom it was obtained. 2 Pars. on Bills & Notes, 566.

Suppose that is so: still it is insisted by the respondents that the rule is not applicable in this case, because they had not notice of the defect in the blank order. But the court here is entirely of a different opinion. Even the holders of negotiable securities, taken in the usual course of business, before the securities fall due, are held chargeable with notice, where the marks on the instrument are of a character to apprise one to whom the same is offered of the alleged defect. Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 365.

When it is proposed to impeach the title of a holder, for value, by proof of any facts and circumstances outside of the written instrument itself, it is a very different matter. He is then to be affected, if at all, by what has occurred between other parties; and he may well claim an exemption from any consequences flowing from their acts, unless it be first shown that he had knowledge of such facts and circumstances at the time the transfer was made. These principles are of universal application; but where a person takes a negotiable security, which,

upon the face of it, is dishonored, he cannot, says Taney, C. J., be allowed to claim the privileges which belong to a bona fide holder. Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65.

If he chooses to receive it under such circumstances, he takes it with all the infirmities belonging to it, and is in no better condition than the person from whom he received it. The same doctrine was enforced and applied in a subsequent case, where, in speaking of a promissory note, so marked as to show for whose benefit it was to be discounted, the court held that all those dealing in paper "with such marks on its face must be presumed to have knowledge of what it imported." Fowler v. Brently, 14 Pet. 318; Brown v. Davis, 3 Term, 80.

Actual notice in such a case is not required, even in suits founded upon negotiable securities, where the evidence of its infirmity consists of matters apparent on its face; nor is any different or stricter rule applicable in cases like the present, it appearing that the printed words, though erased so as to be inoperative, were still entirely legible, even to the casual reader; and that the words "current funds," inserted before the erased word "drafts," were plainly repugnant to the erased words, "drafts to the order of," which followed them in the same connection.

Constructive notice in such cases is held sufficient, upon the ground, that, when a party is about to perform an act which he has reason to believe may affect the rights of third persons, an inquiry as to the facts is a moral duty, and diligence an act of justice. Whatever fairly puts a party upon inquiry in such a case is sufficient notice in equity, where the means of knowledge are at hand; and if the party, under such circumstances, omits to inquire, and proceeds to do the act, he does so at his peril, as he is then chargeable with all the facts which by a proper inquiry he might have ascertained. Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 712; Hill v. Simpson, 7 Ves. Jr. 170; Kennedy v. Green, 3 Myl. & K. 722; Booth v. Barnum, 9 Conn. 286; Pitney v. Leonard, 1 Paige, 461; Pringle v. Phillips, 5 Sand. 157.

Authorities to show that the material alteration of a written instrument renders it void is unnecessary, as it is a principle of universal application.

Decree reversed, and the cause remanded, with direction to enter a decree in favor of the complainant.

OAKSMITH'S LESSEE v. JOHNSTON.

1. In this country there can seldom be occasion to invoke the presumption of a grant from the government, except in cases of very ancient possessions running back to colonial days, as, since the commencement of the present century, a record has been preserved of all such grants, and of the various preliminary steps up to their issue; and provision is made by law for the introduction of copies of the record when the originals are lost.

2. In ejectment for a lot in Washington City, both parties admitted that the original title was in the United States. The plaintiff relied principally upon evidence of title arising from uninterrupted and exclusive possession by his lessor, and the parties through whom he claims from 1828 to 1867. During the latter year the defendant entered. He traced title through a conveyance of the mayor of Washington, executed in October, 1866, in completion of a sale made under the act of Congress of May 7, 1822 (3 Stat. 691), and an ordinance of the city of the same year, creating a board of commissioners to carry the act into effect, and direct the sales of lots. The act required the deeds executed to the purchasers by the mayor to be recorded among the land-records of the county of Washington within the time prescribed for the recording of conveyances of real estate. The ordinance provided that the board should keep regular minutes of their acts and proceedings, and lay the same before the board of aldermen and com mon council at the commencement of every session of the council. The records and minutes were not produced, nor proof of their contents offered by the plaintiff. Held, that no presumption can legitimately arise that any other deed of the demanded premises was executed by the mayor than the one put in evidence, and that the possession created no title upon which the plaintiff can recover.

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Mr. Edward Lander and Mr. William A. Meloy for plaintiff in error.

Mr. A. G. Riddle, contra.

MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action of ejectment to recover a parcel of land situated in the city of Washington, consisting of the south half of lot fourteen in reservation B, and a portion of the adjoining lot thirteen. For this latter portion the plaintiff obtained judgment; and no question with respect to it is here raised. The only contention in this court relates to the other portion of the demanded premises, the south half of lot fourteen. To recover this portion, the plaintiff relied principally upon evidence of title arising from the possession of the premises by

the lessor of the plaintiff, and parties through whom he claims, for a period of nearly forty years. It was shown, that, as early as 1828, one Thomas Hughes occupied and used the premises, and that he continued from that time to occupy and use them exclusively, either in person or by tenants, until his death in 1837; that by his will he devised his interest and estate in them to his daughter Anna, who, upon his death, continued in like manner in their occupation and use until the entry of the defendant in 1867, having erected in the mean time a brick building thereon. The lessor of the plaintiff, Oaksmith, is the trustee of Anna's estate.

The defendant traced title to the premises from the United States through a conveyance of the mayor of Washington, executed in October, 1866, in completion of a sale made by commissioners under the act of Congress of May 7, 1822, 3 Stat. 691, and an ordinance of the city of the same year passed to carry that act into effect. It is conceded, that, previous to the sale, the title was in the United States.

It appeared in evidence that the sale was made in September, 1822, to one Henry Weightman, to whom a bond was given for a conveyance upon payment of the purchase-money; that in June, 1830, the purchase-money was paid, and that, in 1832 or 1833, the purchaser permitted Hughes to occupy the premises as his tenant; that in 1853 the purchaser died, leaving Roger Weightman his only surviving heir; and that to him the mayor of the city, in October, 1866, executed the conveyance, and that during the same year he conveyed to the defendant.

It also appeared in evidence that the purchase of the premises by Henry Weightman in 1822 was made in trust for Roger Weightman, who, as early as 1830, became the assignee of the bond, and paid the purchase-money; and that the conveyance of the mayor to him, in October, 1866, was obtained upon a representation that the bond had been lost; that Roger Weightman had also purchased the adjoining lot thirteen, and in June, 1830, had received a conveyance of the same from the mayor of Washington, and in March, 1837, had conveyed to Hughes that portion of the lot which the plaintiff recovered in this action.

Upon this evidence, assuming it to have established all that