[United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Union Trust & Savings Co.] plaintiffs, there was a misjoinder of defendants in the Bryant case, in making Parks a party.-Painter v. Mauldin, 119 Ala. 88; Evans v. Killand, 9 Ala. 46; Ferry v. Burchard, 21 Conn. 603. The plaintiffs could not sue in their own names on the obligation.-See authorities, supra. The bond is to answer for any loss occurring by reason of fraud or dishonesty of Parks, and the complaint alleges no breach of that condition. This means moral fraud, and fraudulent intent.-Wolf v. Stix, 99 U. S. 1. The bond had expired by its own limitation at time of breach complained of.-City Council v. Hughes, 65 Ala. 201; Burge on Suretyship, 69. The liability of the surety was defined and limited by the letter and every condition expressed in the instrument sued on, and could not by implication be extended beyond them, and the complaint was defective, in not alleging conformance with all the conditions thereof. City Council v. Hughes, 65 Ala. 201; Anderson v. Bellinger, 87 Ala. 334; Miller v. Stewart, 9 Wheat. 681; United States v. Hudson, 10 Wall. 395; Foxcroft v. Nevins, 4 Greene (Me.) 75; Clark v. Lamb, 76 Ala. 406; Mechem on Public Officers, § 282. HORACE STRINGFELLOW, contra.-There can be no doubt that the bond sued on did not conform to the statutory requirements respecting official bonds, its principal variation being in its conditions but the complaint avers that the Register acted under said bond, and was so acting at the time of the said conversion, from which it is alleged the loss to the trust estate accrued. The bond here sued for clearly comes within the curative effect of Section 3089 of the Code of 1896; therefore the bond sued on stands in the place of the Register's official bond, subject "on its condition being broken," to all the remedies which the person agrees might have maintained thereon had it complied with all the requirements of the law. McKissack v. McClendon, 133 Ala. 558. But even assuming that the bond only indemnified against the mala fides of the employee the complaint [United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Union Trust & Savings Co.] shows a good cause of action. "Dishonesty" is defined "a breach of trust." The complaint avers that the general deposit was made of the trust funds. This was in violation of Section 4668 of the Criminal Code.-Alstons' case, 92 Ala. 134. "Wrongful acts knowingly or intentionally committed can neither be justified nor excused on the ground of innocent intent."-Reeves v. States, 95 Ala. 31. It was unnecessary that the complaint should aver that notice was given and suit brought within the time stated in the bond. The appellant was notified by Section 3089 of the Code that if the bond was acted upon it stood in the place of the official bond and was subject to all of its remedies. The statute was part of the bond, and the notice and time of suit stipulated in the bond are not required by it. The same is true of the stipulation in the bond as to the period of its operation. The Register was elected for six years and the bond here given as his official bond and standing in its place it is for the term stated and the surety could only be released from liability by compliance with sections 3124-3129 of the Code. But the complaint here shows the lending of the trust funds was within the time limited by the bond and its renewal. It was unnecessary to aver that the renewal was in writing.-Dexter v. Ohlander, 89 Ala. 262. One executing an official bond with an insufficient or limited condition would be charged by Section 3089 with knowledge of the fact that notwithstanding such condition the bond if acted under would contain the general condition named in the statutes, and the surety in executing and permitting the bond to be acted under would be presumed to consent to it. "A statute which declares the legal obligation of an official bond is a part of its terms as fully as if its words were expressly written within its condition."-Clark v. Lamb, 76 Ala. 407. A surety executing such bond voluntarily assumes liability for his principal according to the obligation of the bond as the law defines it.-Morrow v. Wood, 56 Ala. 8; McKissack r. McClendon, 133 Ala. 558, 32 So. Rep. 486. MCCLELLAN, C. J.-A bond intended by the obligors thereon to be the official bond of a public officer and [United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Union Trust & Savings Co.] which such public officer acts under is by force of the statute the official bond of such officer, and in legal contemplation and effect such bond is payable and conditioned as the statute requires the official bond of such officer to be payable and conditioned.-Code, § § 3070, 3087, 3089; Sprowl v. Lawrence, 33 Ala. 674; Lewis r. Lee County, 66 Ala. 480, 488-9; Steele v. Tutuiler, 68 Ala. 107; McKissack v. McClendon, 133 Ala. 558. That the bond sued on in this case was intended by the obligors to be the official bond of Wm. H. Parks as register in chancery for the district constituted of the county of Montgomery. its own terms fully demonstrate. That said Wm. H. Parks acted as such register in chancery under said bond, and was so acting thereunder at the time of the default complained of, is shown beyond controversy. It is, therefore, of no consequence that the condition of the bond is different from that which the statute prescribes for official bonds, nor of any conse quence that the condition expressed in the bond may not have been broken by the officer. The condition, which, though not written into this paper, is as essentially a part of it for all the purposes of this action as if it and it alone were written into it, is that the officer, Wm. H. Parks, will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of register in chancery during the time he continues therein, or discharges any of the duties thereof (Code, 1896, § 3070); and the obligors thereon are liable for any breach of this condition for the use and benefit of every person sustaining damages by such breach-(Code 1896. § 3087). It would be immaterial whether such bond is in terms payable to the state: The law makes it so payable. It would be immaterial to the sureties liability whether Parks executed it: The surety is liable whether he did or not. And it is immaterial that the instrument though signed by Parks, yet on its face imports no obligation on his part to the state: The law imports that obligation into the bond. On the other hand, no account is to be taken of and no operation is to be given to the several stipulations and conditions set down in this paper which tend to limit the liability which an official bond imports or to clog or impeach the [United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Union Trust & Savings Co.] remedy for the enforcement of such liability. The right of recovery is the same in the abstract and as to amount as if the bond had expressed the statutory conditions and those only; and action upon it is maintainable under the same conditions. It is altogether inapt and inaccurate to say that the city court in its ruling on the demurrer in line with the foregoing vews, made a bond for the partes or even that the law has made a bond which the parties have not made. The law, known of all men (and even of all corporations), said to these parties, if you put forward a Laper writing as and for the official bond of this officer and the officer acts under it, that paper writing imports and involves certain liability upon you in certain contingencies. The parties make and exploit this writing for this purpose knowing the legal consequences of their action, and they thereby take those consequences upon themselves. The law, as it was competent for the law to do, merely gave a certain character and attached certain liabilities to certain acts. The defendant performed those acts, and it is not only no legal wrong, but not even a legal hardship for the law through its ministers to enforce such liability. The city court committed no error in overruling the demurrer to the complaint. There is error, however, in respect of the amount for which judgment was rendered. The complaint claims seventeen hundred dollars damages and no more. It alleges that by reason of the misfeasafice of the register. said sum of seventeen hundred dollars was lost to the plaintiff, and there is no averment that any other sum was lost. It also avers that plaintiff had made demand upon the register for that sum, and there is no allegation of a demand for any other sum. It is quite true that in averring the conversions by the officer divers amounts are stated which in the aggregate equal the sum for which judgment was rendered; but it does not follow that all of these several sums were lost to plaintiff. To the contrary, it may be that enough had been repaid before suit brought to reduce the total loss to the sum of seventeen hundred dollars averred in the complaint to be [Webb & Stagg v. McPherson & Co.] the total loss. Consequently there is no room for the application of the principle that "a judgment for the amount shown due by the declaration or petition may be given although it is greater than the damages laid in the ad damnum clause proper." The complaint did not show that such greater amount was due. Because of this error as to amount the judgment of the city court must be reversed. This court will render the judgment the city court should have rendered, for the sum of seventeen hundred dollars with interest from the time of the last deposit made by the register.-Lister v. Vowell, et al. 122 Ala. 264, 269. Reversed and rendered. HARALSON, DOWDELL and DENSON, J.J., concurring. 1. Webb & Stagg . McPherson & Co. Attachment Suit. Attachment insufficient; affidavit, writ and bond can be amended Any irregularity or defect of form, or of substance in an affi davit for an attachment in the bond or writ of attachment, may, under provisions of the statute, (Code § 564) be amended before or during the trial. 2. Justice of the peace; amendment of claim so as to bring it within the jurisdiction of justice. In a civil suit brought before a justice of the peace, the plaintiff may, at any time before or at the time of the rendition of judgment remit the excess of his demand over and above the sum for which justice is authorized to render judgment, so as to bring the case within his jurisdiction. 3 Justice of the peace; want of jurisdiction must appear in face of proceedings on appeal.-Where the question of the want of jurisdiction in a justice of the peace to render a judgment, is raised in the circuit court in proceedings by common law certiorari to vacate the judgment, the want of jurisdiction must appear upon the face of the proceedings filed by the justice in the circuit court in response to the writ of certiorari; and in |