obligations and regulations, it cannot receive by transfer from another
corporation an exemption which is inconsistent with its own charter
or with the constitution or laws of the State then applicable, even
though under legislative authority the exemption is transferred by
words which clearly include it. Ib.
1. Contempts; status of judge in punishing for contempt.
In punishing a person for contempt of court the judges act impersonally
and are not considered as sitting in their own case.
Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 674.) Patterson v. Colorado, 454.
2. Contempts; truth of improper publication as defense to.
While courts, when a case is finished, are subject to the same criticisms
as other people, they have power to prevent interference with the
course of justice by premature statements, arguments, or intimidation,
and the truth is not a defense in a contempt proceeding to an im-
proper publication made during the pending suit. Ib.
3. Federal interference by habeas corpus with regular course of procedure under
state authority.
Although the power exists and will be exercised in cases of great importance
and urgency, a Federal court or a Federal judge will not ordinarily
interfere by habeas corpus with the regular course of procedure under
state authority, but will leave the petitioner to exhaust the remedies
afforded by the State for determining whether he is legally restrained
of his liberty, and then to bring his case to this court by writ of error
under § 709, Rev. Stat.; this rule applies to a case where petitioner
contends that his commitment under a state statute, providing for
the commitment of one acquitted by reason of insanity, is a depriva-
tion of liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Urquhart v. Brown, 179.
4. Judicial notice as to location of territory.
The court takes judicial cognizance whether or not a given territory is
within the boundaries of the United States, and is bound to take the
fact as it really exists however it may be averred to be. Pearcy v.
Stranahan, 257.
5. Power to overrule long established constitutional construction.
A long established and steadily adhered to principle of constitutional
construction precludes a judicial tribunal from holding a legislative
enactment, Federal or state, unconstitutional and void unless it is
Halter v. Nebraska, 34.
1. Corpus delicti; sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to establish.
While in this case there was no witness to the homicide and the identifica-
tion of the body found was not perfect, owing to its condition caused
by its having been partially burned, yet as the circumstantial evidence
was clearly enough to warrant the jury in finding that the body was
that of the person alleged to have been murdered and that he had been
killed by defendant, the trial court would not have been justified in
withdrawing the case from the jury, but properly overruled a motion
to instruct a verdict of not guilty for lack of proof of the corpus delicti.
Perovich v. United States, 86.
2. Corpus delicti; submission to jury of question of guilt on circumstantial
evidence.
In the absence of positive proof, but where there is circumstantial evidence
of the corpus delicti, it is not error to submit to the jury the question
of defendant's guilt with the instruction that the circumstantial evi-
dence must be such as to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
that the corpus delicti has been established. Ib.
3. Evidence of conversations between officer and accused; admissibility.
The testimony of a marshal as to conversations between him and the de-
fendant charged with murder which were voluntary, and not induced
by duress, intimidation or other improper influences, are admissible.
Ib.
4. Interpreters; appointment discretionary with trial court.
Whether in a criminal trial the court interpreter should be appointed is a
matter largely resting in the discretion of the court, and its refusal so
to do is not an error where it does not appear that the discretion was
in any way abused. Ib.
5. Removal for trial under § 1014, Rev. Stat.; admissibility of evidence to
disprove prima facie case made by indictment.
While in a removal proceeding under § 1014, Rev. Stat., an indictment
constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause it is not conclusive,
and evidence offered by the defendant tending to show that no offense
triable in the district to which removal is sought had been committed
is admissible; and its exclusion is not mere error but the denial of a
right secured under the Federal Constitution. Tinsley v. Treat, 20.
6. Removal for trial under § 1014, Rev. Stat.; procedure for.
A district judge of the United States on application to remove from the
district where defendant is arrested to that where the offense is triable
acts judicially and the provision of § 1014, Rev. Stat., that the pro-
ceedings are to be conducted agreeably to the usual mode of process
in the State against offenders has no application to the inquiry on ap-
plication for removal. Ib.
Whatever tends to diminish a plaintiff's cause of action or to defeat re-
covery in whole or in part amounts in law to a defense. Whitfield v.
Etna Life Ins. Co., 489.
See COURTS, 2;
INSURANCE, 2;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 8.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR.
DINGLEY ACT.
See TERRITORY, 2.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
See CERTIORARI;
JURISDICTION, A 1;
TERRITORIES.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
COURTS, 3;
JURISDICTION, A 6.
1. Election defined and differentiated from transfer.
Election is simply what its name imports; a choice shown by an overt act
between two inconsistent rights either of which may be asserted at the
I will of the chooser alone. Transfer is different from election and re-
quires acts of a different import on the part of the owner and cor-
responding acts on the part of the transferee. Bierce v. Hutchins, 340.
2. Effect of attempting to exercise right to which party not entitled.
The fact that a party, through mistake, attempts to exercise a right to
which he is not entitled does not prevent his afterwards exercising one
which he had and still has unless barred by the previous attempt. Ib.
Statements of a witness, although based on hearsay, constitute evidence
in the cause unless seasonably objected to as hearsay. Schlemmer
v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry. Co., 1.
JURISDICTION, A 6;
MARRIAGE;
EXEMPTIONS.
See ACTIONS;
CONTRACTS, 3, 4;
CORPORATIONS, 1, 2.
1. Duty of courts after surrender has been made.
Although the surrender of a person demanded under an extradition treaty
has been made, it is the duty of the courts here to determine the legality
of the subsequent imprisonment which depends upon the treaties in
force between this and the surrendering governments. Johnson v.
Browne, 309.
2. Right of demanding country to try person for other than crime for which
extradited-Effect of treaty of 1842 with Great Britain.
While the treaty of 1842, with Great Britain, had no express limitation of
the right of the demanding country to try a person only for the crime
for which he was extradited, such a limitation is found in the manifest
scope and object of the treaty itself and it has been so construed by
this court. (United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407.) Ib.
3. Right of demanding country to punish person for offense other than that
for which extradited-Treaty of 1899 with Great Britain.
A person extradited under the treaty of 1899 with Great Britain cannot be
punished for an offense other than that for which his extradition has
been demanded even though prior to his extradition he had been con-
victed and sentenced therefor. Sections 5272, 5275, Rev. Stat., clearly
manifest the will of the political department of the government, that
a person extradited shall be tried only for the crime charged in the
warrant of extradition, and shall be allowed a reasonable time to de-
part out of the United States before he can be arrested and detained
for any other offense. Ib.
4. Effect of treaty of 1899 with Great Britain to repeal §§ 5272, 5275, Rev.
Stat.
Repeals by implication are never favored, and a later treaty will not be
regarded as repealing, by implication, an earlier statute unless the
two are so absolutely incompatible that the statute cannot be en-
forced without antagonizing the treaty, and so held that the treaty
with Great Britain of 1899 did not repeal §§ 5272, 5275, Rev. Stat. Ib.
5. Construction of treaties; good faith to be observed in.
While the escape of criminals is to be deprecated, treaties of extradition
should be construed in accordance with the highest good faith, and a
treaty should not be so construed as to obtain the extradition of a
person for one offense and punish him for another, especially when the
latter offense is one for which the surrendering government has refused
to surrender him on the ground that it was not covered by the treaty.
Ib.
See PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 7.
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