only a de facto officer. Meadors v. Patrick, I that he qualified under an invalid appoint56 S. W. 652, 653, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 95. ment by the Governor, or that his bond is defective. Sprague v. Brown, 40 Wis. 612. An officer de facto is one who exercises the duty of an office under a color of right by virtue of election to that office, as distinguished, on the one hand, from a mere usurper of an office, and, on the other, from an officer de jure. The acts of an officer de facto are valid so far as the rights of the public or third person are concerned, and cannot be indirectly called in question in a proceeding to which he is not a party. Therefore though a majority of a common council of a city, owing to the calling of an election at a date not authorized by statute, were elected in an unlawful manner, its acts were not void. 195, 201. Under a statute providing that the court might appoint six surveyors of the highways to lay out a road, and directing such persons within six days to subscribe the oath of office, and providing that, if this oath should not be taken or subscribed within the time prescribed, the neglect should be deemed a refusal to serve in such office, the person refusing is not an officer, and cannot be considered an officer de facto, so as to render his acts valid. In re Public Road, 4 N. J. Law (1 Southard) 396, 398. Mitchell v. Tolan, 33 N. J. Law (4 Vroom) constable as deputy, but failed to take an Where a person was appointed by a oath, he was an officer de facto. State v. Dierberger, 2 S. W. 286, 287, 90 Mo. 369. A de facto officer is distinguished, on the one hand, from a mere usurper of an office, and, on the other, from an officer de jure. He One who, having been elected to an office, is one who is in actual possession of an office assumes to exercise its duties without havunder claim and color of election or appoint-ing qualified or attempting to do so, is withment, and is in the exercise of its functions out color of title, and hence not a de facto and in discharge of its duties. It is said that officer. Creighton v. Commonwealth, 83 Ky. the best definition of an officer de facto is 142, 147, 4 Am. St. Rep. 143. as follows: "An officer de facto is one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law." Waterman v. Chicago & I. R. Co., 139 Ill. 658, 29 N. E. 689, 691, 15 L. R. A. 418, 32 Am. St. Rep. 228. Person failing to qualify. An officer de facto is one acting under color of authority, and, so far as the public or third persons are interested, acts as if he were an officer de jure. A highway surveyor acting under color of authority pursuant to an appointment signed by a majority of the municipal officers is an officer de facto, and authorized to bind the town, within the scope of his authority, as far as the public or third persons are concerned; and the fact that the appointee had not been sworn did not prevent him from being a de facto officer. Pease v. Inhabitants of Parsonsfield, 42 Atl. 502, 92 Me. 345. Where the deputy sheriff, on being appointed, refused to take the oath, and cut the same off his appointment, and there was no showing that he exercised the duties of the office, or had the reputation in the county of being deputy sheriff, he was an officer de facto. Brown v. State, 66 S. W. 547, 548, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 411. Rightful government required. To constitute a de facto officer, there must be a rightful government. A de facto officer of an illegal or unlawful government is an anomaly that can only exist in absurdity. Penn v. Tollison, 26 Ark. 545, 580. When a government is entirely revolutionized, and all its departments usurped by force, there may be a de facto executive, a de facto judiciary, or a de facto legislature; but, where the Constitution or form of government remains supreme, there can be no de facto department or a de facto office. Frame v. Trebble, 24 Ky. (1 J. J. Marsh.) 205. 206. DE FACTO ROAD. A "de facto road" means a road actually used by the public. Locke v. First Division of St. Paul & P. R. Co., 15 Minn. 350, 365 (Gil. 283, 298). DE FACTO SENATOR. The act of the Senate in acquiescing when a person acts as senator is sufficient to give him color of title to the office, and makes him at least a senator de facto. Audi tor General v. Menominee County Sup'rs, 51 N. W. 483, 490, 89 Mich. 552, DE JURE. If one duly elected sheriff qualifies by filing his official oath and bond, and thereupon enters on the duties of the office and exercises its functions, he is sheriff de facto, so that his right to the office cannot be suc- "De jure" means of right; legitimate; cessfully attacked in a collateral proceeding; lawful; by right and just title. In this sense, and he cannot protect himself from official it is the contrary of "de facto." It may also responsibility upon the ground that he failed be contrasted with "de gratia," in which case to qualify in due time after his election, or it means "as a matter of right," as de gratia 2 WDS. & P.-54 means "by grace or favor." Again, it may be contrasted with "de æquitate," here meaning "by law," as the latter means "by equity." Black, Dict. DE JURE CORPORATION. taining to it. He is responsible to the gov ernment and injured parties when he abuses or transcends his authority, and his acts within the scope of that authority cannot be questioned by the citizens or any department of the government. Auditor General v. Menominee County Sup'rs, 89 Mich. 552, 625, 51 N. W. 483. DE LUNATICO INQUIRENDO. See "Commission de Lunatico Inquirendo." Corporations de jure have been defined to be those whose legal right to exist cannot be questioned even by the state itself. If a corporation has a charter issued to it in the manner prescribed by law, and has in its organization complied fully with every requirement of the charter, then, even as against the state, the corporation has a right to exist, and is technically a de jure corporation. DE NOVO. Brown v. Atlanta Ry. & Power Co., 39 S. E. 71, 73, 113 Ga. 462. A de jure corporation is one whose right to exercise a corporate function would prove invulnerable if assailed by the state by quo warranto proceedings. Capps v. Hastings Prospecting Co., 58 N. W. 956, 957, 40 Neb. 470, 24 L. R. A. 259, 42 Am. St. Rep. 677. DE JURE DIRECTOR. A director duly elected or appointed is a director de jure. Hulings v. Hulings Lumber Co., 18 S. E. 620, 624, 38 W. Va. 351. DE JURE OFFICER. See "Trial de Novo"; "Venire Facias de DE QUARANTINA HABENDA. At common law a widow entitled to quarantine could, in case the heir or other persons ejected her, sue out a writ known as the "writ de quarantina habenda." Jacob's Law Dict. tit. "Quarantine," § 19. This seems to have been a summary process, and required the sheriff, if no just cause were shown against it, speedily to put her into possession. In Oregon the right by statute secured to a widow, of remaining in the husband's house one year, cannot be enforced De facto officer distinguished, see "De by the action of forcible entry and detainer. Aiken v. Aiken, 12 Or. 203, 206, 6 Pac. 682, 683. Facto Officer." A de jure office is one having legal existence, or, rather, one having an existence recognized by law. Buck v. City of Eureka, 42 Pac. 243, 245, 109 Cal. 504, 30 L. R. A. 409. "A de jure officer is one who is regularly and lawfully elected or appointed and inducted into office, and exercises the duties as his right." People v. Staton, 73 N. C. 546, 550, 21 Am. Rep. 479. An officer de jure is one who is clothed with the full legal right and title of the office -in other words, one who has been legally elected or appointed to the office, and who has qualified himself to exercise the duties thereof according to the mode prescribed by law. McMillin v. Richards, 64 N. W. 242, 243, 45 Neb. 786; Stott v. City of Chicago, 68 N. E. 736, 738, 205 Ill. 281. An officer de jure is one who has the lawful right to the office, but who has either been ousted from, or never actually taken possession of, the office. Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Pac. 778, 780, 15 Or. 456, 3 Am. St. Rep. 176. An officer de jure has the legal title to, and is clothed with all the power and authority of, the office. He has a title against the world to exercise the functions of the office, and receive the fees and emoluments apper DEAD BODY. As property, see "Property." Bones bleached by time, constituting parts of a human skeleton, casually found upon the bank of a creek-it being obviously impossible to ascertain who the deceased was, how long since death had ensued, or in what manner it was caused-did not constitute a dead body, within Act Dec. 14, 1893, relating to coroners' inquests. Meads v. Dougherty County, 25 S. E. 915, 98 Ga. 697. A dead body after burial becomes a part of the ground to which it has been committed, and an action of trespass may be maintained by the owner of the lot in possession against one who disturbs the grave and removes the body, so long, at least, as the cemetery continues to be used as a place of burial. Pulsifer v. Douglass, 48 Atl. 118, 119, 94 Me. 556, 53 L. R. A. 238 (citing Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 96 Am. Dec. 759; Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422, 39 Am. Rep. 465; Bessemer Land & Improve ment Co. v. Jenkins, 111 Ala. 135, 18 South. 565, 56 Am. St. Rep. 26). DEAD CULLS. Dead culls are the unavoidable product from the saw in sawing logs, distinguishable from the higher grades produced, which higher grades include shipping culls and better, and mill culls being everything above the grade of dead culls. Brigham v. Martin, 61 N. W. 276, 277, 103 Mich. 150. DEAD FREIGHT. Dead freight is the amount of damages, unascertained, which the parties are entitled to recover for a noncompletion of a cargo. Phillips v. Rodie, 15 East, 547, 555. DEAD SLOW. "Dead slow," as applied to the speed of a vessel, means a speed of about four knots an hour-just enough to give such a vessel steerageway. The Oceanic (U. S.) 61 Fed. 338, 343. DEAD TIMBER. Dead timber is timber which is practically lifeless or mortally hurt, and in such a state of decay that a prudent landowner would ordinarily direct it to be forthwith cut, to prevent further deterioration in value. United States v. Pine River Logging & Improvement Co. (U. S.) 89 Fed. 907, 915, 32 C. C. A. 406. DEAD WALLS. As used in 43 Geo. III, c. 139, relating to a rate for street repairs, and providing that the commissioners should rate and assess all the churchyards, cemeteries, or other burying places, dead walls, and void spaces of ground within such parochial or other district which are not charged to such rate or assessment, in respect to any messuage, the term "dead walls" would include those erect- • ed by a railway company under an act requiring it to build a bridge over its railway, with a brick wall at each side thereof, at a spot where its railway intersected a public street or road which was paved and repaired under the local acts. Arnell v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., 12 C. B. 697, 710. DEAD WEIGHT. The dead weight to which a bank is entitled under Act Feb. 5, 1842, providing that, with a view of enabling banks effectually to secure their debts, it shall be lawful for their respective boards of directors to consider the whole of the debts due them on the passage of this act as forming part of their dead weight, includes only the debts due banks at the time of the passage of the act, and not debts subsequently contracted, though between the date of the passage of the act and its promulgation or acceptance by the banks. City Bank of New Orleans v. Barbarin (La.) 6 Rob. 289, 291. DEADHEAD. "The term 'deadhead' is applied to persons other than the president, directors, officers, or employés of a railroad company who are permitted by the company to travel on the road without paying any fare therefor." Gardner v. Hall, 61 N. C. 21, 22. DEADLY. A charge relative to self-defense based on apparent danger, to the effect that the defendant must have had reasonable ground to believe that there was danger to his life, or of deadly violence to his person, is not error, where it clearly appears from the charge that the word "deadly" was used in the sense of great. Acers v. United States, 17 Sup. Ct. 91, 92, 164 U. S. 388, 41 L. Ed. 481. While "deadly" and "dangerous" are not equivalents, deadly is more than the equivalent, and includes the full signification, of "dangerous." A dangerous weapon may possibly not be deadly, but a deadly weapon-one which is capable of causing death-must be dangerous. State v. Lynch, 33 Atl. 978, 979, 88 Me. 195. DEADLY WEAPON. Other deadly weapon, see "Other." A deadly weapon is one likely to produce death or great bodily injury. State v. Jarrott, 23 N. C. 76, 87; Briggs v. State, 6 Tex. App. 144, 146; Pittman v. State, 6 South. 437, | hurting, it is proper for the court to say, as 438, 25 Fla. 648; Garner v. State, 9 South. a matter of law, that the weapon is a dead835, 846, 28 Fla. 113, 29 Am. St. Rep. 232; ly one. State v. Craton, 28 N. C. 164, 181. People v. Franklin, 11 Pac. 797, 70 Cal. 641; People v. Leyba, 16 Pac. 200, 201, 74 Cal. 407; People v. Lopez, 66 Pac. 965, 966, 135 Cal. 23; People v. Fuqua, 58 Cal, 245, 247; People v. Valliere, 56 Pac. 433, 434, 123 Cal. 576; McNary v. People, 32 Ill. App. 58, 62; Clary v. State, 85 N. W. 897, 898, 61 Neb. 688; Wilson v. State, 15 Tex. App. 150, 155; Skidmore v. State, 43 Tex. 93, 97. A deadly weapon is one which, in the manner used, is capable of producing death, or of inflicting great bodily injury, or seriously wounding. McReynolds v. State, 4 Tex. App. 327, 328; People v. Cole, 11 Pac. 481, 483, 70 Cal. 59. In a case of doubt, the manner in which the weapon is used may be taken into account, in determining whether or not it was deadly. Mazzotte v. Territory (Ariz.) 71 Pac. 911, 912; Commonwealth v. Duncan, 91 Ky. 592, 595, 16 S. W. 530. A deadly weapon is one dangerous to life. Cosby v. Commonwealth, 72 S. W. 1089, 1090, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2050. A deadly weapon is any weapon or instrument by which death would likely be produced when used in a manner in which it may appear it was used in the affray. State v. Bowles, 47 S. W. 892, 893, 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. St. Rep. 598. A weapon may be a deadly weapon, although not specially designated for offensive or defensive purposes, or for the destruction of life or the infliction of injury. Blige v. State, 20 Fla. 742, 754, 51 Am. Rep. 628. "Deadly weapon," as used in Rev. St. c. 28, art. 6, is not restricted to such weapons or instruments as are made and designed for offensive or defensive purposes, or for the destruction of life or the infliction of injury, but embraces any instrument with which a person may be wounded by cutting or stabbing. Commonwealth v. Branham, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 387, 388. A deadly weapon is an instrument used, or that may be used, for the purpose of offense or defense, capable of producing death. Some weapons are per se deadly. Others, owing to the manner in which they are used, become deadly. A gun, a pistol, or a dirk knife is of itself deadly. A small pocketknife, a walking cane, a switch of the size of a woman's finger, if strong and tough, may be made a deadly weapon, if the aggressor shall use such instrument with great or furious violence, and especially if the party assailed should have comparatively less power than the assailant, or be helpless and feeble. State v. Huntley, 91 N. C. 617, 620. Where an instrument appears prima facie capable of taking life or grievously The question whether the weapon is deadly, within the meaning of the law of homicide, is by some writers said to be one of fact for the jury. Mr. Bishop, on the other hand, says: "It is one likely to produce death or great bodily injury. In case of doubt, the manner in which it was used may be taken into consideration in determining whether or not it was deadly; and, when all the facts are established, the question whether a particular weapon was deadly, or not, is one of law, for the court. Yet practically, as in most instances, the establishment of the fact awaits the verdict, and the jury must pass upon the question under instruction of the court." Bishop's Statutory Crimes, 320. Where a weapon and the manner of its use in the commission of assault are such as to admit of but one conclusion in that respect, the question whether or not it is deadly is one of law, and the court should take the responsibility of so declaring. Krchnavy v. State, 61 N. W. 628, 629, 43 Neb. 337. In Pittman v. State, 25 Fla. 648, 6 South, 437, the court said "that any weapon is a deadly weapon which is likely to produce death, but a weapon capable of producing death is not necessarily a weapon likely to produce death." Stone v. Heggie, 34 South. 146, 147, 82 Miss. 410. Ax. An ax will be presumed to be a deadly weapon. Dollarhide v. United States (Iowa) Morris, 233, 39 Am. Dec. 460. without further description. State v. Shields, An ax is a deadly weapon, ex vi termini, 14 S. E. 779, 780, 110 N. C. 497. Under a statute punishing an assault with a knife, sword, or other deadly weapon, with intent to kill, it is held that the phrase "other deadly weapon" cannot be restricted to such weapons only as are carried with the person, concealed or otherwise. The phrase should not be construed according to the rule of ejusdem generis, and is sufficiently broad to include an ax. Wilson v. Com monwealth, 66 Ky. (3 Bush) 105, 106. An ax is not necessarily a deadly weapon. Melton v. State, 17 S. W. 257, 258, 30 Tex. App. 273. Brass knuckles. other weapons, in 2 Pasch. Dig. art. 6512, Though brass knuckles are named, with "as deadly weapons," yet it is necessary to charge in an indictment for an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon that the brass knuckles were a deadly weapon. Wilks V. State, 3 Tex. App. 34, 35. Chair. A chair is not necessarily a deadly weapon. Whether it is such must depend on its size or weight, in connection with the manner of its use, and the part of the person that is stricken with it. There may be chairs so small that they would not, when so used, be likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. Kouns v. State, 8 Tex. App. 13, 15. Chisel. It might have been so large, heavy, and unwieldy as to be harmless in the hands of a man, or it might have been so small or rotten as to be not at all dangerous. As to whether or not the weapon is in fact a deadly one is a matter of proof, and depends in some cases upon the manner of its use or attempted use. Wilson v. State, 15 Tex. App. 150, 155. Hoe. 396. A hoe may be a deadly weapon. Ham A chisel may be a deadly weapon. Com-ilton v. People, 113 Ill. 34, 38, 55 Am. Rep. monwealth v. Branham, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 387, 388. Iron weight. A deadly weapon is a weapon with the manner in which defendant on trial used which death can be produced when used in it on the occasion mentioned in the indictment; it being admitted that defendant used an iron weight, and there being no conflict in the evidence as to its use, but only as to A club may be a deadly weapon. Mc- its size. Long v. Commonwealth, 35 S. W. Nary v. People, 32 Ill. App. 58, 62. 919, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 176. A rock or club is not necessarily a deadly weapon, but may be made so in the hands of a malicious or infuriated person of ordinary strength, if used in an attack upon another with intent to take his life. The physical strength of the person using the instrument or weapon is to be considered by the jury in determining whether it is a deadly weapon. Cosby v. Commonwealth, 72 S. W. 1089, 1090, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2050. It is held in North Carolina that a stick with which in fact no serious injury was inflicted is not a deadly weapon. State v. Ray, 89 N. C. 587. An oaken staff nearly three feet long, of a diameter of one inch and a half or two inches, with which three blows were struck on a man drunk, shattering the bones of the head and rupturing the interior vessels of the brain, was a deadly weapon. State v. West, 51 N. C. 505, 509. A piece of pine weather boarding, 14 to 18 inches long, three-fourths of an inch thick, and 6 inches wide at one end, departing to a point at the other end, was not a deadly weapon in the hands of a sickly boy, 15 years old, weighing about 80 pounds, who held it by the small end, and struck with its large end the legs and back of an adult. Knife. A drawn knife is a deadly weapon. Coker v. State, 2 S. W. 615, 616, 22 Tex. App. 20. A knife with which defendant stabbed deceased, causing his death, is a deadly weapon. State v. Bowles, 47 S. W. 892, 893, 146 Mo. 6, 69 Am. St. Rep. 598. A knife may be a deadly weapon. McNary v. People, 32 Ill. App. 58, 62. Pin. The pushing of a pin down an infant's throat, producing its death thereby, is killing it with a deadly weapon. The question whether an instrument with which a personal injury has been inflicted is a deadly weapon depends not infrequently more upon the manner of its use than upon the intrinsic character of the instrument itself. We may expect death to ensue from pushing a pin down the throat of an infant, just as we may look for death or serious bodily harm as a consequence of firing a pistol into a crowd of human beings or at a particular person. State v. Norwood, 20 S. E. 712, 115 N. C. 789, 44 Am. St. Rep. 498. Piece of pipe. In a contention that a piece of pipe was State v. Sinclair, 27 S. E. 77, 78, 120 N. C. not a deadly weapon, it was stated that, if 603. A good-sized or fair-sized walking stick, made of bois d'arc and loaded, is not a deadly weapon. Stevens v. State, 27 Tex. App. 461, 11 S. W. 459. Fence pole. A black-jack fence pole, though used for a rail, is not necessarily a deadly weapon. the weapon was shown to be one calculated to produce death, then, in law, it would become a deadly weapon. Danforth v. State, 69 S. W. 159-163, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 105. Pistol. A pistol used to strike with is not necessarily a deadly weapon, but may be such, or not, according to the size and manner of |