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Patients afflicted with this malady are expected to keep quiet at all times, and the deceased had been advised by his doctor not to work and had not worked for some time until a few days before the accident. About two or three weeks before the accident he had received an inquiry from the company as to whether he could return to work, and he reported and worked up to the day before the accident. On Monday and Tuesday, August 1 and 2, he worked as usual. On the following day he was not feeling well and did not work, and according to George Minnis, the superintendent, was told to lay off,-"that they did not want him to do any work until he was able to work." On the following morning, August 4, the deceased returned to the office of the plaintiff in error, took his tools and went to work at the plant of the Goes Lithograph Company, at Sixty-first and State streets, in the city of Chicago. Later in the day his body was found on the sidewalk in front of the building, with a leg and arm broken and the skull fractured. No one saw him at his work or saw him fall. One witness, however, testified that his body fell from somewhere above her while she was walking along the sidewalk in front of the building. The usual safety appliances used by employees engaged in this work were found attached to the side of a window on the third story of the building, and a slip of paper to be signed by the party for whom work was done, stating that it had been done in a satisfactory manner and by what employee, was found in his pocket at the time his body was picked up in front of the building. These slips were used for assignment of work, and it was customary for the employee, when he had completed the work, to have the slip signed by the customer and return it to plaintiff in error, where it was used as a basis for computing the employee's pay. Each employee was assigned a locker at the plant, in which the rope, belt and washing appliances used by such employee in washing windows were kept, and the custom was, before an em

ployee started to work, for the superintendent to put a slip in the locker directing such employee where to go and the work that was to be done.

It is insisted that the accident in which the deceased was killed did not arise out of and in the course of the employment, for the reason that the relation of employer and employee had ceased on the day before the accident, when he was directed not to go to work again until he was able to work. Plaintiff in error insists the effect of this conversation was to terminate the employment. It is contended on behalf of the claimant that such testimony is incompetent, but, without passing on that question, we are unable to agree with the contention of plaintiff in error. Holmes was not absolutely discharged from his employment. The evidence also shows that he was not paid his wages for the two previous days' work, and that he had in his possession at the time of his death an assignment slip, directing him to go to work on the building where he was injured. The placing of such slip in the locker of the deceased was a direction from plaintiff in error to go to work the same as if delivered by its foreman in person, and when the deceased took his tools in the regular way and started to work in accordance with such assignment slip the relation of master and servant was established, and the injury occurring to the deceased while attempting to execute such assignment must be held to have occurred in the course of such employment. We think the evidence also shows that the injury arose out of the employment.

It is further insisted that plaintiff in error was not under the act, for the reason that the business in which it is engaged,―i. e., cleaning and washing windows,—is not included in the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation act. While such employment is not specifically enumerated as one of the hazardous employments included under such act, it is nevertheless an employment which is extra-hazard

ous and which we think it was the intention of the legislature should come under that act. The act is commendable legislation and should be liberally construed in order to give effect to the purpose and object in adopting such act. The legislature has not attempted to enumerate all of the various classes of work which shall be held to come under the act, but has attempted, by a general statement of the various kinds of businesses in which employers are engaged, to include all of the hazards incident to the employment of those engaged in any of such businesses. Among the businesses included are the building, maintaining, removing, repairing or demolishing of any structure. The business of washing windows, as such, in large cities, is as much a part of the maintenance of buildings as would be the replacing of glass in windows, the painting and decorating of the buildings, or the re-pointing of the outside where the mortar between the bricks was giving way. No one can seriously question but that those engaged in any of such businesses and employments would come under the act. We think the same may be said as to the business of plaintiff in error. The occupation of the deceased at the time he fell, and at other times, that of washing windows on the outside of buildings several stories high, supported by a belt and ropes attached to the window frame,-was, in fact, dangerous.

As we are of the opinion that there is sufficient competent evidence in the record that warranted the Industrial. Board in finding that the accident arose out of and in the course of the deceased's employment, the finding of the Industrial Board and the judgment of the circuit court of Cook county will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

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(No. 11480.-Judgment affirmed.)

ADOLPH SCOTT GORDEN, Appellant, vs. THOMAS J. GORDEN et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed April 17, 1918.

I. APPEALS AND ERRORS—when freehold is involved on appeal from dismissal of a petition to set aside order of probate of will. Where the effect of an order admitting a will to probate is to vest a freehold estate in the devisecs a freehold is involved on an appeal from a subsequent order dismissing a petition to set aside the order of probate, as a judgment of reversal and the setting aside of the probate would, temporarily at least, divest the freehold.

2. DESCENT from whom an illegitimate son may inherit. An illegitimate son can inherit property only from his mother, any maternal ancestor or any person from whom his mother might have inherited if living, but at common law he could inherit nothing and was looked upon as the son of nobody.

3. WILLS-notice of probate of will is required only to heirs-atlaw, legatees and devisees. The statute in relation to the probate of wills only requires the petition to state the name and place of residence of each of the heirs-at-law, legatees and devisees and requires notice to said parties, only.

4. MARRIAGE-reputation and cohabitation must concur to raise presumption of marriage. To raise a presumption of marriage cohabitation and reputation must concur, and the strength of the presumption depends upon the circumstances, but the cohabitation must be matrimonial and not meretricious, and the reputation must be founded on general, not divided or singular, opinion.

5. SAME-presumption of marriage from cohabitation and repute is rebuttable by proof. The presumption arising in favor of marriage from evidence of cohabitation and repute is rebutted and overcome by proof that the relation was meretricious in its inception, and when shown to have been illicit in its origin it will be presumed, in the absence of anything showing otherwise, that its continuance was of the same character.

6. SAME when marriage may be proved by pedigree evidence. Marriage may be proved by pedigree evidence, but such evidence must be established by the declarations of deceased blood relatives made at a time when such relatives could have no possible interest in the litigation in which such declarations were used.

7. SAME when pedigree evidence and repute are admissible to rebut proof of marriage. Pedigree evidence and repute are a species of hearsay evidence, and where there is no direct proof of

actual marriage but a presumption of marriage is attempted to be established by proof of cohabitation, by pedigree evidence and by repute, declarations of the same parties of a contrary character are admissible in rebuttal.

8. EVIDENCE-presumptions must arise upon the proof. Where there is clear proof of a fact no presumptions can be indulged except such as arise upon the proof.

9. SAME what may be considered pedigree evidence. An inscription on a tombstone properly comes under the head of pedigree evidence, and where the question is whether a certain person is the legitimate son of a testator, the fact that he is not named in the will as a legatee or devisee may be considered in connection with the pedigree evidence introduced.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Christian county; the Hon. WILLIAM B. Wright, Judge, presiding.

W. B. MCBRIDE, FRUMBERG & RUSSELL, and BROWNRIGG & MASON, for appellant.

J. E. HOGAN, S. S. CLAPPER, and George T. Wallace, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court:

A judgment and order were entered in the county court of Christian county in favor of appellees and against appellant, Adolph Scott Gorden, dismissing his petition filed in said court April 9, 1915, to set aside the order of probate of the last will and testament of Randall R. Gorden, deceased, entered October 25, 1913, and to revoke and set aside the order of said court granting letters testamentary to John M. and Thomas J. Gorden, executors named in the will. The petition charged that the testator died possessed of personal property of the value of about $100,000 and seized of real estate of about the same value; that the petitioner is the only son and heir of Randall R. Gorden, and that said purported will is not the last will and testament of the deceased. It appears from the will that the personal property was bequeathed to the First Christian Church of

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