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flag in triumph at Raymond, at Jackson, at wounded. Only our pickets were engaged, the Champion Hill, and at Vicksburgh, is no longer enemy not coming within range of our line of a matter of question. battle.

Tunnel Hill had been abandoned by the rebels in the night; and when I left the summit of the Ridge about noon, the right and left wings of our army were advancing, while the centre still held its position. No enemy was visible, but columns of smoke rising from various points told that the enemy was burning the bridges over the Chickamauga, and such of his stores as he could not carry away. Sherman was throwing a shell, occasionally, into some old rebel camps, which came in sight as he advanced. "No use beating those bushes," said old Willich, after closely inspecting these camps through his field-glass; "the bird has flown."

Estimates of the losses in the last great contest have already been given by telegram. I shall not repeat them here.

In the entire three days' operations, I think our own loss will reach six hundred killed, three thousand wounded, and four hundred prisoners. It cannot, certainly, exceed this; it may fall considerably below.

The rebel loss will not fall short of five hundred killed, two thousand five hundred wounded, five thousand prisoners, seven thousand stands of small arms, twenty stands of colors, and forty pieces of artillery. WILLIAM S. FURAY.

RICHMOND "DESPATCH" ACCOUNT.

ARMY OF TENNESSEE, MISSION RIDGE, Nov. 23, nine P.M.

When this movement was going on, it was observed that the enemy threw a considerable column up the river further to our right, as if he intended to overlap our line, and compel us to stretch it out to a length that would render it very long and very weak. Can it be that he means to threaten our dépôt of supplies at Chickamauga Station, and at the same time to draw us away from Lookout Mountain? The idea that Grant desires to advance his lines in order to get more room and a further supply of firewood, as has been suggested, will not bear the test of reason. A movement on so large a scale looks to ulterior objects, and is intended to initiate operations upon a broad and comprehensive scale.

The first result of such a movement will be to compel General Bragg to weaken his forces on Lookout Mountain, (his left,) to reinforce his right, which is comparatively weak. Indeed, orders to this effect have already been given, and are now being executed. It will never do to let the enemy turn our right, and get possession of our dépôt at Chickamauga.

General Bragg, therefore, must choose between Lookout and Chickamauga. The demonstration to-day was intended, doubtless, to force him to make his election between the two. If he decide to hold Chickamauga, then he must yield the mountain, and throw his army between the enemy's encroaching left wing and the railroad. If he gives the preference to Lookout, then the railroad and his dépôt of supplies must go.

General Grant has made an important move upon the military chess-board to-day, and one that is likely to exert an important influence upon military operations in this quarter. At an The natural effect of the affair to-day, as has early hour this morning, when the fog had lifted already been intimated, will be to force General from the valley below, it was discovered that the Bragg to weaken his left, in order to strengthen Federal Commander was massing a heavy force his right wing, now threatened by a formidable on his left, and opposite to our right. As the and largely superior force. This, I doubt not, morning advanced, this force grew denser and was one of the objects of the demonstration. I larger, until it covered all the slopes this side of look, therefore, for an assault upon Lookout toCemetery Fort, which is near the river above, morrow, when it will be less able to resist an atand the last work the enemy has on his left. At tack than it was to-day. Our artillery on the twelve M., these masses deployed into two lines mountain will be of no assistance after the eneof battle, with heavy reserves. This movement my shall have reached the foot of the mountain, completed, the guns of the fort opened at two it being impossible to depress the guns sufficientP.M., when the heavy lines of the Federals ad- ly. The importance of the mountain ceased vanced rapidly against our pickets, and drove them in, after a sharp resistance on their part. By three o'clock, the enemy had gained Indian Hill, an eminence which stands about midway between Cemetery Fort and Mission Ridge, being between his left wing and our right. He advanced upon no other part of our lines, and rested after gaining possession of the hill.

In the mean time, Major Robertson brought up a few guns of his reserve artillery, and, with other batteries posted on Mission Ridge to the right, opened upon the enemy, with what effect is not known. We only know that he maintained his new position, notwithstanding our fire. No report has been received of our casualties beyond a surmise in official quarters, that they will reach from one to two hundred in killed and

with the loss of Lookout Valley. The possession of the valley reduces the wagon transportation of the enemy to two or three miles at farthest, and gives him the use of the river besides. The voluntary abandonment of the mountain, therefore, should occasion no regret, since its longer retention is not only of slight importance, but will be attended with much difficulty, on account of the great length of our line.

MISSION RIDGE, November 24, midnight. Well, the enemy has assaulted Lookout Mountain to-day, sure enough, as was intimated in my letter of last night he probably would do. Having accomplished a part of the object of his demonstration yesterday, to wit, the transfer of a portion of our forces on the mountain to the ex

treme right, he attacked the mountain with a confidence which the sequel will show was not misplaced. The great rise in the Tennessee had carried away his pontoon-bridges the night before, but his positions were so well taken, and had been so strongly fortified, that he did not hesitate to make the assault. He opened at eleven o'clock with his batteries in Lookout valley, directing his fire against our lines along the western side and northern face of the mountain. Our own batteries on the mountain could take no part in the engagement, owing to a dense fog which enveloped Lookout Point and the crest above. At half-past twelve o'clock, the infantry became engaged, and the battle was then fully joined.

er possession of Lookout Mountain of comparatively little importance, and, now that the mountain has passed into his hands, there is no reason left why we should longer remain in the mud and water around Chattanooga. Besides, General Grant has been throwing a heavy force up the river, and crossing it over in the boats we neglected to burn, all this afternoon. Α portion of this force consists of heavy cavalry, which have been landed above the mouth of the Chickamauga.

Some infantry had also been landed on the east side of that stream-the remainder, and much more numerous body, on the west sideall up the Tennessee and some distance above our right wing. This movement greatly endangers the dépôt and railroad, and furnishes an additional reason for withdrawing across the Chickamauga. Another danger, and a still more serious one, is the probability that Grant will turn our right and get between the main army and Longstreet at Knoxville. It is now well ascertained that Sheridan has not gone to the relief of Burnside, as was fully believed a few days ago; but the whole Federal army is here marshalling for our destruction. Perhaps Grant has concluded that he could best succor Burnside by forcing

Very few details have been received-too few, indeed, for me to attempt to enter into particulars. The impression prevails in well-informed circles that the affair has not been well conducted by the confederate officers in command on the mountain. Our forces had been much weakened the night before by the withdrawal of Walker's division, which was sent to the right, leaving only Stevenson's and Cheatham's divisions behind, both under command of General Stevenson. General Cheatham arrived on the ground late in the afternoon, having just return-Bragg to retire. ed to the army. Up to the time of his return, his division was under the command of General Jackson, the senior Brigadier in the division. It was thought that these two divisions would have been sufficient to hold the position against a largely superior force; but not so. The confederates were steadily pushed back from the moment the infantry opened fire until late in the evening, when General Breckinridge went to the assistance of Stevenson with a brigade. The Federals, who had driven the confederates slowly around the north face of the mountain to Craven's house, and thence around almost to the road which leads to the top, were, in their turn, forced back after night some four or five hundred yards. The fight continued until ten P. M., and even now I can hear an occasional shot while I write.

I have just heard that our communications with Knoxville have been cut, probably by the Federal cavalry that crossed the river above this afternoon, and that the dépôt buildings at Joyner's Station, on the Chattanooga and East-Tennessee road, have been burnt.

November 25-2 A.M.

Finding that he could not withdraw his army in time, General Bragg has given orders to mass his whole available force on the right. A battle may be expected to-day. The situation is critical.

CHICKAMAUGA, November 25-Midnight.

The confederates have sustained to-day the most ignominious defeat of the whole war—a defeat for which there is but little excuse or palliation. For the first time during our struggle for national independence, our defeat is chargeable The troops and guns on the mountain were to the troops themselves, and not to the blunders brought down safely, only a few commissary or incompetency of their leaders. It is difficult to stores being left behind. We lost a consider-realize how a defeat so complete could have ocable number of prisoners, nevertheless, early incurred on ground so favorable, notwithstanding the day, and on the western slope of the mountain, the enemy, it is alleged, having got in the rear of Walthall's brigade, under cover of the prevailing fog. One account says that Walthall lost from five hundred to six hundred prisoners, including nearly the whole of one regiment, the Thirty-fourth Mississippi. It is not improbable that our loss has been exaggerated somewhat.

the great disparity in the forces of the two hostile armies. The ground was more in our favor than it was at Fredericksburgh, where General Longstreet is said to have estimated that Lee's army was equal to three hundred thousand men. And yet we gained the battle of Fredericksburgh, and lost that of Missionary Ridge.

But let us take up the painful narrative at the beginning, and see how this great misfortune, if not this grievous disgrace, has befallen the confederate arms.

Orders have been given to evacuate the mountain, and for the whole army to retire across the Chickamauga, in the direction of the station of Lookout Mountain was evacuated last night, it that name. The loss of Lookout valley and being no longer important to us after the loss of Brown's Ferry removed all doubt as to the Lookout or Will's valley, and no longer tenable ability of General Grant to subsist his army at against such an overwhelming force as General Chattanooga this winter, and rendered the long-Grant had concentrated around Chattanooga.

protection for his flanks and rear, and rendered his front almost impregnable. He possessed the additional advantage of being able to manœuvre his army upon the chord of a semi-circle, while Bragg could move only upon the arc.

But let us proceed with the battle, the strangest, most singular, and unsatisfactory conflict in which our arms have been engaged.

General Bragg abandoned, also, the whole of Chattanooga valley, and the trenches and breastworks running along the foot of Missionary Ridge and across the valley to the base of Lookout, and moved his troops up to the top of the ridge It was found necessary to extend his right well up toward the Chickamauga, near its mouth, in consequence of the heavy forces which the enemy had thrown up the river in that direction. The Tennessee and Missionary Ridge ap-heavy lines of battle, and sometimes in three, proach nearer to each other as one goes up, or rather down, the valley, the width of which, at some points, does not exceed one fourth of a mile. Across this valley, now almost an open plain, varying from a fourth of a mile to two miles in width, the Federals advanced to the assault, their ranks exposed to an artillery fire from the ridge, while in the plain, and to the infantry fire when they attempted the ascent of the hill

or mountain.

Grant deployed his immense masses in two supported by large reserve forces. The spectacle was magnificent as viewed from the crest of Missionary Ridge. He advanced first against our right wing, about ten o'clock, where he encountered that superb soldier, Lieutenant-General Hardee, who commanded on the right, while Major-General Breckinridge commanded on the left. Hardee's command embraced Cleburne's, Walker's, (commanded by General Gist, General Walker being absent,) Cheatham's, and Stevenson's divisions. Breckinridge's embraced his old division, commanded by Brigadier-General Lewis, Stewart's, part of Buckner's and Hindman's, commanded by Patton Anderson. The enemy's first assault upon Hardee was repulsed with great slaughter, as was his second, though made with double lines, supported with heavy reserves. The wave of battle, like the wave of the sea when it dashes against a rock-bound coast, beat and hissed, and struggled in vain; for the brave men who guarded our right were resolved never to yield one foot to the hated invaders. The odds against which they contended were fearful; for while the enemy advanced in two and even three massive lines, their own army consisted of only one long and weak line, without supports.

The only objection that can be urged against our line was its length and weakness, the latter being the result of the former, and the former the result of circumstances beyond our control, it being necessary for us to guard the passes in the ridge, and to conform to the length of the line presented by the enemy. The ridge varies in height from four to six hundred feet, and is crossed by several roads leading out from Chattanooga. The western side, next to the enemy, was steep and rugged, and, in some places, almost bare, the timber having been cut away for firewood. Our pickets occupied the breastworks below, while the infantry and artillery were distributed along the crest of the ridge from McFarlan's Gap almost to the mouth of the Chickamauga, a distance of six miles or more. In addition to the natural strength of the position, we had thrown up breastworks along the ridge wherever the as-oners, and remained masters of the ground until cent was easy.

The Federal army was marshalled under Grant, Thomas, Hooker, and Sherman, and did not number less than eighty-five thousand veteran troops. The confederate army, under Bragg, Hardee, and Breckinridge, did not number half so many. Longstreet's Virginia divisions, and other troops, had been sent to East-Tennessee. Had these been present, with their steady leader at the head of them, we should have won a victory quite as complete as our defeat has been. As it was, we ought to have won the day, and should have done so if our men had done as well as usual. Possibly a mistake was committed when Longstreet was sent away, and possibly it would have been better not to have accepted battle to-day, but to have retired last night. General Bragg thought, however, that there was not time, after the loss of Lookout, to get his army safely over the Chickamauga last night, and that it would be better, occupying so strong a position, to fight it out. But what could he expect from a battle where the odds were so much against him? Not only did Grant have three to one in numbers, but the geographical configuration of the ground, in manoeuvring an army, was as favorable as he could desire. Nature had provided an ample

Yet they not only repulsed every attack, but captured seven flags, about three hundred pris

night, when they were ordered to retire, carrying off all their guns, losing no prisoners, and but a small percentage of killed and wounded. The whole command behaved well, and especially that model soldier, Major-General Cleburne, a true son of the Emerald Isle, and his heroic division. General Hardee saved the army from a disastrous rout, and added fresh laurels to his brow.

The attack on the left wing was not made until about noon. Here as on the right, the enemy was repulsed, but he was obstinate and fought with great ardor and confidence, returning to the charge again and again in the handsomest style, until one of our brigades, near the centre, said to be Reynolds's, gave way, and the Federal flag was planted on Missionary Ridge. The enemy was not slow in availing himself of the great advantages of his new position. In a few minutes he turned upon our flanks and poured into them a terrible enfilading fire, which soon threw the confederates on his right and left into confusion. Under this confusion the gap in our lines grew wider and wider and wider, and the wider it grew the faster the multitudinous foe rushed into the yawning chasm. The confusion extended until it finally assumed the form of a panic. Seeing

the enemy in possession of a portion of the Mountain Run and marched to Germania Ford, heights, the men hastily concluded that the day with a battery of four four and a half-inch guns was gone, and that they had best save them-and one battery of six twenty-pounder Parrott selves.

Just at this time the alarm was increased by an artillery battery, which rushed down the hill to the river for a fresh supply of ammunition; the men, however, supposed they were flying from the field, and that all was lost. Nearly the whole left wing eventually became involved and gave way, a portion of it retiring under orders, but the greater part in unmitigated rout.

General Bragg did all he could to rally the fugitives and re-form the broken line. He exposed himself in the most unguarded manner, and at one time it looked as if he certainly would be killed. His staff-officers were also conspicuous in their efforts to restore our line. They and their chief were the last to leave the ridge.

guns from the reserve artillery, with three hundred cavalry, under the command of Captain Schwartz, of the Fourth New-York cavalry, and a pontoon train, under the command of Captain Mendell of the Engineers corps. The head of this column reached the steep embankments at Germania Ford, at half-past eight A.M. Here a thick growth of almost impenetrable woods was met, and considerable time was occupied in felling trees, cutting out roads, and placing the artillery in position. All this was done with the greatest rapidity, and in the face of the enemy's pickets on the opposite bank of the Rapidan. By great exertions, all the necessary preliminaries were completed by eleven o'clock A.M., the men working with a vigor which indicated that their hearts were inspired with hopes of success.

Major-General Meade arrived at this juncture, and ordered a cessation of further operations till General French, Third corps, was heard from.

The day was lost. Hardee still maintained his ground; but no success of the right wing could restore the left to its original position. All men -even the bravest are subject to error and confusion; but to-day, some of the confederates did not fight with their accustomed courage. Possi- At half-past one, orders were received by Genbly the contrast between the heavy masses of the eral Warren to move forward. Upon the adFederals, as they rolled across the valley and up vance guard of the Second corps making its apthe mountain ridge, and their own long and at-pearance, the rebel cavalry pickets fled in hot tenuated line, was not of a character to encourage them.

Our casualties are small-very small-too small, indeed, to be recorded along with so complete and humiliating a defeat. Included among our losses are some of our best guns-perhaps as many as thirty or forty. The infantry supports, in some instances, fled so precipitately that there was no time left to remove the guns. There were but few roads down the mountain by which they could retreat, and this occasioned further loss. All the artillery behaved well. The men in Cobb's battery stood their ground after their supports had fled, and though they lost their guns, they fought them to the last; and when they could use them no longer, on account of the steepness of the descent, they hurled hand-grenades at the foe as he crawled up the mountain beneath the muzzles of the guns.

The enemy's loss must have exceeded ours ten to one. Our dead and some of the wounded were left on the field.

But it is late and bitter cold, and I must close. We cross the Chickamauga to-night, and then proceed to Dalton. I write under the greatest possible disadvantages.

Doc. 15.

SALLUST.

MOVEMENTS ON THE RAPIDAN.

NEW-YORK TRIBUNE ACCOUNT.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, SIXTH CORPS,
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, December 12, 1863.

Ar half-past six, on the morning of November twenty-sixth, (Thanksgiving,) the Second corps, Major-General G. K. Warren, left its camp on

haste, and Captain Schwartz, with his cavalry, at once forded the river, and marched some three miles, followed by General Caldwell's First division, Second corps, two brigades of which forded the stream. This force was crossed in this way simply to guard against any sudden surprise movement of the enemy, as well as to protect the crossing of the main body of our troops. The ford was a difficult one to cross, and many of the troops were up to their necks in icy water, so that their rations were saturated, and it required almost superhuman exertions to keep their muskets from being immersed. The artillery and ambulances experienced great difficulty in crossing the ford.

Captain Mendell, of the Engineer corps, who had charge of the laying of the pontoon-bridge, was delayed over an hour by finding that there was not a sufficient number of boats to span the stream. He finally succeeded in constructing a temporary trestle which answered every purpose. This inexcusable blunder in not sending enough boats to meet any contingency, occurred both at Culpeper and Germania Fords, and caused dangerous delays. Captain Mendell was not responsible for this carelessness, and, in justice to him, it is but fair to say that to his industry and ingenuity the safe crossing of our entire army was indebted.

As soon as the infantry and artillery crossed the river, they were marched out on the plankroad, about two and a half miles, and encamped for the night on Flat Run. At daybreak on the twenty-seventh, the Second corps moved out on the plank-road, and marched to the old macadamized turnpike. From this point, the Second corps, with General Terry's division of the Sixth corps, marched rapidly toward Old Verdiers

turnpike, where large numbers of Cordon's ori gade, belonging to Early's division, were captured Colonel Carroll had a miraculous escape from instant death, his clothing having ten or twelve bullet-holes in it. Colonel Lockwood, of the same brigade, had his uniform pierced in several places by Minié balls.

In the afternoon, General Meade ascertained that General French had participated in an en

ville, which was the point to be reached. It ing the enemy to his line of battle down the was expected that the Third corps, General French, would join the Second at. Robertson's Tavern, but owing to General French having lost the road, this part of the programme was not carried out. General Hayes led the advance with his division, followed by General Webb's, then General Caldwell's division. At Robertson's Tavern, General Hayes met a large body of rebels and drove them back. General Webb · happened to be near at hand, and at once de-gagement, and the enemy had massed a force ploying his forces to the right of the road, drove them back in confusion toward Raccoon Ford. It was in this spirited encounter that LieutenantColonel Hesser, a gallant officer, fell mortally wounded. About this time, half-past eleven A.M., our skirmishers ascertained that the rebels were concealed in the thick woods, and were shrewdly extending their skirmishers to such an extent, that nearly all of the Second corps was required to check them.

At this time, rebel deserters and prisoners informed General Warren, that Johnston's rebel division was between him and Raccoon Ford, and that he was confronting Rhodes's rebel division.

strong enough to successfully resist him. The exact position of the Third corps, at this time, still continued an uncertainty, although it was known to be four or five miles distant. At sundown General Warren ventured to advance his line of skirmishers, with a strong support. The enemy made a stubborn resistance, and retreated inch by inch, disputing his claim to the soil. Owing to the almost impenetrable woods, it was an impossibility to preserve a perfect line of battle, beside affording a subtle foe concealment, and an excellent opportunity to construct formidable earthworks in addition to those already there.

General Warren evinced his thorough military knowledge by using sufficient military caution in advancing so as to deceive the vigilant enemy, and thereby deter him from hurling his overwhelmingly strong numbers upon our lines. General Warren continued to maintain his position, although no other corps had formed a junction with him.

The First corps, General Newton, which had been ordered from the left in the afternoon, reached the rear of General Warren's command half an hour before dark, and, at daylight on the twenty-eighth, they were in line of battle on his left, a little south of the turnpike.

General Meade was at once informed of this, and also that General Warren had received no tidings from General French on his right, and General Sykes on his left. General Warren notified General Meade that he was ready and willing to begin the attack, if he so desired, by advancing the centre, which was so weak as to be in a critical condition, and wholly unfit to cope with the superior forces of the enemy. It must be borne in mind that both wings of our army were then separated four or five miles from Gen- | eral Warren. General Meade instructed General Warren to wait until the right and left were heard from. Soon after, the roar of artillery The Sixth corps, General Sedgwick, moved up was heard, and just then news came of the po- and took position to the right of the Second sition of the left wing. The rapid cannonading corps, at daylight. At sunrise, the First, Second, came from General Gregg's cavalry division, who and Sixth corps proceeded in line of battle siwere engaging the enemy briskly on the plank-multaneously, but, to their great chagrin, they road. Heavy firing was heard shortly after at found the fleet-footed enemy had decamped durMorton's Ford, where General Custer's cavalry ing the night. By constant and rapid marching, were skirmishing with Stuart's cavalry. During all this time, while General Warren was awaiting further orders and information, the enemy were artfully changing their lines, endeavoring to turn General Warren's right flank. While manoeuvring our forces, Lieutenant-Colonel Josselyn, commanding the Fifteenth Massachusetts volunteers, was seriously wounded, and fell into the hands of the enemy. This determination on the part of the rebels, induced General Warren to make a feint movement, as though about to offer battle for a general engagement. To do this, it was necessary to advance his line of skirmishers. He was entirely successful in deluding the wily To add to our numerous disadvantages, a heavy foe, for, in the language of the F. F. V.'s, he rain-storm set in early in the forenoon, accompafought "right smart" along the front of the Sec- nied with a thick fog, that foiled all our attempts, ond corps. Colonel Carroll's brigade, composed for a time, to continue a close inspection of the of Western troops, conducted themselves in a enemy's works and movements. Determined manner that cannot be too highly praised. Col- not to be balked by unpropitious weather, Genonel Carroll evinced considerable skill by draw-eral Warren made a minute and personal recon.

our advance overtook their retreating rear-guard, and shortly after discovered the main body of the rebel army in a strong position on the west bank of Mine Run, which is about one and three quarter miles from Robertson's Tavern.

Quite a number of deserters were picked up by our advance, and from them we learned that Hill's corps (rebel) had advanced from Orange Court-House down the plank-road, and there united with Ewell's corps, thereby concentrating the whole of Lee's army in a position naturally strong, and with formidable intrenchments to protect him.

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