drawer of a check is not a surety, but the principal debtor, as much as the maker of a note. In re Brown (U. S.) 4 Fed. Cas. 342, 346. grace, and requires no acceptance distinct, time of delivery as an equitable assignment from payment being made promptly. The pro tanto of the sum on deposit. It was held by the Supreme Court of the United States, in Fourth St. Bank v. Yardley, 165 U. S. 634, 17 Sup. Ct. 439, 41 L. Ed. 855, to be the settled law that a check drawn in the ordinary form does not, as between the maker and the payee, constitute an equitable assignment pro tanto of an indebtedness owing by the bank on which the check has been drawn. Donohoe-Kelly Banking Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 71 Pac. 93, 94, 138 Cal. 183, 94 Am. St. Rep. 28. As banks are debtors to their customers for the amount of their deposits, a check is a request of the customer to pay the whole or a portion of such indebtedness to the bearer, or to the order of the payee. Until presented and accepted, it is inchoate. It vests no title, legal or equitable, in the payee to the fund; before acceptance, the drawer may withdraw his deposit. Attorney General v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 325, 27 Am. Rep. 55. A check, therefore, does not constitute an equitable assignment of such portion of the fund drawn on. Akin v. Jones, 27 S. W. 669, 672, 93 Tenn. (9 Pickle) 353, 25 L. R. A. 523, 42 Am. St. Rep. 921; Florence Min. Co. v. Brown, 8 Sup. Ct. 531, 534, 124 U. S. 385, 31 L. Ed. 424. A check is only a direction to the bank to pay a certain sum of money to the person therein named. The money does not thereby become the property of the payee, nor is it placed beyond the control of the depositor. Neither does a check of itself, before presentation, operate as an assignment to the payee of the money for which it was drawn. O'Connor v. Mechanics' Bank, 124 N. Y. 324, 26 N. E. 816. A check not accepted does not constitute a transfer of any money to the credit of the holder. Pullen v. Placer County Bank, 71 Pac. 83, 84, 138 Cal. 169, 94 Am. St. Rep. 19 (citing Florence Min. Co. v. Brown, 124 U. S. 385, 8 Sup. Ct. 531, 31 L. Ed. 424). A check is, and always has been, primarily an authority from the maker upon which his banker may rely, but in which the latter has no interest until he has acted Bank note distinguished. See "Bank Note." Bill of exchange distinguished. A check is denominated a species of inland bill of exchange; not with all the incidents of an ordinary bill of exchange, but still it belongs to that class of commercial paper. Moses v. Franklin Bank, 34 Md. 574, 579; Exchange Bank v. Sutton Bank, 28 Atl. 563, 564, 78 Md. 577, 23 L. R. A. 173. A check is substantially the same as an inland bill of exchange, and in general is governed by the law applicable to bills of exchange and promissory notes. Barnet v. Smith, 30 N. H. 256, 264, 64 Am. Dec. 290; Foster v. Paulk, 41 Me. 425, 428; Neal v. Coburn, 42 Atl. 348, 350, 92 Me. 139, 69 Am. St. Rep. 495. And hence decisions as to bills of exchange are applicable to cases involving checks. Neal v. Coburn, 42 Atl. 348, 350, 92 Me. 139, 69 Am. St. Rep. 495. A check on a bank is in legal effect an equivalent to a bill of exchange payable to bearer or order on demand, so that an action on a check is a suit on a written instrument. Connor v. Becker, 76 N. W. 893, 894, 56 Neb. 343. "Checks upon banks have most of the thereon. Where, however, a check for a val- qualities of inland bills of exchange. They uable consideration works an assignment of the deposit, equitable or legal, such a check is something more than a mere authority to It also evidences a contract between the maker and payee, and, if that contract is a valid and irrevocable one, the check can pay. not be revoked as between them. Raesser v. National Exch. Bank, 88 N. W. 618, 620, 112 Wis. 591, 56 L. R. A. 174, 88 Am. St. Rep. 979. As the execution and delivery of a check assigns to the payee a specified amount represented as belonging to the drawer in the hands of the drawee, it is really an undertaking that the bank or banker on whom it is drawn will deliver to the payee the amount of money expressed, and comes within the provision of the statute of limitations relating to simple contracts in writing. Haynes v. Wesley, 37 S. E. 990, 991, 112 Ga. 668, 81 Am. St. Rep. 72. A bank check is a bill of exchange under Civ. Code, § 3254, and does not operate at the are drawn for a sum certain upon a person or corporation usually having funds of the drawer sufficient for their payment, and are payable on presentation. If payable to bearer they pass by delivery, and, if to the order of the payee, by indorsement in the usual form. They are not payable on time, and are therefore not presented for or subject to acceptance, and in this particular they differ from bills of exchange. The drawer may be made liable, as the drawer of a bill of exchange, upon presentation within a reasonable time and notice of nonpayment." Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Butchers' & Drovers' Bank, 28 N. Y. 425, 427. It is said in Cruger v. Armstrong (N. y.) 3 Johns. Cas. 5, 7, 2 Am. Dec. 126: “A check, although generally received as cash, when given in payment is in form and real ity a bill of exchange. It possesses all the requisites of the bill, and has been treated as such. Lord Kenyon said in the case of Bo hem v. Sterling, 7 Term R. 430, that at the trial of that case he thought there was a distinction between a banker's check and a bill of exchange, but on further consideration he did not think that distinction well founded." Douglass v. Wilkeson (N. Y.) 6 Wend. 637, 643. "A check is a bill of exchange, drawn on a banker, payable on demand." Rand. Com. Paper, § 8. The authorities and textbooks, as a general thing, class them among commercial instruments. All checks are bills, but all bills are not checks, is the conclusion of the authorities. Id., and authorities there cited; Morse, Banks, §§ 363, 393; 2 Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 583; Byles, Bills, 13; 1 Edw. Bills & N. § 19; 2 Pars. Bills & N. 57; Story, Prom. Notes, 487; 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 211, note 1. In Branch Bank V. Crocheron, 5 Ala. 250, 254, this court, in defining the term "notes and bills" as employed in a statute against the issuance of such instruments by a corporation, said they were sufficiently comprehensive to include checks, drafts, bills single, bonds, or tokens. First Nat. Bank v. Nelson, 16 South. 707, 708, 105 Ala. 180. Judge Story says that the distinguishing characteristics of checks, as distinguished from bills of exchange, are that they are always drawn on a bank or banker, they are payable immediately on presentment, without the allowance of any days of grace, and that they are never presented for mere acceptance, but only for payment. By a check on a bank, payable at a future day, the drawer thereof simply undertakes that he will have money there at that day, and no days of grace will be allowed on such a check. Champion v. Gordon, 70 Pa. (20 P. F. Smith) 474, 475, 10 Am. Rep. 681. See, also, Cutler v. Reynolds, 64 Ill. 321, 324. A check is in form and effect a bill of exchange. 3 Kent, Comm. § 44. The difference between one and the other is that the former is drawn upon a bank or on the house of a private banker, is payable on presentment, and the bank or banker is not entitled to days of grace upon it, although payable on some other day than its date. Veazie Bank v. Winn, 40 Me. 60, 61. A check differs from a bill of exchange in several particulars. It has no days of grace, and requires no acceptance distinct from prompt payment. The drawer of the check is not a surety, but the principal debtor, as much as the maker of a promissory note. It is an absolute appropriation of so much money in the hands of the banker to the holder of the check, and there it ought to remain until called for. People v. Compton, 123 Cal. 403, 410, 56 Pac. 44. A check is an order for the payment of money, and is not, either in common par lance or in the technical language of the law, a bill of exchange or promissory note, though in some respects it has the same legal operation. People v. Howell (N. Y.) 4 Johns. 296, 301. Mr. Justice Story, in Re Brown (U. S.) 4 Fed. Cas. 342, says: "I agree that it nearly resembles a bill of exchange, or nullum simile est idem. The distinguishing characteristics of 'checks,' as contradistinguished from 'bills of exchange,' are that they are always drawn on a bank or bankers, that they are payable immediately on presentment without the allowance of any days of grace, and that they are never presentable for mere acceptance." Hawley v. Jette, 10 Or. 31, 34, 45 Am. Rep. 129. The distinction between checks and inland bills of exchange has been clearly and concisely stated by Mr. Justice Swayne in Merchants' Nat. Bank v. State Nat. Bank, In both cases 77 U. S. (10 Wall.) 604, 647, 19 L. Ed. 1008, in which he says: "Banks checks are not inland bills of exchange, but have many of the properties of such commercial paper, and many of the rules of the law merchant are alike applicable to both. It is for a specified sum payable in money. there is a drawer, a drawee, and a payee. Without acceptance, no action can be maintained by the holder upon either against the drawer. The chief points of difference are that a check is always drawn on a bank or banker; no days of grace are allowed; the drawer is not discharged by the laches of the holder in presentment for payment, unless he can show some injury by the default; it is not due until payment is demanded, and the statute of limitations runs only from that time. It is by its face the appropriation of just so much money of the drawer in the hands of the drawee to the payment of an admitted liability of the drawer." Hawley v. Jette, 10 Or. 31, 34, 45 Am. Rep. 129; Haynes v. Wesley, 37 S. E. 990, 991, 112 Ga. 668, 81 Am. St. Rep. 72; Levy V. Laclede Bank (U. S.) 18 Fed. 193, 194; Bull v. First Nat. Bank, 8 Sup. Ct. 62, 63, 123 U. S. 105, 31 L. Ed. 97; Exchange Bank v. Sutton Bank, 28 Atl. 563, 564, 78 Md. 577, 23 L. R. A. 173. A check is a short bill of exchange, payable on demand, and is therefore within the term "bill of exchange" in Act Ill. Nov. 5, 1849, § 2, providing that all actions founded on bills of exchange, orders, etc., shall be commenced within five years after the action accrued. Rogers v. Durant, 11 Sup. Ct. 754, 755, 140 U. S. 298, 35 L. Ed. 481. "A check is an order to the bank to pay the money of the drawer to the payee. It is an appropriation of money; cash. It differs from a bill of exchange in that the element of credit inheres in the latter, as it is made payable at some future day." George Nat. Bank v. Henderson, 46 Ga. 487, 491, 12 Am. | on another for a certain sum of money; Rep. 590. As cash. See "Cash." Cashier's check distinguished. a check; a bill of exchange." Thus the word "draft," as used in Laws 1891, c. 43, § 16, relates to forgery as a general term, and includes checks. State v. Warner, 55 Pac. 342, 343, 60 Kan. 94. As false token. See "False Token." As money. See "Money." As note or order. "Order (In Commercial Payable on demand or presentment. A "cashier's check," so called, differs radically from an ordinary check. The latter is merely a bill of exchange drawn by an individual on a bank, payable on demand; or, in other words, it is an order upon a bank, purporting to be drawn upon a deposit of funds for the payment of a certain sum of money to a person named, or to order or bearer, on demand. As between himself and the bank, the drawer of the check has the power of countermanding his order of payment at any time before the bank has paid it or committed itself to pay it. Aen in the books is to the effect not only that cashier's check is of an entirely different nature. It is a bill of exchange drawn by the bank upon itself, and is accepted by the act of issuance, and, of course, the right of countermand as applied to ordinary checks does not exist as to it. Drinkall v. Movius State Bank, 88 N. W. 724, 726, 11 N. D. 10, 57 L. R. A. 341, 95 Am. St. Rep. 693. Deposit presumed. A check purports to be made upon a deposit to meet it, and presupposes funds of the drawer in the hands of the drawee. First Nat. Bank of Portland v. Linn County Nat. Bank, 47 Pac. 614, 615, 30 Or. 296. A check is an order for the payment of money, drawn on bankers, and payable immediately on presentment without any days of grace, and by its terms is supposed to be drawn on a previous deposit of funds, and is, in fact, an absolute appropriation of so much money in the hands of bankers to the holder of the check, to remain there until called Lester v. Given, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 357, for. 360. Draft. Under Civ. Code, § 3254, defining a "check" as a bill of exchange drawn upon a bank or banker, payable on demand, without interest, instruments having these characteristics do not cease to be checks because drawn by a bank. Garthwaite v. Bank of Tulare, 66 Pac. 326, 327, 134 Cal. 237. The fact that they are payable in another state than the one in which they are drawn does not change their character as checks. Bowen v. Needles Nat. Bank (U. S.) 87 Fed. 430, 437. A draft is an order for the payment of money, drawn by one person on another. Wildes v. Savage (U. S.) 29 Fed. Cas. 1226. It is said to be a nomen generalissimum, and to include all such orders. Wooster defines it: "An order by which one person draws Nearly every definition of a “check” giv it must be drawn on a bank or banker, but that it must be payable on demand. A draft on a bank payable on a day subsequent to its date is a bill of exchange, and not a check. Harrison v. Nicollet Nat. Bank of Minneapolis, 43 N. W. 336, 41 Minn. 488, 5 L. R. A. 746, 16 Am. St. Rep. 718. A check is a bill of exchange, payable on demand, on which an action will not lie sentment and nonpayment, which must be against the drawer until after notice of premade within a reasonable time. Anderson (N. Y.) 21 Wend. 372, 373. It imports an instrument payable on its date. Church v. Pontifex, 9 C. B. 229, 248. Harker v. A check is an order to pay the holder a sum of money at a bank on presentment and demand. No previous notice is necessary; no acceptance is required or expected; it has no days of grace; is payable on presentment, and not before. Head v. Hornblower, 31 N. E. 489, 156 Mass. 458, 16 L. R. A. 510, 32 Am. St. Rep. 472. Bullard v. Randall, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 605, 606, 61 Am. Dec. 433. As personal property. See "Personal Property." A check represents a certain sum of money which the drawer of the check intends that the payee shall in fact have. While not money, a check is a thing of value, and therefore it is the subject of conversion. Pawson v. Miller, 72 N. Y. Supp. 1011, 1012, 66 App. Div. 12. CHECK GUERILLA. A "check guerilla" is one who frequents gambling rooms and solicits money, on the checks used therein to represent money, from the proprietor, bystanders, or bettors. Comp. Laws Nev. 1900, § 4861, CHECK-ROWER. A "check-rower" is an attachment to a machine for planting corn. Joliet Mfg. Co. v. Dice, 105 Ill. 649, 650. CHEESE. See "Filled Cheese"; "Skimmed Milk Cheese." For the purpose of the provision relating to the sale of adulterated cheese or butter, the terms "butter" and "cheese" mean the products usually known by those names, and which are manufactured exclusively from milk or cream, or both, with salt and rennet, and with or without coloring matter. Rev. St. Me. 1883, p. 923, c. 128, § 6. For the purpose of the statutory provisions relative to the sale of imitation butter and cheese, the terms "butter" and "cheese" shall mean the products which are usually known by these names, and are manufactured exclusively from milk or cream, with salt and rennet, and with or without coloring matter. Rev. Laws Mass. 1902, p. 547, c. 56, $ 35. The terms "butter" and "cheese" shall be understood to mean the products usually known by those names, and which are manufactured exclusively from milk or cream, or both, with salt, and with or without coloring matter, and, if cheese, with rennet. Pub. St. N. H. 1901, p. 402, c. 127, § 22. The term "cheese," as used in the chapter of the Penal Code relating to adulterated dairy products, is understood to mean the product usually known by that name, and which is manufactured exclusively from milk or cream, or both. Rev. Codes N. D. 1899, § 7648. a chemical process; a chemical agent pre pared for scientific or economic use. Shreve port Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. v. As. sessor of Caddo Parish, 16 South. 650, 651, 47 La. Ann. 65 (citing Cent. Dict.); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Flemming, 44 S. W. 464, 465, 65 Ark. 54, 39 L. R. A. 789, 67 Am. St. Rep. 900. The word "chemical," however, as used in a constitutional exemption from taxation of capital and machinery employed in the manufacture of chemicals, is to be understood not from a scientific point of view, but in its generally accepted meaning, and in that meaning cannot be held to include illuminating gas. Shreveport Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. v. Assessor of Caddo Parish, 16 South. 650, 651, 47 La. Ann. 65. Benzine put up in bottles containing from two to six ounces, to be sold for cleansing purposes, is included in the term "chemicals," as used in a fire policy, and insuring drugs and chemicals. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Flemming, 44 S. W. 464, 465, 65 Ark. 54, 39 L. R. A. 789, 67 Am. St. Rep. 900. Soda and similar drinks are not "chemicals," within the meaning of Const. art. 207, as amended by Act 1886, No. 92, p. 129, exempting property employed in manufacturing chemicals, though the making of such drinks depends in part on the result of a chemical process. Crescent City Seltz & Mineral Water Co. v. City of New Orleans, 19 South. 943, 944, 48 La. Ann. 768. We do not understand that illuminating gas is generally understood to be chemicals, so as to exempt capital and machinery employed in its manufacture from taxation under the amendment to the 270th article of the Constitution exempting from taxation capital and machinery employed in the manufacture of chemicals. Shreveport Gas, Electric Light & Power Co. v. Assessor of Caddo Parish, 16 South. 650, 651, 47 La. Ann. 65. The word "cheese,” as used in an act relating to internal revenue tax on filled cheese, shall be understood to mean the food product known as "cheese," and which is made from milk or cream, and without the CHEMICAL SALTS. addition of butter, or any animal, vegetable, or other oils or fats foreign to such milk or cream, with or without additional coloring matter. U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2236. CHEESE FACTORY. For the purpose of the pure food act, a "cheese factory" is defined as "factory where milk with or without the addition of salt, rennet and coloring matter is manufactured into cheese." Cobbey's Ann. St. Neb. 1903, § 9410. CHEMICAL. A chemical is a substance used for producing a chemical effect, or one produced by "Chemical salts," as used in Tariff Act Oct. 1, 1890, par. 76, include muriate or hydrochlorate of cocaine. Lehn v. United States (U. S.) 66 Fed. 748. CHEMICALLY PURE. "Chemically pure," as used in reference to substances employed in chemical process, means absolutely pure. Matheson v. Campbell (U. S.) 69 Fed. 597, 608. CHEMIST. See "Pharmaceutical Chemist." Apothecary distinguished, see "Apothe cary." CHEROKEE. The Cherokee Nation has been variously described by the courts as a domestic, dependent nation (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U. S. [5 Pet.] 1, 8 L. Ed. 25); as a state, in a certain sense, although not a foreign state or a state of the Union (Holden v. Joy, 84 U. S. [17 Wall.] 211, 21 L. Ed. 523); as a distinct community, with boundaries accurately described (Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S. [6 Pet.] 515, 8 L. Ed. 483); an alien, though dependent, power (Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94, 103, 5 Sup. Ct. 41, 28 L. Ed. 643); not a foreign, but a domestic, territory; a territory which originated under our Constitution and laws. Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians (U. S.) 66 Fed. 372, 374, 13 C. C. A. 519 (citing Mackey v. Cox, 59 U. S. [18 How.] 100, 15 L. Ed. 299). CHEROKEE LANDS. Lands described in a deed as "Cherokee lands" are not necessarily lands ceded to the Cherokee Indians by the United States. Ephraim v. Garlick, 10 Kan. 280, 281. CHEROKEE OUTLET. CHICORY. Chicory is a compound used to some extent to flavor coffee, and more largely, both in Germany and in this country, to mix with coffee, or as a substitute for coffee for purposes of economy. It is sold for about six cents per pound, and is also used by dealers as an adulterant to mix with ground coffee, and by consumers to mix with, or as a substitute for, coffee. United States v. Rosenstein (U. S.) 60 Fed. 74, 75, 8 C. C. A. 474. CHIEF. "A person engaged chiefly in farming." one whose within the bankrupt act, is chief occupation or business is farming, and one's chief occupation or business, so far as worldly pursuits are concerned, is that which is of principal concern to him, of some permanency in its nature, which he deems of paramount importance to his welfare, and on which he chiefly relies for his livelihood, or as the means of acquiring wealth, great or small. In re Mackey (U. S.) 110 Fed. 355, 358. As Indian country, see "Indian Coun- CHIEF FISCAL OFFICER. try." CHERRY JUICE. Tariff Act 1890, par. 339, relating to the duties on "cherry juice," includes cherry juice so concentrated that five gallons in its natural condition are reduced to one gallon, the entire amount of acidity and coloring matter being retained, and the bulk of the water eliminated. In re Rheinstrom (U. S.) 60 Fed. 599, 600. Cherries of an inedible variety, imported in casks in a surrounding fluid containing alcohol, added for the purpose of resisting fermentation and decay, intended for use in the manufacture of cherry juice, are dutiable under paragraph 263, Schedule G, § 1, c. 11, Tariff Act July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 171 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1651), as "fruits preserved in spirits," and not under paragraph 299, Schedule H, § 1, c. 11, of said act, 30 Stat. 174 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, P. 1655), as "cherry juice, etc." Voight v. Mihalovitch (U. S.) 125 Fed. 78, 82. CHEST. The words "trunk" and "chest" are not synonymous, and therefore an indictment charging the theft of a trunk or chest, being in the alternative, is bad for want of certainty. Potter v. State, 39 Tex. 388, 389. Code Civ. Proc. § 3245, provides that costs cannot be awarded to the plaintiff in an action against a municipal corporation in which the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only, unless the complaint upon which the action is founded was, before the commencement of the action, presented for payment to the "chief fiscal officer" of the corporation. Under other provisions of the statute the comptroller of the city of Buffalo was charged with superintendence of the fiscal concerns of the city and management of the same, and it was made his duty, by and with the advice of the common council, to appoint an auditor, who shall examine and report upon all un liquidated claims against the city before the same should be audited by the common council. Other provisions require that money should only be drawn from the treasury by warrants authorized by the common council, and signed by the mayor and city clerk and it was held that the comptroller was the countersigned by the comptroller, etc., and "chief fiscal officer" of the corporation within the meaning of the statute. Williams V. City of Buffalo (N. Y.) 25 Hun, 301. CHIEF JUDGE. The term "chief judge" is equivalent to that of presiding justice or presiding magistrate. Bean v. Loryea, 22 Pac. 513, 81 Cal. 151. |