It is stated in plaintiff in error's brief and not denied, and also in the written decision of the Industrial Board, that he was not able to testify at the hearing before the committee of arbitration. It appears he did testify before the Industrial Board, and that two physicians also testified in his behalf, but none of that testimony is in the record. An examination of the written decision of the Industrial Board discloses that body made its award on the ground that previous to the time plaintiff in error became faint and dizzy while attempting to lift the disks above his head, he had fallen while descending a stairway and struck his head against the frame of a door, which caused him to feel dizzy and tremble; that he had another fall before returning to the work of lifting the disks, and that medical testimony was to the effect that the blow on the head caused a hemorrhage, which was undoubtedly the cause of the paralysis.

The decision of the Industrial Board does not purport to set out the testimony heard by it, even in substance, but gives the conclusions of the board drawn from the testimony. Those conclusions appear to have been drawn from evidence that plaintiff in error's injury resulted from a fall "while descending the stairs" and striking his head against the frame of a door. Where the stairway was, when the fall occurred, and whether plaintiff in error was in the line of his duty and employment at the time, is not stated. The decision does not state when, after the fall, he returned to work, but that "after returning to work" he had another fall. "He returned to work," and while lifting the disks above his head became faint and dizzy and sank to the floor, since which time he has suffered from paralysis of the right side and leg and of the tongue. So far as this record shows no notice was ever given defendant in error of any injury resulting from a fall down a stairway. The only notice to defendant in error of any injury suffered by plaintiff in error was that of an injury caused by heavy lifting. Admitting he made a mistake in attributing his paralysis to

heavy lifting when it, in fact, resulted from the fall down the stairway, it should in some way appear when the fall occurred and that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. While this court will not disturb an award for insufficient evidence where the evidence is conflicting and there is competent evidence tending to sustain the decision, legal conclusions of the board not based on any evidence are not binding on this court and will not be sustained. Dietzen Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 11.

Plaintiff in error contends that the evidence heard by the Industrial Board on review not having been preserved it will be presumed it was sufficient to sustain the board's decision, and relies on Smith-Lohr Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 88. In that case the committee of arbitration found against the claimant. On review before the Industrial Board, where "considerable additional testimony" was heard, an award was made in claimant's favor. The decision of the Industrial Board was affirmed by the circuit court and the record was brought to this court for review by writ of error sued out by the coal mining company. The additional testimony heard on the petition for review by the Industrial Board was not preserved in the record, and this court held: "It must be presumed that the additional evidence so heard was sufficient to sustain. the board's findings, in the absence of such additional testimony, from the record." In this case the circuit court reversed the decision and award of the Industrial Board and plaintiff in error has brought the record here to secure a reversal of the judgment of the circuit court. In order to justify that result it must be made to appear that the decision of the Industrial Board was justified by the evidence heard by it and that the judgment of the circuit court was wrong. This being a proceeding at law, it was not incumbent on the defendant in error to bring up the evidence to support the judgment. The presumptions are in favor of the judgment of the circuit court and plaintiff in error must

overcome those presumptions. That is the doctrine of the Smith-Lohr Coal Mining Co. case.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(No. 11524. Decree affirmed.)

THE STANDARD BREWERY, Defendant in Error, vs. PATRICK I. CREEDON et al.-(PATRICK I. CREEDON, Plaintiff in Error.)

Opinion filed April 17, 1918-Rehearing denied June 5, 1918.

I. LANDLORD AND TENANT-when rule that landlord may treat tenant holding over as trespasser does not apply-estoppel. Where a tenant for years holds over without any new agreement, the landlord, at his election, may treat the tenant as a trespasser or as a tenant for another year upon the same terms as before; but the rule does not apply where there is a new contract, and where it has been decided by a decree of court that a new relation of landlord and tenant arose at the expiration of the first term, such decrce, while unreversed, will cstop the landlord from claiming that the tenant is holding over or a trespasser.

2. SAME when pleadings and decrees in other suits are admissible in suit on guaranty to lease. The pleadings and the decrees in actions between the tenant and the assignee of the lessor, by which the relation of landlord and tenant for a second term under a new agreement is established between the parties, are admissible in a suit by said assignee against a guarantor of the lease for the first term, although the guarantor was not a party to such decrces or proceedings.

3. SAME when there can be no recovery on guaranty. Where a tenant has complied with all the covenants in the lease for the first five-year term, and it is established, both by judicial proceedings and the acts of the parties, that his possession for the second five-year term was as a tenant and not as a trespasser or holdover, there can be no recovery against the guarantor of the first term on the theory that the possession was unlawfully withheld after the first term and that the landlord was entitled, under the firstterm lease, to a penalty of $10 per day.

4. CORPORATIONS—when corporation cannot claim guaranty is unauthorized or ultra vires. Where the consideration for a contract by a brewery corporation guaranteeing a lease is the agree

ment by the lessee to maintain a saloon where no beer except that made by the guarantor shall be sold, the corporation cannot claim the guaranty was unauthorized or ultra vires, where the lessee kept its agreement and the corporation, with full knowledge of the contract, ratified its provisions.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JESSE A. BALDWIN, Judge, presiding.

JOSEPH P. MAHONEY, (J. KENTNER ELLIOTT, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error.

CASTLE, WILLIAMS, LONG & CASTLE, for defendant in

error.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court: Alphonso L. Creedon, brother of Patrick I. Creedon, plaintiff in error, was the owner of two certain vacant lots in the city of Chicago in 1903. On April 12, 1903, he entered into a written contract with the Harugari Maennerchor Society, (hereinafter referred to as the society,) by which it was agreed that Creedon would commission the society to construct a building on said lots according to certain agreed plans and specifications. Creedon was to furnish $11,000, to be raised by a trust deed on the premises and to be disbursed on the certificates of the architect. Creedon was also to pay all taxes levied against the premises for street improvements, and was to pay the society for moneys to be advanced by it in the construction of said building an amount not to exceed $5000, $2000 thereof to become due and payable seven and a half years from the first day of August, 1903, and the remainder thereof on or before the first day of August, 1913, with interest on the said sums at the rate of six per cent, payable semiannually. In consideration of the foregoing the society was to complete the building as agreed and was to furnish all

moneys necessary for the proper construction and completion thereof except as aforesaid, and was to furnish all labor and material, pay all the permits, architect's fees, all services for the proper and safe construction of the building, (excepting the fees for a survey,) the general taxes assessed subsequent to the year 1902, all assessments for sidewalks abutting the premises, all water taxes, and was to comply with all ordinances of the health department, to make all necessary repairs, to keep the building in good condition. during the life of the agreement, and to keep the building insured against loss by fire during its construction and on its completion to have the same insured for not less than $16,000. The society further agreed to furnish Creedon a bond in a sum to be mutually agreed upon, guaranteeing the satisfactory completion of the building within six months from the date of the agreement, and to further guarantee that all bills and claims for labor and materials furnished for the building would be fully paid. Creedon further agreed to lease the premises and improvements to the society for a period of twenty years from the first day of August, 1903, to and including the 31st day of July, 1923, at an annual rental of $1650 for the first two years of said period and $1800 per annum for the remaining eighteen years, to be paid in monthly installments of equal amounts, and to be paid in advance, beginning with August 1, 1903. The society further agreed that the rental value of the premises should be estimated at the close of each and every five-year period during the entire term of the agreement, by a board of three,-one member thereof to be selected by the parties to the agreement, and should the two appraisers fail to agree upon the rental value for any period they were to select the third appraiser, and a majority decision thereof was to determine the rental value of the premises except for the first five-year period. The decision of the board was to be final and binding on the parties to the agreement, and the expenses of the arbitration were to be borne equally