ference will come to our rescue to save and preserve us from the enemy? Banish it from your minds; it is a wild and visionary dream; it is a false delusion. The sympathy of the world is against you. If you are cowards, you will falter and faint when the fact is announced to you; if you are brave men, it will arouse in your hearts the spirit of true manhood, which you have inherited from your revolutionary fathers and mothers, and make you truer than ever to your country and her cause. Do you look forward with some hope to what has been termed the conservative element of the North, and expect to be preserved and protected by it from Lincoln's power and dominion? Banish the fatal delusion. Conservatism at the North lies prostrate in the dust. In their mad efforts to take away our liberties, they have lost their own. They are as powerless to aid you as they are to protect themselves. You must either submit to Lincoln and abolitionism, or, by your own unaided arm, with the blessing of a kind Providence, win your liberty and your independence. Think not that there is a power at the North to restore to you the Constitution and the Union as they were, even if you were prepared to accept it. You must either be freemen or you must submit to Lincoln, and he has given you his terms. I put the picture before you. Do you stagger before it, or does it arouse within you anew the spirit of resistance, the spirit of freemen, worthy of the ancestry from which we sprung? Look at these things; consider well of them, and let us, with hearts purged and purified with afflictions, appeal to Him who alone can give victory and success to our arms. Doc. 60. except skirting along the bay for the distance of fifteen miles, to make sure that the work of destruction had been well performed by them. Deserters from Captains Anderson and Robinson's companies reported subsequently that both officers and men had broken up and gone home, as the destruction of the salt works which they were ordered to guard had been so complete, and six of them have enlisted in the navy, after taking the oath of allegiance. Acting Master Brown again speaks in terms of commendation of the officers and men engaged in this service, including Acting Ensign Cressy and the five men composing the crew of the steamer Bloomer. Respectfully, THEODORUS BAILEY, Acting Rear-Admiral, Commanding E. G. Blockading Squadron. Doc. 61. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURGH. NEW-YORK, March 1, 1864. THE battle of Gettysburgh is the decisive battle of this war. It not only saved the North from invasion, but turned the tide of victory in our favor. The opinion of Europe on the failure of the rebellion dates from this great conflict. How essential, then, that its real history should be known! Up to this moment no clear narrative has appeared. The sketches of the press, the reports of Generals Halleck and Meade, and the oration of Mr. Everett give only phases of this terrible struggle, and that not very correctly. To supply this hiatus, I send you a connected and, I hope, lucid review of its main features. I have not ventured to touch on the thrilling incidents and affecting details of such a strife, but have confined myself to a succinct relation of its principal events and the actors therein. My only motive is to vindicate history-do AFFAIR IN ST. ANDREW'S BAY, FLA. honor to the fallen and justice to the survivors REAR-ADMIRAL BAILEY'S REPORT. UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP SAN JACINTO, when unfairly impeached. General Meade took command of the army of the Potomac on Sunday, the twenty-eighth of Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy: June, at Frederick, Maryland. On Monday, as SIR: It affords me pleasure to report to the he states, the army was put in motion, and by department that the promise made by Acting Tuesday night the right flank had reached ManMaster William R. Brown, commanding the bark chester and the left occupied Emmettsburgh. Restless, at the conclusion of his last report con- General Buford's cavalry had advanced as far as cerning the destruction of the extensive salt Gettysburgh, and reported that the confederate works in the vicinity of St. Andrew's Bay- army was debouching from the mountains on namely, that he would complete the work so the Cashtown road. Upon this intelligence Genhandsomely begun-appears to have been kept. eral Reynolds was ordered to advance on GettysHe reports that he went on board the burgh with the First and Eleventh corps, which stern-wheel steamer Bloomer, with two officers he reached early on the first of July, and found and forty-seven men belonging to the Restless, Buford's cavalry already engaged with the eneand proceeded up the bay, against very unfavor-my-the corps of General Hill. Rapidly making able circumstances of darkness, wind, and tide, some ten miles above St. Andrew's, where his force was, and destroyed some ninety additional salt works, together with all the boilers, kettles, and buildings attached to them; whereupon the enemy commenced the destruction of some two hundred more which were in advance of our party, and thus saved us from all further trouble his dispositions, General Reynolds joined in the conflict, and soon fell mortally wounded. The command of the field then devolved on General Howard, of the Eleventh corps, who maintained his position till about two o'clock P.M., when the enemy was heavily reenforced by the arrival of Ewell's corps. The battle now raged fearfully between Hill's and Ewell's corps on one side, and General Meade broke up his quarters at Taneytown, as he states, at eleven P.M. on Wednesday, and reached Gettysburgh at one A.M. Thursday, July second. Early in the morning he set to work examining the position of the various army corps. It is hardly true to say that he imitated the example of all prudent commanders on the eve of a battle, and made a complete survey of the ground he occupied. the First and Eleventh corps on the other, till whole army to retire and take up the defensive about four P.M., when General Howard was com- on Pipe Creek almost at the moment that his pelled to yield to the superior numbers of the left flank was fiercely struggling with the right enemy and fall back, losing many prisoners-wing of the enemy. This proves how often the nearly four thousand- to the south side of plans of a general are frustrated by unlooked-for Gettysburgh. His position was eminently criti- contingencies. cal, when, to the great relief of both the General and our valiant troops, a division of the Third corps, under the immediate command of General Sickles, arrived, and the fighting for that day was at an end. It should be mentioned that the Third corps was stationed at Emmettsburgh, by order of General Meade, with a view to protect that important point; but information continuing to reach General Sickles that the First and Eleventh corps were in great danger, he decided to assume the grave responsibility of moving to their relief without orders. Leaving two brigades at Emmettsburgh, he made a forced march of ten miles, in spite of the heat and dust, in three hours, and had the satisfaction to be hailed by General Howard on his reaching the field with the flattering phrase, "Here you are, General-always reliable, always first !"-a generous pres about it. It was on these occasions that the genius of the First Napoleon revealed itself; for at a glance he saw the advantages of his own position and the assailable point of the enemy. It seems that General Lee was somewhat more astute than Meade in this; for in his report he states what he deemed "the most favorable point" for his "In front of General Longstreet," (opattack. posite our left wing,) Lee remarks, the enemy tribute from one soldier to another. General held a position from which, if he could be driven, Slocum, of the Twelfth corps, had arrived a it was thought our army could be used to advanshort time before; but his corps was then some tage in assailing the more elevated ground befour miles distant. In the early part of the yond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of evening (Wednesday) a conference of the lead- the ridge. That officer, then, was directed to ing generals took place, when some insisted on carry this position.' It is plain enough that Lee falling back toward Taney town, while others regarded the point where our left was posted as urged the expediency of maintaining their the key to our position, and if that could be ent position as offering rare advantages for the taken from us our defeat was inevitable. It is inevitable and decisive contest that must occur not to be supposed that General Meade refused on the following day. It appears that General to see this; but as he makes no mention of it Meade had issued a circular (of which I saw sev-in his report, I propose, for the sake of the fual copies) on the morning of Wednesday, July ture historian of the battle, to tell what I know first, to all his corps commanders, stating that his advance had accomplished all the objects contemplated—namely, the relief of Harrisburgh and Philadelphia-and that he would now desist altogether from the offensive. He proposed to post the whole army in line of battle on Pipe Creek, the right flank resting on Manchester and the left on Middleburgh, involving an entire change of front, and there await the movements of the enemy. The position which General Meade had selected for the final struggle between the two armies was some fifteen miles distant from Gettysburgh, where fate willed that it should occur. Whether this important circular ordering him to fall back reached the lamented Reynolds before he became engaged at Gettysburgh it is difficult to say. It could not have failed to reach General Sickles; but he happily determined to push on to the rescue of the First and Eleventh corps, already engaged. It is strange that General Meade should make no mention in his report of this singular and most important fact that he issued a plan of campaign on Wednesday, July first, directing his Besides numerous reports, the following brief communication reached him, which accidentally fell into my hands: "July 1, Gettysburgh. General SICKLES: General Doubleday (First corps) says: For God's sake, come up with all speed. They are pressing us hard. H. T. LEE, Lieut., A. D. C." Near this important ground was posted the valiant Third corps, and its commander, General Sickles, saw at once how necessary it was to occupy the elevated ground in his front toward the Eminettsburgh road, and to extend his lines to the commanding eminence known as the Roundtop, or Sugarloaf Hill. Unless this were done, the left and rear of our army would be in the greatest danger. Sickles concluded that no time was to be lost, as he observed the enemy massing large bodies of troops on their right, (our left.) Receiving no orders, and filled with anxiety, he reported in person to General Meade and urged the advance he deemed so essential. “Oh!” said Meade, "generals are all apt to look for the attack to be made where they are." Whether this was a jest or a sneer Sickles did not stop to consider, but begged Meade to go over the ground with him instantly; but the Commander-inChief declined this on account of other duties. ielding, however, to the prolonged solicitations of Sickles, General Meade desired General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, to accompany Sickles and report the result of their reconnoissance. Hunt concurred with Sickles as to the line to be occupied-the advance line from the left of the Second corps to the Roundtop Hill-but he declined to give any orders until he had reported to General Two P.M. came, and yet no orders. Why was this? Other orders than those expected by General Sickles were, it appears, in preparation at headquarters. It has since been stated, upon unquestionable authority, that General Meade had decided upon a retreat, and that an order to withdraw from the position held by our army was penned by his Chief of Staff, General Butterfield, though happily its promulgation never took place. This order is probably on record in the Adjutant-General's office. Meanwhile the enemy's columns were moving rapidly around to our left and rear. These facts were again reported to headquarters, but brought no response. Buford's cavalry had been massed on the left, covering that flank with outposts, and videttes were thrown forward on the Emmetsburgh Road. While awaiting the expected orders, Sickles made good use of his time in levelling all the fences and stone walls, so as to facilitate the movements of his troops and to favor the operations of the cavalry. What, then, was the surprise of Sickles to see of a sudden all the cavalry withdrawn, leaving his flank entirely exposed! He sent an earnest remonstrance to General Meade, whose reply was that he did not intend to withdraw the cavalry, and that a part of this division (Buford's) should be sent back. It never returned. Under these circumstances, Sickles threw forward three regiments of light troops as skirmishers and for outpost duty. The critical moment had now arrived. The enemy's movements indicated their purpose to seize the Roundtop Hill; and this in their possession, General Longstreet would have had easy work in cutting up our left wing. To prevent this disaster, Sickles waited no longer for orders from General Meade, but directed General Hobart Ward's brigade and Smith's battery (Fourth New-York) to secure that vital position, and at the same time advancing his line of battle about three hundred yards, so as to hold the crest in his front, he extended his left to support Ward and cover the threatened rear of the army. Meade, remarking, however, that he (General dismount; the enemy are engaging your front; Sickles) would doubtless receive orders immedi- the council is over." It was an unfortunate moately. ment, as it proved, for a council of war. Sickles, putting spurs to his horse, flew back to his commad, and, finding that Graham's brigade was not advanced as far as he desired, he was pushing that brigade and a battery forward about a hundred yards, when General Meade at length ar rived on the field. The following colloquy ensued, which I gathered from several officers present: Are you not too much extended, General ?" said Meade. "Can you hold this front ?" "Yes, replied Sickles, "until more troops are brought up; the enemy are attacking in force, and I shall need support." General Meade then let drop some remark, showing that his mind was still wavering as to the extent of ground covered by the Third corps. Sickles replied: "General, I have received no orders. I have made these dispositions to the best of my judgment. Of course I shall be happy to modify them according to your views." No," said Meade, “I will send you the Fifth corps, and you may send for support from the Second corps.' "I shall need more artillery," added Sickles. "Send for all you want," replied Meade, "to the artillery reserve. I will direct General Hunt to send you all you ask for." The conference was then abruptly terminated by a heavy shower of shells, probably directed at the group, and General Meade rode off. Sickles received no further orders that day. There is no doubt, I may venture to add, that Sickles's line was too much extended for the number of troops under his command; but his great aim was to prevent the enemy getting between his flank and the Roundtop alluded to. This was worth the risk, in his opinion, of momentarily weakening his lines. The contest now going on was of the most fierce and sanguinary description. The entire right wing of the enemy was concentrated on the devoted Third corps; for the object of Lee, as he states, was "to carry" the ground which Sickles occupied, and which both generals evidently regarded as of the highest importance. While this terrific combat was raging on our left, Lee ordered Ewell "to attack" our right wing, and Hill "to threaten" our centre, both with the object, as he says in his report, to divert reenforcements from reaching our left, which, as we have seen, Longstreet was "directed to carry." Well may General Meade, in his report, say, "The Third corps sustained the shock most heroically;" for they fought like lions, against tremendous odds, for nearly an hour before the Fifth corps came up under Sykes, who was immediately put in position by General Sickles to the left of the Third corps, and General Sykes was desired to relieve Ward's brigade and Smith's battery on the Roundtop, and hold the line from thence to Birney's left, (First division, Third corps.) Strange to say, this movement was not promptly carried out, and there was imminent danger of losing the Roundtop, for Longstreet was making desperate exertions to "carry it." Fearing this result, Sickles sent orders to General Crawford, of the Fifth These dispositions were made in the very face of the enemy, who were advancing in columns of attack, and Sickles dreaded lest the conflict should open before his dispositions were completed. At this juncture he was summoned to report in person at headquarters to attend a council of corps commanders. His preparations were of such moment and the attack so near that General Sickles delayed attending the council, while giving all his attention to the carrying out of his orders. A second peremptory summons came from General Meade, and, leaving his unfinished task to the active supervision of General Birney and General Humphreys, Sickles rode off to the rear to headquarters. Before he had reached there, the sound of cannon announced that the battle had begun. Hastening rapidly on, he was met by General Meade at the door of his quarters, who said: "General, I will not ask you to street was reenforced by Pickett's three brigades, and further supported by one division and two brigades from Hill's corps. corps, to reenforce Ward's brigade, but he declined to move without orders from his own corps commander, Sykes; but Captain Moore, of Sickles's staff, at length overcame his scruples, and In addition to this heavy mass of infantry, the he reached the disputed point just in time to pre- entire artillery of the rebel army was concentrated vent its falling into the enemy's hands. Consid-against our left. After his oversight of the day ering our force unequal to the exigency, Sickles before, it may be supposed that General Meade called on the heroic troops of the Second corps was better prepared to defend his left, and had for support, and they gave it with a will. The made adequate preparations. About one P.M. the struggle now became deadly. The columns of enemy opened a furious cannonade upon our left Longstreet charged with reckless fury upon our and left centre, which continued some two hours, troops; but they were met with a valor and stern with occasional responses from us. At about three fortitude that defied their utmost efforts. An P.M., the enemy moved forward in column, and alarming incident, however, occurred. Barnes's once more essayed to carry our position on the division, of the Fifth corps, suddenly gave way; left. It was during this conflict that General and Sickles, seeing this, put a battery in position Hancock, commander of the Second corps, a galto check the enemy if he broke through this gap lant soldier and accomplished officer, was woundon our front, and General Birney was sent to or-ed by a musket-ball and obliged to retire. He der Barnes back into line. "No," he said; "im- contributed greatly by his energy and valor to possible. It is too hot. My men cannot stand the success of the day. Meanwhile our artillery it." Remonstrance was unavailing, and Sickles opened with vigor and inflicted great damage. despatched his aids to bring up any troops they After a severe and prolonged struggle, the enemy met to fill this blank. Major Tremaine, of his at length fell back and abandoned the contest. staff, fell in with General Zook, at the head of "Owing to the strength of the enemy's position," his brigade, (Second corps,) and this gallant offi- says Lee's report, “and the reduction of our amcer instantly volunteered to take Barnes's place. munition, a renewal of the engagement could not When they reached the ground, Barnes's disor- be hazarded." Hence it is plain that our good dered troops impeded the advance of the brigade. fortune in preserving our position on the left "If you can't get out of the way," cried Zook, gave us the victory at Gettysburgh; and yet "lie down and I will march over you." Barnes General Meade, not having sufficiently examined ordered his men to lie down, and the chivalric the ground before the battle, disregarded the reZook and his splendid brigade, under the per- peated warnings of that sagacious officer, General sonal direction of General Birney, did march over Sickles, as well as the report of his own Chief of them right into the breach. Alas! poor Zook Artillery, General Hunt, who concurred in all the soon fell, mortally wounded, and half of his bri- suggestions of the commander of the Third corps. gade perished with him. It was about this time-Without meaning to do injustice to General near seven P.M.-that Sickles was struck by a cannon-ball that tore off his right leg, and he was borne from the field. Meade, it must be admitted that his report of this great battle is at such variance with all the statements which have appeared in the press, that it is due not only to history, but to the indomitable prowess of our heroic army, that every fact sustained by concurrent testimony should be given in order to fully establish the truth. I reserve for any suitable occasion abundant documentary evidence to support the facts furnished. It was now pretty clear that General Meade had awakened to the fact which he treated with such indifference when pressed on him by Sickles in the morning—that our left was the assailable point, if not the key to our position; for he began to pour in reënforcements whose presence in the beginning of the action would have saved On Saturday, July fourth, both armies continthousands of lives. "Perceiving great exertions ued to face each other during the entire day; on the part of the enemy," says Meade's report, without either manifesting a disposition to at"the Sixth corps (Sedgwick's) and part of the tack. "The enemy," says Meade, "drew back First corps, (Newton's,) Lockwood's Maryland his left flank, but maintained his position in front brigade, together with detachments from the Se- of our left," as if always conscious that our vulcond corps, were all brought up at different peri- nerable point was there, and they were loth to ods, and succeeded, together with the gallant re-retire from it. On the night of the fourth, Lee, sistance of the Fifth corps, in checking and finally repulsing the assault of the enemy, who retired in confusion and disorder about sunset, and ceased any further efforts." If this remarkable concentration of troops was necessary, at last, to save the left of our army, it is almost incredible that the single corps of General Sickles was able to withstand the impetuous onset of Longstreet's legions for nearly an hour before any succor reached it. finding his ammunition exhausted, and his subsistence imperilled, decided to withdraw, and he began his retreat toward Williamsport, with four thousand of our prisoners, and all his immense trains. On the morning of the fifth, this event became known, and General Meade despatched the Sixth corps in pursuit, together with some squadrons of cavalry. "The fifth and sixth of July were employed," says Meade's report, “in succoring the wounded and burying the dead." On Friday, July third, the enemy renewed The enemy made good use of all this precious their efforts to carry out the original design of time in pushing on toward Williamsport as rapidLee by overthrowing our left wing, and Long-ly as possible; and it was fortunate for them that 66 General no saying what might have happened. detachments were not detailed for these solemn and affecting duties, and that our whole army was not launched in prompt and eager pursuit. They were burdened by heavy trains filled with plunder, without ammunition, and woefully demoralized. Had the half of our army, flushed with success, fallen on them in flank or rear, or anywhere, or any how, General Lee might have got across the Potomac, but his army never. 'The trains, with the wounded and prisoners," says Lee's report, were compelled to await at Williamsport (about the eighth of July) the subsiding of the river and the construction of boats. The enemy had not yet made his appearance." The rebel army must have trembled with anxiety lest the dreaded Yankees should heave in sight before they could escape over the swollen Potomac, which Providence seemed to have destined as the place of their surrender. It was not till the twelfth of July, that our army, too long delayed, came up; but, unfortunately, the enemy had nearly finished their preparations for flight. "An attack," says Lee, was awaited during that and the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two armies were in close proximity." Why it did not take place, the country has never yet understood. General Meade, in his report, gives no explanation. The press of the day stated that General Meade again held councils of war at this supreme moment, and that several of his generals opposed falling on the crippled enemy. All we know is that Lee, | rode through Hagerstown, in the streets of which having completed his preparations, slipped quietly over the river on the morning of the fourteenth. "The crossing was not completed until one P.M.," says Lee, “when the bridge was removed. The enemy offered no serious interruption, and the movement was attended with no loss of materiel except a few disabled wagons and two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to drag through the deep mud." It seems that General Meade and the recalcitrant members of the council of war finally made up their minds to attack. "But on advancing on the morning of the fourteenth," reports General Meade, "it was ascertained he (the enemy) had retired the night previous by the bridge at Falling Waters and the ford at Williamsport." I will close these extracts with the following graphic sketch of a "stampede" which occurred on Monday, July sixth, about seven P.M., and demonstrates most unequivocally the utter demoralization of the confederate army: "About seven P.M.," the writer states, "we were several dead horses and a few dead men. After proceeding about a mile beyond the town, we halted, and General Longstreet sent four cavalrymen up a lane, with directions to report every thing they saw. We then dismounted and lay down. About ten minutes later (being nearly dark) we heard a sudden rush-a panic-and then a regular stampede commenced, in the midst of which I descried our four cavalry heroes crossing a field as fast as they could gallop. All was now complete confusion-officers mounting their horses and pursuing those which had got loose, and soldiers climbing over fences for protection against the supposed advancing Yankees. In the midst of the din I heard an artillery officer shouting to his cannoneers to stand In striking confirmation of the sketch now by him and plant the guns in a proper position given of this important battle, it may be interest- for enfilading the lane. I also distinguished ing to quote a few brief extracts from the diary Longstreet walking about, hustled by the excitof a British officer, who was a guest of General ed crowd, and remarking, in angry tones, which Lee during the campaign in Pennsylvania, and could scarcely be heard, and to which no attenwhich was published in Blackwood's Magazine, tion was paid, 'Now, you don't know what it is in September last. The writer was an eye-wit--you don't know what it is!' While the row ness of the battle of Gettysburgh, and the hearty and confusion were at their height, the object of praise he lavishes upon the confederate troops all this alarm, at length, emerged from the dark and their generals, shows that all his sympathies lane in the shape of a domestic four-wheeled carwere with the South, and he takes no pains to riage, with a harmless load of females. The conceal his prejudices against the North. Speak- stampede had, however, spread, increased in the ing of the moment when the columns of Long- rear, and caused much harm and delay." street had been finally repulsed by our left, on Friday afternoon, July third, he says: "It is difficult to exaggerate the critical state of affairs, as they appeared about this time. If the enemy or his general had shown any enterprise, there is It is to be hoped that the above narrative will be regarded as dispassionate, as it is meant to be impartial. Some slight errors may have crept in; but this may possibly stimulate others to come forward with a rectification. Had General |