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The upper part, the one facing the road from the interior, is a beautiful specimen of engineering skill, and is remarkable for the substantial and permanent manacr in which every part is constructed. It mounted at the time of capture four guns, two field and two siege, though capable of accommodating twenty. It is perhaps a quarter of a mile from the river-bank, and seated on the gradual slope of a ridge, the first seen on ascending the river. In the lower work commanding the river was a casematcd battery of three guns of superior construction. Upon a solid frame of twenty inches of timber were laid two layers of railroad iron, the upper tier reversed and laid into the interstices of the lower. But two guns were in position in it—one eleven-inch columbiad, taken from the Indianola, and an eight-inch smooth bore. On each side were batteries of two guns each, one a seven-inch rifle, of Parrott pattern, making in all eight siege and two field-pieces. There were found besides large quantities of ammunition and a thousand muskets, besides flour, sugar, etc.
Our loss in the affair was four killed and thirty wounded; rebels, five killed and four wounded. Two hundred prisoners constituted the garrison then in the Fort, all of which fell into our hands, with twenty-four officers. A force of about a thousand men has been stationed at De Russy until recently. The smallncss of the garrison is a matter of much surprise, as the enemy must have known of our presence for some days; besides, it appears that a small number left in the morning before the attack. Two thirty-two pounders, on wheels, were hauled off only a few hours before our arrival, and narrowly escaped capture by our forces. It is unaccountable that the rebels should leave so valuable a position almost defenceless at this time, and can only be accounted for on the ground that General Banks was menacing Alexandria, and they decided to sacrifice one of the two places to hold the other. The troops have already rcembarked, and are on the way to Alexandria.
Fort De Russy takes its name from Colonel De Russy, who formerly commanded in this vicinity, and lives not far distant LieutenantColonel Bird was in command, though he reported to General Walker, whose headquarters were at Alexandria.
The following officers are prisoners: Captains Stevens, Morran, Wise, Wright, Laird, and King; Lieutenants Denson, Fuller, Fogarty, Claydon, Trumbull, (Eng.,) Burbank, Hewey, Assenhcimcr, Fall, Hauk, Ball, Little, Barksdale, Spinks, Bringhurst, and Stout
From various sources we gather that the rebels here have about abandoned the idea of defending any of their navigable streams. When asked to account for their apparent neglect of so important a fort, they reply that this was considered merely as an experiment in engineering, (certain- '< ly a very creditable one, and one which the gunboats alone might have vainly assailed for a ] month,) but claim that so soon as we leave the rivers they will fall on us for destruction. This i
certainly does not find corroboration in the fact that they surrendered to forces which marched across the country. Of this sort was the unfinished obstruction of piles about nine miles below here, which the gunboats had to tear away to allow the huge transports to pass through. As nearly as I can learn, Walker has two thousand men, mostly infantry, south of us. Taylor has, perhaps, as many at Alexandria, and it is probable that they may be united at the latter place. Banks has some, doubtless, in his front about Opelousas.
The Red River has not been used for large transports or gunboats since May last, being hitherto too low. The Webb, Missouri, Grand Duke, and Mary Keene are at Shreveport, armed. The distances on this river from the Mississippi are: Black River, forty miles; De Russy, seventy miles; Alexandria, one hundred and forty miles; Shreveport, four hundred and fifty miles.
Richmond, Va., Feb. SO, ISM. f
General Orders, No. 21.
The following Act of Congress is published for the information of the armv: [No. 110.] An Act to reduce the Currency and to authorize
a new issue of Notes and Bonds.
Sec. 1. The Congress of the confederate States of America do enact That the holders of all treasury notes above the denomination of five dollars, not bearing interest, shall be allowed until the first day of April, 1804, east of the Mississippi River, and until the first day of July, 1804, wost of the Mississippi River, to fund the same, and until the periods and at the places stated, the holders of all such treasury notes shall be allowed to fund the same in registered bonds payable twenty years after their date, bearing interest at the rate of four per cent per annum, payable on the first day of January and July of each year.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to issue the bonds required for the funding provided for in the preceding section; and, until the bonds can be prepared, he may issue certificates to answer the purpose. Such bonds and certificates shall be receivable, without interest in payment of all government dues payable in the year 1804, except export and import duties.
Sec. 3. That all treasury notes of-the denomination of one hundred dollars, not bearing interest which shall not be presented for funding under the provisions of the first section of this act shall, from and after the first day of April, 1804, cast of the Mississippi River, and the first day of July, 1804, west of the Mississippi River, cease to be receivable in payment of public dues; and said notes, if not presented at that time, shall, in addition to the tax of thirty-three and one third cents imposed in the fourth section of this act, be subject to a tax of ten per cent per month until so presented; which taxes shall attach to said notes wherever circulated, and shall be deducted from the face of said notes whenever presented for payment or for funding, and such notes shall not be exchangeable for the new issue of treasury notes provided for in this act
Sec. 4. That on all said treasury notes not funded or used in payment of taxes at the dates and places prescribed in the first section of this act, there shall be levied at said dates and places a tax of thirty-three and one third cents for every dollar promised on the face of said notes. Said tax shall attach to said notes wherever circulated, and shall be collected by deducting the same at the treasury, its depositaries, and by the collectors, and by all government officers receiving . the same, wherever presented for payment or for funding, or in payment of government dues, or for postage, in exchange for new notes as hereinafter provided; and said treasury notes shall be fundable in bonds as provided in the first section of this act, until the first day of January, 1865, at the rate of sixty-six cents and two thirds on the dollar, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury, at any time between the first of April, east, and the first of July, 1804, west of the Mississippi River, and the first of January, 1865, to substitute and exchange new treasury notes for the same, at the rate of sixtysix and two thirds cents on the dollar: Provided, that notes of the denomination of one hundred dollars shall not be entitled to the privilege of said exchange: Provided, further, that the right to fund any of said treasury notes after the first day of January, 1805, is hereby taken away; and provided, further, that upon all such treasury notes which remain outstanding on the first day of January, 1805, and which may not bo exchanged for new treasury notes, as herein provided, a tax of one hundred per cent is hereby imposed.
Sec. 5. That after the first day of April next, all authority heretofore given to the Secretary of the Treasury to issue treasury notes, shall be, and is hereby, revoked, provided the Secretary of the Treasury may, after that time issue new treasury notes in such form as he may prescribe, payable two years after the ratification of a treaty of peace with the United States, said new issue to be receivable in payment of all public dues, except export anddmport duties, and to be issued in exchange for old notes, at the rate of two dollars of the new for three dollars of the old issues, whether said old notes bo surrendered for exchange by the holders thereof, or be received into the Treasury under the provisions of this act; and the holders of the new notes, or of the old notes, except those of the denomination of one hundred dollars, after they are reduced to sixtysis and two thirds cents on the dollar, by the tax aforesaid, may convert into call certificates, bearing interest at the rate of four per cent per annum, and payable two years after a ratification of
a treaty of peace with tho United States, unless sooner converted into new notes.
Sec. 6. That to pay the expenses of the government, not otherwise provided for, the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized to istue six per cent bonds to an amount not exceeding five hundred millions of dollars, the principal and interest whereof shall be free from taxation; and for the payment of tho interest thereon, the entire net receipts of any export duty hereafter laid on the value of all cotton, tobacco, and naval stores, which shall be exported from the confederate States, and the net proceeds of the import duties laid, or so much thereof as may be necessary to pay annually the interest, are hereby specially pledged : Provided, that tho duties now laid upon imports, and hereby pledged, shall hereafter be paid in specie, or in sterling exchange, or in coupons of said bonds.
Sec 7. That the Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized from time to time, as the wants of the Treasury may require it, to sell or hypothecate for treasury notes said bonds or any part thereof, upon the best terms he can, so as to meet appropriations by Congress, and at the same time reduce and restrict tho amount of circulation in treasury notes within reasonable and safe limits.
Sec. 8. The bonds authorized by the sixth section of this act may either be registered or coupon bonds, as the parties taking them may elect, and they may be exchanged for each other under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe; they shall be for one hundred dollars or some multiple of one hundred dollars; and shall, together with the coupons thereto attached, be.in such form and of such authentication as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe; the interest shall be payable half-yearly, on the first of January and July in each year; the principal shall be playable not less than thirty years from their date.
Sec. 9. All certificates shall be fundable, and shall be taxed in all respects as is provided for the treasury notes, into which they are convertible, if not converted before the time fixed for taxing the treasury notes. Such certificates shall from that time bear interest upon only sixty-six and two thirds cents for every dollar promised upon their face, and shall be redeemable only in new treasury notes at that rate; but, after the passage of tins act, no call certificates shall be issued until after the first day of April, 1864.
Sec. 10. That if any bank of deposit shall give its depositors the bonds authorized by the first section of this act in exchange for their deposits, and specify the same on the bonds by some distinctive mark or token, to be agreed upon with the Secretary of the Treasury, then the said depositors shall be entitled to receive the amount of said bonds in treasury notes, bearing no interest, and outstanding at the passage of this act: Provided, the said bonds are presented before the privilege of funding said notes at par shall cease, as herein prescribed.
Sec. 11. That all treasury notes heretofore issued of the denomination of five dollars shall continue to be receivable in payment of public dues, as provided by law, and fundable at par under the provisions of this act, until the first of July, 1864, east, and until the first of October, 1864, west of the Mississippi River; but after that time they shall be subject to a tax of thirty-three and a third cents on every dollar promised on the face thereof; said tax to attach to said notes wherever circulated, and said notes to be fundable and exchangeable for new treasury notes, as herein provided, subject to the deduction of said tax.
Sec. 12. That any State holding treasury notes, received before the times herein fixed for taxing said notes, shall be allowed until the first day of January, 1865, to fund the same in six per cent bonds of the confederate States, payable twenty years after date, and the interest payable semi-annually. But all treasury notes received by any State after the time fixed for taxing the same, as aforesaid, shall be held to have been received, diminished by the amount of said tax. The discrimination between the notes subject to the tax and thoso not so subject shall be left to the good faith of each State, and the certificate of the Governor thereof shall in each case be conclusive.
Sec. 13. That treasury notes heretofore issued, bearing interest at the rate of seven dollars and thirty cents on the hundred dollars per annum, shall no longer bo received in payment of public dues, but shall be deemed and considered bonds of the confederate States, payable two years after the ratification of a treaty of peace with the United States, bearing the rate of interest specified on their face, payable the first of January in each and every year.
Sec. 14. That the Secretary of the Treasury be and he is hereby authorized, in case the exigencies of the Government should require it, to pay the demand of any public creditor, whose debt may be contracted after the passage of this act, willing to receive the same in a certificate of indebtedness, to be issued by said Secretary in such form as he may deem proper, payable two years after a ratification of a treaty of peace with the United States, bearing interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, payable semi-annually, and transferable only by special indorsement, under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury; and said certificate shall be exempt from taxation in principal and interest.
Sec. 15. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to increase the number of depositories, so as to meet the requirements of this act, and with that view to employ such of the banks of the several States as he may deem expedient
Sec. 16. The Secretary of the Treasury shall forthwith advertise this act in such newspapers published in the several States, and by such other means as shall secure immediate publicity; and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy shall each cause it to be pubVou VIIL—Doc. 28
Iished in general orders, for the information of the army and navy.
Sec. 17. The forty-second section of the act for the assessment and collection of taxes, approved May first, 1863, is hereby repealed.
Sec. 18. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and required, upon the application of the holder of any call certificate, which, by the first section of the act to provide for the funding and further issue of treasury notes, approved March twenty-third, 1863, was required to be hereafter deemed to be a bond, to issue to such holder a bond therefor, upon the terms provided by said act
Approved February seventeenth, 1864.
Adjutant and Inspector-General.
ADDRESSED TO THE SOLDIERS OF THE CONFEDERATE
BY REV. A. a LOJJGSTREET, IX. D.
I Do not know that the attempt has ever been made to improve soldiers by an address to their reason and understanding. I propose to try the experiment, beginning with the new recruits.
It has grown into a proverb that "one hundred regulars will whip four hundred raw troops."
The history of all wars proves this to be substantially true. And yet, the hundred and four hundred arc made up of the same material. How happens it that there is such a disparity between them? Can mere drilling make one man bolder than another? Impossible, as is proved by tho fact, that when brought into battle for the first time they are all alike—all equally alarmed and all equally apt to run. But the regulars soon become accustomed to battle, and nothing gives us alarm to which we are accustomed. They soon discover, too, that the roar of cannon and the bursting of bombs, which terrify them so much in the first battle, are the most harmless of all implements of warfare brought into the field They are better than raw troops simply because they have got over the fears of raw troops. If, therefore, it were possible for new recruits to engage in their first battle with the coolness and self-possession of veterans, thoy would be equal to veterans. Is this impossible? Certainly not; for most of the troops with which Bonaparte fought the battlo of Waterloo were new levies, and they fought as gallantly as the best on the field. This they did from confidence in their General. They, doubtless, felt all tho alarms common to troops engaging in battle for the first time, but they did not yield to their fears. And to this point it seems to me any raw troops may bring themselves by tho force of reason alone, especially when assisted a little by experienced officers. Let each man go into the battle-field with this
train of reflections: "I shall be frightened of course. At what? Why, at the danger to which my life is exposed. Well, now, what is really the extent of the danger? In the most sanguinary battle, not one fifth of the combatants are killed or wounded. The chances are, therefore, five to one that I shall not be hurt. The proportion of the slightly and recoverably wounded is to the killed and mortally wounded as five is to one. The chances are, therefore, five to one, that if touched at all, I shall not be mortally wounded. The cannon are the common engines which unnerve men. Now, of the whole number of killed in battle, not more than one in one hundred aro killed by cannon.* A hundred to one, therefore, that those noisy bellowers do not hurt me. The alternative is presented to me to stand my ground in spite of my fears, or to run. Now, in which is the most danger? Why, surely in running; for, as a general rule, of a given number, more men are killed in (light than in fight. While I stand my ground, I am all the time destroying, weakening, and disheartening the enemy, and encouraging my companions in arms. Victory, therefore, is likely to insure my safety. But in running, I may be killed by the very men whom I would have disabled had I stood firm. I weaken our forces, throw the battle upon a reduced number, expose them to increased labors and losses, become then an object of their hatred and contempt, dispirit them and invigorate the foe, not only for this battle, but for all future battles. The regulars show that battles lose their terrors when we become used to them; how am I ever to become used to them by running? If I save my life by it, I increase the danger of being made prisoner a hundred-fold. Fear or no fear, then, I will fight as long as the regulars fight"
Now, in all this, I put love of country, Yankee insolence, and brutality entirely out of the question; for with panic-stricken troops, carrying in their bosoms no antidote for their fears or moral remedy for their natural defects, these considerations are utterly worthless, as has been most lamentably proven in our last great battle. The remedy is found in the foregoing train of reflections. They cannot make brave men of cowards; they cannot prevent fears on the battle-field ; but they surely ought to make the coward and the timid fight manfully in spite of their infirmities. Officers should impress them on the minds of their new recruits; and as such men fight well under a general in whom they have confidence, they should always, if practicable, be attached to the brigade, division or corps in whose generals they have the most confidence. Lord Wellington is reported to have said that by nature he was a great coward, but that his pride of character, self-respect, and love of country predominated over his fears. The consequence was, that he became the hero of heroes. I see no reason why every soldier in the confederate army might not
* I state this upon the authority of a brigadier-general of many battles, who has turned his attention to thlfl matter on the field.
become a hero upon the same principle. I am aware of the military dogma that men, to become good soldiers, must first become mere machines. If this be true, then it were better for us (policy aside) to make up our armies of stout, able-bodied negroes, inured to toil, than of their high-minded, chivalrous, but more feeble masters. At the opening of the war, our armies were composed mainly of troops of the latter class—men of science, men of wealth, men of the learned professions, Congressmen, legislators, professors, and students—all accustomed to a life of comparative ease. There was little drilling of them, or time for drilling them, before they were engaged in a series of battles. The conscript laws filled our ranks with men from all grades of society, and of all descriptions of character — in the main, hardworking, strong-muscled, able-bodied men, accustomed to hard living and constant fatigue. They have been long in the machine factory, long enough to have every attribute of humanity drilled out of them. Has this class proved themselves to be better soldiers than the other? Have they fought better? Have they gained any more victories? Have they endured any more hardships, and with more patience P Let the advocates of machinery answer these questions.
The dogma which I have been considering is not only false, but is in the highest degree mischievous. If scientific war be but a conflict of machines, it necessarily follows that the power which has the greatest number of machines must in the end be victorious. How is it possible for nine millions of population—six, wo may say— to bring into the field as many men as can twenty-three millions f And yet we seem to be trying the hopeless experiment. Every body is to be called to arms. In reason's name, I ask. Why? We have plenty of men enrolled to whip all the Yankees in the field at this time, if our men will but fight as they did at the beginning of the war I Did wo lose the battle of Mission Ridgo from want of men? No, but from derangement of our machinery. And why should that defeat run us all crazy? I see nothing alarming in it One of the bitter fruits of the dogma in question is that officers who subscribe to it fill take no pains to inspire their men with courage, self-confidence, and high-toned patriotism, but will treat them pretty much as they would so many prize-fighters. Away with the false, demoralizing dogma 1 Soldiers, you are moral agents; do for yourselves, then, what I would do for you, if I could. Nerve yourselves up by your own mental energies to deeds of noble daring and unflinching valor, though your enemy be three to your one.
My first chapter was addressed to raw recruits. It was not designed to dissipate their fears in battle, for no counsel can do this; but to teach them to be good soldiers in spite of their fears— to show them that if they will consult their own personal safety, they will fight in fear rather than run from fear. I now address the soldiers gencrally. Much that I have said to the first class is equally applicable to this.
Men who engage in battle expecting to be whipped, are very certain to be whipped. The reason is plain; they fight without object and without spirit—their thoughts more occupied in finding apologies for running than the achievement of victory. Now, I can conceive of but these four things which can induce a rational being to expect defeat in battle:
1st. Superiority in numbers opposed to him.
2d. Superiority in arms.
3d. Superiority in valor.
4th. Superiority in generalship.
Let us consider these matters in their order:
1. Superiority in Numbers.—This is the bugbear that mado cowards of us for thirty years before we seceded, which seems to have turned the heads of half the nation, civil and military, within the last two months, and which seems likely to make us destroy ourselves to keep the Yankees from destroying us.
I have already bestowed a few remarks upon this head; let us consider it a little more in detail. To give the instances in which brave men conquered twice and thrice their numbers would be to write a book. Take a few cases from our own history. .At Big Bethel one thousand three hundred confederates put to confusion and flight four thousand Federals. At the battle of Blackburn's Ford (Bull Run) one brigade whipped twice its number. At the first battle of Manassas thirty-eight thousand completely routed seventy-five thousand. It is said the Yankees fight better now than they did then; and that the Western Federals fight better than the Eastern. This may be true, but it would bo a harmless truth if we did not fight worse. We whipped Western troops at Chickamauga, and we would have whipped them again at Mission Ridge if a brigade or more of our men had not played the coward.
Even in the rout which these men led off, Cleburne's gallant band arrested the whole Federal army, when they were probably four to one against him. This I regard a.s by far the most brilliant feat of the war. To have stood his ground would have been creditable to him and his men, but in the midst of confusion and flight to have formed his men in an advantageous position, and to have maintained it against repeated assaults of overwhelming numbers, and to have defeated them, entitles him to a monument as high as Lookout, and to each of his men one as high as Mission Ridge. I hope he will preserve with peculiar care the name of every man that stood by him in that memorable conflict.*
Here, then, we have an illustration from the same battle-field, of the difference between running from superior numbers and fighting them bravely. Cleburne demonstrated, under every discouragement, that Western troops, even in the exultation of victory, may be whipped by infe
* If the papers speak the truth, according to Bragg, Bates and hlf small brigade are entitled to all the credit that I have given to Cleburne and his men. If so, let the names be changed and the honors stand.
rior numbers, when possessed of superior valor. Let the renegades remember this, and retrieve their credit by fighting gallantly in their next battle.
There are other considerations which it seems to me should divest numbers of their terrors to reflecting troops; at least so far as to raise them above cowardly conduct
These truths all will admit; the more men in the army, the more unwieldy and sluggish does it become, the more difficult is it to make them effective in action, the more on the sick-list, the more killed by a given number of shots, the more transportation and provisions do they require, and the more unlikely that they will have a commander capable of directing their movements skilfully and usefully. These are most serious drawbacks to a large army, especially when far away from home. They will, of themselves, exhaust it in time. A small arm}', then, has every advantage of a large one, except in the single matter of numbers. They are more immediately under the eye of their commander, more readily concentrated, more prompt in reaching the points of attack, lose fewer in battle, and in retreat (orderly retreat I mean) are absolutely unapproachable by their cumbersome foe. These facts are of themselves sufficient to account for the many victories which inferior numbers have gained over superior. Lot us suppose that Grant commands a hundred thousand men, and Johnston but fiftythousand. There are twenty positions between Dalton and Atlanta which Johnston may occupy, with the certainty of whipping Grant, if his men will flght bravely. (It is to be hoped he has examined all these positions.) Should he be driven from one of these positions after hard fighting, his losses, compared with those of the enemy, will be about as one to five. And so of all the other positions. But there is one view of the subject which should quiet all fears of the soldier on the score of numbers, and it is this: that it is absolutely -impossible for Grant to conquer Johnston in the case supposed, because it is absolutely impossible for him to force Johnston into a fight upon ground of his own choosing. Upon the whole, then, there is no great cause of alarm to the soldier in the numbers opposed to him. The Fabian policy avoids defeat at least.
2. Superiority in Arms.—Except in artillery, I know of no advantage the enemy have of us in arms—certainly none to be feared. Of artillery I have already spoken, and shown that they are the least formidable implements of war of any that are used. For the destruction of fortifications, ships, and towns, cannon are useful; but for field service they are the most inconvenient, cumbersome, inefficient, expensive, worthless engines of war that ever were invented. A man told me he had been in six battles, and he had never seen a man killed by a cannon or bomb in his life. Another told me that he had belonged to an artillery corps for two years; that in that time they had broken down four teams of horses, and been brought into action but once, in which he had no reason to believe that they