"That parties who have already made entries under the act approved March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-three, of which this is amendatory, shall be permitted to complete the same upon full compliance with the provisions of this act."

This assumes that, without this provision, the inchoate rights acquired under the act of March 3, 1873, would be left without authority to perfect them, or be wholly swept away. This provision would be unnecessary, if the act of March 3, 1873, remained in force.

5. The act of March 13, 1874, is a revision of the whole subject of the act of March 3, 1873, and, embracing not only the same subject but also the same objects, works a repeal or supersedure of the prior act. Thus, it was said by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of The United States v. Tynen (11 Wall., 92), that "even where two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter act covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act." This has been subjected to some criticism, but not affecting the repeal in this case. (Bishop, Written Laws, 158; United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S., 546; Norris v. Crocker et al., 13 How., 429; Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wall., 657).

6. The rule is fully recognized that, "an affirmative statute giving a new right" does not "of itself of necessity destroy a previously existing right, unless the intention of the legislature be apparent that the two rights should not exist together" (Broom, Legal Maxims, 29, citing O'Flaherty v. M'Dowell, 6 H. L. Cas., 142, 157). But here the intention of Congress to deny the right to a commission of one per centum is entirely clear.

7. The fact that the act of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat., 406, sec. 2), refers to the act of March 3, 1873, "and the acts amendatory thereof," cannot be regarded as evidence that the act of March 3, 1873, is in force. The act of March 3, 1877, is entitled "An act for the relief of certain settlers on the public lands." It permits "homestead and pre-emption settlers, where crops were destroyed or seriously injured by grasshoppers in the year eighteen hundred and seventy-seven, to leave and be absent from said lands until the first day of October, eighteen hundred and seventy-eight," &c., and then declares, that "all the rights and privileges extended by this act to homestead and pre-emption settlers shall apply to and include the settlers under an act entitled 'An act to encourage the growth of timber on western prairies,' approved March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-three, and the acts amendatory thereof." See acts of March 13, 1874 (18 Stat., 21), May 20, 1876 (19 Stat., 54), June 19, 1876 (19 Stat., 59), and July 1, 1879 (21 Stat., 48, sec. 2). This provision may have been supposed necessary, as there were settlers under the act of March 3, 1873. But such reference to a superseded act does not revive or give it effect for any other purpose than the benefit therein mentioned. (Steamboat Company v. The Collector,

18 Wall., 491). It is thus shown, that the act of March 3, 1873, was superseded by the act of March 13, 1874.

8. Most of the provisions of the act of March 3, 1873, as shown, were carried into the Revised Statutes. The Revised Statutes, which passed June 22, 1874, "embrace the statutes of the United States, general and permanent in their nature, in force on the 1st day of December, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-three," with a provision repealing all acts passed prior to the latter date, any portion of which is embraced in the revision, but with another provision, that "the enactment of the revision is not to affect or repeal any act of Congress passed since the first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-three, and all acts passed since that date are to have full effect." (Rev. Stat., 5595, 5596, 5601.) As the revision was not adopted until June 22, 1874, it was not possible for the act of March 13, 1874, to refer in terms to, or by number supersede, sections of the Revised Statutes. But, as the revision declares that all acts passed since December 1, 1873, up to June 22, 1874, "are to have full effect," and as the act of March 13, 1874, is one of such acts, it must have the effect, in superseding the act of March 3, 1873, to supersede those sections of the Revised Statutes which were taken from this last-mentioned act. Hence, no question is presented as to what would be the effect of an act passed since June 22, 1874, purporting to amend an act passed prior to December 1, 1873, which had been in whole or in part carried into the Revised Statutes, but which had been repealed by the revision.

IV. The act of March 13, 1874, was superseded by the act of June 14, 1878 (20 Stat., 113.) This latter act amends the former "so as to read as follows:" and then revives the whole subject by provisions having the same general objects, and so effects a supersedure. It continues in force the provision requiring each applicant to file an affidavit, and the other provision, that, "upon filing said affidavit with said register and said receiver and on payment of ten dollars, if the tract applied for is more than eighty acres; and five dollars if it is eighty acres or less, he or she shall thereupon be permitted to enter the quantity of land specified;" and the other provision, "that the registers and receivers of the several land-offices shall each be entitled to receive [from the applicant] two dollars at the time of entry, and the like sum when the claim is finally established and the final certificate issued." It then declares that "all acts and parts of acts in conflict with this act are hereby repealed." This latter repealing provision, though usual, was wholly unnecessary. The repeal was equally operative without it. This has already been shown.*

V. It is urged, that the policy and provisions of other acts giving fees and commissions to registers and receivers require, that such reg

* Judge Richardson's valuable "Supplement to the Revised Statutes of the United States" (vol. 1, 1874-1881) treats (see pages 8, 348) the act of March 13, 1874, as superseded by the act of June 14, 1878.

isters and receivers should be accorded the same rights under the "timber-culture acts." Statutes having similar objects should generally be construed alike. (Sedgwick, Construction Stat. and Const. L., 2d ed., 230; Receivers, &c., v. Paterson Savings Bank, 2 Stock., 13.) If the provisions of the "timber-culture acts" were ambiguous, or of doubtful import, there might be some force in this claim. But the provisions in force are perfectly clear and free from all doubt. These provisions cannot be enlarged by any general policy apparent in other statutes as to other public lands. Thus, it is said, that, in construing a statute, "we cannot, to bring it to our views, import into it words not used by the law-makers; or control it, when unambiguous, though we think it is not what it should be." (Bishop, Written Laws, 80.) When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction. It is not allowed to construe that which has no need of construction. (L., L., & G. R. R. Co. v. United States, 92 U. S., 733, 751; Bishop, Written Laws, 80, 81, 145.) Thus, it is said, "it would be dangerous to give scope to make a construction in any case against the express words, when the meaning of the makers doth not appear to the contrary, and when no inconvenience will thereupon follow; and therefore in such cases a verbis legis non est recedendum." (Edrich's Case, 3 Coke, Part V, 118; Bishop, Written Laws, 145.) Lord Bacon has said that, "judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare, to interpret law, not to make or give law." (Osage-Land Case, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 368.)

The fourth paragraph of section 2238 of the Revised Statutes is so clearly repealed, or, more properly, superseded, that it is impossible to declare it in force, without violating the plain meaning of language, the clear purpose of Congress, well-established rules, as already shown, for determining when a repeal or supersedure of a statute occurs, and the undoubted principles established by authorities cited.

The result is, that, such fourth paragraph of section 2238 of the Revised Statutes not being in force, registers and receivers of local district landoffices are not entitled to the commission of one per centum each, originally authorized by it on the minimum cash value of lands entered under the timber culture acts."

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

First Comptroller's Office, January 8, 1883.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PAYMENT OF A REGISTERED CERTIFICATE OF STOCK OF THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY A POWER OF ATTORNEY IN BLANK PURPORTING TO MAKE AN ASSIGNMENT AND AUTHORIZE A TRANSFER IN BLANK, PRESENTED LONG AFTER ITS MATURITY, AND APPEARING FROM THE RECORDS OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT TO HAVE BEEN PAID ALREADY.-BARING BROTHERS & CO.'S CASE.

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1. Under the act of November 10, 1803 (2 Stat., 245), registered certificates of stock of the United States, "bearing interest at six per centum per annum, from the twentieth day of December, 1803, inclusively, payable in London, semi-annually, the principal of which [was] payable at the Treasury of the United States by annual instalments of not less than one fourth part each, the first of which [to] commence fifteen years after the twenty-first day of October, 1803, and transferable only by appearance in person, or by attorney, at the proper office"-that of the Register of the Treasury— were issued "December 24, 1803." One of these certificates, issued payable to "Francis Baring & Company, of London, merchants," appears from the proper entry on the ledger account in the Treasury Department to have been finally paid, the last payment appearing under date of April 18, 1821. In December, 1882, long after its maturity, this certificate accompanied by a power of attorney in blank, purporting to make an assignment and authorize a transfer in blank-which power of attorney appears signed and sealed by the firm of "Francis Baring & Co.," October 31, 1805, and executed and acknowledged at London, by "Charles Wall, esqr., a partner in the house of Francis Baring and Company," "to be his and their act and deed," on said last-named date, in the presence of "James Comerford, notary public, London," as certified by said notary public under seal-was presented at the Treasury Department of the United States, and payment thereof requested, by Baring Brothers & Company, of London, successors to Francis Baring & Company. The records of the Treasury Department show that all the certificates of like tenor and effect were paid at maturity. Held (1.) That under the circumstances the record in the Treasury Department of payment is prima facie sufficient evidence of the final payment of the certificate. (2.) That after so long a period has elapsed since the certificate became due, and in view of the ability of the United States always to make payment, and of the fact that payment has been made of all other certificates of like tenor and effect, payment of this certificate may be inferred as a presumption of fact. (3.) That the law presumes payment of the certificate under the circumstances stated. (4.) That the facts and circumstances do not sufficiently show either a legal or equitable title to the certificate in the claimants. (5.) That the certificate is not in form or legal effect negotiable. (6.) That the holders of the blank assignment and power of attorney to make transfer are not authorized to fill in the blanks with their firm name. (7.) That the interpretation and validity of the blank assignment and power are to be determined by the law of England. (8.) That equitable rights might have passed by such blank assignment and power to make transfer if accompanied by proper evidence of consideration paid, and circumstances showing the purpose of the parties interested therein. (9.) That the accounting officers of the Treasury Department will generally not pass on the rights of parties claiming an equitable title to such a certificate, but will require the rights of the payees and those claiming under them to be ascertained by the decree of a court of equity. (10.) But, that, as courts of equity will not enforce stale claims, no case is here presented for reference to a court.

Under the act of November 10, 1803 (2 Stat., 245), certificates of stock were issued, one of which, being that now presented for payment, is as follows:*

"Two Thousand Dollars Louisiana Six per cent. Stock.

(No. 136.)

"TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES, "Register's Office, December 24, 1803. "BE IT KNOWN, That there is due from the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, unto FRANCIS BARING & COMPANY, of London, Merchants, or their Assigns, the sum of TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS, bearing interest at six per centum per annum, from the twentieth day of December, 1803, inclusively, payable in London, semi-annually, viz, on the first days of July and January, and at the rate of Four Shillings and Six Pence, sterling, for each Dollar, being Stock created by virtue of an act, entitled 'An act authorising the creation of a Stock to the amount of eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, for the purpose of carrying into effect the convention of the 30th of April, 1803, between the United States of America and the French Republic, and making provision for the payment of the same,' passed the tenth day of November, 1803; the principal of which is payable at the TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES by Annual Instalments of not less that One Fourth Part each, the first of which will commence fifteen years after the twentyfirst day of October, 1803; which debt is recorded in this office, and is transferable only by appearance in person, or by attorney, at the proper office, according to the rules and forms instituted for that purpose. "2,000 DOLLARS.

Accompanying this certificate is a blank assignment and power of attorney to make transfer, as follows:

"Know all men by these presents, That we, Francis Baring and Company of London, merchants, for value received, have bargained, sold, *The history of this loan can be found in a work entitled "The National Loans of the United States from July 4, 1776, to June 30, 1880, by Rafael A. Bayley, Treasury Department [second edition], Washington, Government Printing Office, 1882,” pages 46, 121. This is reprinted in vol. 2 of the Census Reports of 1880.

The original treaty of April 30, 1803 (8 Stat., 208), which gave rise to the loan under the act of November 10, 1803 (2 Stat., 245), with correspondence on the subject and papers relating to the loan, is preserved in a bound volume in the Treasury Department, entitled "Papers in relation to the purchase of Louisiana," of which papers photographic copies have been made.

The order for the issue of the so-called "Louisiana six per cent. stock," amounting to $11,250,000, was given by President Jefferson on the 16th of January, 1804, and on the same day, Secretary Gallatin directed the Register to deliver to Alexander Baring, acting as attorney, for Francis Baring & Co., of London, and Hope & Co., of Amsterdam, certificates of the new stock created under the order of the President, to the amount of $3,750,000; and to transmit the remaining certificates, amounting to $7,500,000, by a special messenger, to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to the French Republic. By the terms of the contract between the Secretary of the Treasury and Alexander Baring, as attorney, the interest on the stock issued to the amount of $5,000,000 was made payable in Amsterdam, and the interest on the balance, $6,250,000, was made payable in London. The $7,500,000 belonging to France was delivered to Robert B. Livingston, American Minister, April 25, 1804.