to the State from whence he escaped, and return him into slavery, but that every person who hindered or obstructed such master or agent, or who harbored or concealed such fugitive, after notice that he was such, should be subject to damages not only, but to a penalty of $500, to be recovered for the benefit of the claimant in any court proper to try the same. 1 Stat. 302. By the act of 1850 (9 Stat. 462), the circuit courts were ordered to enlarge the number of commissioners, "with a view to afford reasonable facilities to reclaim fugitives from labor."

The ninth section of the act provided that any person who should wilfully obstruct or hinder the removal of such fugitive, either with or without process, or should rescue or aid or abet an attempt to escape, or should harbor or conceal the fugitive, having notice, should for either of said offences be subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000, and imprisonment not exceeding six months, by indictment and conviction in the United States Court, "and shall pay and forfeit, by way of civil damages to the party injured by such illegal conduct, the sum of $1,000 for each fugitive so lost as aforesaid, to be recovered by action of debt," &c.

In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, the legislation of 1793 was held to be valid.

It was held in Sims's Case, 7 Cush. 285, that the act of 1850 was constitutional, and that the State tribunals cannot by writ of habeas corpus interfere with the Federal authorities when acting upon cases arising under that act.

In Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, it was held by this court that the Fugitive-slave Act of 1850 was constitutional in all its provisions, and that a habeas corpus under the State laws must not be obeyed, but the authority of the United States must be executed.

The case of Prigg, decided under the act of 1793, and that of Booth, under the act of 1850, are pertinent to the present question.

In the former case, it was held that the act of 1793, so far as it authorized the owner to seize and recapture his slave in any State of the Union, was self-executing, requiring no aid from legislation, either State or National. The clause relating to fugitive slaves, it is there said, is found in the National and not

in the State Constitution. It was said to be a necessary conclusion, in the absence of all positive provision to the contrary, that the national government is bound through its own departments, legislative, judicial, or executive, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution. This doctrine is useful at the present time, and is pertinent to the point we are considering. The clause protecting the freedmen, like that sustaining the rights of slaveholders, is found in the Federal Constitution only. Like the former, it provides the means of enforcing its authority, through fines and imprisonments, in the Federal courts; and here, as there, the national government is bound, through its own departments, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution. In connection with the clause of the Constitution just quoted, there was not found, as here, an express authority in Congress to enforce it by appropriate legislation; and yet the court decide not only that Congress had power to enforce its provisions by fine and imprisonment, but that the right to legislate on the subject belongs to Congress exclusively. Courts should be ready, now and here, to apply these sound and just principles of the Constitution.

This provision of the Constitution and these decisions seem to furnish the rule of deciding the constitutionality of the law in question, rather than that which provides that life, liberty, or property, shall not be interfered with except by due process of law. It is not necessary to consider how far Congress may legislate upon individual crimes under that provision. If I am right in this view, the legislation we are considering to wit, the enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment by the means of penalties and indictments-is legal.

It is a well-settled principle, that, if an indictment contain both good counts and bad counts, a judgment of guilty upon the whole indictment will be sustained.

The record shows that the court below considered each and every count of the indictment as insufficient, and that judgment was entered discharging the defendants without day; i.e., from the whole indictment. Upon the view I have taken of the validity of the fourth count, this judgment was erroneous. It should be reversed, and a trial ordered upon the indictment.

MONTGOMERY, ASSIGNEE, v. BUCYRUS MACHINE WORKS.

A., relying upon the representations of D., that the firm of B., C., and D., of which he was a member, was perfectly solvent, and that B. was wealthy, sold it goods. D. having, without the knowledge of A., retired from the firm, an arrangement was entered into whereby the proceeds of the sale of such goods remaining in the hands of the agents of the firm of B., C., and D., were applied to discharge the debt due to A., and the unsold portion of such goods returned to him. A., at the time, believed that B. and C. were insolvent; and they were within four months from such arrangement adjudged bankrupts. Held, that the representations of D. were a fraud upon A., on account of which he could have rescinded the contract of sale, and followed the goods wherever he could find them; and the goods not having lost their identity, nor become part of the permanent stock of B. and C., upon which they ob. tained credit, their assignee cannot, in the absence of actual fraud in the arrangement for the payment of such proceeds, recover them in a suit against A.

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri.

Mr. James Baker for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. T. W. Bartley and Mr. S. E. Jenner, contra.

MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court. There can be no question, on the conceded facts of the case, that Stewart, Porter, and Wallace were copartners, under the firm name of Stewart, Porter, & Co.; and that they are bound by the duties and obligations arising out of that relation, so far as the transactions and contract with the defendant are concerned. The firm was formed at Sedalia, Mo., in January, 1870, by Stewart and Porter, to deal in agricultural implements, with a view to include Wallace, if he chose to join it; and the name of the partnership was taken for this purpose. Wallace was sent by them soon after this to Ohio, where the works of the defendant, a manufacturing corporation, were situated, to make contracts with it as their partner, if he elected to become such. This election was all that was required to render him a member of the firm: there was no necessity that he should sign any articles of copartnership.

Wallace, when he reached Ohio, elected to join the firm. Pursuant to the express authority conferred upon him by his associates in business, he entered into a contract of purchase

with the defendant, to whom he represented that the firm, consisting of Stewart, Porter, and himself, was solvent and doing a good business, and that Porter was wealthy. Previously to this the defendant knew nothing of the firm, but, relying on the truth of his statements, parted with its property to a firm composed of Stewart, Porter, and Wallace; nor did it learn of the retirement of Wallace from the firm until after proceedings in bankruptcy had been commenced against Stewart and Porter. It dealt throughout, as it had commenced, with a firm composed of the three persons, which, so far as it is concerned, was not changed.

It is true, before closing its dealings, it acted under the mistaken belief that this firm was insolvent. The firm owed no one else; and the firm composed of Stewart and Porter, which was insolvent, was not indebted to the defendant.

By the terms of the contract made by Wallace, on behalf of the firm, with the corporation, one car-load of machines was sold and delivered at the time; and there was a further agreement to fill all orders as soon as practicable. From time to time, orders were given, and machines forwarded. They were generally shipped direct to the different persons who had engaged to sell them for Stewart, Porter, & Co.; and the proceeds of these machines, when sold, were applied, with the consent of all parties, to discharge the debt due the corporation, and the unsold machines were returned to it.

The defendant had the right to rescind the contract on the ground of fraud, and follow the property or its proceeds wherever they could be found. This it did not do, because its agents and officers had no reason to believe that Wallace had actually misled them to its injury until after the machines were all forwarded. But equity and good conscience required that the proceeds of property obtained from it by fraud should be paid to it, or that the property itself, if unsold, be returned. This was recognized by Stewart, Porter, and Wallace; and the arrangement by which this was done is binding on them and the corporation. The machines did not lose their identity; nor can it be said that they formed a part of the permanent stock of goods of the bankrupts, Stewart and Porter, so that they can be considered as having thereby obtained credit.

Their creditors, therefore, have no right to complain, as the settlement was made in the absence of actual fraud; and the mere fact, that, when it was made, the corporation knew that Porter and Stewart were insolvent, does not render it fraudulent under the Bankrupt Law. The transaction by which it got part of the machines back, and received the proceeds of those which had been sold, was, under the circumstances, most equitable; and it cannot be defeated by the consideration that Wallace, after he had made the contract, was allowed to retire from the firm. It would be a great wrong to the corporation, who knew nothing of this, or of the untruthfulness of Wallace's representations, until after the property had all been delivered. It always dealt with the firm as composed of Stewart, Porter, and Wallace. Having no information to the contrary until after the bankruptcy of Stewart and Porter, and the receipt of the proceeds of its own property fraudulently procured from it, the corporation is not liable to the assignee of Stewart and Porter for such proceeds.

Judgment affirmed.

HENDERSON ET AL. v. MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

ET AL.

COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION v. NORTH GERMAN LLOYD.

1. The case of the City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 103, decided no more than that the requirement from the master of a vessel of a catalogue of his passengers landed in the city, rendered to the mayor on oath, with a correct description of their names, ages, occupations, places of birth, and of last legal settlement, was a police regulation within the power of the State to enact, and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States. 2. The result of the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, was to hold that a tax demanded of the master or owner of the vessel for every such passenger was a regulation of commerce by the State, in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States, and therefore void.

3. These cases criticised, and the weight due to them as authority considered. 4. In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose and its constitutional validity must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect.

5. Hence a statute which imposes a burdensome and almost impossible condition on the ship-master as a prerequisite to his landing his passengers, with