[Price v. Price.] and his wife on the 20th day of September, 1898, conveying the land in question to J. M. Rottenberry. No objection was offered to the introduction of this deed except on the ground that it was irrelevant, which was properly overruled. The deed was regularly acknowledged and recorded. No testimony was offered to show that J. M. Rottenberry had ever reconveyed said lands to plaintiff. In order to recover in an action of ejectment, the plaintiff must show title at the commencement of the suit and on to the time of trial.-Cofer v. Shening, 98 Ala. 338; Bruce v. Bradshaw, 69 Ala. 360; Scranton v. Ballard, 64 Ala. 403. The judgment of the court is affirmed. MCCLELLAN, C. J., TYSON and ANDERSON, J.J., concur ring. Price v. Price. Bill in Equity for Divorce. 1. Divorce; when will not be granted on grounds of insanity. Where a bill is filed by a husband praying for a divorce from his wife upon the ground of her insanity, and it is shown that prior to the filing of the bill complainant and defendant had been married for 33 years and that soon after the marriage the complainant had notice of the conditions upon which it was sought to predicate insanity, it is proper for the court to decline to grant the divorce; the complainant having waited too late to proceed in the premises. APPEAL from the Chancery Court of Tallapoosa. Heard before the Hon. RICHARD B. KELLY. The bill in this case was filed by the appellant, E. B. Price against the appellee, Amanda Price, for the pur pose of obtaining a divorce against the defendant. It was averred in the bill that the plaintiff and the defendant had been married for 33 years prior to the time of the filing of the bill; that at the time of the marriage, [Price v. Price.] the said wife was insane, and had remained so up to the time of the filing of the bill. At the time the bill was filed, the respondent, the wife of the plaintiff, was hopelessly insane, and confined in the State Insane Asylum at Tuscaloosa. On the submission of the cause upon the pleadings and proof, the chancellor decreed that the complaint was not entitled to the relief prayed for, and ordered the bill dismissed. From this decree the complainant appeals and assigns the rendition thereof as error. LACKEY & BOWLING, for appellant. Cited 19 Am. & E. Enc. Law p. 1161 et seq., Pike et al. v. Pike, 104 Ala. 642; Lewis v. Lewis, 9 L. R. A. 505, (44 Minn. 124.), Rawdon v. Rawdon, 38 Ala. 565. THOMAS L. BULGER, contra. Cited Rawdon v. Rawdon, 28 Ala. 565. MCCLELLAN, C. J.-We do not commit ourselves to the proposition that the chancery court has jurisdiction to decree the annulment or declare the invalidity of marriage on the ground of insanity of a party or the parties at the time of solemnization; but assuming such jurisdiction to exist, we have no difficulty in concurring with the conclusion of the chancellor that this is not a proper case for its exercise. In the first place, if Mrs. Price was insane at the time of the marriage, the complainant has waited too long to file his bill: They were married thirty-three years before bill was filed. Soon after the marriage complainant had notice of the conditions upon which it is now sought to predicate insanity. It is too late now for him to proceed in the premises. But in the second place, the evidence fails to reasonably satisfy us that Mrs. Price was insane at the time of her marriage. Affirmed. HARALSON, DOWDELL and DENSON, J.J., concurring.. [Chapman & Co. v. Johnson.] 1. Chapman & Co. v. Johnson. Registration of Mortgage. Mistake of officer recording it does not affect rights of mortgagee. Where a mortgage is duly filed for record in the office of the Judge of Probate, such filing is, under the provisions of the statute, (Code, 1896, § 987), operative as notice of the mortgagee's lien from the day delivered to the Judge, and a mistake of the officer in recording the mortgage does not affect the rights of the mortgagee thereafter, nor render the record of the mortgage ineffective as constructive notice to such subsequent purchasers for value. APPEAL from the County Court of Geneva. This was an action brought by the appellee against the appellants to recover damages resulting to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant purchasing two bales of cotton upon which plaintiff had a lien and thereby depriving the plaintiff of the enforcement of the lien. The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The cause was tried by the court without the intervention of the jury, and upon the hearing of all the evidence the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. From this judgment the defendants appeal and assign the rendition thereof as error. W. R. CHAPMAN, for appellant.-Cited Code §§ 986, 987 and 991; Sanders v. Knor, 57 Ala. 80; Hardaway v. Semmes, 38 Ala. 657; Pollak v. Davidson, 87 Ala. 551; Dufphey v. Frenage, 5 S. & P. 215; Duvose v. Young, et al, 10 Ala. 365; Jones v. Parks, 22 Ala. 446. C. D. CARMICHAEL, contra. DENSON, J.-The plaintiff, Johnson, held a mortgage which was executed to him by one, W. M. Newell [Chapman & Co. v. Johnson.] on the 13th day of November, 1900, to secure an indebtedness of $100.00. The mortgage was made payable the 1st day of October, 1901, and conveyed the crop of Newell for the years 1900, 1901, 1902 and 1903, grown on his farm in Geneva county. That part of the mortgage descriptive of the crops conveyed, was in the following words and figures, to-wit; "and the entire crop raised by me, or for me, or in which I may be interested during 1900. 1991, 1902 and 1903, in Geneva county, Alabama, or elsewhere." In recording the mortgage, the judge of probate wrote the part descriptive of the crops conveyed, as follows, to-wit; "and the entire crop raised by me, or in which I may be interested during the year 19— in Geneva county, Alabama, or elsewhere." The mortgage was duly filed for record in the office of the judge of probate of Geneva county (the residence county of the mortgagor) on the 23rd day of November, 1900, as is shown by the following endorsement on the mortgage, namely, "Filed for record on the 23rd day of November, 1900, at 2 o'clock p. m., and recorded in Book 20, page 137 record of mortgages, Geneva county. Ed. Roach, Judge of Probate." It is conceded by the parties to this controversy, that the only question which is presented for review by the record is, whether or not the mistake made by the judge of probate in the recordation of the mortgage, as above shown, rendered the record of the mortgage ineffective as constructive notice to subsequent purchasers for value. Scetion 987 of the Code of 1896 was brought down from the Code of 1852 in almost the exact language in which it appears in section 1270 of that Code. This section provides, that a conveyance is operative as a record from the day of delivery to the judge. In the first case in which this section of the Code was construed, that of Mims v. Mims, 35 Ala. 23, it appeared that a mortgage was executed in which the mortgagor acknowledged an indebtedness to the mortgagee in the sum of one hundred and twenty-two and 40-100 dollars, to be paid on or before the first day of May next, "and the further sum of five hundred dollars, to be paid on or before the first day of January next." The mortgage [Chapman & Co. v. Johnson.] was duly filed for record, but, the transcribing officer, in recording it, omitted the words which are italicised above, so that it appeared from the record to be a security only for the sum of $122.40. In the case of Seibold v. Rogers, 110 Ala. 438, it appeared that a mortgage was executed by J. W. Davis, but the transcribing officer recorded the name of the mortgagor as J. W. Cavis. It was held in each case, that under the statute the mortgage was not impaired in its efficiency against subsequent purchasers, by the fact that there was a mistake made by the transcribing officers in making the record. WALKER, C. J., in the opinion in the case first cited, reasons as follows: "The object and effect of the statute are clearly to place the conveyance, as soon as the grantee has discharged his entire part in procuring the record, by having it properly proved, or acknowledged and delivered to the officer, in the same attitude as if it were spread upon the record book. This statute relieves a party, who has done all that is devolved upon him by the law, from the consequence of the failure of the probate judge to discharge his duty, or of the imperfect manner in which he discharges it. The conveyance being operative as a record from its delivery to the judge, no subsequent mistake of his could deprive it of the operation thus given it by the law." In the case in 110 Ala. supra, the court said; "The delivery of the instrument to the probate judge for record was all that was required of the plaintiff (mortgagee), to give notice of his lien. He was not required to supervise the act of the probate judge in recording the paper, and hence it is immaterial as far as the plaintiff's rights are concerned, that the recording officer committed an error in writing the mortgagor's name Cavis instead of Davis upon the mortgage record." It is further stated by the court, substantially, that the conclusion reached could not be otherwise without disregarding the express language of the statute.-Leslie v. Hinton, 83 Ala. 266; Fouche v. Swain, 83 Ala. 151; Heflin v. Slay, 78 Ala. 180; McGregor v. Hall, 3 Stew. 397. |