DECISION BY WILLIAM LAWRENCE, First Comptroller.

The simple question for decision is, have six months expired from the passage of the act, approved January 16, 1883?

An act is said to be passed on the day it is approved by the President. This act was approved and so passed on the sixteenth of January, 1883. If the "six months" mentioned in the act are to be computed commencing with the seventeenth day of January, the provision above quoted is not in force on this sixteenth of July, but will be at and after midnight of this day. But if the six months are to be computed commencing with the day the act was passed, then said provision is now in force on this sixteenth day of July. The whole question turns on the meaning of the expression "from the passage of this act." Is it inclusive or exclusive of the day of the passage of the act? The answer is, it is inclusive. In other words, in computing the six months, the sixteenth of January is to be counted as the first day. This conclusion seems to result from the evident purpose of the act. It was intended to introduce a reform in the civil service. It made a radical change in the mode of making certain appointments to office. Congress evidently intended to give a period of time of six months-no more, no less-in which the provision above quoted should not operate. In other words, the law in all its provisions, except that above quoted, was to be in operation for six months before this special provision should take effect. The law took effect and was in force on the sixteenth day of January. This is well settled. Thus in Arnold et al. v. United States (9 Cranch, 119), it appeared that the act approved July 1, 1812, provides "that an additional duty of 100 per cent. upon the permanent duties now imposed by law, &c., shall be levied and collected upon all goods, wares, and merchandises which shall from and after the passing of this act be imported into the United States." The court said, "it is contended that this statute did not take effect until the second day of July; nor indeed until it was formally promulgated and published. We cannot yield assent to this construction. The statute was to take effect from its passage; and it is a general rule that where the computation is to be made from an act done, the day on which the act is done is to be included." (United States v. Williams et al., 1 Paine, C. C., 261; see People v. Clark, 1 Cal., 406; In re Welman, 20 Vermont, 653; Rex v. Moore, Jefferson, 9; Cushing, May 25, 1855, 7 Op. Att. Gen., 216.)

In Matthews v. Zane (7 Wheat., 164, 211), the Supreme Court held that an act approved March 3, 1803, took effect and was operative "on that day." This is affirmed in Lapeyre v. United States (17 Wall., 198); and Swayne, Justice, says, "there is no statute fixing the time when acts of Congress shall take effect, but it is settled that where no other time is prescribed, they take effect from their date. Where the language employed is," from and after the passing of this act" the same result follows. The act becomes effectual upon the day of its date. In such cases

it is operative from the first moment of the day. Fractions of the day are not recognized."*

This is reaffirmed in United States v. Norton (97 U. S., 164), and it was held that the proclamation of the President of June 13, 1865 (13 Stat., 763), annulling, in the Territory of the United States east of the Mississippi River, all restrictions previously imposed upon internal domestic and coastwise intercourse and trade, took effect as of the beginning of that day, and that hence there was on that day no authority under the act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat.,375), and the Treasury regulations of May 9, 1865, for retaining from the owner of cotton shipped to New Orleans from Vicksburg, one-fourth thereof, nor for exacting from him a payment equal in value to such one-fourth.

The conclusion is that the civil service act approved January 16, 1883, in its general provisions took effect on that day; the period "of six months from the passage of this act," mentioned in section seven thereof, expired at midnight of the fifteenth of July, 1883; and that the provision of section seven of said act hereinabove quoted, took effect, and

This subject is discussed in Wellman's case, 20 Vermont, 653; Howe's case, 21 Vermont, 619; 1 Kent, Com., 457; Bishop on Written Laws, 27-31 a, citing Dwarris Stat., 2d ed., 16, 31, 34, 36, 37, 460; The Ann., 1 Gallis, 62; Panter v. Attorney General, 6 Bro. P. C., 553; Latless v. Holmes, 4 Term R., 660; Hamlet v. Taylor, 5 Jones N. C., 36; People v. Clark, 1 Cal., 406; Tomlinson v. Bulloch, 4 Q. B., D. 232; Smith v. Smith, Mart. N. C., 26; United States v. Williams, 1 Paine, 261; In re. Howes, 6 Law Reporter, 297; 1 Kent Com., 454, 455; Matthews v. Zane, 7 Wheat., 164, 211; Heard t. Heard, 8 Ga., 380; the State v. Click, 2 Ala., 26; Smets v. Weatherbee, R. M. Charl., 537; Rathbone v. Bradford, 1 Ala., 312; Goodsell v. Boynton, 1 Scam., 555; Temple v. Hays, Morris, 9; Taylor . The State, 31 Ala., 383; The State v. Bank of South Carolina, 12 Rich, 609; Wood v. Fort, 42 Ala., 641; Lapeyre v. The United States, 17 Wal., 191, 198; In re. Richardson, 6 Law Reporter, 392, 2 Story, 571; Johnson v. Merchandise, 2 Paine, 601, Dyer v. The State, Meigs, 237, 255; Wartman v. Philadelphia, 9 Casey Pa., 202; Westbrook Manuf. Co. v. Grant, 60 Maine, 88; Portland Bank ".、 Maine Bank, 11 Mass., 204; Reg. v. Edwards, 9 Exch., 32, 23 Law J., N. S. Exch., 42 ; Edwards r. Reg., 9 Exch. 628; Reg. v. St. Mary, Warwick, 1 Ellis and B., 816; Commercial Steamship Co. r. Boulton, Law Rep., 10 Q. B., 346; Duffy v. Ogden, 14 Smith (Pa.) 240; Lester r. Garland, 15 Ves., 248; Chick v. Smith, 8 Dowl. P. C., 337; Campbell v. Strangeways, 3 C. P. D., 105; Lockett v. Hill, 1 Woods, 552; Combe v. Pitt, 3 Bur., 1423, 1434; Johnson v. Pennington, 3 Green, N. J., 188; Metts v. Bright, 4 Dev. and Bat., 173; Lang v. Phillips, 27 Ala., 311; National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U. S., 686; Bishop's Crim. Law, 279 et seq.; Salmon v. Burgess, 1 Hughes, 356; In re. Wynne, Chase Dec., 227, 251; In re Richardson, 2 Story C. C., 571, 3 Op. Att.-Gen. 82; United States v. Arnold, 1 Gallis, 348; Lang v. Phillip, 27 Ala., 311; Kimm v. Osgood, 19 Miss. 60; Gardner v. The Collector, 6 Wall., 499; Kennedy v. Palmer, 6 Gray, 316; Turley *. Logan, 17 Ill., 151; Prescott v. Illinois and Michigan Canal, 19 Ill., 324; McCulloch t. The State, 11 Ind., 424; Southwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 2 Casey, Pa., 446 ; Metropolitan Board of Health v. Schmades, 3 Daly, 282, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 205; St. Martin e. New Orleans, 14 La. An., 113; 1 Bishop's Crim. Law, 296. And see Lawson's Concordance, 145, title "From," citing Peebles v. Hannaford, 18 Maine, 106; Smith v. Helmer, 7 Barb., 416; Northeastern B. R. Co. v. Payne, 9 Rich, L., 177; Tennessee, &c., R. R. Co. v. Adams, 3 Head, 596; Pittsburgh v. Clay, 74 Pa. St., 259; Chesapeake, &c., Canal Co. v. Key, 3 Cranch C. C., 599.

26 D 83

was in force, at that moment, and has been so in force and operative since, and is now in force.

Said act is now fully in force in all its provisions. The Secretary of the Treasury will be so advised.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

First Comptroller's Office, July 16, 1883.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TIME WITHIN WHICH A CLAIM MUST BE PRESENTED FOR DRAWBACK OR REBATE UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1883, (22 STAT., 488), "TO REDUCE INTERNAL-REVENUE TAXATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."-DRAWBACK EXPIRATION CASE.

1. Claims for rebate under the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 488), must be presented on or before June 30, 1883.

2. The act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 489, sec. 4), provides, "that on and after May first, 1883," "the internal taxes on snuff, smoking and manufactured tobacco" shall be reduced to eight cents per pound. And it declares "that on all original and unbroken factory packages of smoking and manufactured tobacco and snuff, held by manufacturers or dealers at the time such reduction shall go into effect, upon which the tax has been paid, there shall be allowed a drawback or rebate of the full amount of the reduction, but the same shall not apply in any case where the claim has not been presented within sixty days following the date of the reduction." Held: That the period mentioned "within sixty days following the date of the reduction" terminated at the close of business hours on June 30, 1883.

DECISION BY WILLIAM LAWRENCE, First Comptroller.

Section four of "An act to reduce internal-revenue taxation, and for other purposes," approved March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 489), provides:

"SEC. 4. That on and after May first, eighteen hundred and eightythree, the internal taxes on snuff, smoking, and manufactured tobacco, shall be eight cents per pound; and on cigars which shall be manufactured and sold or removed for consumption or sale on and after the first day of May, eighteen hundred and eighty-three, there shall be assessed and collected the following taxes, to be paid by the manufacturer thereof: On cigars of all descriptions, made of tobacco or any substitute therefor, three dollars per thousand; on cigarettes weighing not more than three pounds per thousand, fifty cents per thousand; on cigarettes weighing more than three pounds per thousand, three dollars per thousand; Provided, That on all original and unbroken factory packages of smoking and manufactured tobacco and snuff, cigars, cheroots, and cigarettes held by manufacturers or dealers at the time such reduction shall go into effect, upon which the tax has been paid, there shall be allowed a drawback or rebate of the full amount of the reduction, but the same shall not apply in any case where the claim has not been presented within sixty days following the date of the reduction; and such rebate to manufacturers may be paid in stamps at the reduced rate; and no claim shall be allowed or drawback paid for a less amount than

ten dollars. It shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, to adopt such rules and regulations and to prescribe and furnish such blanks and forms as may be necessary to carry this section into effect."

The "date of the reduction" mentioned in this section is "on and after May first, 1883." The period mentioned in this section "within sixty days following the date of the reduction" expired with the last moment of the usual business hours of the last day of June, 1883. TREASURY DEPARTMENT,

First Comptroller's Office, July 17, 1883.

IN THE MATTER OF THE RIGHT OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, TO CERTAIN FEES.-WELLS'S CASE.

1. For making docket entries, the commissioners of circuit courts are not entitled to the fees of one, two, and three dollars prescribed by section 828 of the Revised Statutes, for clerks of courts, commonly called docket fees. But they are entitled to compensation for making a docket required by order of court fifteen cents per folio.

2. Such commissioners are not entitled to fees, for making itemized statements of fees of commissioner, marshal, and witnesses, nor for copies of same, sent to the clerk of the court, in each criminal case, as distinct from compensation for the transcript of proceedings, to be returned to the clerk.

3. Such commissioners are not entitled to compensation for "filing" evidence of witnesses, to be furnished to the United States attorneys.

The accounts of W. C. Wells, a commissioner of the circuit court, for the northern district of Alabama, include charges for "docket fees" in criminal cases; also charges for making itemized statements, in such cases of fees of commissioner, marshal, and witnesses, and for copies of the same, for the clerk of the circuit court. Also charges for "filing" evidence of witnesses in such cases.

The First Comptroller, in settling this account, is required to decide whether these charges can be lawfully paid.

C. C. Lancaster, for the claimant.

I. At the November Term, 1881, of the United States court at Huntsville, Ala., the following rule was adopted by the court, upon the suggestion of the Attorney-General, for the observance of the commissioners:

"Rule 4.-Each commissioner shall keep a well-bound book as a docket, in which he shall enter, on the day the transactions occur, the issuing of each warrant, upon whose complaint and request the same was issued, the nature of the offense, and the officer to whom the warrant was delivered for service, together with the proceedings had under the said warrant; there shall be entered the names of the witnesses present and examined, and their fees, the name of the guard, if any, and his fees, together with the marshal's or deputy's fees, and all of said fees, together with mileage and expenses allowed by law, and a statement

of the commissioner's own fees, shall be properly entered upon the warrant when returned to the commissioner. After the close of each examination, the commissioner shall forward to the clerk of the United States circuit court, for the proper district, all the papers in the case, with a proper transcript of the proceedings, in which he shall schedule the papers forwarded."

The seventh clause of section 847, Revised Statutes, authorizes payment to commissioners

"For issuing any warrant or writ, and for any other service the same compensation as is allowed to clerks for like services."

The 10th, 11th, and 12th clauses of section 828, Revised Statutes, allow clerks, for making dockets, indexes, taxing costs, &c., a fee of one, two, and three dollars.

The docket fee charged by the commissioner in his account, is under the 12th clause, and is clearly within the scope and provisions of sections 847 and 828, Revised Statutes. The services performed by the commissioner in making and indexing his docket, taxing costs, &c., are identical with those of the clerk, with one exception in the 10th clause of section 828. Such services are clearly contemplated by the 7th clause of section 847, and this clause was evidently intended to embrace neeessary services, not particularly enumerated under this section. This is plainly so, because otherwise it would assume that Congress, having created this office, and having provided a free-tariff as compensation, would impose imperative duties, and payment be avoided on the ground that there was no provision for the payment of such services. In other words, payment of just charges would be denied for the performance of services actually necessary, for the proper administration of the office, and which the incumbent is bound to perform under a penalty. By rule 7 of the court" said clerks are charged with the duty of bringing to the attention of the court any failure on the part of the commissioners to comply with the foregoing order." Disobedience to rules of court is punished by giving judgment against the disobedient party or by attachment for contempt. 2 Bouv., 490. It is consonant with the principles of justice and equity, that compensation for that service should be made according to a liberal view of the statute that applies to it rather than to deny it. The conclusion might be different if the officer were compensated in part by a salary, but he is not.

"There can be no consistent theory, except that which regards official rewards as the recompense for actual or implied official work. Nor would it be possible, in most cases, to have the work done without some certainty of pay for it. An officer is not to be expected to work for nothing, his hire,

but the law assumes that the laborer is worthy of *." (Hunter's case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 152.) "the intention of the law-giver and the meaning of the law are to be ascertained by viewing the whole and every part of the Act. One part of the statute must be so construed by another that the whole may, if possible, stand; and that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be surperfluous, void, or insignificant; Broom, Leg. Max., 585.

"Where the words of a statute, prescribing compensation to a public officer, * admit of two interpretations, they should be construed in favor of the officer." (U. S. v. Morse, 3 Story, 87; Morse v. U. S., 4 Ct. Cl., 141.)

Section 4698, Code of Alabama:

"Each justice of the peace and notary public with jurisdiction of justices of the peace, must keep a docket of all criminal cases tried, which