led to this belief by the false representations of Thomas that he was holding a note for $500 on his desk for her to sign; that before she signed the note in question Thomas showed her a blank note for $500, payable to the order of herself, and had laid it on his desk, and that when she signed the note she intended to sign the $500 note shown her, which she had read; that he took advantage of her attention being on the check and substituted the note sued on for the $500 note which she believed she was signing. The court sustained an objection to such proof so offered, for the reason these matters were not put in issue by the pleadings. Thereupon plaintiff in error asked leave to file an amended affidavit of merits setting up substantially the above facts. The court refused to permit such additional affidavit to be filed or proof of the facts alleged in it to be introduced in evidence. The action of the court in this respect is assigned as error.

On the trial no attempt was made to prove any of the matters set out in the original affidavits of merits or to deny that the signature attached to the $1575 note was, in fact, the signature of plaintiff in error. On the contrary, she denied she signed any note for $1575 and undertook to show that her signature to the note sued on was obtained from her in the manner indicated by the above testimony and offer of proof. It is clear from what occurred on the trial that this was the defense sought to be interposed by the additional affidavit of merits and was the only defense relied upon by plaintiff in error to the note. It is also in evidence that her counsel were taken by surprise at the ruling of the court in refusing to admit such evidence, and that the failure to embody such defense in the second affidavit of merits was through an oversight or mistake on their part as to the sufficiency of the affidavit denying the execution of the note to admit such defense. Section 10 of the Negotiable Instrument act (Hurd's Stat. 1916, p. 1779,)

provides that if any fraud or circumvention be used in obtaining the making or executing of any promissory note, such defense may be availed of against any assignee of the note as well as against the party committing such fraud. In Munson v. Nichols, 62 Ill. III, we held that where the maker was induced by the artifice of the payee to execute a note payable absolutely, under the belief that he was executing one of a different character and payable only on a contingency, such defense might be interposed to such note in the hands of an assignee. Such, in effect, was the defense sought to be interposed in this case, and the action of the court in refusing to permit the additional affidavit to be filed and to admit the evidence offered by plaintiff in error deprived her of the only defense which she had or sought to interpose to the note sued on. Under the circumstances we think the trial court should have permitted the amended affidavit of merits to be filed.

Section 1 of the statute on amendments (Hurd's Stat. 1916, p. 54,) provides that the courts "shall have power to permit amendments in any process, pleading or proceeding in such action, either in form or substance, for the furtherance of justice, on such terms as shall be just, at any time before judgment rendered therein." While a discretion is vested in the courts, under this section, to allow such amendments, it is a judicial discretion, which is subject to review, and one which should be exercised liberally in favor of the allowance of such amendments whenever essential to the proper presentation of a party's cause of action or defense. (Shufeldt v. Fidelity Savings Bank, 93 Ill. 597; Himrod Coal Co. v. Clark, 197 id. 514; Scovill Manf. Co. v. Cassidy, 275 id. 462; Misch v. McAlpine, 78 id. 507.) To hold otherwise would be practically to defeat the object of this statute. In Misch v. McAlpine, supra, we held that leave should be given to a defendant who has pleaded the general issue to file additional pleas where it appears that

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an additional plea is indispensable to enable defendant to make a legal defense and he has been guilty of no culpable negligence in asking for such leave. As pointed out in that case, the statute is very comprehensive, and permits amendments, in form or substance, in any process, pleading or proceeding at any time before final judgment. In that case the suit was brought on a promissory note and a plea of general issue with an affidavit of merits was filed. Subsequently the defendant entered his motion for leave to file a special plea setting up want of consideration and fraud in obtaining the note and that the plaintiff had notice of such fraud and want of consideration. The court refused to permit such additional plea to be filed except upon the condition that the defendant would not ask for a continuance of the cause. A motion for a continuance was subsequently overruled and the defendant was compelled to go to trial without filing the special plea. It was held it was error not to grant the continuance and to permit the additional plea to be filed. It was there further pointed out that there was nothing in the record which indicated that any extraordinary delay would ensue had the cause been continued, and it was further said on page 509 of the opinion: “But no matter what delay might ensue, defendant was entitled to leave to file additional pleas to enable him to make a ‘legal defense' and to a continuance of the cause on account of the absent witness. If the defense proposed to be made was true, plaintiffs were not entitled then or any other time to a judgment against defendant, and it would be manifestly unjust that they should have it," and for the errors indicated the judgment of the trial court was reversed. In the instant case it is clear that the only defense which plaintiff in error had to the note was the one sought to be interposed by the additional affidavit of merits. While the first affidavits filed were sworn to and do not raise this question, there is nothing inconsistent in the defense sought to be in

terposed by the additional, affidavit and that interposed by the former ones. It merely sets up additional grounds of defense not mentioned in the other affidavits of defense. While the most satisfactory reasons are not shown for not seeking to file the additional affidavit at an earlier date, we think it sufficiently appears that the defense made by the additional affidavit was the one intended to be interposed, and where, as here, it appears the original affidavit of merits was made by the attorney, and it subsequently appears to the court that through inadvertence, oversight or mistake on the part of the attorney the true defense sought to be interposed has not been made by the pleadings and cannot be made under the pleadings on file, the court, in the exercise of the discretion vested in it by the statute, should allow such amendment to be made as will enable the defendant to present the merits of his defense to the action on such terms as will be just and reasonable for the protection of the rights of all parties concerned.

Other questions have been raised and argued as to the competency and materiality of certain evidence offered and which was excluded by the court. As we understand the record, this evidence was not admitted for the reason that the trial court held that the same was incompetent and immaterial under the issues formed by the pleadings. As those questions are not likely to arise again on the issues presented by the additional affidavit it will be unnecessary to further consider them at this time.

For the reasons given the judgments of the Appellate Court and of the municipal court of Chicago must be reversed and the cause remanded to the latter court for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed. Reversed and remanded.

(No. 11766.-Judgment affirmed.)

THE PEOPLE ex rel. William A. Shriver, Appellee, vs. HERBERT H. COWEN et al. Appellants.

Opinion filed April 17, 1918.

I. APPEALS AND ERRORS―rulings on motions must be incorporated in bill of exceptions. Motions, and rulings thereon, must be incorporated either in a bill of exceptions or a stenographic report signed by the trial judge before they can become a part of the record, and recitals in the judgment order of the court and suggestions of counsel in their brief and argument that certain rulings were made on motions, supported by affidavits, are not sufficient.

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-the legislature has supreme power over public corporations. The legislature has supreme power over public corporations, and may divide, alter, enlarge or abolish them as in the legislative judgment the public welfare may require; and this power may be exercised by the legislature itself by direct legislation, or it may delegate the power to certain officers, courts or the electors of the municipality.

3. STATUTES when statutes are in pari materia—construction. Acts relating to the same subject matter and not inconsistent with each other are in pari materia although they contain no reference to cach other and are passed at different times, and where two acts in pari materia are construed together and one of them contains provisions omitted from the other, the omitted provisions will be applied in a proceeding under the act not containing such provisions, where not inconsistent with the purposes of the act.

4. SCHOOLS-Section 92 of the High School act of 1909 applies to high school districts organized under act of 1911. Section 92 of the High School act of 1909, providing for the dissolving of high school districts by election, applies to high school districts organized under the void act of 1911, as the 1911 act was an addition to the 1909 law without repealing any portion of the latter, and both statutes must be construed together.

5. SAME-validating act of 1917 does not apply to high school districts dissolved by election. The act of 1917, validating high school districts organized under the void act of 1911, does not purport or intend to validate a district which has been previously discontinued and dissolved by a vote of the people under section 92 of the law of 1909.

6. SAME―when validating act of 1917 does not revive district. The act of 1917, validating certain high school districts, does not operate to revive a district which had previously been declared in