charges of the Illinois Traction System for delivering cars to it from plants in Springfield and elsewhere in Illinois located on the lines or side-tracks of the Illinois Traction System. To state the proposition more clearly: Whether appellant absorbs the switching charges for cars delivered to it by other carriers in Springfield does not necessarily depend on the kind of freight contained in the cars but on whether the cars are delivered to it by a steam railroad or by the electric railroad. No such discrimination is authorized by the law. The assistant general freight agent of appellant testified that his company does not refuse to absorb the switching charges for cars delivered from the plant of the Springfield Drain Tile Company by the Illinois Traction System because they contain drain tile but because the cars are delivered to appellant by the Illinois Traction System, and that if the plant of the Springfield Drain Tile Company were located on the line or side-track of a steam railroad appellant would absorb the switching charge. Appellant argues this case upon the theory that it has the right to make a contract or agreement with one railroad company to absorb the switching charges for cars delivered to it by that railroad from plants located on its lines without being obliged to enter into the same agreement with other connecting carriers similarly situated; that the matter of the absorption of switching charges is contractual in its nature, and that the carrier having the line haul and the connecting carrier are the parties having the right to control the matter by contract. The fallacy of this argument lies in the fact that such a contract or agreement between the carrier having the line haul and the connecting carrier is not between the parties to be affected by the so-called contract. The connecting carrier receives its compensation in any event, either from the carrier having the line haul or from the shipper, and it is not a matter of concern to it which of the parties pays its charges. The making of a so-called contract between the carrier having the line haul and the connecting carrier, by which the carrier having the line haul agrees to pay the switching charges of the connecting carrier, amounts to no more than the voluntary assumption of the switching charges by the carrier having the line haul. It is in no proper sense of the word a contract for the absorption of the switching charges by the carrier having the line haul. The proper parties to such a contract, to be of any force and effect, would necessarily be the railroad having the line haul and the shipper, and manifestly the carrier having the line haul would have no right to enter into a contract with one shipper by which the carrier agreed to absorb the switching charges and at the same time refuse to make the same contract with or render the same service for another shipper similarly situated on the line of some other railroad, where the switching charges and the charges for the line haul are in each case the same. To recognize such a right would be to sanction unjust discrimination by a common carrier against certain shippers. Section 38 of the Public Utilities act provides: “No public utility shall, as to rates or other charges, services, facilities or in any other respect, make or grant any preference or advantage to any corporation or person or subject any corporation or person to any prejudice or disadvantage. No public utility shall establish or maintain any unreasonable difference as to rates or other charges, services, facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of service. Every public utility shall, upon reasonable notice, furnish to all persons who may apply therefor and be reasonably entitled thereto, suitable facilities and service, without discrimination and without delay." In enforcing this section of the statute the commission, under the facts in this case, properly made the order which appellant here seeks to have set aside. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. (No. 11615.-Judgment affirmed.) THE WOMEN'S CATHOLIC Order of FORESTERS 7's. CATH- Opinion filed April 17, 1918. I. BENEFIT SOCIETIES—beneficiary must come within designated class at time of death of insured. The beneficiary named in a benefit certificate has no vested interest therein or in the fund provided for its payment until the decease of the member, whose death matures the certificate, and if at the time of the death of the insured the beneficiary named comes within one of the classes of beneficiaries designated in the by-laws and in the statute he may recover. 2. SAME a beneficiary may recover as a dependent although named as a member of the family. Where a benefit certificate includes dependents in a class of beneficiaries, on the introduction of the policy showing a party to be the beneficiary named, together with proof of dependency, said beneficiary may recover although named in the certificate as "dear friend and member of my family," as it is not necessary that the insured and the beneficiary be blood relatives in order that there may be dependency. ute. 3. SAME to what extent beneficiaries are limited by the statThe only limitation made by the statute upon a benefit society in the designation of its beneficiaries is that it cannot extend its beneficiaries to a class not named in the statute, but it may limit the beneficiaries to only a part of those named in the statute. 4. SAME what is sufficient to show beneficiary is a dependent. Where a benefit society includes dependents as beneficiaries, it is sufficient to show that a beneficiary is a dependent if he receives som e substantial support or assistance from the insured, such as food, clothing, lodging or education, or some other substantial aid which rests upon some moral, legal or equitable ground. 5. SAME-relation of a dependent to insured must be fixed by situs and not by contract. To entitle a beneficiary to recover as a dependent of the insured it must appear that the relation of the dependent to his benefactor is fixed by situs and not by contract, except in the one instance of husband and wife, who are at all times considered as dependent, each one upon the other. AP PEAL from the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JESSE A. BALD WIN, Judge, presiding. STANLEY S. WALKOWIAK, (O. A. Arnston, of counsel,) for appellants. CHARLES C. STILWELL, for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court: On March 4, 1915, the Women's Catholic Order of Foresters filed its bill of interpleader in the circuit court of Cook county against Catherine Heffernan, appellee, and John W. Ryan and James E. Ryan, appellants. The following facts were alleged in the bill of interpleader and were admitted in the answers thereto of both the appellee and the appellants: The complainant is a fraternal beneficiary society existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Illinois, having its principal office in the city of Chicago. It is organized and doing business for the purpose of furnishing life indemnity or pecuniary benefits to beneficiaries of its deceased members, and has engaged in furnishing insurance to its members according to its constitution and general rules duly adopted by it and in force for its government. On October 27, 1897, it issued an endowment beneficiary certificate to Winifred Ryan, who was then a member of the organization in good standing, bearing the number 13,744, class A. On the face of said certificate the name of Ann Ryan, her mother, appeared as the beneficiary thereof. On the reverse side thereof appears a request for a change of the beneficiary named on the face of the certificate, naming "Catherine Heffernan, dear friend and member of my family," as the beneficiary thereunder, and a new endowment certificate was issued to Winifred Ryan, in accordance with said request, about February 1, 1905, in the sum of $1000. Section 2 of article 15 of complainant's constitution in force at the time of the issuance of said last named certificate, and from thence up to the death of Winifred Ryan, provided that endowments may be made payable to the following classes of persons: "Class First: To a member's (1) husband, (2) children, (3) grandchildren, (4) father and mother, (5) grandparents, (6) brothers and sisters, (7) nieces and nephews, (8) cousins in the first degree, (9) aunts and uncles, (10) any members of the family, (11) next of kin who would be distributees of the personal estate of such member upon her death intestate, (12) to religious or charitable institutions; in any of which cases no proof of the dependency shall be required before issuing the endowment certificate. "Class Second: To any other person who is dependent upon the member for maintenance (food, clothing, lodging or education); in which case written evidence of the dependency within the requirements of the laws of this order must be furnished to the satisfaction of the high secretary before the endowment certificate can be issued." Winifred Ryan died in the city of Chicago on December 31, 1914, and was at the date of her death a member in good standing in said organization. She left her surviving John W. Ryan and James E. Ryan, her brothers, as her only heirs-at-law and next of kin, who claimed that Catherine Heffernan was not at any time a member of the family of or in any manner related to Winifred Ryan. The benefits of said endowment had become due and payable to the true and lawful beneficiary thereunder in the sum of $1000, less complainant's proper costs in this proceeding. Catherine Heffernan claims as the holder and lawfully designated beneficiary named in said last certificate, numbered 72,498, class A, and that Lionel Sherwin, administrator of the esWinifred Ryan, and also John W. Ryan and James. tate of E. Ryan, as heirs of Winifred Ryan, claim that they are entitled to such fund. The complainant states that it has no interest in the controversy of said parties and has in no way colluded with any of them and brings the money into court, and after being allowed $40 for its costs and charges out of said sum of $1000 is by the court discharged from the case. |