In view of all this, the conclusion seems irresistible, that the compensation of a Representative in Congress cannot be withheld to be applied on his indebtedness to the United States; because: 1. The language of the Constitution is imperative. He "shall receive a compensation for" his services as fixed by law. (Art. I, sec. 6). The plain meaning of this is, that he shall be paid in money from the Treasury. If his compensation is not paid to him, but retained, it cannot, without an abuse of language, be said, that he has received it, as the Constitution requires. It is essential to a receipt that it acknowledge the delivery of the money received. (Rex v. Harvey, Russ & R., Cr. Cas., 227; Rex v. Martin, 7 Car. & Payne, 549; Fisher v. Leslie, 1 Espinasse, 426; Israel v. Israel, 1 Camp., N. P., 499.) Set-off, recoupment, and the equivalent civil law "compensation" are all treated of in the law books as distinct from, and in no sense, payment. 2. If the United States can apply the salary on a judgment in its favor, Congress can authorize any other creditor of a Representative to reach and appropriate it by judicial process. To say that such appropriation satisfies the mandate of the Constitution, that the Representative "shall receive" his compensation, would be a perversion of terms. And it may be added, that, under such a law, not a few of the ablest men who have been distinguished in Congress would have been driven from the service. 3. The clause of the Constitution in question should be construed as imperative, requiring actual payment, on grounds of public necessity and policy. The same reasons, which exist at common law to deny the right of private creditors to reach by any process the salaries of public of ficers, apply with equal, or greater, force to the United States as a creditor. The appropriation of salaries to pay debts by process of law might in some cases disable Representatives in Congress from attending sessions, and thus deny to the people the privilege of securing the services of the men of their choice. A construction of the Constitution cannot be tolerated, which would defeat the purpose, so plainly apparent, to furnish to Representatives the means of support while in the discharge of their public duties. * * The construction of constitutions and statutes, where the words admit of any doubt, "should lean strongly to avoid absurd consequences, injustice, and even great inconvenience. Great public interests will not needlessly be put at hazard by the interpretation." Bishop, Written Laws, 82). In view of all this, the officer is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable doubts which may rise under the statutes. (United States r. Morse, 3 Story, 87; Moore v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl., 139; Sherburne v. United States, 16 Id., 494-498.) 4. The intention of the makers of the Constitution is the controlling element in construing it. This may be ascertained from its words, its history, and the reasons for its provisions. (Bishop, Written Laws, 70, 92a). The provision requiring that Representatives receive compensation was made for the reasons, and to secure the objects, already stated: (1) to procure the services of men of talents, (2) to provide them with the means of support, (3) to enable them, without other means, to engage in public service, (4) to secure their independence and freedom from "the allurements of the corrupt or the opulent," and (5) to save them from the necessity of engaging in private pursuits as a means of securing a support, which might interrupt the performance of their duties. A construction of the Constitution, which would permit the salary of a Representative to be reached, either by the United States as a creditor, or by private creditors, would defeat every object which the provision as to payment was designed to secure, and this is wholly inadmissible. Thus, it is said: "The two rules of most general application in construing a written instrument are-1st, that it shall, if possible, be so interpreted ut res magis valeat quam pereat, and 2dly, that such a meaning shall be given to it as may carry out and effectuate to the fullest extent the intention of the parties." (Broom, Legal Maxims, 540). The conclusion is, that payment cannot be withheld from the claimant, Ochiltree. The Delegates from the Territories stand upon a different footing. They are not created or required by the Constitution. They are elected only in pursuance of statute. (The American Insurance Co. et al. v. Canter, 1 Pet., 511, 546; Benner et al. v. Porter, 9 How., 244; 3 Op. Att.Gen., 410.) The Constitution does not by its terms apply to their salary. It is therefore subject to the legislation of Congress. Delegates are clearly within the provisions of sections 236 and 1766 of the Revised Statutes. The salary of any Delegate may be withheld, and applied on his indebtedness to the United States. If either of the Delegates in question should not concur in this result, he has a remedy by suit in the Court of Claims, and in that form the question may reach the Supreme Court of the United States. If the First Comptroller makes a set-off in certifying a balance as to compensation of a Representative, there is no remedy if his action should be deemed erroneous. (Rev. Stat., 191, 305, 311; Bonnafon's Case, 14 Ct. Cls., 490; Taggart's Case, 17 Ct. Cls., 322.) But, under the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., 481), if the First Comptroller should refuse to make the set-off, the Secretary can withhold payment, if he shall deem it advisable. (Bonnafon's Case, 14 Ct. Cls., 489). The demand of payment of this compensation is a claim. (Claims-Assignment Case, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 15.) Before a balance is certified, or payment made, the question may be submitted by the Secretary to the Court of Claims under section 1063 of the Revised Statutes. In either of these forms the question may reach the Supreme Court, for the decision of that highest judicial tribunal of the United States. It may, if the Secretary shall deem it advisable, be transmitted to the Court of Claims for an opinion under section 2 of the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat., 485), but this would not be conclusive. If the opinion, thus obtained, should be in accord with that above given, payments would be withheld accordingly. If the opinion should be otherwise, it would be deemed proper, under the circumstances, to leave the claimant to his remedy by suit in the Court of Claims, in the hope, that it might be deemed sufficiently important to secure upon it, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer of the United States will be advised accordingly.* TREASURY DEPARTMENT, First Comptroller's Office, March 27, 1883. * In 2 Bancroft's History of the Formation of the Constitution, p. 122, it is said: "To complete the independence of Congress, provision needed to be made for the sup port of its members. The committee of detail left them to be paid for their services by their respective States; but this mode would impair the self-sustaining character of the Government. "If the general legislature,' said Dickinson, 'should be left dependent on the State legislatures, it would be happy for us if we had never met in this room."" The predominant idea was, to secure the independence of Congress by supporting the members, and the intention was, to prevent this independence from being impaired. The Government, the representative of the sovereignty, should never be imperiled from lack of support. It should be self-sustaining, self-preserving. One of the arguments used in favor of a salary was thus stated: "There was a danger that members might be compelled by their necessities, or tempted by their wants, to yield up their independence, and, perhaps, their integrity to the allurements of the corrupt or the opulent." (2d Elliot's Deb., 279, 280.) Mr. Madison said in the Virginia Convention: "Suppose their compensations had been appointed by the State governments, or fixed (in amount) in the Constitution, would it be a safe government for the Union, if its members depended on receiving their salaries from other political bodies at a distance and fully competent to withhold them? Its existence would, at best, be but precarious, they might become extremely inadequate, and produce the very evil which gentlemen seem to fear." (Elliot's Debates, p. 350.) To withhold compensation from a member for any possible reason, might destroy his independence, vacate his seat, disfranchise his constituents, and, to make the rule general, were all members in the same condition, destroy the Government, or suspend its legislative functions. Madison, in the convention (Madison Papers, p. 184), said, objecting to payment by States, "that it would create an improper dependence." So he wished to make the members independent by receiving compensation. If the compensation be not received for any reason the same result is reached, to wit, improper dependence. Mr. Randolph said: "If the States were to pay the members, a dependence would be created that would vitiate the whole system. The whole nation has an interest in the attendance and services of the members." Mr. Butler contended for payment of compensation by States for Senators, and feared that they would lose sight of their constituents, "unless dependent on them for support." (Mad. Pap., p. 425.) March 27, 1883, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury was advised, by letter, of the opinion of the First Comptroller, and on the 29th of March, 1883, the letter was returned with the indorsement, that "the Secretary will make no order in the matter." IN THE MATTER OF ALLOWANCES TO ATTORNEYS EMPLOYED AND RETAINED "TO ASSIST THE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS" OF THE UNITED STATES.-DISTRICT ATTORNEYS' ASSISTANTS' CASE. 1. Under section 363 of the Revised Statutes the usage has been, that the AttorneysGeneral appoint assistants to the district attorneys in some of the districts of the United States, who are regarded in some sense as regular assistants. 2. Under the same section the Attorneys-General have employed attorneys "to assist the district attorneys" in some designated and special case, or cases, or in a particular service. 3. Sections 269, 277, 363, and 365, of the Revised Statutes, constitute the authority by which the bills and accounts of said assistant, or special-assistant, attorneys are audited. 4. Section 363 of the Revised Statutes, and the act of August 2, 1861 (12 Stat., 285, section 2), from which this section was taken, have always been construed as giving to the Attorney-General the exclusive authority to determine the amount of the compensation to be paid, and as making his decision, with the proper certificate required by section 365 of the Revised Statutes, conclusive on the accounting officers. In this respect, the accounts thus allowed belong to that limited class of claims over which the accounting officers have no discretion as to amounts. 5. As to whether the Attorney-General can stipulate for the payment of necessary and reasonable expenses of attorneys by him employed and retained, quære? 6. If so, the amount approved by him as proper charges for such expenses is not conclusive on the accounting officers. The following is taken from Senate Executive Document, No. 82, second session, Forty-seventh Congress: TREASURY DEPARTMENT, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a resolution passed by the Senate of the United States, which was referred by your office to this office for a report, and which is as follows: "IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, February 27, 1883. "Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury be directed to furnish to the Senate copies of vouchers and items audited by the First Auditor of the Treasury on account of expenses incurred by the Department of Justice since January 1, 1882, with the names of special or assistant attorneys, and by what authority in law he audited the bills and accounts of said special or assistant attorneys." In compliance therewith I respectfully state that I transmit herewith copies of the accounts, vouchers, and items therein referred to. Section 363 of the Revised Statutes provides as follows: "SEC. 363. The Attorney-General shall, whenever in his opinion the public interest requires it, employ and retain, in the name of the United States, such attorneys and counselors at law as he may think necessary to assist the district attorneys in the discharge of their duties, and shall stipulate with such assistant attorneys and counsel the amount of compensation, and shall have supervision of their conduct and proceedings." Under this section the usage has been for the Attorneys-General to appoint assistants to the district attorneys in some of the districts of the United States, who are regarded in some sense as regular assistants. Under the same section the Attorneys General have employed attorneys to assist the district attorneys in some designated special case, or cases, or in a particular service. * * * In reply to that part of the resolution which inquires "by what authority in law the bills and accounts of said special or assist. ant attorneys" were audited, I have the honor to state that sections 363, 365, 277, and 269 of the Revised Statutes constitute the authority in question. Section 363 expressly provides as to the compensation of such special or assistant attorneys that "the Attorney-General shall stipulate with such assistant attorneys and counsel the amount of compensation, and shall have supervision of their conduct and proceedings." This provision and the act of August 2, 1861 [12 Stat., 285, Sec. 2], from which it was taken, have always been construed as giving to the Attorney-General the exclusive authority to determine the amount of the compensation to be paid and as making his decision, with the proper certificate required by section 365, conclusive on the accounting officers. In this respect the accounts thus allowed belong to that limited class of claims over which the accounting officers have no discretion as to amounts. I herewith return the resolution. Very respectfully, Hon. CHARLES J. FOLGER, Secretary of the Treasury. WILLIAM LAWRENCE, Comptroller. In addition to what was said in the foregoing letter in regard to allowances to attorneys employed and retained to assist the United States District Attorneys, it is deemed proper to add the following: The statute authorizes the Attorney-General to "employ and retain, in the name of the United States, such attorneys and counselors at law as he may think necessary." (Rev. Stat., 363.) He is the sole judge of the necessity of employing attorneys and of the number to be employed. (Exigency Case, 3 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 97, and cases there cited; Seaman-Relief Case, Id., 138; Yorktown Centennial Case, Id., 141; 1 Lawrence, Compt. Dec., 2d ed., App., ch. xii, 542.) Upon the same principle, "the amount of compensation," stipulated as the statute authorizes, is conclusive on accounting officers. Long usage has settled the question, that the stipulation of the amount may be made by the Attorney-General after the services are rendered (11 Op. Att.-Gen., 435; 10 Id., 48; 14 Id., 384; 15 Id., 168.) In many cases it would be impossible to stipulate in advance of the services. And a construction of the statute, which would require this, is forbidden by the rule, that "all laws should receive a sensible construction" (United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall., 486), and by the rule, that "the interpretation should |