with the condition of the trust imposed by that instrument. We think the same result follows as to the balance of the property. It is further insisted that the intent that the instrument should operate as a testamentary disposition of the property is shown by the provision reserving to the grantor a life estate in the property so long as he lives, coupled with the provision that upon the death of Charles Luther Price before the death of the grantor the instrument should be void. From these provisions it is insisted it is manifest that what the grantor intended to do, and in fact did do, was to create a contingent life estate to take effect after the life estate reserved to the grantor, and shows that it was the intention of the grantor that no present estate should pass to the trustee upon the execution and delivery of the deed. In making this contention appellants are mistaken as to the language of the deed. It does not provide that the trust shall be void in the event the death of Charles Luther Price shall precede that of the grantor, but, on the contrary, provides only that the trust in so far as it concerns Charles Luther Price shall be void. In all other respects the trust created by the deed is to be valid and enforcible. The only effect of the death of Charles Luther Price before that of the grantor would be to terminate that portion of the trust which provided for his future support and maintenance. On the death of the grantor the trustee would be required to make a division of the property among the grandchildren of the grantor living at the time of the death of Charles Luther Price. No power was reserved to the grantor to make any other or further disposition of the fee in the event of the death of Charles Luther Price before that of the grantor. The absence of such provision, coupled with the further provision reserving a life estate to the grantor, we think clearly made the instrument operate as a present conveyance of the fee immediately upon the execution and delivery of the deed and relieves it of its testamentary char acter under the rule announced in Oswald v. Caldwell, 225 Ill. 224, and other cases cited by appellants. Deeds of this character are not void as attempted testamentary dispositions of property, as they take effect immediately upon the execution and delivery of such instrument and not upon the death of the grantor. It is further insisted that the deed is void for the reason that the remainder-men who were to take upon the death of Charles Luther Price were not named in the instrument. In Shackelton v. Sebrce, 86 Ill. 616, Latimer v. Latimer, 174 id. 418, and Craig v. Rupcke, 274 id. 626, we held that an estate of freehold might be created to commence in futuro without the creation of an intermediate estate to support it, and in City of Peoria v. Darst, 101 Ill. 609, and Stoller v. Doyle, 257 id. 369, we held that a valid remainder might be limited to one who was not named in the granting clause, and that a contingent interest in the children of the grantee was created by a deed which directed that in case of the death of the grantee before that of his wife the wife should have the use of the land for her life and upon her death it should go to his children, if any were living. In the instant case the deed contained apt words of conveyance to vest the trustee with the legal title to the property for the purposes of the trust. Under the terms of the deed, the trust, as to this property, was to endure only during the lifetime of Charles Luther Price. Immediately upon his death the trust was to terminate and the property vest in the grandchildren of the grantor who survived the death of Charles Luther Price, and upon the termination of the trust such grandchildren became seized of the legal as well as the equitable estate in remainder in such property. (39 Cyc. 202, 203.) The bill makes the trustee, as well as the grandchildren and those of the greatgrandchildren who have an interest in the unconveyed homestead estate, parties to the bill, and the court thus acquired jurisdiction of the persons of all parties who have any interest in the property in controversy. Under the express terms of the deed the estate in remainder was only to vest in such of the grandchildren of the grantor as survived the death of Charles Luther Price. Henrietta Price, the widow and sole devisee of a deceased son of the grantor, and the great-grandchildren of the grantor, are not of that class. The decree directs partition of that portion conveyed to the trustee among the grandchildren of the grantor living at the time of the death of Charles Luther Price and of the homestead estate among all of the heirs of the grantor. This is in accordance with the rights of the parties. The decree is right and will be affirmed. Decree affirmed. INDEX. ABUSE OF PROCESS.—See ACTIONS AND DEFENSES. ACCELERATION. PAGE. rule as to acceleration of remainder on failure of life es- ACTIONS AND DEFENSES. what must appear to sustain action for malicious prosecu- 457 .... 234 mandamus is proper remedy to expunge void order of dis- charge by habeas corpus... 251 when fraud is defense against assignee of note.. 301 505 the plaintiff in a forcible detainer suit must show right 525 ADMINISTRATORS.-See EXECUTORS. ADVANCEMENTS. there is no presumption of advancement where wife pays 55 what is advancement-under common law the donee had AGENCY.-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. AMENDMENTS. when amendment of 1903 shortening time for bringing suit 301 |