66

Court of Minnesota used this language: ''Cause,' or 'sufficient cause,' means legal cause, and not any cause which the common council may think sufficient. The cause must be one which specially relates to and affects the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public. The cause may be one touching the qualifications of the of ficer, or his performance of his duties, showing that he is not a fit or proper person to hold the office. An attempt to remove the officer for any cause not affecting his competency or fitness would be an excess of power, and equivalent to an arbitrary removal. In the absence of any statutory specification the sufficiency of the cause should be determined with reference to the character of the office and qualifications necessary to fill it." In re Guden, 75 N. Y. Supp. 794, 798, 71 App. Div. 422.

"For cause," as used in New York City Charter (Laws 1873, c. 335) § 25, authorizing the removal of certain municipal officers for cause, means "a cause founded on some act of omission or commission by the officer in regard to his duties or affecting his general character, which the law and the public opinion will pronounce to be sufficient to justify a forfeiture of the office, and not in the political bias or personal dislike of the city's chief executive, nor in his leaning to another individual for whom the place is desired. Removals for cause are distinguish able from removals which are in the arbitrary will of the officer vested with the power, and which generally follow the changes of the removing power or of party ascendancy. A removal for cause must be for a substantial, reasonable, and just cause." In re Nichols (N. Y.) 6 Abb. N. C. 474, 480.

New York City Charter 1873, providing that the heads of all departments and all other persons whose appointment is provided for therein may be removed by the mayor for cause, means that "a reason must exist which is personal to the individual sought to be removed, which the law and a sound public opinion will recognize as a good cause for his no longer occupying the place. The removal must be for cause-that is, for some good reason which actually exists-and not for a false reason which the removing power honestly or mistakenly believes to be true." People v. City of New York (N. Y.) 19 Hun, 441, 448.

In Syracuse City Charter, § 199, providing that the city marshal may be removed for "cause" on charges duly furnished, the word "cause" implies some valid reason for the removal arising out of the nonperformance or improper performance of official duties by the incumbent. People v. McGuire, 50 N. Y. Supp. 520, 522, 27 App. Div. 593.

Const. 1870, art. 6, § 6, provides that judges may be removed from office by a concurrent vote of both houses of the General Assembly, and that the names of the members voting for or against the judge, with the cause or causes of removal, shall be entered on the journal of each house, etc. Under this constitutional provision it was held that the word "cause," as used in removal clause, means legal cause, and not any cause which the legislators might think sufficient, so that under that section the Legislature has no power to remove a judge for economic reasons or on grounds of policy not personal to the incumbent or his administration of the office. McCully v. State, 53 S. W. 134, 137, 102 Tenn. 509, 46 L. R. A. 567.

"Cause," as used in the New York City charter of 1873, limiting the power of the removal of clerks, employés, etc., given the board of fire commissioners, by declaring that it cannot be exercised in respect to any regular clerk until he has been informed of the cause of the proposed removal, and has had an opportunity of making an explanation, means "some delinquency, general neglect of duty, or incapacity to perform the duties, or some delinquency affecting his general character and his fitness for the office. The cause assigned should be personal to himself and imply an unfitness for the place, and such cause being assigned, if unexplained, the removal may be made." People v. Fire Com'rs of City of New York, 72 N. Y. 445, 449.

A city charter providing that the council may remove any person from office appointed by them, for cause, meant such cause as may be satisfactory to the council, and did not constitute the council a judicial tribunal to hear and determine, so as to require notice to be served on the party removed before they could obtain jurisdiction of his person, and the words "for cause" did not intend a judicial proceeding requiring notice. City of Hoboken v. Gear, 27 N. J. Law (3 Dutch.) 265, 287.

The word "cause," in a city charter empowering the mayor to remove an appointed officer for cause, in legal intendment, means upon sufficient charges, notice thereof, and a hearing. State ex rel. Brennan v. Walbridge,

ment until he has been informed of the cause

of the proposed removal, is to be construed as meaning "reasonable cause," and hence the statute does not give unlimited discretion to the heads of the departments. People v. Thompson, 94 N. Y. 451, 452.

Gallagher v. Brown, 57 Mo. App. 199); State ex rel. Bristol v. Walbridge, 69 Mo. App. 657,

669.

Act March 24, 1873, authorizing the board of finance and taxation of Jersey City

Pub. St. c. 237, § 3, declares that the Supreme Court, on the petition of any creditor interested in any assignment for the benefit of creditors, upon due notice and for cause shown, shall remove any assignee named who shall neglect to render an inventory, etc. Held, that the words "for cause shown" meant a cause connected with such neglect, and that the assignee could not, therefore, be removed for any other cause than a neglect to render an inventory, schedule, etc. Case v. Mason, 23 Atl. 48, 15 R. I. 51.

Of accident or injury.

Condition distinguished, see "Condition." In Moulton v. Inhabitants of Sanford, 51 Me. 127, 134, Chief Justice Appleton, in speaking of the proximate cause of the injury, says: "Ordinarily that condition is usually termed the cause whose share in the matter is most conspicuous and is the most immediately preceding and proximate in the event." Maryland Clay Co. v. Goodnow, 51 Atl. 292, 298, 95 Md. 330; Sturgis v. Kountz, 30 Atl. 976, 979, 165 Pa. 358, 27 L. R. A. 390.

The word "cause" has two meanings one as that which brings a thing to be, and the other as that on which a thing under given circumstances follows. So it was said in an action for injury to a fireman in a fireboat, whose foot was caught in an eye splice while casting off lines from two coalboats belonging to defendant, which had tied to the fireboat: "Undoubtedly in this case, if the line of defendant had not been on the Seth Low, the accident could not have happened. It was a thing on which, under the circumstances, the thing happened, but it was not the thing which brought the thing to be, for that was the starting of the Seth Low. Or, in the more familiar language of the law, the placing of the rope upon the Seth Low was the causa sine qua non, but the starting of the Seth Low was the causa causans." It was held that the proximate cause of the injury was the starting of the fireboat, and not in the rope or eye-splice, and therefore plaintiff could not recover from the owner of the coalboat. Trapp v. McClellan, 74 N. Y. Supp. 130, 133, 68 App. Div. 362.

Of accusation.

The constitutional provision that in all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right "to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation" against him, means that the offense must be set out with clearness and all necessary certainty to apprise the accused of the crime with which he stands charged. United States v. Noelke (U. S.) 1 Fed. 426, 431 (citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 568, 23 L. Ed. 588).

In Cathcart v. Commonwealth, 39 Pa. (1 Wright) 108, Mr. Justice Strong, in speak. ing of the constitutional guaranty that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, says that "an indictment must exhibit the nature and cause of the accusation; that it must set out the crime laid to the charge of the accused; but the mode in which the crime was committed, the instrument with which the murder was effected, whether it was held in the right hand or the left, whether the wound was inflicted on the head or the body, are entirely apart from the nature and cause of the accusation." So it may be said of an indictment in which one who, in point of fact, was strictly an accessory before the fact, is charged as principal. It is not necessary to state the means or agency by which he accomplished the murder, whether it was done by his own hand or the hand of another employed by him for the purpose. It is sufficient if the charge be stated with such certainty that he may know what he is called upon to answer. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 187, 199.

The word "cause" is defined to mean that which produces or effects a result; that from which anything proceeds, and without which it would not exist. It is said that the word is used in this sense in the usual constitutional provision that a person accused of crime is entitled to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and that, inasmuch as the effect cannot exist without a cause, a good indictment cannot, as a rule, exist without a statement of the essential facts and circumstances which are the cause of the alleged crime or result. State v. Dougherty, 4 Or. 200, 203.

State v. Board of Education, 1 Pac. 844, 849, 18 Nev. 173.

Of imprisonment.

"The cause of imprisonment," as used in Act 1845, relating to the relief of persons imprisoned for debt, and providing that the debtor may petition that his property be assigned so that he may have the benefit of the provisions of the act, and providing, further, that the debtor must set forth in his petition the cause of his imprisonment, would embrace the name or names of, or the sum or sums due to, the creditor or creditors at whose suit the debtor is imprisoned. Spear v. Wardell, 1 N. Y. (1 Comst.) 144, 155.

CAUSE (Verb).

To cause a thing to be done is one thing; to direct it to be done is quite another thing. What is caused to be done is done; what is directed to be done is by no means always actually done. Burnham v. Aiken, 6 N. H. 306, 328.

In a declaration charging that defendant maliciously caused and procured plaintiff to be declared a bankrupt, the words "caused and procured," are to be interpreted in their ordinary sense, and the words are satisfied if a false statement by the defendant in fact occasioned such result, though the statement was, as a matter of law, insufficient to cause the adjudication which the court erroneously made. An interpretation of the words that nothing was a consequence of the defendant's untrue statement which would not be a necessary and legal result of the truth was incorrect. Farley v. Danks, 4 El. & Bl. 493, 499.

The destruction of property is caused by the owner's illegal or improper conduct, within the meaning of the term "caused," as used in Pamph. Laws 1854, c. 1519, if without such conduct on his part the destruction would not have occurred. Palmer v. City of Concord, 48 N. H. 211, 97 Am. Dec. 605.

As compel.

In a statute providing that in an action of trover the sheriff shall cause the defendant to give security for the protection of the chattel sued for, the word "cause" is synonymous with "compel," and authorizes the taking and holding of the body of the defendant until he does the act required. Poole v. Vernon (S. C.) 2 Hill, Law, 667, 670.

Comp. Laws, § 3322, declaring that the state board of education shall have power, and that it is made their duty, to prescribe and cause to be adopted, a uniform series of textbooks in the principal studies pursued in the public schools, means that the board must not only prescribe or select he books, but see that such books are adopt

As permit.

In a declaration in an action against a town for injuries caused by a defective highway, alleging that the town "caused" and suffered the highway to remain out of repair, the word "caused" does not necessarily imply active and affirmative misconduct on the part of the town, its servants and agents. In other words, it does not necessarily mean that the town actually dug or caused to be dug in the highway the hole in question, but simply that the negligence of the town resulted in or caused the defect in question. Carroll v. Allen, 37 Atl. 704, 705, 20 R. I. 144.

Rev. Civ. Code La., declaring that he who causes, assists, or encourages another to

commit an unlawful act is responsible in solido with the person causing the damage by such act, is not limited to persons who actually engage in some active assistance or encouragement, but includes as well persons whose duty it was to prevent the act, and who, through omission, neglected to do so. Comitez v. Parkerson (U. S.) 50 Fed. 170, 171.

As procure.

9 Geo. IV, c. 31, § 11, making it a felony to cause to be taken, by any person, poison or other destructive thing, does not mean that there must be any manual delivery of the poison, and where a servant puts the poison in a coffeepot, and sets it out for her mistress, stating that the coffee is for her, and the mistress pours and drinks it, there is "causing to be taken," within the meaning of the stat

ute.

Rex v. Harley, 4 Car. & P. 369, 371.

Gen. St. c. 35, § 9, providing that any person who causes the intoxication of another shall be compelled to pay for his care while so intoxicated, means the act of participating in causing such intoxication; and hence a liquor dealer is liable, though he only sells a portion of the liquor causing such intoxication. Werner v. Edmiston, 24 Kan. 147, 152.

An alternative writ of mandamus requiring the authorities of the port of Mobile to assess, levy, and "cause" to be collected a sufficient tax to pay the relator's judgment means that, so far as the authorities have control over the performance of duties by the tax collector, they shall exercise that control in favor of the collection of the taxes. United States v. Port of Mobile (U. S.) 12 Fed. 768, 770.

"Cause to be run," as used in Act March, 1828, appointing commissioners to settle the boundary line between the county of Gloucester and the counties of Salem and Cumberland, and providing that such commis sioners "shall cause the line of partition to

Attachment proceedings.

A cause is a suit, litigation, or action, any question, civil or criminal, contested be

fore a court of justice, and thus includes an attachment proceeding. Gibson v. Sidney,

69 N. W. 314, 315, 50 Neb. 12.

The word "cause," as used in Rev. St. c. 69, § 4, allowing an application for the transfer of a cause from a justice court, means the civil action in the justice court, and not merely an attachment incident thereto, and hence the attachment alone cannot be removed, since the attachment is a proceeding in a cause, and not the cause itself. Curtis v. Moore, 3 Minn. 29, 34 (Gil.

7, 12).

Ex parte order or decree.

The word "cause," as used in Code, 4192, enacting that either party in any civil cause in the superior courts of the state may except to any sentence, judgment, or decision or decree of such court, contemplates a hearing when both parties are before the judge, and does not embrace an ex parte order or decree. Nacoochee Hydraulic Min. Co. v. Davis, 40 Ga. 309, 320.

Indictment distinguished.

"Cause," as used in the statute providing that every recognizance entered into before any court having criminal jurisdiction shall remain in full force and effect until the cause in which such recognizance shall be entered into shall be finally determined, does not mean indictment. "The indictment is not the cause. The accusation of criminality is the cause, and the indictment is an incident in pursuing the accusation. It is true that the term 'cause' sometimes expresses a suit or action, but it has a broader signification, which comprises the prosecution of a purpose or an object, and, as used in this act, is to be taken in the sense of 'prosecution.'" State v. Hancock, 24 Atl. 726, 728, 54 N. J. Law (25 Vroom) 393.

Mandamus.

An action in mandamus, under the statute of Illinois, is a cause in law. People v. Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 62 N. E. 196, 193 Ill. 577.

As party.

Rev. St. 1263, provides that clerks shall be paid a certain sum for indexing the

word was used in the sense of an action or lawsuit, and did not authorize a fee for each party to the case, but only one fee for the whole action. Clark v. Lucas County Com'rs, 50 N. E. 356, 357, 58 Ohio St. 107.

disqualifications of a witness founded on the As used in Act 1864, c. 109, removing all interest of the party, except where an original party to a contract or cause of action was dead, means the contract or cause of action in issue and on trial, and includes only an original party to the contract, who is also a party to the suit. Robertson v. Mowell, 8 Atl. 273, 274, 66 Md. 530.

As question of law or fact.

meaning, includes all questions that have A "cause," in its usual and natural arisen or may arise in it; and, where a judge before whom a cause or question has been heard or tried in the District or Circuit Court is disqualified to sit on the trial or hearing in such case in the Circuit Court of Appeals, there is a strong reason for holding that a judge who has once heard the

cause, either upon the law or upon the facts, is therefore disqualified to take part in the Circuit Court of Appeals at the hearing and decision of the cause or any question arising therefrom, and certainly a judge who has once heard the cause upon its merits is disqualified. Moran v. Dillingham, 19 Sup. Ct. 620, 622, 174 U. S. 153, 43 L. Ed. 930.

Special proceedings.

Rev. St. § 828 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 635], allowing a clerk of a Circuit Court of the United States fees for docketing and in

dexing the cause, cannot be construed to include proceedings for the removal of a prisoner from one district to another for trial. "The application to the judge is a summary one, and accompanied by a copy of the indictment, information, or commitment of the commissioner before whom he has been examined, and ordinarily no evidence is required, except as to the identity of the accused, when the judge issues a warrant for his removal, and no papers are required to be filed with the clerk." United States v. King, 13 Sup. Ct. 439, 441, 147 U. S. 676, 37 L. Ed. 328.

Tayl. St. 1323, § 84, providing that any cause or matter in the county court may be removed to the circuit court, in case the county judge shall be interested in the conLamonte v. Ward, 36 Wis. 558, 563. troversy, includes a proceeding for contempt.

"Cause," as used in Common Law Procedure Act 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, § 148), enacting that a writ of error shall not be necessary or used in any cause, does not include informations in the nature of quo warranto. Regina v. Seale, 5 El. & Bl. 1, 7.