ed., 823; Cooper v. Turner, 2 Starkie, Evidence, 497; Lucas v. Novosilieski, 1 Esp., 296; Sellen v. Norman, 4 C. and P., 80; Pfiel v. Vanbatenberg, 2 Camp., 439.)

The rule of presuming payment after the lapse of twenty years* *Dunlop v. Ball, 2 Cranch, 180; Higginson v. Mein, 4 Id., 415; Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheat, 497; Oaksmith's Lessee r. Johnston, 92 U. S., 343; Flemming v. Reed, 37 Tex., 152; Scott v. Hickox et al., 7 Ohio St., 94; Jewett v. Petit, 4 Mich., 510.

The presumption has in some cases been held conclusive. (Didlake v. Robb, 1 Woods, 680.) And, certainly, after a period of sixty years, in reason and justice the presumption should be conclusive when there has been no recognition of the debt by the debtor. In Maryland, by statute of 1715, ch. 23, sec. 6, the lapse of twelve years is made a conclusive presumption of payment in all cases of bonds, judgments, recognizances, and other specialties. (1 Dorsey, Laws of Md., Part I, 11; Carroll v. Waring et al., 3 Gill & J., 491.)

The presumption of payment rests on the same principle by which courts presume a grant from persons apparently having title to land, in favor of those having had a long-continued possession adverse in law and fact. Many of the authorities on this subject are collected in House Mis. Doc. No. 10, 2d session, 47th Congress, and in Fitzpatrick's Heirs v. Forsythe, 7 American [Cincinnati] Law Record 411, January, 1879. Among the authorities on this subject are the following:

Elementary Books. American Law Register, Feb., 1874, p. 69, old series, vol. 22, N. S. 13; Angell on Limitations, sec. 38-3-4-9-10; Starkie, Ev., Part 4, p. 1222; 2 Green). Ev., sec. 539-541 n; 1 Greenl., Ev., 20-45 n. ; 2 Washburn Real Prop., 293 A [39]; 3 Idem, 51 [449]; Washburn on Easements and Servitudes, 2d ed. [72], 109 [68], 103, &c.; Best on Presumptions of Law and Fact, 87; Wood Civil Law, 123; Phillip's Jurisprudence, sec. 147; Maine Anc. L., 284; Tudor Leading Cases, 114; Perry on Trusts, sec. 866; 2 Greenl. Ev.; Cruse Dig., Book 3, p. 423 n.; Matthew's Presumptive Evidence, 1, 7, 271–277; 3 Dane's Abridgment, 55; Hoffman's Eccl. Law, 123, 126; Broom, Legal Max., 800-852; 3 Cruse Digest, 467; 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 21 n.

It is the Doctrine of the Courts. (Lessee of Ludlow v. Barr, 3 Ohio, 408; Courcier v. Graham, 1 Ohio, 330; Blake v. Davis, 20 Ohio, 242; Duke v. Thompson, 16 Ohio, 48; Jarboe v. McAtee, 7 B. Monroe, 279; Berthelemy v. Johnson, 3 B. Monroe, 92; Edson v. Munsell, 10 Allen, 568; McArthur v. Gallagher, 8 Ohio, 512; Roods v. Symes, 1 Ohio, 316; Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick., 93; Melvin v. Lock, 17 Pick., 255; Hill v. Crosby, 2 Pick., 466; Trustees Episcopal Church v. Trustees of Newburn Academy, 2 Hawks, 233; 16 Pick., 241; Ewans v. Trumbull, 2 Johns., 313; Eldridge v. Knott, Cowp., 214; Oswald v. Leigh, 1 Term R., 270; Id., 399; Coolidge v. Leonard, 8 Pick., 504; Strickler v. Todd, 10 S. & R., 63-69; Rust v. Low, 6 Mass., 90; Mayor v. Horner, 1 Cowper, 102; Campbell r. Smith, 3 Halst., 141; Olney v. Fenner, 2 R. I., 211; Tinkburn v. Arnold, 3 Greenl. Ev., 120; Pillsbury v. Moore, 44 Maine, 154; Farran v. Merrill, 1 Greenl. Ev., 17; Croker v. Pendleton, 10 Shepley, 339; Belknap v. Trimble, 3 Paige, 577; Townsend v. McDonald, 2 Kernan, 381; Hazard v. Robinson, 3 Mason, 272; Wilson v. Wilson, 4 Dev., 154; Gayette v. Bethune, 14 Mass., 51-53; Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 402; Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend., 309-315; Schauber v. Jackson, 2 Wend., 13; Corning v. Gould, 16 Wend., 531; Hall v. McLeod, 2 Metc., Ky., 98; Wallace v. Fletcher, 10 Foster, 434; Winnipiseogee Co. v. Young, 40 N. H., 420; Tracy v. Atherton, 36 Vermont, 512; Townsend v. Downee, 32 Vermont, 183; Ingra. ham v. Hutchinson, 2 Conn., 584; Balstour v. Bensted, 1 Campl., 465; Daniel v. North, 11 East., 371; Knight v. Halsey, 3 Bos. and Pul., 172-206; Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East., 215; Wright v. Howard, 1 Sim. & Stu., 203; Wallace v. Minor, 7 Ohio, Pt. 1, p. 249; 6 Ohio, 366; 5 Ohio, 456; 16 Ohio, 34; Miller's Heirs v. McIntire, 6 Peters, 61; Harpending v. Dutch Ch., 16 Peters, 455; Humbert v. Trinity Church, 22 Wend., 485; Dutch Ch. v. Mott, 7 Paige, 77; Stillman v. Whitebrook M. Co. v. 3 Woodb. & Minot, 538; Hussb. v. McNeil, 1 Wash. C. C. R., 70; Ransdale v. Grove, 4 McLean, 282; Baird v. Wolfe, 4 McLean, 549; Sargeant v. St. B. Ind., 12 How., 371; Hanson

has the sanction of the Supreme and other courts of high authority,

v. Eustace, 2 How., 208; Boulden v. Massie, 7 Wheat., 122; Hepburn v. Auld, 5 Cranch, 262; Weatherhead v. Barkiesville, 11 How., 329; Archer v. Tanner, 2 Henning & Mun., 370; Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal., 1; Ingraham v. Hough, 1 Jones, N. C., 39; Callender v. Sherman, 5 Ired. N. C., 711; Stimfler v. Roberts, 18 Pa. St. (6 Harris), 299; Meanor v. Hamilton, 27 Pa. St., 137; Johnson v. Irwin, 3 S. & R., 291; Thomas v. Hatch, 3 Sumner, 170; Young v. Collins, 2 Brown, 28; Miller v. Bates, 3 S. & R., 63; Kingston r. Leslie, 10 S. & R., 391; Ewing v. Barton, 2 Yeates, 318; Cannon v. Philips, 2 Sneed, Tenn., 214; Lessee of Brock v. Burchell, 2 Swan Tenn., 31; Martin v. Stark, 10 Humph., 162.)

Stockbridge v. West Stockbridge, 14 Mass., 257.

Chamberlain v. Marshall and others [Saint Paul], Federal Reporter, September 20, 1881; s. C., House Mis. Doc. No. 42, first session Forty-seventh Congress, 9; Fussell v. Hughes, same Federal Reporter, 1; s. c., same Mis. Doc., 19.

Process Presumed. (Morgan r. Burnet, 18 Ohio, 535; Curtis v. Keesler, 14 Barb., 511; Tracy . Atherton, 36 Vermont, 503; Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat., 244; Wendell v. Jackson, 8 Wend., 183; People v. Dennison, 17 Wend., 312; People v. Trinity Church, N. Y. court of appeals, September, 1860; 3 P. F. Smith, 84; 1 Rawle, Penrose & Watts, Pa., 78; 4 W. & S., 336; Mather v. Trinity Church, 3 S. & R., 509; Bedle v. Beard, 12 Co., 5; Croker v. Pendleton, 10 Shepley, 339; Jackson v. McCall, 10 Johns, 377; Vandyck v. Van Buren, 1 Caines, 84; Burgess v. Bennett, 1 Caines, C., 1; Grote v. Grote, 10 Johns, 492; Jackson v. Schoonmaker, 7 Johns, 12; Mather v. Trinity Church, 3 S. & R., 509; Powell v. Millbank, 12 G., 3 B. R.; 1 T. R., 339; Williams v. Presby. Soct., 1 Ohio St., 492.)

The rule is so strong that in case of a possession adverse in law and in fact the presumption of a grant cannot be repelled by evidence. It is conclusive. (Strickler v. Todd, 10 Serg. & R., 63–69; Rust v. Lowe, 6 Mass., 90; Mayor v. Horner, Cowp., 102; 2 Greenl. Ev., sec. 539; Wilson v. Wilson, 4 Dev., 154; Ingraham v. Hough, 1 Jones, N. C., 39, and cases collected; 22 [Philadelphia] American Register, 73.)

The doctrine was applied by courts of law to easements, because the statute of limitations did not apply to them. For the same reason, courts must apply it in cases of lands to which the statute does not apply. The reason of the law is the life of the law.

Courts of Equity apply the Doctrine. (Ridley v. Hettman, 10 Ohio, 524, commented on; 22 American Law Register, 69 [N. S., vol. 13]; Larrow v. Beam, 10 Ohio, 502; Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St., 479; Matthews v. Rector, 24 Ohio St., 444-5; Wallace v. Fletcher, 10 Foster, 446; Miller v. McIntyre, 6 Peters, 61-65; Rhodes v. Symmes, 1 Ohio, 281. Fussell v. Hughes alone cited per Matthews, Justice.) The doctrine originated with courts of equity in 1707, and was adopted by courts of law in 1761. (Wallace v. Fletcher, 10 Foster, 446.)

In Tax Sales the courts presume the proceedings regular after a long possession, even less than twenty years. (Bierce v. Pierce, 15 Ohio, 547-533-543; Wallace v. Seymour, 7 Ohio, Pt. 1, p. 156; Matthews v. Rector, 24 Ohio St., 445; Burnly v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St., 474; Ward v. Barrows, 2 Ohio St., 241; Coombs v. Lane, 4 Ohio St., 112; Ridley v. Hettman, 10 Ohio, 524; Read v. Goodyear, 17 S. & R., 350; Freeman v. Thayer, 33 Maine, 76; Farrar v. Eastman, 5 Greenl. Me., 345; Brown v. Connelly, 5 Blackf'd, 391; Keane v. Cannovan, 21 Cal., 300; Coleman v. Anderson, 10 Mass., 105; Gray v. Gardner, 3 Mass., 399; Bank U. S. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat., 70; 2 Ohio St., 241-246; 4 Ohio St., 112-148.)

It is not intended to say that a presumption of payment will arise so long as the debtor acknowledges the debt. (Police Case, 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d ed., 74 Ashton's Case, Id., 167; 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d. ed., App., ch. xiv, 589, note). There is issued monthly a Public Debt Statement, which shows the outstanding matured debt. The following is from the statement of the public debt of the United States for the month of December, 1882, and does not include the certificate now in question:

INTEREST-BEARING DEBT.

Amount outstanding.

ties.

and, in principle, applies as well to simple contract debts as to special

Title of loan.

Authorizing act.

Rate.

When re-
deemable.

Interest pay-
able.

Interest due and unpaid.

Accrued in-
terest.

Registered.

Coupon.

Total.

6. There is no sufficient evidence of either the legal or equitable ownership by the claimants of the certificate in question.

a. The certificate is not in form or legal effect negotiable. It is, as the statute requires it to be, "transferable only on the books of the Treasury of the United States, by the proprietor or proprietors

his, her, or their attorney" (act of November 10, 1803, 2 Stat., 246). It cannot be pretended that there is any authority for giving it the character of a negotiable instrument. The authorities, in effect, declare it to be simply a chose in action, assignable but not negotiable. (Combs v. Hodge et al., 21 How., 405; Gibson's Case, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 286.)* The possession of the certificate is not, therefore, evidence of a legal title in the claimants. It is not even evidence of an equitable title thereto. (Combs v. Hodge et al., 21 How., 400.)

b. The possession of the certificate together with the possession of the paper purporting to be an assignment and power to make transfer, gives no legal title therein to the claimants, nor right to demand payment. The certificate, as it declares, is payable to "Francis Baring & Company, of London, Merchants, or their assigns," and "is transferable only by appearance in person, or by attorney, at the proper office, according to the rules and forms instituted for that purpose." The "proper office" of transfer is the office of the Register in the Treasury Department. There has been no transfer by Francis Baring & Co., "by ap pearance in person."

The paper in question, dated "the thirty-first day of October, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and five," and under seal, is in blank, and does not name a purchaser, or attorney to make a transfer. On the face of it there is no transfer, or power, to any named person, or company. Nor is there any authority to fill in the blanks in this paper with the firm name of the claimants as assignees, or as authorized to make the proper transfer. At the time the bond was held by Francis Baring & Co., and when the blank power was executed in England it gave no legal authority to fill in the blanks with the name of a purchaser or attorney. Thus, in White v. Vermont and Massachusetts Railroad Company (21 How., 578), decided in 1858, it is said that:

"In England the law is, that a bond delivered in blank, as it respects *The certificate of stock is not under seal. By the English common law a sealed instrument is generally not negotiable. (1 Daniel, Neg. Instrs., 27, § 31, citing Edwards, Bills and Prom. Notes, 208, 210; Chitty, Bills, 13 Am. ed. [166], 190; Story, Bills of Exchange, § 62; Story, Prom. Notes, § 55; Conine v. Junction and B. R. R. Co., 3 Houst., 289; Burroughs, Public Securities, 134, § 20, citing Glyn v. Baker, 13 East, 509, May 21, 1811.) See Stat. 51 Geo. III, ch. 64; Stat. 4 Ann; Enthoven v. Hoyle, 76 Eng. C. L., 393; Hibble white v. M'Morine, 6 M. & W., 200; Crouch v. Credit Foncier, Law Repts., 8 Q. B., 374.

There are cases in England which seem to make exceptions to this rule. (Burroughs, Public Securities, 138, § 20.)

The American doctrine is, that bonds of States, cities, and counties, and of corporations are regarded as negotiable, though under seal. (Id.. 141, § 20; White v. Vermont and Mass. R. R. Co., 21 How., 575).

the payee, is void, and the blank incapable of being filled up by the holder, either upon an implied or express parol authority from the maker. This is maintained upon the principle that the authority of an agent to make a deed for another must be by deed; and, also, that to admit the parol authority to fill up the blank would, in effect, make a bond transferable and negotiable, like a bill of exchange or exchequer bill. (Hibblewhite v. M'Morine, 6 Mees. & Welsb., 200 [decided 1840], and Enthoven v. Hoyle et al., in the Exch., 9 Eng. L. & Eq. R., 434), S. C., 76 Eng. C. L., 394, decided 1853. The law had been otherwise held by Lord Mansfield, in the case of Texira v. Evans, cited in Master v. Miller (1 Anstruther, 228); but was distinctly overruled by Park, B., in delivering the opinion of the court in the case first above cited."

See Barnett's case, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 200; 2 Parsons, Contracts, 6th ed., 723.

These doctrines are not always applied in the United States, and especially in the usages of recent years. (Barnett's case, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 202 and cases there collected.) But the so called blank assignment and power to make transfer now in question, having been executed in England, the construction and validity thereof are to be determined by the law of England. Thus it is said, that

"Matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation, and the va lidity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made." (Scudder v. Union National Bank, 91 U. S., 412; Rorer, Inter-State Law, 8, 46; Story, Confl. of Laws, § 273; Robinson . Bland, 2 Burr., 1077; 2 Fonblanque, Equity, 443; Wharton, Confl. of Laws, §§ 418, 433.)

Equitable rights might be created by the execution and delivery of such assignment and power with the certificate upon sufficient consideration. (Barnett's case, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 200; Combs v. Hodge, et al., 21 How., 400, citing Turton v. Benson, 1 P. Wm's., 496; s. c., 2 Vern., 764; Davies v. Austen, 1 Ves., jun., 247; s. c., 3 Bro., ch., 179; Cator v. Burke, 1 Bro., ch., 434; Scott . Shreeve, 12 Wheat., 605; Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How., 612.)

The law casts upon a party asserting such equitable rights the onus of proving the facts which support them-the possession, the consideration, and that the papers were designed to pass rights to the claimants. (1 Greenleaf. Evidence, § 74; 3 Id., § 253; 1 Story, Eq. Jur., 310.) And, in such cases, accounting officers of the Treasury Department, having generally no sufficient means of passing upon equities (Comegys et al. v. Vasse, 1 Pet., 212), and to avoid all question as to whether their decision would operate as a conclusive res adjudicata, would generally require adverse claimants to go into a court of equity and obtain a judicial determination by decree. See, as to effect of decision, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., Introduction, XL; Comegys et al. v. Vasse, 1 Pet., 193, 212; Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How., 614; Keyser's Case, 4 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., post. And, as to requiring decree in equity, Gibson's Case, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 286; Safford & Co.'s