he had no idea that there would be any serious contest over the questions involved in his testimony. In any event, we do not think that his testimony is in any way contradicted, directly or indirectly, on material questions, by any evidence presented on the hearing in the circuit court.

Considering the entire record as it is before us, and having in mind all the objections raised by counsel for appellant, we are of the opinion that the evidence justifies the probating of the will, and the decree and finding of the trial court in that regard must be affirmed.

Counsel for appellant, however, further insist that even though the decree of the trial court is correct in this regard it is incorrect as to charging the costs of the guardian ad litem against appellant. They first insist that there was no proof made as to whether Louise Flynn, for whom a guardian ad litem was appointed, was a defendant, or whether she was a minor, or whether she had any interest in the case. The transcript of the record of the proceedings in the county court was introduced in evidence in the circuit court. From the order of the county court it appears that Louise Flynn was a minor and was interested in the proposed admission to probate of the said will. The guardian ad litem was appointed in the county court, and it was his duty to appear in the circuit court when the case was appealed to that court. The circuit court appointed the same guardian ad litem, and in view of the fact that the transcript of the record in the county court was presented on the hearing in the circuit court there was no occasion for the circuit court to hear any other testimony as to the minority of Louise Flynn or her interest in the proceedings. We think the state of the record was such as to authorize the circuit court to appoint a guardian ad litem. This court has held that it is the duty of any court in a proceeding to probate a will to appoint a guardian ad litem for all infant defendants made parties to such proceedings. (Simpson v. Simpson, 273 Ill. 90.) We have also held that under the present

statute a proceeding to probate a will is a proceeding inter partes and that all parties in interest should be made parties to the proceeding. (Mosser v. Flake, 258 Ill. 233.) Manifestly, Louise Flynn, a minor, having an interest in the proceedings, was properly made a party, and the court was required to appoint for her, as it did, a guardian ad litem to protect her interests.

While it is true, as insisted by counsel for appellant, that costs are not ordinarily taxed in this State unless authorized by the statute, the general rule has always been that the power to appoint a guardian ad litem to manage the defense of an infant is one which is inherent in every court of justice. (2 Sharswood's Blackstone's Com. book 3, *p. 427.) The appellant herein appealed this proceeding to the circuit court. Before he could proceed in such a way as to bind the infant minor, Louise Flynn, it was necessary that a guardian ad litem be appointed for her. We see no reason why the party who was seeking relief in the circuit court should not justly be required to pay the fees of a guardian ad litem which were incurred because of the action taken by the one who was seeking relief. It would certainly be unreasonable to hold that the guardian ad litem should be compelled to act as such without being properly compensated. The circuit court having the inherent power to appoint a guardian ad litem, and being required so to do before a hearing of the cause could proceed, it necessarily follows that the court could provide that a reasonable fee should be paid for his services to such guardian ad litem. Counsel for appellant concede that the decree only covered the costs in the circuit court. The decree of the circuit court on the question of costs was right.

We find no reversible error, and the decree of the circuit court will therefore be affirmed. Decree affirmed.

(No. 11995.-Judgment affirmed.)

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Edward J. Foote et al. Appellants, vs. WALTER CLARK et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed April 17, 1918.

I. HIGHWAYS-right to have a highway narrowed is statutory. An existing public highway cannot be narrowed unless legislative authority especially provides therefor, as no such right exists at common law.

2. SAME the State has full power over all public highways. The State has paramount authority over all public ways and public places, and the legislature may, in the absence of special constitutional restrictions, regulate or discontinue public highways or invest municipal corporations with authority to do so.

3. SAME-amendment of 1917, concerning narrowing of roads, affects pending mandamus proceeding. The amendment of 1917 to section 74 of the Road and Bridge law of 1913, giving a discretion to the highway commissioners to grant or deny a petition to narrow a road, applies to a proceeding, which was pending when the amendment was passed, for a writ of mandamus to compel the commissioners to narrow a road in accordance with a petition filed.

4. SAME-filing petition to narrow road does not fix rights of parties. The filing of a petition to require highway commissioners to narrow a road in accordance with the statute does not fix the rights of the parties so as to prevent the legislature, during the pendency of mandamus proceedings against the commissioners, from making the granting of such petition subject to the discretion of the commissioners instead of mandatory.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. SAMUEL C. STOUGH, Judge, presiding.

J. E. MALONE, JR., for appellants.

WOODWARD & HIBBS, for appellees.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the

court:

This was a petition for a writ of mandamus filed in the circuit court of LaSalle county to compel the commissioners of highways of the town of Vermilion, in said county, to

narrow a road to the width of forty feet.

The writ was

denied and the petition dismissed. From the order dismissing the petition and refusing the writ this appeal was prosecuted to this court.

In May, 1916, appellants filed their petition with the town clerk of said town to narrow a road one mile in length under the provisions of section 74 of the Road and Bridge act of 1913, the signers to said petition representing the majority of the land owners along the line of said road. Thereafter the petition was presented to the highway commissioners of said town and denied, the commissioners refusing to reduce the width of the road. Later, in June, 1916, this petition for a writ of mandamus was filed. While the petition was pending in the circuit court the legislature amended section 74 of the Road and Bridge act, said amendment going into effect July 1, 1917. On November 2, 1917, the parties to this cause stipulated that “if it shall appear to the court that the right of the relators to have the writ of mandamus prayed for has not been affected or destroyed by the passage of the act above referred to, then and in such event an order awarding the peremptory writ of mandamus as prayed for shall be entered herein; and if, on the contrary, it shall appear to the court that the said act herein above referred to has destroyed the right of the relators to have said writ issue, then and in such event said petition shall be dismissed." A jury was waived and the cause submitted to the court for trial upon the stipulation. The trial judge held that the amendment controlled at the time of the hearing and dismissed the petition.

The sole question involved in this appeal is whether section 74 of the act of 1913 as it stood on the statute books at the time this petition for mandamus was filed should control at the time of the hearing, or whether the amendment of said section in force July 1, 1917, should control the hearing on November 2, 1917.

Section 74 of the Road and Bridge act of 1913, so far as it applies to the point here at issue, reads: "The commissioners of highways of any town or road district may reduce the width of any existing public road within any town or road district to a width of forty feet when the same is petitioned for by a majority of the land owners along the line of said road, within said town or district." (Laws of 1913, p. 552.)

In People v. Commissioners of Highways, 270 Ill. 141, it was held that when a petition conforming to the provisions of the above section 74 was filed with the highway commissioners it was mandatory upon said commissioners. to grant the petition. (See to the same effect, People v. Highway Comrs. 279 Ill. 542; People v. Highway Comrs. 280 id. 24.) In 1917, while this petition for mandamus was pending in the circuit court, the legislature amended part of said section 74, so that it now reads as follows: "The commissioners of highways of any town or road district may in their discretion reduce the width of any existing public highway in any town or road district to a width of forty feet when the same is petitioned for by a majority of the land owners along the line of said road within said. town or district." (Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 2544.) The amendment, so far as it affects the question here, inserted the three words in italics, viz., "in their discretion." The history of the various amendments to this section of the Road and Bridge act bearing on this question is set out in some detail in People v. Commissioners of Highways, supra, and need not be again stated here, except to say that the Road and Bridge law as it existed before the enactment of section 74 of the act of 1913, left it permissive with the road commissioners whether such petition should be granted. or not. After this court held in People v. Commissioners of Highways, supra, that the law as it then stood was mandatory upon the commissioners and not permissive or in any way left to their judgment, the legislature, probably