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of possession, means "a court of general jurisdiction, whether federal, state, or territorial." Burke v. McDonald, 13 Pac. 351, 360, 2 Idaho (Hasb.) 339.

The statute provides that a guardian's sale shall not be void on account of any ir

regularity in the proceedings, providing it shall appear, among other things, that he was licensed to make the sale by a probate court of competent jurisdiction. Where it appears that license was granted by a probate court, the question is, was such license granted by a probate court of competent jurisdiction? This will depend upon the sense in which the phrase "competent jurisdiction" is used in the statute. The term is susceptible of two meanings: It may signify that the court must acquire and exercise jurisdiction competent to grant the license through and by reason of a strict conformity to the requirements of the statute; or it may signify jurisdiction over the subject-matter, a sort of authority in the abstract to hear and determine the case. In other words, by a probate of "competent jurisdiction" may be meant the court whose jurisdiction it is proper to invoke in the given instance. The phrase "competent jurisdiction" is not to be taken in the first sense above spoken of, for the section in which it occurs is professedly a healing statute, plainly designed to cure certain irregularities, and therefore excusing to some extent a noncompliance with the provisions of law. The term as there used means the probate court whose jurisdiction it is proper to invoke in the particular case in hand. Montour v. Purdy, 11 Minn. 384 (Gil. 278, 296), 83 Am. Dec. 88.

A "court of competent jurisdiction" is one provided for in the Constitution or created by the Legislature, and having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person. In re Norton, 68 Pac. 639, 641, 64 Kan. 842, 91 Am. St. Rep. 255.

COMPETENT OFFICER.

the board of control should have power to declare the lands forfeited to the state, and requiring said board to confer the lands upon some other competent party, the term "competent party" means a railroad company proposing to construct the very line of railroad for which the lands were originally granted. Bowes v. Haywood, 35 Mich. 241, 246,

COMPETENT PERSON.

nal," within the meaning of Rev. St. § 5292, A "competent person, officer, or tribumaking it perjury to take a false oath before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, means a person, officer, or tribunal competent under the laws of the United States to administer the oath alleged to be false. United States v. Madison (U. S.) 21 Fed. 628, 629; United States v. Curtis, 2 Sup. Ct. 507, 509, 107 U. S. 671, 27 L. Ed. 534. The term may include a state officer authorized by act of Congress to administer oaths in proceedings relative to timber claims. United States v. Madison (U. S.) 21 Fed. 628, 629.

Within Code 1892, c. 123, providing for the employment of a competent person by the board of supervisors to investigate the title to school lands and to conduct suits leading thereto, the term "competent person" will not necessarily exclude a lawyer who was otherwise competent, for, if he were competent in other respects, his eminence as a lawyer would not render him less competent to institute and prosecute the suits to effect. Warren County v. Dabney (Miss.) 32 South. 908, 909.

One person named by mutual consent of the parties to determine the value of property and certain premises could not be considered "competent persons," within the mean ing of an agreement for submission. Har vey v. Grabham, 5 Adol. & E. 61, 67.

COMPETENT PROOF.

Rev. St. 464, § 4142, providing that whenever a receiver of an insolvent corporation shall show by his oath or "other competent proof" that a person is indebted to the corporation, etc., "does not mean proof competent to establish the fact in a legal sense before a jury, but merely proof sufficient to create a rational belief which may fall far short of that necessary to authorize a verdict." It is sufficient if a receiver who applies for a warrant swore to the facts on information and belief. Noble v. Halliday,

Rev. St. 5292, making it perjury to make a false oath before any competent tribunal, "officer," or person, etc., means an officer competent under the laws of the United States to administer the oath alleged to be false. United States v. Madison (U. S.) 21 Fed. 628, 629; United States v. Curtis, 2 Sup. Ct. 507, 509, 107 U. S. 671, 27 L. Ed. 534. The terms may include a state officer authorized by act of Congress to administer oaths in proceedings relative to timber claims. United States v. Madison (U. S.) 21 Fed. 628, 1 N. Y. (1 Comst.) 330, 335. 629.

COMPETENT PARTY.

In Laws 1857, p. 346, 11, providing that, if either of the railroad companies to which lands were granted by such act fail to perform the conditions therein specified,

COMPETENT SUPPORT.

A will providing that testator's daughter and grandson should have a "reasonable and competent support" out of the proceeds of his estate did not mean merely "food and clothing necessary to sustain life, nor any

Eq.

other fixed quantity or allowance, but de- | davit made by one party to a suit, for the pends on circumstances and exigencies." El- purpose of taking the testimony of the other, lerbe v. Ellerbe's Heirs (S. C.) Speers, is to point out the fact to be proved, and not 328, 340. the evidence of that fact. Within the range of the affidavit, the party is to be examined like any other witness, and it is as compe tent for him to prove a fact by admissible declarations of others as it is for any other witness. Hogan v. Sherman, 5 Mich. 60, 65.

COMPETENT TRIBUNAL.

It is usual to say, even of foreign judgments, that if pronounced by a competent tribunal, and carried into effect without our assistance, they are conclusive of the question decided. And here "competent tribunal" means one of the regularly established courts of the country, and in it. In re Williamson, 26 Pa. 9, 30, 67 Am. Dec. 374.

Rev. St. § 5392, providing that every person who, having taken an oath before a "competent tribunal, officer or person" in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify truly, etc., and, contrary to such oath, testifies falsely to that which he does not believe to be true, shall be guilty of perjury, etc., means that the oath must be permitted or required by some law of the United States, and be administered by some tribunal, officer, or person authorized by such laws to administer oaths in respect to the particular matters to which it relates. It does not necessarily mean that the tribunal by which the oath is administered shall have been created by the government, which requires it to be taken, in order that the officer who administers it shall be an officer of that government. United States v. Curtis, 2 Sup. Ct. 507, 509, 107 U. S. 671, 27

L. Ed. 534.

The word "competent," when relating to a witness, implies a legal capacity to testify, and, when applied to evidence in law, means having the legal capacity or fitness to be heard in court, as distinguished from credibility or sufficiency. Thus a witness may be competent, although unworthy of belief. Evidence may be competent, although not alone sufficient, even if believed. People v. Compton, 56 Pac. 44, 46, 123 Cal. 403.

"Competent witness," as used in St. 1866, inal case, at his own request and not otherc. 260, providing that a defendant in a crimwise, may testify in his own behalf, and he shall be deemed a competent witness, means "competent not for a special purpose, or to give evidence only which shall operate in his favor, but competent to testify to any facts relevant and material to the issue. Like all other witnesses, he is to tell the truth, and the whole truth, concerning any matter proper to be inquired about. If he offers himself as a witness, he waives his constitutional privilege of refusing to furnish evidence against himself, and may be interrogated as a general witness in the case." Commonwealth v. Mullen, 97 Mass. 545, 546.

COMPETING.

A "competent person, officer, or tribunal," within the meaning of Rev. St. U. S. § 5292, making it perjury to take a false oath The word "competing," in Const. art. 17, before any competent tribunal, officer, or§ 4, prohibiting the consolidation of any railperson, means a person, officer, or tribunal competent under the laws of the United States to administer the oath alleged to be false. The terms may include a state officer authorized by act of Congress to administer oaths in proceedings relative to timber claims. United States v. Madison (U. S.) 21 Fed. 628,

629.

"Competent tribunal," as used in 2 Rev. St. 563, § 22, providing that persons who are committed or detained by virtue of the final judgment or decree of any competent tribunal, of civil or criminal jurisdiction, shall not be entitled to prosecute the writ of habeas corpus, means a tribunal having jurisdiction of the matter and of the person. People v. Liscomb (N. Y.) 3 Hun, 760, 775; People v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559, 568, 569, 19 Am. Rep. 211.

COMPETENT WITNESS.

road, canal, or other transportation companies owning or having under their control parallel or competing lines, does not apply to street railways, even though their lines are parallel. "The travel over paralle streets is not necessarily a competing travel. Every street has a travel of its own, which is conducted upon its own railway. That travel may be almost entirely conducted without competition with the travel upon another, though parallel, street. Nor do railways upon parallel streets have the same termini. Many of them, though running upon parallel streets for a considerable distance, diverge altogether from such a course at their extremities. Two roads would be 'competing' if laid upon the same street and running in the same direction." Appeal of Montgomery, 20 Atl. 399, 400, 136 Pa. 96, 9 L. R. A. 369.

"Competing railroads," within the meaning of Rev. St. Mo. § 2569, which prohibits A "competent" witness is one competent any railroad within the state from owning, to testify generally, and laboring under no operating, or managing any parallel or comegal disqualifications. The office of an affi-peting railroad within the state, applies only

Abridgment distinguished, see "Abridgment."

Code distinguished, see "Code."

where both the railroads are situated within | COMPILE-COMPILATION.
the state, and the competition between the
two must be of some practical importance,
such as is liable to have an appreciable effect
on the rates. Two railroads which do not
touch at any two common points, and be-
tween which for a distance of 40 miles an-
other railroad is interposed, and whose traf-
fic, except an unimportant amount, will in no
event pass over the other, are not "compet-
ing" lines within the meaning of the statute.
Kimball v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (U. S.)
46 Fed. 888, 890.

Whether a railroad is a "competing railroad" in its relation to another road, within the meaning of a statute prohibiting competing railroads from consolidating, cannot be determined by the application of the doctrine of judicial notice, but it is a question of fact only, to be established by evidence. East Line & R. R. Ry. Co. v. Rushing, 6 S. W. 834, 837, 69 Tex. 306.

"Competing line," within the meaning of a clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, forbidding a railroad corporation from controlling any other railroad corporation having under its control a parallel or competing line, only applies to a line already constructed; but the word "parallel" is not so limited, but may include a projected road surveyed, laid out, and in the process of construction. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Commonwealth (Pa.) 7 Atl. 368, 373.

The term "competing road," within the meaning of Const. Ky. 1891, § 201, prohibit

ing consolidation of a railroad with a parallel or competing road, characterizes two railroads which connect two important cities, and are natural competitors for the traffic between such cities. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 16 Sup. Ct. 714. 719, 161 U. S. 677, 40 L. Ed. 849.

COMPETITION.

See "Unfair Competition."

"Competition" is the struggle between rivals for the same trade at the same time. It is self-evident that there cannot be competition unless there is trade, and so, though the popular saying is that competition is the life of trade, yet it is quite certain that trade is the mother of competition, for the latter springs from the former, so that whatever restrains trade restrains competition in exact degree. Ferd Heim Brewing Co. v. Belinder, 71 S. W. 691, 695, 97 Mo. App. 64.

The essential quality of that series of

acts or course of conduct which we call "competition" is that which shall be the result of the free choice of the individual, and not of any legal or moral obligation or duty. Meredith v. New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co., 37 Atl. 539, 543, 55 N. J. Eq. 211.

To "compile" is to copy from various authorities into one work. Story v. Holcombe (U. S.) 23 Fed. Cas. 171, 174.

COMPLAIN.

The generally understood meaning of the verb "complain" is to express regret or pain. Southern Indiana Ry. Co. v. Davis (Ind.) 68 N. E. 191, 194.

COMPLAINT.

See "Cross-Complaint"; "Supplemental "Supplementary Complaint"; "Sworn Complaint."

Complaint";

Within the meaning of Sess. Laws 1890, p. 52, providing that the county court shall have power to determine all complaints made in regard to the assessed value of any property, and that upon hearing of complaints the board may subpoena and administer orders to witnesses, etc., the word "complaints" is not used in the technical sense in which the word "complaint" is used in the Civil Code. And it is not necessary that a formal allegation or charge in writing should be filed in order to confer jurisdiction upon the Pac. 344, 345, 13 Utah, 488. board. Central Pac. R. Co. v. Standing, 45

The term "complaint" is not always limited to charges of crime or wrong, and it may be that as used in some statute it comprehends oral as well as written allegations; but whenever used it means the making of a statement of fact as a basis for the taking of legal action. Hence a notice to a sheriff directing him to place in temporary quarantine certain cattle is not a "complaint" within the statute authorizing the sheriff to seize and quarantine cattle on a complaint made to him that such cattle were capable of communicating or liable to impart fever. Asbell v. Edwards, 66 Pac. 641, 642, 63 Kan. 610.

In civil proceedings.

The term "complaint" is that given to designate the first pleading on the part of the plaintiff in a civil action. Sharon v. Sharon, 7 Pac. 456, 457, 67 Cal. 185.

The "complaint" is a statement of the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. Talbot

v. Garretson, 49 Pac. 978, 979, 31 Or. 256.

A "complaint" is the exhibiting any action, real or personal, in writing, and the party making it is called the "plaintiff." State v. McCann, 67 Me. 372, 374.

Code Civ. Proc. § 481, describes the fol- pleadings." Ross v. Evans, 14 N. W. 897, lowing rule for a complaint: "A plain and 898, 30 Minn. 206. concise statement of the facts, constituting each cause of action, without unnecessary repetition." Becker v. Fischer, 43 N. Y. Supp. 685, 13 App. Div. 555.

The office of the "complaint" is to state in a plain and concise manner the cause of action upon which the plaintiff relies. Code Civ. Proc. § 481, subd. 2; Hughes v. Wilcox, 39 N. Y. Supp. 210, 211, 17 Misc. Rep. 32.

Same-Cross-complaint distinguished.

The only real difference between a "complaint" and a "cross-complaint" is that the first is filed by the plaintiff and the second by the defendant. Both contain a statement of the facts, and each demands affirmative relief on the facts stated. White v. Reagan, 32 Ark. 281, 290.

Same-Election contest.

There is a broad distinction between a

A "complaint" is defined by the Code to be a statement of the facts constituting a cause of action, in plain and concise lan- suit for an office and a mere contest of the guage, without repetition, and in such a man- result of the election as declared by the ofner as to enable a person of common under-ficer to whom the duty of certifying the fact standing to know what is intended. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Prairie School Tp., 51 N. E. 100, 101, 151 Ind. 36; Wabash R. Co. v. Young, 55 N. E. 853, 854, 154 Ind. 24.

The complaint in an action "is the pleading in an action, containing a statement of a cause of action, with a demand for the proper relief to which the party may be entitled. A verification forms no part of a complaint." McMath v. Parsons, 2 N. W. 703, 704, 26 Minn. 246.

The word "bill" or "complaint," when found in the Code of Civil Procedure, shall mean "petition." Cobbey's Ann. St. Neb. 1903, § 1851.

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Same-Counterclaim.

Gen. St. 1878, c. 65, § 113, allowing an appeal from justice court if "the amount claimed in the complaint" exceeds $30, will not be construed to include amount claimed in pleadings other than the complaint, and hence does not authorize an appeal because more than $30 is demanded in a counterclaim, but will be limited to the amount claimed in the complaint. The term "complaint" has a fixed and well-known meaning, and the language "amount claimed in the complaint" can hardly be construed to be equivalent to the words "amount for which judgment is demanded by either party in his

tribunal before whom an election contest is is intrusted. The power of the officer or conducted is limited to the mere award of the election, or of ordering another election. Neither the officer nor the tribunal before whom the contest is had gives the contestant a judgment for his right to the office, or for the fees and emoluments of it, but merely gives him a certificate, and leaves him, if the office is not voluntarily surrendered by the contestee, to assert his title thereon. Furthermore, the character of the proceedcuted before the judge in chambers or before ings is the same, whether the contest is prosethe court. Though heard before the court, it is to be determined without a jury. On the other hand, if it was a suit, a trial by jury should not be denied if demanded. Const. art. 5, § 10. It therefore follows that an election contest is not a "suit, complaint or plea," within the meaning of the phrase as used in defining a constitutional jurisdiction of the district court. Williamson v. Lane, 52 Tex. 335, 345.

"Complaint or plea," as used in a constitution confining the jurisdiction of the district court to a suit, complaint or plea wherein the matter in controversy is valued at or amounts to $500, exclusive of interest, does not include a proceeding to contest an election, there being a difference between the contest of an election and a suit for an office, the latter being a suit within the latter meaning of the Constitution, the former involving a political or rather extrajudicial question, to be regulated under the Constitution by the political authority of the state. Gibson v. Templeton, 62 Tex. 555, 556.

Same-Summons or writ distinguished.

The term "complaint," as used in the removal statute, providing that any party who desires to remove a cause may file his petition at any time before the defendant is required by the law of the state in which the suit is brought to answer or plead to the declaration or complaint of the plaintiff, is not used as synonymous with the words "writ" or "summons," which is at common law the process of commencing the suit, and

is the first step taken to bring the parties into court, while the declaration or complaint is necessarily the second step which manifests the case; so that such petition need not be filed within the time when pleas for abatement must be filed under the state practice. Wilson v. Winchester & P. R. Co. (U. S.) 82 Fed. 15, 17.

In criminal proceedings.

A "complaint" is a form of legal process, which consists of a formal allegation or charge against a party, made or presented to the proper court or officer, as for a wrong done or a crime committed. State v. Dodge County, 31 N. W. 117, 120, 20 Neb. 595; Asbell v. Edwards, 66 Pac. 641, 63 Kan. 610; State v. Goetz, 69 Pac. 187, 188, 65 Kan. 125. It imports a charge in clear and distinct form of a writing. State v. Goetz, 69 Pac. 187, 188, 65 Kan. 125.

The complaint is the allegation in writing, made to a court or magistrate, that a person has been guilty of some designated offense. Pen. Code Cal. 1903, § 806; Pen. Code Idaho 1901, § 5219; Rev. St. Utah 1898, § 4604. Under such section the word "complaint" includes the accusation made before the committing magistrate, and also the information filed by the district attorney in the trial court. United States v. Collins (U. S.) 79 Fed. 65, 66.

A complaint is an allegation made to a magistrate that a person has been guilty of some public offense. Comp. Laws Nev. 1900, § 4070.

A "complaint," within the meaning of an article in the Code of Criminal Procedure entitled "Security to Keep the Peace," is a statement in writing, made to a magistrate, that a person has threatened to commit an offense against the person or property of another, and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, § 7765.

A "complaint," within the meaning of the chapter relating to security to keep the peace, is a statement in writing of the jurisdictional facts, clearly specifying the threatened offense, and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. Rev. St. Utah 1898, § 4524.

ficer may arrest a person for drunkenness without a warrant, and when the person is sufficiently recovered from his intoxication, the officer shall make a "complaint" against him for the crime. Hobbs v. Hill, 32 N. E. 862, 157 Mass. 556.

The term "complaint" is a technical one, descriptive of proceedings before magistrates, and a complaint may be made before one magistrate and the warrant thereon returned to another for a hearing. Commonwealth v. Davis, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 432, 436.

Where criminal prosecutions originate upon complaint, one made under oath or affirmation is implied. Campbell v. Thompson, 16 Me. (4 Shep.) 117, 120.

A warrant on which a person was arrested, in setting forth that he was to be held to answer to a "complaint" charging him with the crime of perjury, did not import that the instrument charging the perjury was a "technical complaint," as the term is used in the statutes, and the warrant, therefore, was not defective in not using "indictment" instead of "complaint." In re Durant, 12 Atl. 650, 654, 60 Vt. 176.

St. 1868, c. 263, § 2, providing that the penalty for selling adulterated milk "may be recovered on complaint" before any court of jurisdictions, is permissive and not mandatory, and does not exclude an indictment. Commonwealth v. Haynes, 107 Mass. 194,

197.

The term "complaint," when it is a charge for a crime committed, is generally under oath. State v. Dodge County, 31 N. W. 117, 120, 20 Neb. 595.

Same-As affidavit or indictment.
See "Affidavit"; "Indictment."

The affidavit before the magistrate which charges the commission of an offense is called a "complaint." Code Cr. Proc. Tex. 1895,

art. 256.

Same-Information distinguished.

Webster defines "complaint" as an accusation or charge against an offender, made by a private person or an informer to the justice of the peace or other proper officer, Complaints are preliminary charges be alleging that the offender has violated the fore committing magistrates. Gardner v. People, 62 N. Y. 299, 306.

"The word 'complaint,' as used in the statutes of this commonwealth in reference to criminal offenses, sometimes means the formal written charge of crime to which the accused person is to answer, and sometimes it means the oral charge which may be made to a proper magistrate or court, and which is to be reduced to writing by the magistrate or court. It is used in the latter sense in Pub. St. c. 207, § 25" providing that an of

law, and claiming the penalty due to the prosecutor. It differs from "information," which is a prosecution of the offender by an attorney or solicitor; from a "presentment" or "indictment," which are the accusations of the grand jury. Consequently, on a complaint exhibited by a tithing man to a justice of the peace, the accused is not entitled to a jury trial, under the constitutional provision giving one accused by an indictment or information right to a trial by jury. Goddard v. State, 12 Conn. 448, 453.

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