for the woven-figured cotton cloth therefore manifests a congressional intent to make an exception as to them and not make the said minimum rates of duty thereon cumulative. In our opinion, the omission of the words "in addition thereto" in the last-mentioned provision is entirely immaterial and may be considered surplusage, as the language itself is plain, clear, and unambiguous without them, and under the ordinary rules of grammatical construction can only be construed as intending to levy cumulative duties. If it were intended to apply the two rates of duty in said provision separately or alternatively, we think Congress would undoubtedly have used the conjunction "or" therein, instead of "and," to effectuate such purpose, and thus put the matter beyond the possibility of doubt. As it is, Congress not only used the conjunction "and," which, among other things, means "together with," "joined with," and "added to," but failed to use a comma after the words "shall pay less duty than 15 per centum ad valorem," when such comma would ordinarily be used to indicate "the slightest possible separation in ideas or construction." (Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary, 1927.) Note the case of Thos. Boag & Co. v. United States (T. D. 42286, 51 Treas. Dec. 1020); also Schneider Bros. & Co. v. United States (13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 519; T. D. 41392).

Just why Congress inserted the words "in addition thereto" in the two other corresponding provisions of said paragraph 903, we do not know, except that it was done out of an abundance of precaution.

In our view, the assessment of duty on the bleached woven-figured cotton cloth in question, both as to its classification and the computation of duty under said paragraph 903, was correctly made. Judgment is therefore rendered in favor of the Government, overruling the protest and affirming the action of the collector. Judgment order will issue accordingly.

(T. D. 43115)

Flouncings made of embroidered net

WM. H. MASSON v. UNITED STATES

Flouncings in the piece, which were made by embroidering patterns, not upon flouncings, but upon the plain net, in an embroidery machine, are dutiable under the first part of paragraph 1430, tariff act of 1922, as flouncings, composed of net or netting, embroidered or otherwise.

United States Customs Court, Second Division

Protest 169330-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of Baltimore

[Affirmed.]

(Decided December 21, 1928)

Comstock & Washburn (J. Stuart Tompkins of counsel) for the plaintiff. Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (Fred J. Carter, special attorney), for the United States.

Before FISCHER, WELLER, and TILSON, Justices

TILSON, Justice: The merchandise under consideration was assessed for duty by the collector as embroidered net flouncings, at the rate of 90 per cent ad valorem, under the first part of paragraph 1430 of the tariff act of 1922. The plaintiff claims the merchandise to be properly dutiable at the rate of 75 per cent ad valorem, as embroidered articles, under the latter part of paragraph 1430 of said act. There are other claims made in the protest, which, upon the record before us, are clearly untenable.

When the case was called for trial the two official samples were introduced in evidence and marked "Exhibits 1 and 2." Counsel then agreed and stipulated that the merchandise, invoiced as net flouncings, consisted of flouncings in the piece which were made by embroidering patterns on plain net, in an embroidery machine. Upon this stipulation the case was submitted for decision.

At the request of counsel time was allowed for the filing of briefs, but counsel for the importer has failed to avail himself of the opportunity granted.

The pertinent part of paragraph 1430 of the tariff act of 1922, under which the merchandise was assessed for duty, reads as follows: Laces, nets and nettings, embroidered or otherwise, flouncings, * * * and all fabrics and articles composed in any part, however small, of any of the foregoing fabrics or articles; all the foregoing, finished or unfinished * * by whatever name known and to whatever use applied, and whether or not named, described, or provided for elsewhere in this Act, when composed wholly or in chief value of yarns, threads, filaments * * 90 per centum ad valorem.

The pertinent part of said paragraph, under which the merchandise in question is claimed to be properly dutiable, reads as follows:

Embroideries not specially provided for, and all fabrics and articles embroidered in any manner by hand or machinery, * ** all the foregoing, finished or unfinished, by whatever name known, and to whatever use applied, and whether or not named, described, or provided for elsewhere in this Act, when composed wholly or in chief value of yarns, threads, filaments * * 75 per centum ad valorem.

*

It will be seen from the stipulation that the merchandise is concededly flouncings which were produced by embroidering patterns on

28080-29-VOL 55 3

plain net. Prior to the merchandise becoming flouncings, by having embroidered thereon certain patterns, it was plain net. So far as the record shows the only operation the plain net had performed upon it was the embroidering of certain patterns thereon, which converted it into flouncings. By the same operation the plain net was embroidered and converted into flouncings. After the plain net became flouncings there was no embroidery, or embroidery patterns placed upon it; in fact it was not subjected to any further process of manufacture.

In the case of United States v. Field & Co. (15 Ct. Cust. Appls. 254; T. D. 42263) the Court of Customs Appeals, in passing upon embroidered lace window curtains made of net or netting, held them to be dutiable at the rate of 75 per cent ad valorem, as embroidered articles, under the latter part of paragraph 1430 of the tariff act of 1922. In the outset of that case the Court of Customs Appeals observed:

We interpret the appraiser's report as to the merchandise covered by the first protest to mean that the curtains described therein were embroidered, and not that the component material was embroidered before the curtains were made therefrom.

We construe this as a plain indication by the Court of Customs Appeals that if the component material in the curtains had been embroidered prior to its becoming a curtain the conclusion reached by them would probably have been different.

In this case the embroidery operation is just the reverse of what it was in the Field case, supra. The flouncings were never embroidered, but the component material from which the flouncings were made was embroidered prior to its becoming a flouncing, that is, the plain net from which the flouncings were made, prior to its being converted into flouncings, was embroidered.

Applying the principle enunciated by the Court of Customs Appeals in the Field case, supra, to the present case, it is clear that flouncings can not be relegated, for duty purposes, to the second clause of said paragraph, as embroidered articles, unless the embroidery was placed thereon after the fabric or article had attained a status or condition entitling it to be regarded as a flouncing in and of itself. If it can be said that the merchandise is an embroidered article, it can with equal force be said that it is embroidered net or netting, because the embroidered patterns were placed, not upon the flouncings, but upon the plain net. Prior to the embroidered pattern being placed upon the merchandise its character and identity, as net, was definitely fixed.

In the first part of paragraph 1430 of said act Congress has taken special care to provide for nets and nettings, embroidered or not embroidered, and all fabrics and articles composed in any part, how

ever small, of any of the foregoing fabrics or articles; all the foregoing, finished or unfinished, by whatever name known and to whatever use applied. In our judgment it would be hard to frame a provision that would be more comprehensive of flouncings composed of embroidered net than that found in the first part of paragraph 1430 of said act. By the same line of reasoning by which embroidered flouncings in the case of United States v. Smith (12 Ct. Cust. Appls. 384; T. D. 40544), and embroidered lace window curtains in the case of United States v. Field (15 Ct. Cust. Appls. 254; T. D. 42263) were excluded from the first part of paragraph 1430, are flouncings, composed of embroidered net, included within the first part of said paragraph in the present case.

We therefore hold the merchandise under protest to be properly dutiable at the rate of 90 per cent ad valorem, as flouncings made by embroidering patterns on plain net, under the first part of paragraph 1430 of the tariff act of 1922. The protest is overruled. Let judgment be entered accordingly.

(T. D. 43116)

Unfinished spark plugs-Parts of machines, finished or unfinished

C. B. RICHARD & Co. v. UNITED STATES

Porcelain insulators which have reached a point in manufacture which clearly identifies them as parts of spark plugs, precluding their use for anything else, are unfinished parts of machines and are more specifically provided for at the rate of 30 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 372, tariff act of 1922, as parts of machines, finished or unfinished, than at the rate of 70 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 212 of said act, as printed china.

United States Customs Court, Third Division

Protest 94855-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of New York

[Reversed.]

(Decided December 21, 1928)

Walden & Webster (Walter F. Welch of counsel) for the plaintiffs.

Charles D. Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General (Marcus Higginbotham. special attorney), for the United States.

Before WAITE, YOUNG, and CLINE, Justices

YOUNG, Justice: The merchandise in question is reported by the appraiser to consist of insulators or plugs composed wholly or in chief value of printed china. Duty was assessed thereon at 70 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 212, tariff act of 1922. The plain

tiffs claim the merchandise properly dutiable at the rate of 30 per cent, or 35 per cent, or 40 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 372, or at the rate of 40 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 399, or at the rate of 25 per cent or 50 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 369, tariff act of 1922.

At the trial of this case counsel for the plaintiffs set forth the claim principally relied upon to be that the articles of merchandise herein. were properly dutiable at the rate of 30 per cent ad valorem as "all other machines or parts thereof, finished or unfinished, not specially provided for" under paragraph 372, tariff act of 1922.

The principle enunciated in the case of Redden v. United States (5 Ct. Cust. Appls. 485; T. D. 35147) and in the cases therein cited seems to be that if articles have reached a point in manufacture which clearly identifies them and their future use with parts of finished articles, and if they can not be used for anything else, then they are unfinished parts.

The articles of merchandise herein have reached a point in manufacture which clearly identifies them as parts of spark plugs, their future use is clearly identified as spark plugs, and they have also reached a point of manufacture where they can not be used for anything else. Consequently they are unfinished parts of spark plugs.

In the case of A. F. Stauff v. United States (Abstract 47891) this court held that an oil-burning marine engine is a machine. If internal-combustion engines in which oil is used are machines, then there is no escape from the conclusion that internal-combustion engines in which gas is used are also machines. The evidence shows that the articles of merchandise herein, unfinished spark plugs, are used as parts of internal-combustion engines when finished, and have no other use. Therefore the articles of merchandise herein are unfinished parts of machines and properly dutiable at 30 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 372, tariff act of 1922, and we so hold. The protest is therefore sustained. Let judgment be entered accordingly.

(T. D. 43117)

Coal-tar mixture

BAKELITE CORPORATION ET AL. U. UNITED STATES (No. 3056)

1. CRESYLIC ACID AND COAL-TAR MIXTURE-DUTIABILITY.

Upon the authority of United States v. General Bakelite Corporation (13 Ct. Cust. Appls. 607, T. D. 41458), involving a mixture of the same material, the imported merchandise is dutiable under the provision of paragraph 27, tariff act of 1922, for "all mixtures, including solutions, rather than free of duty under the provision of paragraph 1459 for "all mixtures

* *

*