ther proceedings by the order requiring such | proceeding, at her request after the sale reaffidavits to be filed.

[4] The claim that the petition for a new trial duly filed in court with an order of notice issued by the court and served is not a civil cause pending in court does not require consideration.

[5] The objection to the sufficiency of the

tained the money arising from the proceeds of the sale temporarily for safe-keeping, they were merely agents, and not trustees, of such defendant, who could maintain action of assumpsit against them for the money left with them, and attachment or garnishment process will lie against them at the instance of plaintiff in the foreign attachment proceeding.

assumpsit will lie for money.

allegations of the petition should be met by demurrer or motion for a specification. Post-2. Garnishment 13-Writ may issue where ponement of the taking of depositions until the issue could be made more certain if asked for might have been granted if in fact justice required such course.

[6] It is suggested that Watkins admitted that the witness had given him no intimation that he could furnish any new evidence. This seems to be an acknowledgment that counsel proposed to ask questions without knowing what the answers would be. This is perhaps a dangerous practice in the course of a trial, but no legal objection to the procedure is known. The witness was asked as to the accident because of which Watkins claims to recover. To what extent the facts of the original injury may become material in the trial cannot be ascertained in advance. The propriety of interrogation in a deposition is sustained if the matters inquired about may become relevant. B. & M. R. R. v. State, 75 N. H. 518, 77 Atl. 996, 31 L. R. A. (N S.) 539, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 382. Whether the deposition can be used at the trial in court is a question not now raised. Most of the difficulties the defendant railroad suggests will not arise if they secure Tufts' attendance at the trial. P. S. c. 225, § 1.

Where defendant in attachment may maintain assumpsit against the garnishee, attachment will lie.

Action by Ellen D. Booth against Pearl T. Bingnear and another, wherein Morris Eliason and another were garnisheed. Motion for discharge from attachment as garnishees denied.

PENNEWILL, C. J., and CONRAD, J., sit

ting.

L. Irving Handy, of Wilmington, for petitioners.

John Pearce Cann, of Wilmington, for respondent.

This matter comes before the court on written motion of Morris Eliason and John P. Cochran, Jr., wherein they recite that Pearl T. Bingnear sold certain personal property at public sale, at which they acted as clerks. And they allege that at the close of the sale, the proceeds thereof, the sum of $519.11, were entrusted to them for safe-keeping, as Pearl T. Bingnear did not want to keep so large a sum of money on the farm. Subsequently Unless Watkins thought the witness Tufts and before the money was turned over to her could testify to something that would aid Ellen D. Booth caused foreign attachment to him, it is not probable he would have in- be issued against the said Pearl T. Bingnear curred the expense of attempting to take his and Charles J. Bingnear, and the petitioners deposition. The railroad certainly cannot were summoned as garnishees. They allege complain because Watkins, instead of seek- in their petition that they believe they hold ing to extract the information from Tufts, said money as trustees for said Pearl T. their employee, by secret negotiation, pro- Bingnear and are, therefore, not liable to atceeded openly, giving them notice and oppor-tachment as garnishees, and prayed the court tunity to hear all that Tufts could be in- that they be discharged therefrom. duced to say. No reason is perceived for discouraging what appears to be a reasonable method for the scientific investigation of fact. Taylor v. Thomas, 77 N. H. 410, 411, 92 Atl.

740.

Exceptions overruled.
All concurred.

In re ELIASON et al.

(Superior Court of Delaware. New Castle. March 22, 1921.)

1. Garnishment 32-Clerks at public sale who retained proceeds for safe-keeping for seller could be garnisheed.

CONRAD, J. (delivering the opinion of the court). Garnishment process will not lie against a trustee. Plunkett v. Le Huray, 4

Har. 436.

Money of a client in the hands of his attorney cannot be attached. Johns v. Allen, 5 Har. 419.

Neither an administrator nor the debtor of the estate can be attached as garnishee. Lyons' Adm'r v. Houston, Ex'x, 2 Har. 349.

The State Treasurer is not liable to attachment for money due from the state to an individual. Farmers' Bank v. Ball, 2 Pennewill, 374, 46 Atl. 751.

[1] In the case at bar, the petitioners were clerks at a public sale of the personal propWhere clerks at a public sale of the property of Pearl T. Bingnear, one of the defenderty of a defendant in a foreign attachment ants in the foreign attachment proceeding,

[2] Where the defendant, in the attachment proceeding, could have maintained an action of assumpsit against the garnishee, attachment will lie. 20 Cyc. 1000.

The conclusion of the court is that the attachment laid in the hands of the petitioners was properly laid, and they should not be discharged from the attachment.

Rule discharged, costs on petitioners.

PECKHAM v. INDUSTRIAL SECURITIES
CO.

(Superior Court of Delaware. New Castle. April 9, 1921.)

1. Contracts 303 (2)-When performance excused by impossibility of performance through governmental act and court decree stated.

A promisor is bound to perform his contract unless it was unlawful when made or has since become impossible of performance through no fault of his, which impossibility may be caused, not only by governmental act, but also by decree of court, provided such decree is not induced by the contractor's own act or fault; mere inconvenience or difficulty of performance not being enough, and the promisor in an honest effort to carry out his agreement being under duty, if possible, to procure dissolution of an injunction against him effectually preventing performance, or to secure dismissal by removing the cause therefor.

2. Contracts 338 (1)-Plea must show performance impossible, and that injunction was not secured through promisor's act or fault.

Though an injunction secured by a private litigant may be such an act of the law, and such vis major, as will excuse performance of a contract, the plea of the promisor when sued for breach setting up such excuse must show that the injunction relied upon as a defense made performance impossible, that it was not secured through the act or fault of the promisor, and also that an effort has been made by him to dissolve the injunction, or that such effort would have been futile if made.

pleaded as an excuse for defendant corporation's failure to perform its contract, would not prevent plaintiff from recovering judgment and collecting the same from any assets defendant Corporation might have outside the jurisdiction of the federal court issuing the injunction, so that, to be a complete answer to plaintiff's declaration, the plea of such injunction as excuse for nonperformance should show there are no such assets.

Action by Frank B. Peckham against the Industrial Securities Company. On general demurrer to defendant's fourth plea. Demurrer sustained.

PENNEWILL, C. J., and RICE, J., sitting. James H. Hughes, Jr., of Wilmington (of Marvel, Marvel, Layton & Hughes, of Wilmington), for plaintiff.

James I. Boyce, of Wilmington, for defendant.

This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for the breach of a certain re-sale contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant, February 24, 1919. The breach of the covenant, as alleged in the declaration, is that the defendant did not resell and secure for and pay over to the holder of the contract the sum of $1,294.00 on the 31st day of December, 1919.

The declaration alleges that the defendant agreed with the plaintiff to sell certain stock of the Perfection Tire & Rubber Company, which was sold to the plaintiff by the defendant, and to secure for and pay over to the holder of the writing obligatory the above mentioned sum.

To the declaration four pleas were filed, and by his fourth plea, in confession and avoidance, the defendant says:

"That the plaintiff ought not to have or maintain his aforesaid action thereof against the said defendant because the said defendant says that prior to the said thirty-first day of December, 1919, a bill was filed in the District Court of the United States at Chicago, Illinois, by one of the stockholders of the said defendant and that a receiver was appointed for this defendant and that on the thirtieth day of December, A. D. 1919, an order was entered in the said District Court enjoining all officers, directors, attorneys, agents and employees of the said defendant from paying any amount under or upon or on account of any indemnity bond, repurchase contract or re-sale contract theretofore made or issued by this defendant or from taking any action or steps of any nature to pay, redeem, discharge or to carry out any of the provisions of such indemnity bond, repurchase pre-contract or re-sale contract, and so this defendant says that it was on the said thirty-first day of December, 1919, and hath been at all times hitherto enjoined by the said District Court from performing and fulfilling its obligations as contained in the said certain writing obligatory or contract under seal in the said declaration mentioned," etc.

3. Contracts 338(1)—As injunction pleaded
as excuse for failure to perform does not
vent recovery and collection from assets of
defendant outside of jurisdiction of enjoining
court, plea of injunction should show there
are no such assets.

Injunction issuing from a federal court against defendant corporation sued for breach of contract in the courts of Delaware, and

To said plea the plaintiff entered a gen- | issued, unless the court has acquired juriseral demurrer. diction of the person of the defendant. Joyce on Inj. § 75.

Plaintiff's Argument on Demurrer. The issue raised by the plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's fourth plea, reduces itself to the question, whether the injunction of the Illinois federal court was such vis major as to excuse the performance of the defendant's contract.

The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall. 1, sets out the circumstances that will excuse the performance of a contract.

In the case at bar, the appointment of a receiver and the issuance of a restraining order did not dissolve the corporate entity of the defendant. It is domiciled in Delaware and hence the Delaware courts have primary jurisdiction over it.

Defendant's Argument on Demurrer.

The authorities are few and not in harmony on the question raised. It is well settled that performance of a contract cannot Applying the test laid down in Dermott v. be compelled where it would involve a vioJones, supra, was the act of the court in en-lation of law and it is equally well settled joining payment on the re-sale contracts en- that a contract is discharged if its performtered into by the defendant either (1) an act ance is subsequently prohibited by statute. of God, (2) an act of law, or (3) an act of the Williston on Contracts, § 1938. other party? Obviously it was not an act of God, and equally so not an act of the plaintiff. It must then be because the court's restraining order was an act of law. Page on Contracts, § 1374, states this rule.

In Sample v. Irrigation Co., 129 Cal. 222, 61 Pac. 1085, the court adopted the language of Klauber v. Car Co., 95 Cal. 353, 30 Pac. 555 holding that:

"No case has been cited in which it has been held that interference by a writ sued out by a private litigant will excuse performance of a contract, although it may deprive the contractor of the means of performance. It is not prevention by operation of law. It is the act of an individual, and not of the government."

See also Union Contracting & Paving Co. v. Campbell, 2 Cal. App. 534, 84 Pac. 305; South Memphis Land Co. v. McLean Hardwood Lumber Co., 179 Fed. 417, 102 C. C. A. 563.

A restraining order issued through the fault of a promisor is not an excuse for the nonperformance of a contract. 3 Williston on Contracts, § 1939; See also Western Drug Supply & Specialty Co. v. Board of Administration of Kansas, 106 Kan. 256, 187 Pac. 701; Switzer v. Pinconning Mfg. Co., 59 Mich. 488, 26 N. W. 762.

The leading cases in support of the proposition that judicial process may constitute such vis major as to excuse the non-performance of an express contract, is Kansas Life Insurance Co. v. Burman, 141 Fed. 835, 73 C. C. A. 69. This case is not in point, because as is pointed out in Western Drug Supply & Specialty Co. v. Administration, supra:

"The very basis on which that action was brought was declared void."

In the case at bar, the restraining order was secured by a third party, a private litigant, and it is not an act of law, and therefore, is not an excuse for the non-performance of a contract.

Jurisdiction by injunction does not extend

The leading case is that of Baily v. De Crespigny, L. R. 4 Q. B. 180, and the doctrine there laid down has been universally recognized. 13 C. J. 646, and the many cases cited. If subsequent statutory enactment rendering performance illegal relieves the obligor, there is no sound reason why the order of a court of competent jurisdiction should not also relieve him. In the face of such injunction he cannot perform, no matter how ready and willing he may be, without committing a contempt of court and subject himself to such penalties as the court may impose. On the other hand, if the injunction be improperly issued, the obligee with whose rights it interferes may appear in the court issuing the injunction and have it dissolved on proper showing. See Union Life Insurance Co. v. Burman, 141 Fed. 835, | 848, 73 C. C. A. 69; People v. Globe Mutual Life Insurance Co., 91 N. Y. 174; Williston on Contracts, § 939.

It is a very well settled rule of law that, if performance is rendered impossible by act of God, the law, or the other party, it is a sufficient excuse. Moller v. Herring, 255 Fed. 670, 167 C. C. A. 46, 3 A. L. R. 624; Malcomson v. Wappoo Mills et al. (C. C.) 88 Fed. 680.

Thus where the performance of a contract is prevented by an act of the Legislature or the action of a court of competent jurisdiction the non-performance is excused. Crise v. Lanahan (Md.) 11 Atl. 842. See also Burkhardt v. Georgia School Township, 9 S. D. 315, 69 N. W. 16; Webb Granite, etc., Co. v. Worcester, 187 Mass. 385, 73 N. E. 639.

It is respectfully submitted that the court here may not and will not punish the defendant because he did not violate an injunction issued out of the District Court of the United States. The least that can be said is that the suit here is prematurely brought.

PENNEWILL, C. J., after the statement above, delivered the opinion of the court:

(113 A.)

the said injunction issued in the state of Illinois relieves or excuses the defendant from the performance of its obligations under the contract.

In the leading case of Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall, 1, 17 L. Ed. 762, the Supreme Court said:

sovereign. *
The situation is little dif-
ferent, in the concrete, from that where, on ac-
count of the nature of the contract, it is evi-
dent that the parties dealt on the assumption
it relates, the subsequent destruction of which,
of the continued existence of the thing to which
in law, will excuse performance."

"It is a well settled rule of law, that if a par- In that case the contract was held to be ty by his contract charge himself with an obli- ultra vires, so that the very basis upon which gation possible to be performed, he must make the action was brought was void, and the it good, unless its performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, the law, or the oth-court held that the injunction was such vis major as excused performance of the coner party." tract. The law itself made performance impossible.

This statement of the law is not disputed, and it is conceded that the non-performance of the contract by the defendant was not caused either by the act of God, or by the other party, the plaintiff.

The single issue raised by the demurrer then is, whether the injunction issued by the Illinois federal court was an act of the law that made impossible the performance of the contract by the defendant, and excused the breach complained of.

Other authorities relied on by the defendant are Baily v. De Crespigny, L. R. 4 Q. B. 180; Moller v. Herring, 255 Fed. 670, 167 C. C. A. 46, 3 A. L. R. 624; Crise v. Lamhan (Md.) 11 Atl. 842; Webb Granite & Co. v. Worcester, 187 Mass. 385, 73 N. E. 639; and 13 C. J. 646, and the cases there cited.

There can be no question, of course, that where performance is made impossible by governmental act, that is, by Constitution or

In Klauber v. Car Co., 95 Cal. 353, 30 Pac. statute it is vis major and performance will 555, cited by plaintiff, the court said:

"No case has been cited in which it has been held that interference by a writ sued out by a private litigant will excuse performance of a contract, although it may deprive the contractor of the means of performance. It is not prevented by operation of law. It is the act of an individual, and not of the government."

This language was approved and adopted in Sample v. Fresno Flume & Irrigation Co., 129 Cal. 222, 61 Pac. 1085.

To the same effect are the cases of Union C. & P. Co. v. Campbell, 2 Cal. App. 534, 84 Pac. 305, and South Memphis Land Co. v. McLean Hardwood Lumber Co., 179 Fed. 417, 102 C. C. A. 563 (Tenn.).

In the above cases the party securing the injunction or receivership was a private liti

gant.

The cases on the subject are not numerous, neither are they uniform in holding that an injunction secured by a private party will not excuse performance of a contract. But they do seem to be uniform in holding that where the contract is lawful and possible of fulfillment, such an injunction will not excuse a breach. And there is also uniformity in this; that where the injunction or other judicial interference is caused by the fault of the defendant it will not excuse the performance of his contract.

be excused; no one will be compelled to carry out an illegal agreement. In such cases it is clearly the law that makes performance impossible.

But the contract in the present case was not unlawful, nor was its performance made impossible by the government. A private litigant, a stockholder, of the defendant comthe execution of the contract in question, pany secured an injunction which enjoined and for a time at least made its performance by the defendant impossible without violating the court's order.

Did this judicial decree excuse performance of the contract by the defendant? It does not distinctly appear for what cause the injunction was issued, but it was issued against the defendant company at the suit

of a stockholder, and it may have been because of some act or fault of the company. In such case it is generally held that per

formance is not excused.

formance

The cases relied on by the plaintiff are mainly from California. There is one from Tennessee. The Civil Code of California (section 1511) provides that, "want of peris excused" when it is prevented by the "operation of law." This language is somewhat different from that generally held to excuse performance, viz.: "an act of the law." The former might reasonably be construed to mean, constitutional or statutory law, or as some of the cases say "an act of the government"; whereas the latter expression could be very reason"In principle there can be no distinction be-ably held to embrace a decree of court. tween an injunction granted on the interposition of the state, in the exercise of the sover

In the leading case cited by the defendant, Kansas Union Life Ins. Co. v. Burman, 141 Fed. 835, 848, 73 C. C. A. 69, 82, it was said:

eign right of visitation, and one granted by the court at the suit of a stockholder on the ground that the transaction of the two corporations is in contravention of the charter granted by the

But regardless of any such possible distinction we think the California cases may be distinguished a more substantial ground. It should be noted that while the language employed by the courts in those

on

in others the legal proceeding interfering with performance of the promise was one that the defendant could not remove.

cases is very comprehensive and embraces | ready said, was unlawful when made, and apparently all cases where the thing that prevents performance is secured by a private litigant, they all follow and rely on the Klauber Case, supra. In that case suit was brought to foreclose a mortgage given by the defendant on all its property, and a receiver was appointed who took the property into possession, so that it could not carry out its contract with the plaintiff to extend it's railway, etc. The court held that it was not impossible to perform the contract because the defendant might have paid off the mortgage. It is to be observed that the alleged impossibility of performance in that case was caused by the defendant's failure to pay his obligation. In Sample v. Fresno Flume, etc., Co. an injunction was held to be no excuse for non-performance, and the reason must have been that it did not appear that performance was impossible, for the court said the defendant should have shown that an effort was made to dissolve the injunction. And likewise in the case of Union C. & P. Co. v. Campbell, where an injunction was relied on by the defendant, it was held, under section 1511 of the Civil Code that it was no excuse.

[1] As a result of our examination of the authorities we are inclined to believe that the conflict between them is more apparent than real. We take this to be the law: A promisor is bound to perform his contract unless it was unlawful when made, or has since become impossible of performance through no fault of his. This impossibility may be caused not only by governmental act but also by decree of court, provided such decree is not induced by the contractor's own act or fault. Inconvenience or difficulty of performance is not enough, it must be absolute. The promisor is not required to do something that is impossible or unlawful; and he is bound to respect the decree of a court which he can neither change nor remove. But in the honest effort to carry out his agreement he must, if possible, procure the dissolution of the injunction, or secure the dismissal of the interfering proceeding by removing the cause therefor.

The vital question is-not whether the interfering act was governmental or individu

This statement of the law is, we believe,

"It was an act of individual and not of gov-al-but was performance made impossible by ernment. The defendant should have made an a judicial proceeding that defendant could effort to dissolve the injunction. It is not the not prevent or control? law operating on the facts which creates the difficulty but the use of a judicial writ by a private litigant. The contractor could have kept his contract alive by obtaining from the board of supervisors an extension of time. He took no steps to procure a dissolution of the injunction, but simply waited until the plaintiff in that action dismissed the proceeding."

In this case also performance was not shown to be impossible.

In South Memphis Land Co. v. McLean Hardwood Lumber Co. the court said:

"There is highly respectable authority for the proposition that judicial process, order, or decree may constitute such vis major as to relieve a party from an otherwise absolute obligation." (Citations.)

"On the other hand, there is excellent authority for the proposition that an injunction in a suit by a third party furnishes no excuse for non-performance of an express contract." (Citations.)

in harmony with the rule laid down in 3 Williston on Contracts, § 1939, and other text writers, and practically with all the cases, if the decisions are considered in the light of the facts of each case, and not with respect to the general language sometimes used in the opinion.

[2] But while we think that an injunction secured by a private litigant may be such an act of the law, and such vis major as will excuse the performance of a contract, we are also of the opinion that the plea setting up such excuse must show that the injunction relied upon as a defense made performance impossible, and also that it was not secured by the act or fault of the defendant. A party will not be permitted to escape liabili ty under his contract by securing or consenting to an injunction. And, if the defendant

could have secured a dissolution of the injunction it did not make performance of his But the court declined to say what the contract impossible, within the meaning of the effect of the injunction would have been had law. It must appear that the injunction was it made the performance of the contract im- not secured by the act or fault of the defendpossible, because, at most it forbade the run-ant, and also that an effort has been made by ning of the railway at grade, and defendant the defendant, to dissolve the injunction or did not "show that it was impossible for the railway company to reach Railroad avenue otherwise than by crossing the Illinois Central tracks at grade."

*

We think it unnecessary to comment further than we have on the cases cited by the defendant. In some of them, notably the leading case of Kansas Union Life Ins. Co.

that such an effort would have been futile, if made. Because such facts do not appear, the court are constrained to sustain the de

murrer.

[3] And the court are also of the opinion that the injunction pleaded as an excuse for defendant's failure to perform its contract would not prevent the plaintiff from recov