the facts stated, should be the final judgment. It is, obviously, as if the court had been asked, generally, upon a statement of all the facts, to determine what, upon those facts, is the law of the case. We thus state the matter, because it is apparent that the case turns altogether upon the question propounded as to the validity, in view of all the facts stated, of the contract under which the plaintiff's cattle were transported. This court is without jurisdiction to answer the question certified in its present imperfect form and the certificate must be dismissed. Sadler v. Hoover, 7 How. 646.

MR. JUSTICE BREWER dissented.

It is so ordered.

PATTERSON v. COLORADO Ex rel. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO.

No. 223. Argued March 5, 6, 1907.-Decided April 15, 1907.

The requirement in the Fourteenth Amendment of due process of law does not take up the special provisions of the state constitution and laws into the Fourteenth Amendment for the purpose of the case, and in that way subject a state decision that they have been complied with to revision by this court.

Whether an information for contempt is properly supported, and what constitutes contempt, as well as the time during which it may be committed, are all matters of local law.

As a general rule the decision of a state court upon a question of law is not an infraction of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and reviewable by this court on writ of error merely because it is wrong or because earlier decisions are reversed.'

While courts, when a case is finished, are subject to the same criticisms as other people, they have power to prevent interference with the course of justice by premature statements, arguments, or intimidation, and the truth is not a defense in a contempt proceeding to an improper publication made during the pending suit.

205 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

In punishing a person for contempt of court the judges act impersonally and are not considered as sitting in their own case. United States v Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 674.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Thomas M. Patterson, pro se, with whom Mr. Henry M. Teller, Mr. Charles S. Thomas, Mr. Sterling B. Toney, Mr. James H. Blood, Mr. Harvey Riddell, Mr. S. W. Belford and Mr. John A. Rush were on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

The articles and cartoon were legitimate and privileged criticisms. They did not relate to "pending" cases within the meaning of the law; and whatever reference they made to cases were in no wise calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice. These matters are jurisdictional, and by reason of them the court was without jurisdiction to proceed against respondent for contempt and to adjudge a fine against him, and in so doing it was the rendering of a judgment that deprived him of his property without due process of law. Titus v. The People, 7 Colorado, 451; New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 20 Wall. 387.

It follows that in cases of criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the court, there must be a charge, in writing, and stating the facts constituting the contempts, and unless the facts set out constitute a contempt the court is without jurisdiction to either issue a citation or proceed further with the cause. Cooper v. The People, 13 Colorado, 337; Mullin v. The People, 15 Colorado, 440; Wyatt v. The People, 17 Colorado, 252.

Once a suit is decided newspapers may make whatever comments they will about it, and though the honor and integrity of the court may be assailed, judges, like other persons, are relegated to the courts for redress.

To issue a citation in contempt proceedings upon an unverified information confers no jurisdiction, and all proceedings thereafter in such proceedings are void for want of jurisdiction. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 286; Thomas v. The People,

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

205 U.S.

14 Colorado, 254; Cooper v. The People, 13 Colorado, 355, and cases cited.

The legislature having defined contempts, fixed a practice and declared a punishment, the court was without authority to ignore the statutes and proceed in defiance of their provisions.

The legislature did exercise its authority over contempt and changed the rule of the common law by positive statute. It, like Congress, declared what should constitute contempt, and in doing so it included what has been divided by the courts into civil and criminal contempts in its enumeration. Sec. 321, Colorado Civil Code.

Every one of these enumerated contempts are declared by Rapalje to be criminal contempts, and Rapalje's definition is approved by the Colorado Supreme Court. Rapalje on Contempts, §21; Wyatt v. The People, 17 Colorado, 258.

To fine or imprison an accused person in contempt proceedings for publishing the truth about a judge or court when the truth of the charge is pleaded in justification and an offer to prove the same is made, is to deprive him of liberty or property without due process of law. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 285; Cooper v. People, 13 Colorado, 337, 365; Matter of Sturock, 97 Am. Dec. 626; State v. Circuit Court, 38 L. R. A. 559, 560; In re Shortridge, 99 California, 526; Postal Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 698; Windsor v. McVeagh, 93 U. S. 277; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350; Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U. S. 414, 419.

This court has a right to review the decisions of the state courts in contempt cases. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90; Eilenbecher v. Plymouth County District Court, 134 U. S. 31; Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101; Manley v. Park, 187 U. S. 547; Detroit Co. v. Osborne, 189 U. S. 383; Abbott v. National Bank of Commerce, 175 U. S. 409.

Mr. I. B. Melville and Mr. Horace G. Phelps, with whom Mr. William H. Dickson, Attorney General of the State of

205 U.S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

Colorado, Mr. Samuel H. Thompson, Jr., and Mr. N. C. Miller were on the brief, for defendant in error:

This court has no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado in this case. No treaty or Federal statute of, or any authority exercised under, the United States is involved. No statute of, or authority exercised under, the State of Colorado is involved on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States.

The legislature of the Territory of Colorado in 1861 adopted the common law of England, so far as applicable and of a general nature, as well as all the acts and statutes of a general nature passed by the British parliament in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of James I. Laws of Colorado,

1861, p. 35.

A following legislature, in 1868, repealed this statute, but afterwards, at the same session, reënacted it, and it has ever. since remained in force in this commonwealth. 2 Mills' Ann. Stat. §4184; Herr v. Johnson, 11 Colorado, 393, 396; Chilcott et al. v. Hart, 23 Colorado, 40, 51; Teller v. Hill, 18 Colo. App. 509, 512.

The constitution of the State of Colorado was adopted July 1, 1876, and the Supreme Court of such State was created and its duties defined by article VI thereof. 1 Mills' Ann. Stat. 252.

The original thirteen States inherited the common law, and so held it at the time of the adoption of their respective constitutions. Colorado adopted the common law by legislative enactment, and so held it at the time of the adoption of its constitution.

When the courts of those States came into existence by constitutional creation, they became possessed of common law powers by reason of the existence of the common law in their respective jurisdictions; and for the same reason, when the Supreme Court of Colorado came into existence, by virtue of the constitution of such State, it became possessed of common law powers, except as otherwise provided in said instrument.

The Supreme Court of Colorado is a constitutional court, with common law powers, and right of self-preservation is an inherent right in such courts. Rapalje on Contempts, §1; Abbott's Trial Brief (Crim. 2d ed.), 13; 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d ed.), 30; 9 Cyc. of Law & Proc. 26; 2 Bish. New Crim. Law, § 243; Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cr. 75, 94; United States v. Hudson, 7 Cr. 32, 34; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227; Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 39, 42; Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 540; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510; Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 303 et seq; Ex parte Savin, 131 U. S. 267, 275; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 596.

It follows that the legislature is without power to limit or restrict the exercise of such inherent power, whenever the latter is necessary for the protection and preservation of the efficiency and usefulness of such court. Rapalje on Contempts, § 1; Abbott's Trial Brief (Crim. 2d ed.), note, p. 13; 9 Cyc. Law. & Proc. 27, and cases cited under note 40; 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d ed.), 33, and cases cited under note 1; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510.

While freedom of the press, like that of freedom of speech, is necessary to the perpetuation of a republican form of government, this does not mean that either can be carried to such an extreme as to impede, embarrass, or unjustly influence the due and orderly administration of justice, or prejudice the rights of litigants in pending cases, for the latter would more surely impair the existence of our government than the former. Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th ed.), 604, 605; 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2d ed.), 59; 9 Cyc. Law and Proc. 20; 2 Bish. New Crim. Law, 8259; Abbott's New Trial Brief (Crim. 2d ed.), 15; Oger's Libel & Slander (3d ed.), 519, 524.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to review a judgment upon an information for contempt. The contempt alleged was the publication of certain articles and a cartoon, which, it was