all postmasters. The principles and considerations stated throw some light on the question, which arises on the appeal in this case, and render a conclusion thereon not difficult.

3. The act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 602, sec. 4), is operative from its date as to the salary of the postmaster at Washington City. It is well settled, that, when there are a general provision or provisions as to a class or classes of cases, and a separate particular provision as to one or more special cases named, the latter are excepted from, and not controlled by, such general provision (State v. Stoll, 17 Wall., 425; Huidekoper's case, second, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 160). Hence the special provision of this act, as to the salary of the postmaster at Washington City, is not controlled, either (1) as to the time when it takes effect, or (2) in any other respect, by the general provisions as to other salaries. This special provision takes effect at its date, upon the general principle, that every provision of a statute so takes effect, unless otherwise specially provided. And there is no such specific provision, either in this, or by force of any other act. The special provision, which is made, as to the time when the act takes effect on the salaries of postmasters of the first, second, and third classes, necessarily gives rise, by implica tion, to the inference that Congress intended the act to take effect as to all other salaries at its date. This inference is aided by the fact that the act requires a re-adjustment by the Postmaster-General of the salaries of the postmasters of the first three classes, on which a change of salary should be based, while there is no re-adjustment required as to the salary of the postmaster at Washington City, but its amount is by the act definitely fixed, and is unchangeable, except by subsequent statute. Congress has clearly shown a purpose to exclude the salary of the postmaster at Washington City from the operation of all laws fixing amounts, except the special provision fixing it at $5,000 per annum. The reasons which operated to make this exceptional provision must be presumed to so operate from the date of the act, there being no evidence of a contrary intention. From the latter date this office ceased to belong to any of the general classes specified, and hence is governed by its own law.

The action of the Auditor of the Treasury for the Post-Office Department is affirmed in its allowance of one thousand dollars, and is reversed as to the disallowance of two hundred and fifty dollars; and said latter sum is adjudged to be allowed to the postmaster at Washington City, as charged in his quarterly account for the quarter which ended September 30, 1883; and said account is adjusted accordingly.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

First Comptroller's Office, November 26, 1883.

IN THE MATTER OF THE AUTHORITY TO PAY, FROM AN APPROPRIATION FOR THE SERVICE OF A CURRENT FISCAL YEAR, AN ALLOWANCE MADE TO AN ATTORNEY RETAINED TO ASSIST A DISTRICT ATTORNEY, FOR CONTINUOUS SERVICE IN PART RENDERED DURING A PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR.-STAR-ROUTE ATTORNEY'S CASE.

1. When an attorney is, under section 363 of the Revised Statutes, retained by the Attorney-General, to assist a district attorney, and the attorney so retained renders continuous service running through parts of two fiscal years, the compensation for the service rendered in each year is to be paid from the annual appropriation for that year.

2. The question, whether an attorney, under a retainer for continuous service to be completed, is entitled to any part of his compensation during the progress of his service, depends on the terms of the contract of employment.

3. Authorities cited on the right of an attorney to a quantum meruit.

The Attorney-General is authorized, "whenever in his opinion the public interest requires it," to "employ and retain, in the name of the United States, such attorneys and counselors at law as he may think necessary to assist the district attorneys in the discharge of their duties," and is also authorized to fix "the amount of compensation" for such service. (Rev. Stat., 363.)

In the year 1881, the Attorney-General retained an attorney to assist the attorney of the United States for the District of Columbia (Rev. Stat. relating to Dist. Col., 904) in prosecuting what are commonly known as the star-route cases. The service of the attorney so retained has continued at short intervals ever since. During the fiscal year which ended June 30, 1883, sundry payments for his services were made, on accounts presented by him of amounts approved by the AttorneyGeneral, from the appropriation "For payments of district attorneys and their assistants," provided by the act of August 7, 1882 (22 Stat., 336).

An account for the services of the attorney so retained "in full to November 19, 1883," approved by the Attorney-General for a gross sum, is presented to the First Comptroller for his appropriate action thereon. This account covers services since April 5, 1883. The appropriation for the fiscal year which ended June 30, 1883, is exhausted. The claimant asks that this entire account be paid from the appropriation "For payments of district attorneys and their assistants," made by the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 631), for the current fiscal year ending June 30, 1884.

DECISION BY WILLIAM LAWRENCE, First Comptroller.

It is ascertained, that the practice has not been entirely uniform as to the appropriation from which payments have been made in such

cases as this. This want of uniformity has, perhaps, grown out of the fact that the appropriations have generally been adequate, and the result in no way affected the Treasury or the authority of Congress. If the whole account in this case can now be paid from the appropriation for the current fiscal year, Congress can have no control over such account. If, however, that portion of it, which is for services rendered during the fiscal year which ended June 30, 1883, cannot be paid from the appropriation for the current fiscal year, Congress will be asked for a deficiency appropriation for the fiscal year 1883, from which such portion can be paid. Congress will thus exercise its discretion as to making an appropriation.

Thus, the question is presented, how far payment may be made from the appropriation for the current fiscal year. And it is clear, that only so much of the account can be paid from this appropriation as shall be approved by the Attorney-General for services rendered since June 30, 1883. The statutes admit of no other construction. The act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 603, 631), makes appropriations, as it says, "for the objects hereinafter expressed for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and eighty-four." Its title is: "An act making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and eighty-four," &c. Other appropriation acts use an equivalent expression in making appropriations "for the service of the fiscal year." (Act August 5, 1882, 22 Stat., 219; act July 1, 1882, 22 Stat., 128.) These are mere examples. Thus, the appropriation for the current fiscal year is, by its clear terms and purpose, limited to the payment for service rendered during such fiscal year. It is an annual appropriation, which, by well settled usage, is to be distinguished from a permanent specific appropriation, or from a defi ciency appropriation. (Mississippi Central Railroad Co.'s case, post.) Various provisions of the Revised Statutes recognize this view. Section 3690 refers to "appropriations contained in the annual appropriation bills and made specifically for the service of any fiscal year,” and declares, that such appropriations "shall only be applied to the payment of expenses properly incurred during that year, or to the fulfillment of contracts properly made within that year," and, as to services, for such as were rendered within the year. The statute requires the Secretary of the Treasury to submit to Congress "annual estimates for the public service." (Rev. Stat., 3669.) The appropriations based on these annual estimates are "for that fiscal year," for which the estimate is made. (Rev. Stat., 3679.) The history of the legislation on the subject ject of appropriations shows that Congress, by various provisions, has devoted annual appropriations for personal or official services to the payment only for such services as were rendered within the year for which the appropriation was made. (1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d ed., App., Ch. XIV, 579; Mississippi Central Railroad Co.'s case, post.) The claimant in this case has apparently so treated the appropriations, by

applying for and receiving payments under the appropriation for the fiscal year which ended June 30, 1883, and by now asking payment from the appropriation for the current fiscal year. If all of a claim for continuous service, running into a second year, falls due at the termination of such service, and is payable from the appropriation for the later year, then the payments already made in the fiscal year which ended June 30, 1883, were unauthorized. But, in fact and in law, personal service running through two or more years is, for all purposes of annual appropriations and payments, to be regarded as rendered, in part for the service of one year, and so on for other years, respectively. The

claimant says:

"It has been decided, that an attorney has no right to any compensation until his services are completed, unless the client chooses to make a payment on account; that, if he [such attorney], without cause, abandons the cause or business before it is completed, he can recover nothing; and that the statute of limitations runs against his claim only from the time when the services cease properly."*

The question, whether an attorney shall be entitled to partial or full payments for services from time to time as rendered, depends entirely on the contract made. The claimant in this case does not seem to have made such contract as he describes. But in the case of a contract by an attorney with the Government, for services, only to be paid for when completed, and running through a period of two or more years, he is entitled finally to payment for the service rendered in each year. He will charge accordingly. Even in such case, the appropriation acts are laws which determine the fund from which the amount of compensation earned each year shall be paid. To meet such cases, annual appropriations are made available for two years after the year in which the service is rendered (Rev. Stat., 3690, 3691; act June 20, 1874, 18 Stat., 110, sec. 5; act June 14, 1878, 20 Stat., 130, sec. 4), and, during that time, such appropriations may "be applied to the payment of expenses properly incurred during that [the proper fiscal] year" (Rev. Stat., 3690; Shipman v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl., 146; Dougherty v. United States, Id., 496; Mississippi Central Railroad Co.'s case, post). And even after the two years had elapsed, the statute formerly provided a mode (which became inoperative June 14, 1883), of securing an appropriation for payment in such cases (act June 14, 1878, 20 Stat., 130, sec. 4).

L

* As to the right of an attorney to recover on a quantum meruit, when there has been a special contract, see Wharton (Agency, 622), Thurston v. Percival (1 Pick., 415), Caldwell v. Shepherd (6 T. B. Mon., 392), Rust v. La Rue (4 Litt., 416), Quint and Hardy v. The Ophir Silver Mining Co. (4 Nev., 304), Coopwood et al. v. Wallace (12 Ala., 790), Lewis and wife v. Yale (4 Fla., 418), Lecatt v. Sallee (3 Port., 115), and Morgan et al. v. Roberts (38 Ill., 65). The right of an attorney against the Government in such case may be different from his right against private parties. Some general principles are referred to in 1 Parsons Contracts (6th ed., 115), 2 Id. (55), Contract-Assignment case (2 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d ed., 476), Exigency case (3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 104), Clark v. United States (95 U. S., 539), Dougherty v. United States (18 Ct. Cl., 503), and Strong v. District of Columbia (1 Mackey, 265).

The construction now given to the appropriation acts in question is not new; it follows several decisions in other cases. (AvailabilityAppropriation case, ante, 132; Specific-Appropriation case, ante, 137; Coyle's case, ante, 517; Mississippi Central Railroad Co.'s case, post). The statute makes the allowance of the Attorney-General, as to "the amount of compensation" for services of attorneys retained to assist district attorneys, conclusive on accounting officers (District Attorneys' Assistants' case, ante, 113). The appropriation, from which payment is to be made, is to be determined in the Treasury Department (Rev. Stat., 248, 269; Bender's case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d ed., 318; 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d ed., App. Chs., XII, XIV, 549, 585). The proper practice is supposed to be, to present an account for the service rendered in each fiscal year; and the amount of such account, approved by the Attorney-General, is to be transmitted to the proper Auditor for report to the First Comptroller. For the payment of the amount so approved for services in any fiscal year Congress, in case the appropriation therefor is exhausted, but not carried to the surplus fund, will be asked for a deficiency appropriation. The sum allowed for service during the current fiscal year is to be paid from the appropriation therefor. The parties interested will be advised accordingly.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

First Comptroller's Office, December 20, 1883.

IN THE MATTER OF RE-OPENING A DECISION OF THE FIRST COMPTROLLER REJECTING A CLAIM, FOR THE PURPOSE OF REFERRING IT FOR THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS, UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1883 (22 STAT., 485, SEC. 2).-RE-OPENING DECISION CASE.

1. The decision in Detection-Appropriation case (ante, 60) re-affirmed.

2. Section 2 of the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 485), does not apply to claims finally acted on by the First Comptroller, either before or since it became a law.

3. This conclusion is justified, as well by the words of this section, as by the rule that statutes should be so construed as "to avoid absurd consequences, injustice, and even great inconvenience."

In the Detection-Appropriation case (ante, 60), the First Comptroller rendered a decision, February 9, 1883, rejecting a claim. Section 2 of the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 485), provides:

"That when a claim or matter is PENDING in any of the executive departments which may involve controverted questions of fact or law, the head of such department may transmit the same, with the vouchers, papers, proofs, and documents pertaining thereto, to said court [of Claims], and the same shall be there proceeded in under such rules as the court may adopt. When the facts and conclusions of law shall have been found, the court shall not enter judgment thereon, but shall report its findings and opinions to the department by which it was transmitted for its guidance and action."