coming drama, was supplied with the necessary maps and information, and rode, during the sixteenth, in company with Generals Grant, Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others, to the position on the west bank of the Tennessee, from which could be seen the camps of the enemy, compassing Chattanooga and the line of Missionary Hills with its terminus on Chickamauga Creek, the point that I was expected to take, hold, and fortify. Pontoons with a full supply of balks and chesses had been prepared for the bridge over the Tennessee, and all things prearranged with a foresight that elicited my admiration. From the hills we looked down upon the amphitheatre of Chattanooga as on a map, and nothing remained but for me to put my troops in the desired position. The plan contemplated that in addition to crossing the Tennessee and making a lodgment on the terminus of Missionary Ridge, I should demonstrate against Lookout Mountain near Trenton with a part of my command. got over on the twenty-third, but my rear division was cut off by the broken bridge at Brown's Ferry, and could not join me, but I offered to go in action with my three divisions, supported by Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis, leaving one of my best divisions to act with General Hooker against Lookout Mountain. That division has not joined me yet, but I know and feel that it has served the country well, and that it has reflected honor on the Fifteenth army corps, and the army of the Tennessee. I leave the record of its history to General Hooker, or whoever has had its services during the late memorable events, confident that all will do it merited honor. At last, on the twenty-third of November, my Third division behind the hills opposite the mouths of Chickamauga, I despatched the brigade of the Second division, commanded by General Giles A. Smith, up under cover of the hills to North-Chickamauga, to man the boats designed for the pontoon-bridge, with orders at midnight to drop down silently to a point above All on the Chattanooga were impatient for ac- the mouth of South-Chickamauga, then land the tion, rendered almost acute by the natural ap-regiments, who were to move along the river prehension felt for the safety of General Burn-quietly, and capture the enemy's river pickets. side in East Tennessee. General Giles A. Smith then to drop rapidly below the mouth of Chickamauga, disembark the rest of his brigade, and despatch the boats across for fresh loads. My command had marched from Memphis, and I had pushed them as fast as the roads and distance would permit; but I saw enough of the condition of men and animals in Chattanooga to inspire me with renewed energy. I immediately ordered my leading division (Ewing's) to march via Shell Mound to Trenton, demonstrate against Lookout Ridge, but to be prepared to turn quickly and follow me to Chattanooga, and in person I returned to Bridgeport, rowing a boat down the Tennessee from Kelly's, and immediately on arrival put in motion my division in the order they had arrived. The bridge of boats at Bridgeport was frail, and, though used day and night, our passage was slow, and the roads thence to Chattanooga were dreadfully cut up and encumbered with the wagons of other troops stationed along the road. These orders were skilfully executed, and every picket but one captured. The balance of General Morgan L. Smith's division was then rapidly ferried across; that of General John E. Smith followed, and by daylight of November twenty-fourth, two divisions of about eight thousand men were on the east bank of the Tennessee, and had thrown up a very respectable rifle-trench as a téte-du-pont. As soon as the day dawned, some of the boats were taken from the use of ferrying, and a pontoon-bridge begun under the immediate direction of Captain Dresser, the whole planned and supervised by General W. F. Smith in person. A pontoon-bridge was also built at the same time over Chickamauga Creek, near I reached General Hooker's headquarters dur-its mouth, giving communication with the two ing a rain in the afternoon of the twentieth, and regiments left on the north bank, and fulfilling met General Grant's orders for the general at a most important purpose at a later stage of the tack for the next day. It was simply impossible | drama. for me to fill my post in time. Only one division, General John E. Smith's, was in position. General Ewing was still in Trenton, and the other two were toiling along the terrible road from Shell Mound to Chattanooga. No troops ever were or could be in better condition than mine, or who labored harder to fulfil their part. On a proper representation, General Grant postponed the attack. On the twenty-first, I got the Second division over Brown's Ferry Bridge, and General Ewing got up, but the bridge broke repeatedly, and delays occurred which no human sagacity could prevent. All labored night and day, and General Ewing I will here bear my willing testimony to the completeness of this whole business. All the officers charged with the work were present, and manifested a skill which I cannot praise too highly. I have never beheld any work done so quietly, so well; and I doubt if the history of the war can show a bridge of that extent, (namely, one thousand three hundred and fifty feet,) laid down so noiselessly and well in so short a time. I attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General W. F. Smith. The steamer Dunbar arrived up in the course of the morning, and relieved General Ewing's division of the labor of rowing across, but by noon the pontoon-bridge was down, and my Third division were across with men, horses, artillery, and every thing. General Jeff. C. Davis was ready to take the Missionary Hills. The movement had been carefully explained to all division commanders, and at one P.M. we marched from the river in three columns in echelon; the left, General Morgan L. Smith, the column of direction, following substantially Chickamauga Creek; the centre, General J. E. Smith, in columns, doubled on the centre at full brigade intervals to the right and rear; the right, General Ewing, in column at the same distance to the right and rear, prepared to deploy to the right, on the supposition that we would meet an enemy in that direction. Each head of column was covered by a good line of skirmishers, with supports. A light drizzling rain prevailed, and the clouds hung low, cloaking our movements from the enemy's tower of observation on Lookout. We soon gained the foot-hills, our skirmishers kept up the face of the hill, followed by their supports, and at half-past three P.M. we gained with no loss the desired point. As turned to his own corps at Chattanooga. night closed, I ordered Ġeneral Jeff. C. Davis to keep one of his brigades at the bridge, one close up to my position, and one intermediate. Thus we passed the night, heavy details being kept at work on the intrenchments on the hill. During the night the sky cleared away bright, and a cold frost filled the air, and our camp-fires revealed to the enemy and to our friends in Chattanooga our position on Missionary Ridge. About midnight I received at the hands of Major Rowley, of General Grant's staff, orders to attack the enemy at dawn of day, and notice that General Thomas would attack in force early in the day. Accordingly, before day I was in the saddle, attended by all my staff, rode to the extreme left of our position, near Chickamauga, thence up the hill held by General Lightburn, and round to the extreme right of General Ewing. Catching as accurate an idea of the ground as possible by the dim light of morning, I saw that our line of attack was in the direction of Missionary Ridge, with wings supporting on either flank; quite a valley lay between us and the next hill of the series, and this hill presented steep sides, the one to the west partially cleared, but the other covered with the native forest; the crest of the ridge was narrow and wooded. A brigade of each division was pushed up rapidly to the top of the hill, and the enemy, for the first time, seemed to realize the movement, but too late, for we were in possession. He opened with artillery, but General Ewing soon got some of Captain Richardson's guns up that steep hill, The further point of the hill was held by the and we gave back artillery, and the enemy's skir- enemy with a breastwork of logs and fresh earth, mishers made one or two ineffectual dashes at filled with men and two guns. The enemy was General Lightburn, who had swept around and also seen in great force on a still higher hill begot a further hill, which was the real continua-yond the tunnel, from which he had a fair plungtion of the ridge. ing fire on the hill in dispute. From studying all the maps, I had inferred that Missionary Ridge was a continuous hill, but we found ourselves on two high points, with a deep depression between us and the one immediately over the tunnel, which was my chief objective point. The ground we had gained, however, was so important that I could leave nothing to chance, and ordered it to be fortified during the night. One brigade of each division was left on the hill, one of General Morgan L. Smith's closed the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John E. Smith's were drawn back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing's right was extended down into the plain, thus crossing the ridge in a general line facing south-east. The enemy felt our left flank about four P.M., and a pretty sharp engagement with artillery and muskets ensued, when he drew off, but it cost us dear, for General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded, and had to go to the rear, and the command of the brigade then devolved on Colonel Tupper, One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois, who managed it with skill during the rest of the operations. At the moment of my crossing the bridge, General Howard appeared, having come with three regiments from Chattanooga along the east bank of the Tennessee, connecting my new position with that of the main army in Chattanooga. He left the three regiments, which I attached temporarily to General Ewing's right, and he re The gorge between, through which several roads and the railroad tunnel pass, could not be seen from our position, but formed the natural place d'armes where the enemy covered his masses, to resist our contemplated movement of turning his right and endangering his communications with his dépôt at Chickamauga. As soon as possible, the following dispositions were made: The brigades of Colonels Cockrell and Alexander and General Lightburn were to hold our hill as the key point; General Corse, with as much of his brigade as could operate along the narrow ridge, was to attack from our right centre; General Lightburn was to despatch a good regiment from his position to cooperate with General Corse; and General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the east base of Missionary Ridge, connecting with General Corse, and Colonel Loomis, in like manner, to move along the west base, supported by the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith. The sun had already risen before General Corse had completed his preparations and his bugle sounded the "forward." The Fortieth Illinois, supported by the Fortysixth Ohio, on our right centre, with the Twentieth Ohio, Colonel Jones, moved down the face of our hill, and up that held by the enemy. The line advanced to within about eighty yards of the intrenched position, where General Corse found a secondary crest, which he gained and held. To this point he called his reserves, and asked for reenforcements, which were sent, but the space was narrow, and it was not well to crowd the men, as the enemy's artillery and musketry fire swept the approach to his position, giving him great advantage. As soon as General Corse had made his preparations he assaulted, and a close, severe contest ensued, lasting more than an hour, giving and losing ground, but never the position first obtained, from which the enemy in vain attempted to drive him. General Morgan L. Smith kept gaining ground on the left spur of Missionary Ridge, and Colonel Loomis got abreast of the tunnel and the railroad embankment on his side, drawing the enemy's fire, and to that extent relieving the assaulting party on the hill-crest. Calander had four of his guns on General Ewing's hill, and Captain Wood his Napoleon battery on General Lightburn's; also, two guns of Dillon's battery were with Colonel Alexander's brigade. The suddenness of the attack disconcerted the men, and, exposed as they were in the open field, they fell back in some disorder to the lower end of the field, and re-formed. These two brigades were in the nature of supports, and did not constitute a part of the real attack. The movement, seen from Chattanooga, five miles off, gave rise to the report, which even General Meigs had repeated, that we were repulsed on the left. Not so. The real attacking columns of General Corse, Colonel Loomis, and General Smith were not repulsed. They engaged in a close struggle all day persistently, stubbornly, and well. When the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith fell back as described, the enemy made a show of pursuit, but were caught in flank by the well-directed fire of our brigade on the wooded crest, and hastily sought his cover behind the hill. Thus matters stood about three P.M. The day was bright and clear, and the amphitheatre of Chattanooga lay in beauty at our feet. I had watched for the attack of General Thomas "early in the day." Column after column of the enemy were streaming toward me, gun after gun poured its concentric shot on us from every hill and spur that gave a view of any part of the ground held by us. All directed their fire as carefully as possible to clear the hill to our front without endangering our own men. The fight raged furiously about ten A.M., when General Corse received a severe wound and was carried off the field, and the command of the brigade, and of the assault at that key point, devolved on that fine young officer, Colonel Wolcott, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, who filled his post manfully. He continued the contest, pressing forward at all points. Colonel Loomis had made good progress to the right; and at about two P.M. General John E. Smith, judging the battle to be most severe on the hill, and being required to support General Ewing, ordered up Colonel Runion's and General Matthias's brigades across the fields to the summit that was being fought for. They moved up under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, and joined to Colonel Wolcott, but the crest was so narrow that they necessarily occupied the west face of the hill. The enemy at the time being massed in great strength in the tunnel gorge, moved a large force, under cover of the ground and the thick bushes, and suddenly appeared on the right and rear of this command. An occasional shot from Fort Wood and Orchard Knoll, and some musketry fire and artillery over about Lookout, was all that I could detect on our side; but about three P.M. I noticed the white line of musketry fire, in front of Orchard Knoll, extending further right and left, and on. We could only hear a faint echo of sound, but enough was seen to satisfy me that General Thomas was moving on the centre. I knew our attack had drawn vast masses of the enemy to our flank, and felt sure of the result. Some guns which had been firing at us all day were silent, or were turned in a different direction. The advancing line of musketry fire from Orchard Knoll disappeared to us behind spur of the hill, and could no longer be seen, and it was not until night closed that I knew that the troops in Chattanooga had swept across Missionary Ridge, and broken the enemy's centre. Of course, the victory was won, and pursuit was the next step. I ordered General Morgan L. Smith to feel the tunnel, and it was found vacant, save by the dead and wounded of our own and enemy's, commingled. The reserve of General Jeff. C. Davis was ordered to march at once, by the pontoon-bridge across the Chickamauga at its mouth, and push forward for the dépôt. General Howard had reported to me, in the early part of the day, with the remainder of his army corps, (the Eleventh,) and had been posted to connect my left with Chickamauga Creek. He was ordered to repair an old broken bridge about two miles up Chickamauga, and to follow General Davis at four A.M., and the Fifteenth army corps to march at daylight. But General Howard found to repair the bridge more of a task than at first supposed, and we were compelled all to cross Chickamauga on the new pontoon-bridge at its mouth. By about eleven A.M., General Jeff. C. Davis's division appeared at the dépôt, just in time to see it in flames. He entered with one brigade, and found the enemy occupying two hills partially intrenched just beyond the dépôt. These he soon drove away. The dépôt presented a scene of desolation that war alone exhibits. Corn-meal and corn, in huge burning piles, broken wagons, abandoned caissons, two thirty-two pounder rifled guns, with carriages burned, pieces of pontoons, balks, chesses, etc., (destined, doubtless, for the famous invasion of Kentucky,) and all manner of things burning and broken. Still the enemy kindly left us a good supply of forage for our horses, and meal, beans, etc., for our men. Pausing but a short while, we passed on, the road lined with broken wagons and abandoned caissons, till night. Just as the head of the column emerged from a dark, miry swamp, we encountered the rear-guard of the retreating arThe fight was sharp, but the night closed in so dark that we could not move. General Grant came up to us there-General Davis still leading. my. At daylight we resumed the march, and at Greysville, where a good bridge spanned the Chickamauga, we found the corps of General Palmer, on the south bank. He informed us that General Hooker was on a road still further south, and we could hear his guns near Ringgold. As the roads were filled with all the troops they could accommodate, I then turned to the east to fulfil another part of the general plan, namely, to break up all communications between Bragg and Longstreet. We had all sorts of rumors as to the latter, but it was manifest that we should interpose a proper force between these two armies. I therefore directed General Howard to move to Parker's Gap, and thence send a competent force to Red Clay, or the Council Ground, and there destroy a large section of the railroad which connects with Dalton and Cleveland. This work was most successfully and completely performed that day. The division of General Jeff. C. Davis was moved up close to Ringgold, to assist General Hooker, if needed, and the Fifteenth corps held at Greysville, for any thing that might turn up. About noon, I had a message from General Hooker, saying that he had had a pretty hard fight at the mountain pass just beyond Ringgold, and he wanted me to come forward, and turn the position. He was not aware, at the time, that Howard, by running through Parker's Gap toward Red Clay, had already turned it. So I rode forward to Ringgold, and found the enemy had already fallen back to Tunnel Hill. He was already out of the valley of Chickamauga, and on ground where the waters flow to the Coosa. He was out of Tennessee. Accordingly, on the morning of November twenty-ninth, General Howard moved from Parker's Gap to Cleveland, General Davis by way of McDaniel's Gap, and General Blair, with two divisions of the Fifteenth army corps, by way of Julian's Gap-all meeting at Cleveland that night. Here another good break was made in the Cleveland and Dalton road. On the thirtieth, the army moved to Charleston, General Howard approaching so rapidly that the enemy evacuated in haste, leaving the bridge but partially damaged, and five car-loads of flour and provisions on the north bank of the Hiawassee. This was to have been the limit of our journey. Officers and men had brought no luggage or provisions, and the weather was bitter cold. I had hardly entered the town of Charleston, when General Wilson arrived with a letter from General Grant, at Chattanooga, informing me that the latest authentic accounts from Knoxville were to the twenty-seventh, at which time General Burnside was completely invested, and had provisions only to include the third December; that General Granger had left Chattanooga for Knoxville by the railroad, with a steamboat following him in the river; but the General feared Granger could not reach Knoxville in time, and ordered me to take command of all troops moving to the relief of Knoxville, and hasten to Burnside. Seven days before, we had left our camps on the other side of the Tennessee, with two days' rations, without a change of clothing, stripped for the fight, with but a single blanket or coat per man-from myself to the private included; of course, we then had no provisions, save what we gathered by the road, and were ill supplied for such a march. But we learned that twelve thousand of our fellow-soldiers were beleaguered in the mountain town of Knoxville, eighty-four miles distant, that they needed relief, and must have it in three days. This was enough, and it had to be done. General Howard, that night, repaired and planked the railroad bridge, and at daylight the army passed the Hiawassee, and marched to Athens, fifteen miles. I had supposed rightfully that General Granger was about the mouth of the Hiawassee, and sent him notice of my orders that the General had sent me a copy of his written instructions, which were full and comI found General Grant at Ringgold, and, after plete, and that he must push for Kingston, near some explanations as to breaking up the railroad which we would make a junction. By the time from Ringgold back to the State line, as soon as I reached Athens, I had time to study the geosome cars loaded with wounded could be pushed graphy, and sent him orders which found him at back to Chickamauga Dépôt, I was ordered to Decatur; that Kingston was out of our way; move slowly and leisurely back to Chattanooga. that he should send his boat to Kingston, but On the following day, the Fifteenth corps de- with his command strike across to Philadelphia, stroyed absolutely and effectually the railroad, and report to me there. I had but a small force from a point half-way between Greysville and of cavalry, which was, at the time of my receipt Ringgold, back to the State line; and General of General Grant's orders, scouting over and Grant, coming to Greysville, consented that, in-about Benton and Columbus. I left my aid, stead of returning to Chattanooga, I might send Major McCoy, at Charleston, to communicate back my artillery, wagons, and impediments, with the cavalry, and hurry it forward. and make a circuit by the north as far as the took me in the night at Athens. Hiawassee. On the second December, the army moved It over rapidly north toward Loudon, twenty-six miles distant. About eleven A.M., the cavalry passed to the head of the column, and was ordered to push to Loudon, and, if possible, save the pontoon-bridge across the Tennessee, held by a brigade of the enemy, commanded by General Vaughn. The cavalry moved with such rapidity as to capture every picket; but the brigade of Vaughn had artillery in position, covered with earthworks, and displayed a force too respectable to be carried by a cavalry dash, and darkness closed in before General Howard's infantry got in. The enemy abandoned that place in the night, destroying the pontoons, running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into the Tennessee, and abandoning a large quantity of provisions, four guns, and other material, which General Howard took at daylight. But the bridge was gone, and we were forced to turn east, and trust to General Burnside's bridge at Knoxville. It was all-important that General Burnside should have notice of our coming, and but one day of the time remained. Accordingly, at Philadelphia, during the night of December second, I sent my Aid, Captain Audenreid, forward to Colonel Long, commanding the brigade of cavalry, to explain to him how all-important it was that General Burnside should have notice within twenty-four hours of our approach, and ordering him to select the best material of his command to start at once, ford the Little Tennessee, and push into Knoxville at whatever cost of life and horseflesh. road abreast of him, and in person I was at a house where the roads parted, when a messenger rode up bringing me a few words from General Burnside, dated December fourth. Colonel Long had arrived at Knoxville with his cavalry, and all was well there. Longstreet still lay before the place, but there were symptoms of a speedy departure. I felt that I had accomplished the first great step in the problem for the relief of General Burnside's army, but | still urged on the work. As soon as the bridge was mended, all the troops moved forward. General Howard had marched from Loudon and had formed a pretty good ford for his wagons and horses at Davis, seven miles from Morgantown, and had made an ingenious bridge of the wagons left by Vaughn at Loudon, on which to pass his men. He marched by Unitia and Louisville. On the night of the fifth, all the heads of columns communicated at Marysville, where I met Major Van Buren, of General Burnside's staff, announcing that Longstreet had the night before retreated on the Rutledge, Rodgersville, and Bristol road, leading to Virginia; that General Burnside's cavalry was on his heels; that the General desired to see me in person as soon as I could come to Knoxville. I ordered all the troops to halt and rest, except the two divisions of General Granger, which were ordered to move forward to Little River, and General Granger to report in person to General Burnside for orders. for the short time allowed in the selection of His force was originally designed to reënforce General Burnside, and it was eminently proper that it should join in the stern chase after LongCaptain Audenreid was ordered to go along. street. On the morning of December sixth, I The distance to be travelled was about forty rode from Marysville into Knoxville and met miles, and the roads villainous. Before day General Burnside. General Granger arrived they were off, and at daylight the Fifteenth later in the day. We examined his lines of forcorps was turned from Philadelphia to the Lit-tifications, which were a wonderful production tle Tennessee at Morgantown, where my maps represented the river as very shallow, but it was found too deep for fording, and the water freezing cold-width two hundred and forty yards, depth from two to five feet. Horses could ford, but artillerymen could not. A bridge was indispensable. General Wilson, who accompanied me, undertook to superintend the bridge, and I am under many obligations to him, as I was without an engineer, having sent Captain Jenny back to Greysville to survey the field of battle. We had our pioneers, but only such tools as axes, picks, and spades; but General Wilson, working part with crib-work and part with trestles, made of the houses of the late town of Morgantown, progressed apace, and by dark of December fourth troops and animals passed on the bridge, and by daylight of the fifth the Fifteenth corps, General Blair, was over, and General Granger's corps and General Davis's division were ready to pass; but the diagonal bracings were imperfect for want of proper spikes, and the bridge broke, causing delay. I had ordered General Blair to march out on the Marysville road five miles, there to await notice that General Granger was on a parallel The General explained fully and frankly what he had done and what he had proposed to do. He asked of me nothing but General Granger's command, and suggested, in view of the large force I had brought from Chattanooga, that I should return with due expedition to the line of the Hiawassee, lest Bragg, reenforced, might take advantage of his absence to assume the offensive. I asked him to reduce it to writing, which he did, and I here introduce it as part of my report: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO, Major-Gen. W. T. Sherman, Commanding, etc.: |