among the males of competent age; and in others, again, a middle principle was adopted, which made taxation and voting dependent upon each other, or annexed to it the qualification of holding some personal estate, or the privilege of being a freeman, or the eldest son of a freeholder of the town or corporation. When the Revolution brought about the separation of the colonies and they formed themselves into independent States, a very striking diversity was observable in the original constitutions adopted by them;2 and a like diversity has pervaded all the constitutions of the new States which have since grown up, and all the revised constitutions of the old States which have received the final ratification of the people. In some of the States the right of suffrage depends upon a certain length of residence and payment of taxes; in others upon mere citizenship and residence; in others upon the possession of a freehold or some estate of a particular value, or upon the payment of taxes, or performance of some public duty, such as service in the militia or on the highways. In no two of these State constitutions will it be found that the qualifications of the voters are settled upon the same uniform basis. So that we have the most abundant proofs that among a free and enlightened people, convened for the purpose of establishing their own forms of government and the rights of their own voters, the question as to the due regulation of the qualifications has been deemed a matter of mere State policy, and varied to meet the wants, to suit the prejudices, and to foster the interests of the majority. An absolute, indefeasible right to elect or be elected seems never to have been asserted on one side or denied on the other; but the subject has been freely canvassed as one of mere civil polity, to be arranged upon such a basis as the majority may deem expedient with reference to the moral, physical, and intellectual condition of the particular State. 5

1 See Charter of Rhode Island, 1663, and Rhode Island Laws (edit. 1798) p. 114. See also Connecticut Charter, 1662, and Massachusetts Charters, 1628 and 1692.

2 2 Wilson's Law Lect. 132 to 138; 2 Pitkin's Hist. ch. 19, pp. 294 to 316.

8 2 Wilson's Law Lect. 132 to 138. Mr. Hume, in his Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, proposes that the representatives should be freeholders of £20 a year, and householders worth £500. 1 Hume's Essays, Essay 16, p. 526.

See the Federalist, No. 54; 2 Wilson's Law Lectures, 132 to 138; 2 Pitkin's Hist. 294 to 316.

Dr. Lieber's Encyclopædia Americana, art. Constitutions of the United States. The Federalist, Nos. 52 to 54.

§ 583. It was under this known diversity of constitutional provisions in regard to State elections, that the convention which framed the Constitution of the Union was assembled. The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of a republican government. It was incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of Congress would have been improper, for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States would have been improper, for the same rcason, and for the additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch of the federal government which ought to be dependent on the people alone.1 (a) Two modes of providing for the right of suffrage in the choice of representatives were presented to the consideration of that body. One was to devise some plan which should operate uniformly in all the States, on a common principle; the other was to conform to the existing diversities in the States, thus creating a mixed mode of representation. In favor of the former course, it might be urged that all the States ought, upon the floor of the House of Representatives, to be represented equally: that this could be accomplished only by the adoption of a uniform qualification of the voters, who would thus express the same public opinion of the same body of citizens throughout the Union; that if freeholders alone in one State chose the representative, and in another all male citizens of competent age, and in another all freemen of particular towns or corporations, and in another all taxed inhabitants, it would be obvious that different interests and classes would obtain exclusive representations in different States, and thus the great objects of the Constitution, the promotion of the general welfare and common defence, might be unduly checked and obstructed; that a uniform principle would at least have this recommendation, that it could create no well-founded jealousies among the different States, and would be most likely to satisfy the body of the people by its perfect fairness, its permanent equality of operation, and its entire independence of all local legislation, whether in the shape of State laws or of amendments to State constitutions.

1 The Federalist, No. 52.

(a) See the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution. VOL. I.28

§ 584. On the other hand, it might be urged in favor of the latter course, that the reducing of the different qualifications, already existing in the different States, to one uniform rule, would have been a very difficult task, even to the convention itself, and would be dissatisfactory to the people of different States. It would not be very easy for the convention to frame any rule which would satisfy the scruples, the prejudices, or the judgments of a majority of its own members. It would not be easy to induce Virginia to give up the exclusive right of freeholders to vote; or Rhode Island or Connecticut the exclusive right of freemen to vote; or Massachusetts the right of persons possessing a given value of personal property to vote; or other States the right of persons paying taxes, or having a fixed residence, to vote. The subject itself was not susceptible of any very exact limitations upon any general reasoning. The circumstances of different States might create great diversities in the practical operation of any uniform system. And the natural attachments which long habit and usage had sanctioned, in regard to the exercise of the right, would enlist all the feelings and interests and opinions of every State against any substantial change in its own institutions. A great embarrassment would be thus thrown in the way of the adoption of the Constitution itself, which perhaps would be thus put at hazard, upon the mere ground of theoretical propriety."

§ 585. Besides, it might be urged that it is far from being clear, upon reasoning or experience, that uniformity in the composition of a representative body is either desirable or expedient, founded in sounder policy, or more promotive of the general good, than a mixed system, embracing and representing and combining distinct interests, classes, and opinions.3 In England the House of

1 The Federalist, No 52.

2 Rawle on the Constitution, ch. 4, p. 40.

8 Mr. Burke manifestly thought, that no system of representative government could be safe without a large admixture of different persons and interests. "Nothing," says he, "is a due and adequate representation of a state that does not represent its ability as well as its property. But as ability is a vigorous and active principle, and as property is sluggish, inert, and timid, it can never be safe from the invasion of ability, unless it be, out of all proportion, predominant in the representation." Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution. See also Paley's Moral Philosophy, B. 6, ch. 7. In a subsequent page of his Reflections on the French Revolution, he discusses the then favorite theory of representation proposed for the constitution of France, upon the triple basis of territory, population, and taxation, and demonstrates with great clearness, its inconvenience, inequality, and inconsistency. The representatives, too,

Commons, as a representative body, is founded upon no uniform principle, either of numbers, or classes, or places. The representation is made up of persons chosen by electors having very different, and sometimes very discordant qualifications: in some cases, property is exclusively represented; in others, particular trades and pursuits; in others, inhabitancy and corporate privileges; in others, the reverse. In some cases the representatives are chosen by very numerous voters; in others, by very few: in some cases a single patron possesses the exclusive power of choosing representatives, as in nomination boroughs; in others, very populous cities have no right to choose any representatives at all: in some cases a select body, forming a very small part of the inhabitants, has the exclusive right of choice; in others, non-residents can control the whole election: in some places a half-million of inhabitants possess the right to choose no more representatives than are assigned to the most insignificant borough, with scarcely an inhabitant to point out its local limits. Yet this inequality has never of itself been deemed an exclusive evil in Great Britain. And in every system of reform which has found public favor in that country, many of these diversities have been embodied from choice, as important checks upon undue legislation; as facilitating the representation of different interests and different opinions; and as thus securing, by a well-balanced and intelligent representation of all the various classes of society, a permanent protection of the public were to be chosen indirectly, by electors appointed by electors, who were again chosen by other electors. "The member," says Mr. Burke, "who goes to the national assembly is not chosen by the people, nor accountable to them. There are three elections before he is chosen; two sets of magistrates intervene between him and the primary assembly, so as to render him, as I have said, an ambassador of a state, and not the representative of the people within a state." So much for mere theory in the hands of visionary and speculative statesmen.

1 Paley's Moral Philosophy, B. 6, ch. 7, pp. 380, 381 to 394; De Lolme, Const. of England, B. 1, ch. 4, pp. 61, 62; 1 Kent's Comm. 219; 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 209, 210, 211; 1 Wilson's Law Lect. 431.

2 Mr. Jefferson in his Notes on Virginia (192), insists with great earnestness upon the impropriety of allowing to different counties in that State the same number of representatives, without any regard to their relative population. And yet in the new constitution adopted in 1830-1831, Virginia has adhered to the same system in principle, and her present representation is apportioned upon an arbitrary and unequal basis. (a)

8 Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution.

(a) Under the constitution of Virginia of 1872, senators and representatives were apportioned by population.

liberties of the people, and a firm security of the private rights of persons and property. Without, therefore, asserting that such a mixed representation is absolutely and under all circumstances the best, it might be safely affirmed that the existence of various elements in the composition of the representative body is not necessarily inexpedient, unjust, or insecure, and, in many cases, may promote a wholesome restraint upon partial plans of legislation, and insure a vigorous growth to the general interests of the Union. The planter, the farmer, the mechanic, the merchant, and the manufacturer might thus be brought to act together, in a body representing each; and thus superior intelligence, as well as mutual good-will and respect, be diffused through the whole of the collective body.2

§ 586. In the judgment of the convention this latter reasoning seems to have obtained a decisive influence, and to have established the final result; and it was accordingly declared, in the clause under consideration, that "the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature."3 Upon this clause, which was finally adopted by a unanimous vote, the Federalist has remarked: "The provision made by the convention appears to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to the standard already established by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States, because,

1 Mr. Wilson in his Lectures (430 to 433), considers the inequality of representation in the House of Commons as a prominent defect in the British government. But his objections are mainly urged against the mode of apportioning the representation, and not against the qualifications of the voters. In the reform now under the consideration of Parliament, there is a very great diversity of electoral qualifications allowed, and apparently supported by all parties. Mr. Burke, in his Reflections on the French Revolution, holds doctrines essentially different in many points from Mr. Wilson. See also in Wynne's Eunomus, Dialogue 3, §§ 18, 19, 20, an ingenious defence of the existing system in Great Britain.

2 See Paley's Moral Philosophy, B. 6, ch. 7, p. 380; Id. 394. See also Franklin's Remarks; 2 Pitk. Hist. 242. Dr. Paley has placed the inequalities of representation in the House of Commons in a strong light; and he has attempted a vindication of them, which, whether satisfactory or not, is at least urged with great skill and ingenuity of reasoning. Paley's Moral Philosophy, B. 6, ch. 7; pp. 391 to 400. See also 2 Pitk. Hist. 242.

Journal of Convention, 216, 233. The clause, however, did not pass without opposition; a motion to strike out was made and negatived, seven States voting in the negative, one in the affirmative, and onc being divided. Journ. of Convention, 7 August, p. 233.