[Francis et al. v. White, Admr.] The 1st, 2d, 28th and 29th grounds of demurrer, the over-ruling of which constitutes the 1st, 2d, 26th and 31st assignments of error, were as follows: (1.) It does not appear from said bill that C. C. Sheats, complainant's intestate, owned any right, title or interest in the lands sought to be redeemed. 2.) The bill does not show what interest the complainant seeks to redeem in the lands described therein. (28.) The averment of the bill fails to show what right, title or interest C. C. Sheats had in the lands sought to be redeemed at the time of the execution sale. (29.) The averment of the bill fails to show what right, title or interest C. C. Sheats had in the lands sought to be redeemed at the time of his death. The 9th and 10th grounds of demurrer were as foliows: (9.) It is not averred in the bill that complainant had no means of ascertaining the value of permanent improvements placed on part of the land, therein de scribed, by Foster H. Pointer. (10.) It is not averred in the bill that complainant had no means of ascertaining the value of permanent improvements placed on a part of the land, therein described, by Nelson Campbell. The 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th grounds of demurrer, the over-ruling of which constitutes the bases of the 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th assignments of error, were as follows: (11.) It is not averred in said bill that the complainant had no means of ascertaining the existence of all lawful charges against said lands. (12.) The bill fails to allege that complainant had no means of ascertaining the amount due for lawful charges on said lands. (13.) The bill does not show what diligence the complainant had exercised in ascertaining or attempting to ascertain the lawful charges. (14.) The allegation of said bill, that complainant has diligently inquired and searched for information respecting the amount of lawful charges against said property held by the defendant Francis, is a conclusion of the pleader, and no facts are stated showing diligence upon the part of complainant. The 22d ground of demurrer, the over-ruling of which constitutes the basis of the 22d assignment of error, was as follows: (22.) The bill is not accompanied with the amount of money necessary to defray the expenses of executing titles from the defendants to complainant. [Francis et al. v. White, Admr.] The defendants also moved to dismiss the bill for want of equity. Upon the submission of the cause upon the demurrers and motions to dismiss for want of equity, the chancellor over-ruled the demurrers and said motions. From this decree, the defendants appealed, and assigned the rendition thereof as error. C. C. HARRIS and CALLAHAN & HARRIS, for appellants. "The statute requires that possession of the land must be delivered on demand, in ten days after said sale; that the party seeking to redeem must pay or tender to the purchaser, or his vendee, the purchase money, with ten per cent. per annum thereon, and all other lawful charges. The statutory right of redemption is lost if not exercised in the precise mode prescribed by the statute. This is strongly set forth in the following authorities:-"Bailey, Davis & Co. v. Timberlake, 74 Ala. 225; Spooner v. Phillips, 27 Ala. 197; Burke v. Brewer, 32 So. Rep., p. 602; Beebe v. Buxton, 99 Ala. 117; Cramer v. Watson, 73 Ala. 132; Oldfield v. Eulert, 39 Am. St. Rep., p. 765; Waller v. Harris, 32 Am. Dec., p. 590; Ex Parte Bank Monroe, 42 Am. Dec., p. 61; Hill v. Walker, 98 Am. Dec., p. 465; 2 Freeman on Judgments, sec. 314; et seq." "If the bill does not show that a tender was made before it was filed, a tender made in it is not sufficient to authorize a decree for redemption, unless in connection with such offer, the bill shows a valid and sufficient excuse for the omission to make a tender before it was filed."-Spoor v. Phillips, 27 Ala. 197. In construing the statutes of redemption, this court has repeatedly held that in a bill to redeem, it is necessary to give the court jurisdiction that the necessary amount to effect redemption must be paid into court on the filing of the bill.-Long v. Slade, 121 Ala. 271; Murphree v. Summerlin, 114 Ala. 57; Beatty v. Brown, 101 Ala. 697. With a studied effort, the complainant avoids stating the interest of his intestate, C. C. Sheats, in the lands sought to be redeemed. Professedly, his right to redeem is the right which was vested in Sheats at the time of his death, and no other. And this bill must affirmatively [Francis et al. v. White, Admr.] show that the complainant has an interest in the subject matter of the suit, and a proper title to institute the particular suit concerning it.-Goldsby v. Goldsby, 67 Ala. 562; Rapier v. Gulf City Paper Co., 64 Ala. 340. It has been said that the purchaser at execution sale may transfer by deed his title, as he may the title to other land; and that after such conveyance, an application to redeem must be made to his vendee, and that the redemp tion statute contemplates a payment or tender to such vendee.-Camp v. Simon, 34 Ala. 126; Lehman, Durr & Co. v. Collins, 69 Ala. 131. The statute has made no provision for the redemption of a part of the property. It has only granted a privilege, and this privilege cannot be enlarged or extended by judicial construction. If the courts can extend one pro vision, or supply one omission, they can extend or supply any number.-Powers v. Andrews, 84 Ala. 293. E. W. GODBEY, contra.-Non-payment into court affects only part of the property, while the demurrer goes to the entire bill.-Beall v. Lehman, 110 Ala. 446; George v. Cen. R. R. & Banking Co., 101 Ala. 607; Richardson v. Dunn, 79 Ala. 170. Payment into court is unnecessary when the true amount is unknown.-Freeman v. Jordan, 17 Ala. 502; Aycock v. Adler, 87 Ala. 192. In Pritchard v. Sweeney, 109 Ala. 651, it was held that the purchaser must disclose to the would-be redemptioner the value of his permanent improvements placed upon the land; and in Posey v. Pressley, 60 Ala. 251, it was said that a redemptioner's "duty is performed when his offer clearly indicates his willingness and readiness to pay for such mprovements, and if there is a general offer to redeem, and the right of redemption is denied," the party offering to redeem will be excused from any particular inquiry as to a claim for improvements. SIMPSON, J.-This is a bill filed by appellee, as administrator of the estate of C. C. Sheats for the purpose of redeeming certain real estate, which was sold under executions, against said Sheats, in his lifetime, the appellant, Francis, being the purchaser, and appellants, [Francis et al. v. White, Admr.] Pointer and Campbell being purchasers, severally, of portions of said real estate. The appeal is from the decree of the chancery court overruling the demurrer to the bill, and the motion to dismiss the same for want of equity. Appellant's brief discusses together assignments of error No. 4, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16 and 27, and is correct in the contention that the complainant's rights depend upon a compliance with statutory requirements in regard to the redemption of real estate. The right of redemption is a personal privilege, and, in order to avail himself of the right, the complainant must show "that he has not failed to do what the law requires, in order to invest him with the right he seeks to enforce," or must show some valid reason for his failure in any particular.-Bank v. Brewer, 32 So. Rep, 602; Henderson v. Hamrick, 29 So. Rep. 924. When the purchaser is absent from the State, a tender, to be sufficient, must be made by a deposit of the money in court, on the filing of the bill, and the absence of the purchaser or his vendee from the State excuses the tender in person and authorizes the filing of the bill. Beebe v. Barton, 99 Ala. 117; Lehman, Durr & Co. v. Col lins, 127, 132. The bill alleges that "none of it was in the actual possession of said C. C. Sheats, but such of it as was not bare and vacant and as was susceptible of actual possesion, was in the possession of tenants. If complainant is mistaken in this averment, he avers that no demand has ever been made for possession by the defendant Francis of the said C. C. Sheats, and that, if said C. C. Sheats remained or continued in the possession, he did so, by and with the consent of the defendant Francis." Where the purchaser made no demand for possession, the failure to demand is a valid reason for failing to deliver possession.-Baker r. Burdenshaw, 132 Ala. 166; Hardin v. Collins, 35 So. Rep. 357; 138 Ala, 399. The statute provides the course to pursue if the land is in possession of tenants.-Code, § 3506. We hold that the averments of the bill were sufficient to dispense with the averment of delivery of possession on demand. [Francis et al. v. White, Admr.] It is insisted that it is the duty of the party, seeking to redeem, to ascertain at his peril what the lawful charges are, and to tender them, and that ignorance of improvements or their value, or of the lawful charges will not excuse him, and in fact nothing will excuse him except the "conduct or agreement of the purchaser," and that these words (used in the case of Spoor v. Phillips, 27 Ala. 197) mean that the purchaser must have been guilty of some positively wrongful conduct, or act, such as misinforming the proposed redemptioner, and that the effect of the purchaser leaving the state relieves only from the necessity of making the tender in person, and not from the duty of ascertaining, at his peril, what the lawful charges are. The law does not require impossible things of any one. The averments of the bill show that Francis has absented himself from the State; that complainant has made diligent inquiry to ascertain his post office address, has written to him repeatedly asking for an account of the lawful charges claimed by him to have been paid, has also requested both of his vendees to inform him what lawful charges are claimed by them and they have refused to give any information. Complainant has also made diligent inquiry as to lawful charges, has tendered into court the amount of all that he has been able to ascertain, and offers to pay all lawful charges which may be ascertained under the orders of the court. This court, speaking through Chief Justice Brickell has said: "Upon the purchaser, or party in possession, claiming compensation for permanent improvements, rests the duty of informing the party coming to redeem of the character and extent of the claim."-Cramer v. Watson, 73 Ala. 133; Prichard v. Sweeney, 109 Ala. 655. The averments of the bill in this case show a sufficient tender of the lawful charges.-Hardin v. Collins, 138 Ala. 399; Baker r. Burdenshaw, supra. In the case of Long v. Slade, 121 Ala. 267, referred to by appellant, there was no tender made in court at all; while in the case at bar, the bill shows that the purchase money and 10 per cent, and the amount of all the charges which complainant has been able to ascertain, with one omission hereinafter noted, have been deposited |