his estate and was included in the petition to sell real estate to pay debts, to which appellant was a party defendant. In determining the division and distribution of the estate among the heirs of Edward H. Courter the law charged appellant with having received certain land of the value of $1000. If this sum was equal to or exceeded the value of appellant's share in the whole estate at the time of his father's death then appellant had no further share or interest in his father's estate. There is no direct proof of the value of the whole estate at that time, but we think the facts and circumstances in evidence warrant the conclusion that $1000 exceeded the value of appellant's share in the estate as that value existed at the time of his father's death. When the conveyance was made to appellant, Edward H. Courter was the owner of 240 acres of land lying in a body. He was then married and had four children and the issue of a deceased child. He conveyed to appellant, as an advancement, one-sixth of his land. After his death it developed that his personal estate was insufficient to pay his debts. Upon the petition of the administrator approximately 66 acres of the remaining 200 acres were set off to the widow as dower and homestead and 120 acres of the balance were sold to pay debts. At this sale each 40acre tract of the farm sold for less than $1000. Aside from the advancement made to appellant there then remained for division and distribution among the children and lineal descendants of Edward H. Courter $178.66 from the proceeds of sale of the 120 acres, 24 acres of unincumbered timber land, and the remainder in the land assigned to Lucy A. Courter as homestead and dower after the termination of her life estate. Each of the children of Courter except appellant, shortly before the final settlement and distribution by the administrator, sold and conveyed his or her interest in all the estate left by Courter, except the $178.66 in the hands of the administrator, to Lucy A. Courter for $500, and thereafter, in 1897, the children of Rachel McFarland sold and conveyed to William B. King all their interest in the estate, except the sum of $44.66 received through the administrator, for $600. The administrator did not pay to appellant any part of the $178.66 remaining, after the payment of debts, from the proceeds of sale of real estate, but distributed that money among the other children and descendants of Edward H. Courter, and filed in the estate, with his final report showing distribution, the instrument evidencing the advancement to appellant for the purpose of showing why appellant did not share in that distribution. Appellant made no objection to the distribution made by the administrator, and during a period of more than thirty years made no claim to the land in the possession of Lucy A. Courter and William B. King and their grantees, although 24 acres of this land was unincumbered by dower or homestead. It was not until oil in paying quantities was discovered on this land that appellant asserted any claim to the estate left by his father, and so far as the record discloses it was the discovery of oil that increased the value of the undivided one-fifth interest in this land now claimed by appellant to a sum exceeding $1000. Whether appellant has any interest in the real estate in controversy depends upon whether an undivided one-fifth interest in his father's estate was worth more than $1000 at the time of his father's death,-not whether thirty years. later, and after the discovery of oil on the premises, that undivided one-fifth interest is worth more than $1000. In our opinion the evidence shows that appellant has no interest in the real estate in controversy, and the decrce of the circuit court is therefore affirmed. Decree affirmed. (No. 11639.-Judgment affirmed.) JAMES P. MONAHAN, Admr., Defendant in Error, vs. THE METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error. Opinion filed February 20, 1918-Rehearing denied April 9, 1918. 1. INSURANCE—usual purpose of incontestable clauses in insurance policies. Incontestable provisions in insurance policies are valid as creating a short statute of limitations in favor of the insured, the purpose of such provisions being to fix a limited time within which the insurer must ascertain the truth of the representations made in the policy. 2. SAME-incontestable clause of policy construed as to duty of insurer. Under an incontestable clause in an insurance policy providing that "after two years this policy shall be non-contestable except for the non-payment of premiums as stipulated or for fraud," the insurer must assert its claim for a breach of warranty within the two-year period whether the insured survives that period or not, either by affirmative action or by defense to a suit brought on the policy by the beneficiary within the two years. 3. SAME ambiguous language in policy is construed in favor of insured. Uncertain or ambiguous language in an insurance policy is to be construed in favor of the insured and most strongly against the insurer. 4. SAME all rights and obligations of parties are not fixed at death of insured. Some of the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of insurance necessarily become fixed upon the death of the insured, but the beneficiary has an interest in the contract, and as between the insurer and the beneficiary all the rights and obligations are not determined as of the date of the death of the insured. 5. SAME-incontestable clause in a policy inures to benefit of beneficiary after death of insured. An incontestable clause in an insurance policy inures to the benefit of the beneficiary after the death of the insured as much as it inures to the benefit of the insured during his lifetime. WRIT OF ERROR to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. WILLIAM F. COOPER, Judge, presiding. HOYNE, O'CONNOR & IRWIN, (JOHN O'CONNOR, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error. KING, BROWER & HURLBUT, for defendant in error. Mr. JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the court: The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, plaintiff in error, issued a policy of insurance on the life of Patrick H. Fay for the sum of $3000, payable upon his death to his legal representatives, the policy being dated December 12, 1903. The date upon which the application for the policy was made is in dispute. Fay died intestate October 19, 1905. On October 31, 1905, James P. Monahan was appointed administrator of Fay's estate. The required proof of death was made, and plaintiff in error having failed to pay the amount of the policy, the administrator, defendant in error here, brought this suit against it in the superior court of Cook county January 23, 1906. The cause was tried and resulted in a verdict in favor of defendant in erThis verdict was set aside and a new trial granted. On the second trial the court directed a verdict for plaintiff in error. The judgment rendered on this verdict was reversed on appeal to the Appellate Court and the cause was remanded to the superior court. (Monahan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 180 Ill. App. 390.) A third trial resulted in a judgment for defendant in error for the full amount of the policy and interest. This judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District, and the record has been brought up for review by writ of certiorari. ror. A number of errors have been assigned and argued by plaintiff in error. Defendant in error has assigned crosserrors, and in the view we take a determination of one of the cross-errors is decisive and it will be unnecessary to note or pass upon the errors assigned. A copy of the application of Fay was expressly made a part of the contract. In the application Fay made certain express warranties, among them being that at that time he was in sound health, that he had no other insurance on his life except $4000 in the Royal League, and that the last time he had been attended by a physician was in 1902, when he had been treated by Dr. Tiben for indigestion. Plaintiff in error defended upon the ground that there was a breach of these warranties which rendered the policy void. The policy contained, among others, a provision that "after two years this policy shall be non-contestable except for the nonpayment of premiums as stipulated or for fraud." Plaintiff in error did not defend upon the ground that the policy had been procured by fraud. It did not allege or prove fraud, but relied solely upon its contention that there had been a breach of the warranties contained in the application. To plaintiff in error's plea of breaches of warranty defendant in error filed replications setting forth the incontestable clause of the policy, and alleging that although the policy was dated December 12, 1903, and within two years after that date plaintiff in error had notice of the death of Fay and of the fact that defendant in error claimed that plaintiff in error was indebted to him in the sum of $3000 by reason of the making and delivery of the policy and the payments of the premiums and presentation of the proofs of death, and although defendant in error was appointed administrator of the estate of Patrick H. Fay on October 31, 1905, plaintiff in error did not, within two years from the date of the policy, contest the same. The court sustained demurrers to these replications. The uncontradicted proof establishes the facts set out in these replications, and at the close of plaintiff in error's case defendant in error moved the court to instruct the jury to find the issues in his favor. This motion was based upon the ground that the defense interposed was barred by the provisions of the incontestable clause. This motion was denied. In the Appellate Court defendant in error assigned cross-error upon |