in detail in the petition, were offered from the floor of the senate and all were separately adopted. The bill as thus amended was ordered to third reading and duly passed by the senate as amended. Afterwards the bill as amended in the senate was duly reported back to the house and the concurrence of that body asked as to all the senate amendments. On motion in the house said amendments were duly concurred in by a majority vote. It further appears that after the bill was passed by the house and amended by the senate and the amendments concurred in by the house it was presented to the Governor for his approval, and the Secretary of State has certified, as provided by section 10 of chapter 124 of our statutes, that said bill having remained with the Governor ten days, Sundays excepted, the General Assembly being in session, it has thereby become a law. It is further alleged that said act, which was presented to the Governor for his approval and which was certified to by the Secretary of State as having become a law by failure of the Governor to act thereon, did not and does not contain the fourteen amendments which were offered from the floor of the senate and adopted by that body and which were a part of the bill as it was when it passed the senate and was concurred in by the house, and that said act as now printed in the session laws was not the act passed by the senate and house of representatives and it has not become a law in the manner provided by the constitution and is invalid and void. Respondents answered the petition, admitting that the act, with the fourteen amendments aforesaid, which was passed by the house of representatives and by the senate, was never, in fact, presented to the Governor for his executive action, and they submit the question of the validity of the act to the court. Section 16 of article 5 of the constitution provides as follows: "Every bill passed by the General Assembly shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor. If 283 - 19 he approve, he shall sign it, and thereupon it shall become a law; but if he do not approve, he shall return it, with his objections, to the house in which it shall have originated, which house shall enter the objections at large upon its journal and proceed to reconsider the bill. If then two-thirds of the members elected agree to pass the same, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered; and if approved by two-thirds of the members elected to that house, it shall become a law notwithstanding the objections of the Governor; but in all such cases the vote of each house shall be determined by yeas and nays, to be entered upon the journal. ** * Any bill which shall not be returned by the Governor within ten days, Sundays excepted, after it shall have been presented to him, shall become a law in like manner as if he had signed it; unless the General Assembly shall, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall be filed with his objections in the office of the Secretary of State, within ten days after such adjournment, or become a law." In Neiberger v. McCullough, 253 Ill. 312, we held that no bill can become a law except in the mode prescribed in the constitution, and that the power and duty to decide whether a bill has become a law reside in the courts. It was further held in that case that it is competent to show by the journal of either branch of the General Assembly that a bill was not passed in the mode prescribed by the constitution, and that when it does not appear from the house and senate journals that certain amendments were printed before the vote was taken on its final passage, as provided by section 13 of article 4 of the constitution, such bill was not passed in the manner provided by the constitution and did not thereby become a valid law. While the objection to the law under consideration is different from that in Neiberger v. McCullough, supra, it is no less vital. Under section 16 of article 5 of the constitution a bill as passed by both houses shall be the one presented to the Governor for his approval or veto, and this is a necessary step before any bill can become a law. After the bill has been presented to the Governor there are three ways in which it may become a law, which are, briefly, as follows: First, by his approval; second, by remaining with him ten days, Sundays excepted, without action; third, by his vetoing the bill and returning it to the house of the General Assembly in which it was introduced and it being subsequently passed by both houses by a two-thirds vote in the manner indicated in section 16 of article 5. In the instant case the only way in which the bill could have become a law was the second, by remaining with the Governor ten days without action by him. It requires no argument to show that if a bill were passed by both branches of the General Assembly and a different bill under the same number and title were presented to the Governor for his signature and approved by him or allowed to become a law by not acting. for ten days and in the form as presented to him published. as a law, its invalidity would be established by showing the published law was not the law enacted by the General Assembly as shown by the house and senate journals. In this case a measure known as House Bill No. 737 was passed in a certain form by the house of representatives and senate and certified by the respective presiding officers of said houses, but an altogether different measure was permitted to become a law by remaining with the Governor for ten days without his action. This is conceded by the answer and is shown by the act as published in the session laws. and the certificate of the Secretary of State and the certified copy of the house and senate journals. The provisions of section 16 of article 5 of the constitution are mandatory. The law as it appears in the session laws has not been enacted and become a law without the approval of the Governor in the manner prescribed by the constitution and is therefore invalid and void. The Registration law of 1899 as amended is not affected by the invalid and unconstitutional law of 1917 and is still in force in the city of Chicago. The writ of mandamus is awarded as prayed. Writ awarded. (No. 11658.-Reversed and remanded.) THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN, Plaintiff in Error, vs. WIL- Opinion filed April 17, 1918. 1. CORPORATIONS—what is sufficient averment that agricultural society is a corporation. An allegation that an agricultural society was organized for the promotion of agriculture, horticulture, manufacturing, mechanics and household arts under and by authority of the act of 1857, and that it became and is a body corporate and politic, is a sufficient averment that said society is a corporation. 2. SAME-agricultural society organized under act of 1857 is a charitable corporation. The primary purpose of an agricultural society organized under the act of 1857 is not the pecuniary profit of its members but the promotion of public benefits, and in its essential elements such a society is a charitable corporation. 3. SAME-operation of common law rule that real estate of dissolved corporation reverts to grantor. The common law rule that the real estate of corporations remaining unsold upon dissolution reverts to the original grantor or his heirs has become obsolete as to corporations organized for profit but is still applied as to land donated to aid a corporation organized for a charitable or public purpose though not as to land purchased for a reasonable value. 4. SAME when real estate of agricultural society escheats to county. Where an agricultural society organized under the act of 1857 has ceased to operate and for more than five years has abandoned its real estate for which it had paid an adequate price, the real estate so abandoned will escheat to the county, under the statute on escheats, where there are no members of the society having any equitable claims against the land. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Franklin county; the Hon. JULIUS C. KERN, Judge, presiding. ROY MARTIN, State's Attorney, and W. F. SPILLER, for plaintiff in error. HART & HART, for defendants in error. Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court: Franklin county, plaintiff in error here, by bill in equity filed in the circuit court of said county sought to have declared as escheated to the county certain real estate described in said bill. A demurrer was sustained to the bill and the bill dismissed. On appeal to this court the decree of the circuit court was affirmed on the ground that proceedings for escheated property, being statutory, can only be prosecuted in a court of law. (Franklin County v. Blake, 247 Ill. 500.) Subsequently an information was filed in the Franklin county circuit court seeking to have declared as escheated the same tract of land. A demurrer was sustained to the information, and on appeal to this court the appeal was dismissed because no final judgment was rendered by the court sustaining the demurrer. (Franklin County v. Blake, 257 Ill. 354.) The case was again redocketed in the Franklin county circuit court, and at the February, 1917, term thereof a final order was entered sustaining a demurrer to and dismissing the information. This writ of error has been sued out to reverse said order or judgment. The information avers that on or about August 17, 1857, more than fifty persons named, together with about two hundred other citizens of Franklin county not named, under and by authority of an act of the General Assembly passed in February, 1857, entered into a voluntary association under the name "Franklin County Agricultural Society," for the purpose of promoting agriculture, horticul |