battle, and would never carry sword or musket more. All through the woods between Bald Knob and Mission Ridge, and over the open ground at the foot of the latter, sad sights drew tears, even from eyes unaccustomed to weeping. At one place a father was walking beside the stretcher on which was borne the torn and mangled yet still breathing body of his son. At the foot of a tree, a strong man was bending, heart-broken, over the lifeless form of his brother. A fragment of a shell had driven the barrel of a musket, in a soldier's hand, with such force against his face, that the head was nearly severed in twain. A rebel officer was lying prone on his face in one of the rifle-pits, still grasping in his hand the sword, which, I afterward learned, he had bravely flourished in the very faces of our men, as they burst with resistless valor over the rebel works. I thought as I looked at him, that, as a tribute to his courage, he should be buried as he lay, under the works he had so well defended, with his sword still in his hand. On the ridge the corpses lay strewed around more thickly, and all along the line occupied by Wood and Baird and Sheridan, the eye could not gaze in any direction without beholding the stiff, cold forms of the dead. The expression upon the faces of our own men who had fallen here, was most touching and remarkable, for not all the pains of dissolution had been able to drive from their features the smile of victory, or the placid look of contentment which always rests upon the countenance of him who feels his work well done. Could those near and dear to the brave men who fell at Chattanooga, have gazed upon their faces the next morning, I am sure it would have mitigated, for all time to come, their emotions of grief. For it was plain as the sun at noonday, that these men had died, not only without mental agony, but that their last earthly feeling was one of calm contentment or triumphant joy. True this was death—but it was death without its hideousness -death robbed of all its terrors--death whose grandeur made it preferable to life. On the summit of the ridge the captured artillery was huddled together in groups, and here, in spite of all my stoicism, I saw another spectacle, of a different nature, which affected me to tears. Numbers of soldiers were standing around the pieces, peering into their huge throats with intense curiosity, passing their hands over every portion even of the carriage-wheels, patting the guns as a child pats the head of a dog, and smiling in each other's faces! As I gazed upon those men, it seemed to me as if I were carried back to another age, and saw before me the sacrifices, the strength, the spirit, and the glories of the American Revolution. God bless the soldiers whose deepest and most solemn joy springs from the overthrow of their country's enemies! I endeavored, with all my power, to ascertain what regiment had first planted its flag upon the crest of the Ridge. It was impossible to do so, and I predict now, that it will never be known. A dozen different regiments lay claim to the honor; and each one has, no doubt, witnesses among the spectators, who honestly testify to the validity of its claim; for it was impossible for any one man to mark all parts of the line at once, and each naturally supposed that the flag he first saw on the crest, was actually the first placed there. As I was riding out to the Ridge, a group of soldiers were standing near the road. As I passed, they remarked to each other, "There goes a correspondent," and then called out to me: "Don't forget to speak well of the First Ohio boys! I will not; although their actions the day before spoke for them more loudly than can the pen of the historian. But this is what I shall say: The First Ohio and Twenty-third Kentucky had been consolidated before the battle, under command of Colonel Langdon, of the former. Did I not know, from the causes I have mentioned, how easily one or a hundred spectators could have been deceived in the matter, I should assert, with the utmost positiveness, that the flag of these consolidated regiments was the first that floated over Mission Ridge. But whatever difference of opinion there may be with regard to the particular regiment to which this honor should be assigned, the illustrious rivals can well afford to be generous to each other; for all agree that five minutes did not elapse from the time our first soldier stood upon the top of the ridge, until a line of Union banners was floating all along the crest. Let all, in these honorable rivalries, imitate the noble example of the Seventy-sixth Ohio and Thirty-eighth Indiana. These regiments were over to the right on Wednesday, the former on the extreme right of Osterhaus's division, the latter on the right of Johnson's. As Osterhaus swept round upon the left flank of the enemy-Johnson at the same time attacking them in front-the lines, met, and nearly five hundred rebels, inclosed between the Seventy-sixth Ohio and the Thirty-eighth Indiana, threw down their arms. Nobody could decide to which regiment they surrendered, and a contest commenced which should crown both with immortal honor; for each claimed the prisoners, not for itself, but for the other. General Sherman's men did not make quite the same progress on the left as the other portions of our army; but let no one decide, on that account, that they did not fight as bravely. Their bold attack upon Tunnel Hill drew upon them the concentrated might of half the rebol army, and, although some of them gave way in confusion, it was simply because they were assailed by overwhelming numbers. This was particularly the case with General John E. Smith's division. But they need not even this explanation at my hands. That the courage of the men and the ability of the officers who bore the American flag in triumph at Raymond, at Jackson, at wounded. Only our pickets were engaged, the Champion Hill, and at Vicksburgh, is no longer enemy not coming within rauge of our line of a matter of question. battle. Tunnel Hill had been abandoned by the rebels in the night; and when I left the summit of the Ridge about noon, the right and left wings of our army were advancing, while the centre still held its position. No enemy was visible, but columns of smoke rising from various points told that the enemy was burning the bridges over the Chickamauga, and such of his stores as he could not carry away. Sherman was throwing a shell, occasionally, into some old rebel camps, which came in sight as he advanced. "No use beating those bushes,” said old Willich, after closely inspecting these camps through his field-glass; "the bird has flown." Estimates of the losses in the last great contest have already been given by telegram. I shall not repeat them here. In the entire three days' operations, I think our own loss will reach six hundred killed, three thousand wounded, and four hundred prisoners. It cannot, certainly, exceed this; it may fall considerably below. The rebel loss will not fall short of five hun- RICHMOND "DESPATCH" ACCOUNT. When this movement was going on, it was observed that the enemy threw a considerable column up the river further to our right, as if he intended to overlap our line, and compel us to stretch it out to a length that would render it very long and very weak. Can it be that he means to threaten our dépôt of supplies at Chickamauga Station, and at the same time to draw us away from Lookout Mountain? The idea that Grant desires to advance his lines in order to get more room and a further supply of firewood, as has been suggested, will not bear the test of reason. A movement on so large a scale looks to ulterior objects, and is intended to initiate operations upon a broad and comprehensive scale. The first result of such a movement will be to compel General Bragg to weaken his forces on Lookout Mountain, (his left,) to reinforce his right, which is comparatively weak. Indeed, orders to this effect have already been given, and are now being executed. It will never do to let the enemy turn our right, and get possession of our dépôt at Chickamauga. General Bragg, therefore, must choose between Lookout and Chickamauga. The demonstration to-day was intended, doubtless, to force him to make his election between the two. If he decide to hold Chickamauga, then he must yield the mountain, and throw his army between the enemy's encroaching left wing and the railroad. If he gives the preference to Lookout, then the railroad and his dépôt of supplies must go. General Grant has made an important move upon the military chess-board to-day, and one that is likely to exert an important influence upon military operations in this quarter. At an The natural effect of the affair to-day, as has early hour this morning, when the fog had lifted already been intimated, will be to force General from the valley below, it was discovered that the Bragg to weaken his left, in order to strengthen Federal Commander was massing a heavy force his right wing, now threatened by a formidable on his left, and opposite to our right. As the and largely superior force. This, I doubt not, morning advanced, this force grew denser and was one of the objects of the demonstration. I larger, until it covered all the slopes this side of look, therefore, for an assault upon Lookout toCemetery Fort, which is near the river above, morrow, when it will be less able to resist an atand the last work the enemy has on his left. At tack than it was to-day. Our artillery on the twelve M., these masses deployed into two lines mountain will be of no assistance after the eneof battle, with heavy reserves. This movement my shall have reached the foot of the mountain, completed, the guns of the fort opened at two it being impossible to depress the guns sufficientP.M., when the heavy lines of the Federals ad- ly. The importance of the mountain ceased vanced rapidly against our pickets, and drove them in, after a sharp resistance on their part. By three o'clock, the enemy had gained Indian Hill, an eminence which stands about midway between Cemetery Fort and Mission Ridge, being between his left wing and our right. He advanced upon no other part of our lines, and rested after gaining possession of the hill. In the mean time, Major Robertson brought up a few guns of his reserve artillery, and, with other batteries posted on Mission Ridge to the right, opened upon the enemy, with what effect is not known. We only know that he maintained his new position, notwithstanding our fire. No report has been received of our casualties beyond a surmise in official quarters, that they will reach from one to two hundred in killed and with the loss of Lookout Valley. The possession of the valley reduces the wagon transportation of the enemy to two or three miles at farthest, and gives him the use of the river besides. The voluntary abandonment of the mountain, therefore, should occasion no regret, since its longer retention is not only of slight importance, but will be attended with much difficulty, on account of the great length of our line. MISSION RIDGE, November 24, midnight. Well, the enemy has assaulted Lookout Mountain to-day, sure enough, as was intimated in my letter of last night he probably would do. Having accomplished a part of the object of his demonstration yesterday, to wit, the transfer of a portion of our forces on the mountain to the ex treme right, he attacked the mountain with a confidence which the sequel will show was not misplaced. The great rise in the Tennessee had carried away his pontoon-bridges the night before, but his positions were so well taken, and had been so strongly fortified, that he did not hesitate to make the assault. He opened at eleven o'clock with his batteries in Lookout valley, directing his fire against our lines along the western side and northern face of the mountain. Our own batteries on the mountain could take no part in the engagement, owing to a dense fog which enveloped Lookout Point and the crest above. At half-past twelve o'clock, the infantry became engaged, and the battle was then fully joined. er possession of Lookout Mountain of comparatively little importance, and, now that the mountain has passed into his hands, there is no reason left why we should longer remain in the mud and water around Chattanooga. Besides, General Grant has been throwing a heavy force up the river, and crossing it over in the boats we neglected to burn, all this afternoon. Α portion of this force consists of heavy cavalry, which have been landed above the mouth of the Chickamauga. Some infantry had also been landed on the east side of that stream-the remainder, and much more numerous body, on the west sideall up the Tennessee and some distance above our right wing. This movement greatly endangers the dépôt and railroad, and furnishes an additional reason for withdrawing across the Chickamauga. Another danger, and a still more serious one, is the probability that Grant will turn our right and get between the main army and Longstreet at Knoxville. It is now well ascertained that Sheridan has not gone to the relief of Burnside, as was fully believed a few days ago; but the whole Federal army is here marshalling for our destruction. Perhaps Grant has concluded that he could best succor Burnside by forcing Very few details have been received-too few, indeed, for me to attempt to enter into particulars. The impression prevails in well-informed circles that the affair has not been well conducted by the confederate officers in command on the mountain. Our forces had been much weakened the night before by the withdrawal of Walker's division, which was sent to the right, leaving only Stevenson's and Cheatham's divisions behind, both under command of General Stevenson. General Cheatham arrived on the ground late in the afternoon, having just return-Bragg to retire. ed to the army. Up to the time of his return, his division was under the command of General Jackson, the senior Brigadier in the division. It was thought that these two divisions would have been sufficient to hold the position against a largely superior force; but not so. The confederates were steadily pushed back from the moment the infantry opened fire until late in the evening, when General Breckinridge went to the assistance of Stevenson with a brigade. The Federals, who had driven the confederates slowly around the north face of the mountain to Craven's house, and thence around almost to the road which leads to the top, were, in their turn, forced back after night some four or five hundred yards. The fight continued until ten P. M., and even now I can hear an occasional shot while I write. I have just heard that our communications with Knoxville have been cut, probably by the Federal cavalry that crossed the river above this afternoon, and that the dépôt buildings at Joyner's Station, on the Chattanooga and East-Tennessee road, have been burnt. November 25-2 A.M. Finding that he could not withdraw his army in time, General Bragg has given orders to mass his whole available force on the right. A battle may be expected to-day. The situation is critical. CHICKAMAUGA, November 25-Midnight. The confederates have sustained to-day the most ignominious defeat of the whole war—a defeat for which there is but little excuse or palliation. For the first time during our struggle for national independence, our defeat is chargeable The troops and guns on the mountain were to the troops themselves, and not to the blunders brought down safely, only a few commissary or incompetency of their leaders. It is difficult to stores being left behind. We lost a consider-realize how a defeat so complete could have ocable number of prisoners, nevertheless, early incurred on ground so favorable, notwithstanding the day, and on the western slope of the mountain, the enemy, it is alleged, having got in the rear of Walthall's brigade, under cover of the prevailing fog. One account says that Walthall lost from five hundred to six hundred prisoners, including nearly the whole of one regiment, the Thirty-fourth Mississippi. It is not improbable that our loss has been exaggerated somewhat. the great disparity in the forces of the two hostile armies. The ground was more in our favor than it was at Fredericksburgh, where General Longstreet is said to have estimated that Lee's army was equal to three hundred thousand men. And yet we gained the battle of Fredericksburgh, and lost that of Missionary Ridge. But let us take up the painful narrative at the beginning, and see how this great misfortune, if not this grievous disgrace, has befallen the confederate arms. Orders have been given to evacuate the mountain, and for the whole army to retire across the Chickamauga, in the direction of the station of Lookout Mountain was evacuated last night, it that name. The loss of Lookout valley and being no longer important to us after the loss of Brown's Ferry removed all doubt as to the Lookout or Will's valley, and no longer tenable ability of General Grant to subsist his army at against such an overwhelming force as General Chattanooga this winter, and rendered the long-Grant had concentrated around Chattanooga. protection for his flanks and rear, and rendered his front almost impregnable. He possessed the additional advantage of being able to manœuvre his army upon the chord of a semi-circle, while Bragg could move only upon the arc. But let us proceed with the battle, the strangest, most singular, and unsatisfactory conflict in which our arms have been engaged. Grant deployed his immense masses in two General Bragg abandoned, also, the whole of Chattanooga valley, and the trenches and breastworks running along the foot of Missionary Ridge and across the valley to the base of Lookout, and moved his troops up to the top of the ridge It was found necessary to extend his right well up toward the Chickamauga, near its mouth, in consequence of the heavy forces which the enemy had thrown up the river in that direction. The Tennessee and Missionary Ridge ap-heavy lines of battle, and sometimes in three, proach nearer to each other as one goes up, or rather down, the valley, the width of which, at some points, does not exceed one fourth of a mile. Across this valley, now almost an open plain, varying from a fourth of a mile to two miles in width, the Federals advanced to the assault, their ranks exposed to an artillery fire from the ridge, while in the plain, and to the infantry fire when they attempted the ascent of the hill or mountain. supported by large reserve forces. The spectacle was magnificent as viewed from the crest of Missionary Ridge. He advanced first against our right wing, about ten o'clock, where he encountered that superb soldier, Lieutenant-General Hardee, who commanded on the right, while Major-General Breckinridge commanded on the left. Hardee's command embraced Cleburne's, Walker's, (commanded by General Gist, General Walker being absent,) Cheatham's, and Stevenson's divisions. Breckinridge's embraced his old division, commanded by Brigadier-General Lewis, Stewart's, part of Buckner's and Hindman's, commanded by Patton Anderson. The enemy's first assault upon Hardee was repulsed with great slaughter, as was his second, though made with double lines, supported with heavy reserves. The wave of battle, like the wave of the sea when it dashes against a rock-bound coast, beat and hissed, and struggled in vain; for the brave men who guarded our right were resolved never to yield one foot to the hated invaders. The odds against which they contended were fearful; for while the enemy advanced in two and even three massive lines, their own army consisted of only one long and weak line, without supports. The only objection that can be urged against our line was its length and weakness, the latter being the result of the former, and the former the result of circumstances beyond our control, it being necessary for us to guard the passes in the ridge, and to conform to the length of the line presented by the enemy. The ridge varies in height from four to six hundred feet, and is crossed by several roads leading out from Chattanooga. The western side, next to the enemy, was steep and rugged, and, in some places, almost bare, the timber having been cut away for firewood. Our pickets occupied the breastworks below, while the infantry and artillery were distributed along the crest of the ridge from McFarlan's Gap almost to the mouth of the Chickamauga, a distance of six miles or more. In addition to the natural strength of the position, we had thrown up breastworks along the ridge wherever the as-oners, and remained masters of the ground until cent was easy. The Federal army was marshalled under Grant, Thomas, Hooker, and Sherman, and did not number less than eighty-five thousand veteran troops. The confederate army, under Bragg, Hardee, and Breckinridge, did not number half so many. Longstreet's Virginia divisions, and other troops, had been sent to East-Tennessee. Had these been present, with their steady leader at the head of them, we should have won a victory quite as complete as our defeat has been. As it was, we ought to have won the day, and should have done so if our men had done as well as usual. Possibly a mistake was committed when Longstreet was sent away, and possibly it would have been better not to have accepted battle to-day, but to have retired last night. General Bragg thought, however, that there was not time, after the loss of Lookout, to get his army safely over the Chickamauga last night, and that it would be better, occupying so strong a position, to fight it out. But what could he expect from a battle where the odds were so much against him? Not only did Grant have three to one in numbers, but the geographical configuration of the ground, in manoeuvring an army, was as favorable as he could desire. Nature had provided an ample Yet they not only repulsed every attack, but captured seven flags, about three hundred pris night, when they were ordered to retire, carrying off all their guns, losing no prisoners, and but a small percentage of killed and wounded. The whole command behaved well, and especially that model soldier, Major-General Cleburne, a true son of the Emerald Isle, and his heroic division. General Hardee saved the army from a disastrous rout, and added fresh laurels to his brow. The attack on the left wing was not made until about noon. Here as on the right, the enemy was repulsed, but he was obstinate and fought with great ardor and confidence, returning to the charge again and again in the handsomest style, until one of our brigades, near the centre, said to be Reynolds's, gave way, and the Federal flag was planted on Missionary Ridge. The enemy was not slow in availing himself of the great advantages of his new position. In a few minutes he turned upon our flanks and poured into them a terrible enfilading fire, which soon threw the confederates on his right and left into confusion. Under this confusion the gap in our lines grew wider and wider and wider, and the wider it grew the faster the multitudinous foe rushed into the yawning chasm. The confusion extended until it finally assumed the form of a panic. Seeing the enemy in possession of a portion of the heights, the men hastily concluded that the day was gone, and that they had best save themselves. Just at this time the alarm was increased by an artillery battery, which rushed down the hill to the river for a fresh supply of ammunition; the men, however, supposed they were flying from the field, and that all was lost. Nearly the whole left wing eventually became involved and gave way, a portion of it retiring under orders, but the greater part in unmitigated rout. General Bragg did all he could to rally the fugitives and re-form the broken line. He exposed himself in the most unguarded manner, and at one time it looked as if he certainly would be killed. His staff-officers were also conspicuous in their efforts to restore our line. They and their chief were the last to leave the ridge. Mountain Run and marched to Germania Ford, with a battery of four four and a half-inch guns and one battery of six twenty-pounder Parrott guns from the reserve artillery, with three hundred cavalry, under the command of Captain Schwartz, of the Fourth New-York cavalry, and a pontoon train, under the command of Captain Mendell of the Engineers corps. The head of this column reached the steep embankments at Germania Ford, at half-past eight A.M. Here a thick growth of almost impenetrable woods was met, and considerable time was occupied in felling trees, cutting out roads, and placing the artillery in position. All this was done with the greatest rapidity, and in the face of the enemy's pickets on the opposite bank of the Rapidan. By great exertions, all the necessary preliminaries were completed by eleven o'clock A.M., the men working with a vigor which indicated that their hearts were inspired with hopes of success. Major-General Meade arrived at this juncture, and ordered a cessation of further operations till General French, Third corps, was heard from. The day was lost. Hardee still maintained his ground; but no success of the right wing could restore the left to its original position. All men -even the bravest are subject to error and confusion; but to-day, some of the corfederates did not fight with their accustomed courage. Possi- At half-past one, orders were received by Genbly the contrast between the heavy masses of the eral Warren to move forward. Upon the adFederals, as they rolled across the valley and up vance guard of the Second corps making its apthe mountain ridge, and their own long and at-pearance, the rebel cavalry pickets fled in hot tenuated line, was not of a character to encour- haste, and Captain Schwartz, with his cavalry, age them. at once forded the river, and marched some three Our casualties are small-very small-too miles, followed by General Caldwell's First dismall, indeed, to be recorded along with so com-vision, Second corps, two brigades of which plete and humiliating a defeat. Included among our losses are some of our best guns-perhaps as many as thirty or forty. The infantry supports, in some instances, fled so precipitately that there was no time left to remove the guns. There were but few roads down the mountain by which they could retreat, and this occasioned further loss. All the artillery behaved well. The men in Cobb's battery stood their ground after their supports had fled, and though they lost their guns, they fought them to the last; and when they could use them no longer, on account of the steepness of the descent, they hurled hand-grenades at the foe as he crawled up the mountain beneath the muzzles of the guns. The enemy's loss must have exceeded ours ten to one. Our dead and some of the wounded were left on the field. But it is late and bitter cold, and I must close. We cross the Chickamauga to-night, and then proceed to Dalton. I write under the greatest possible disadvantages. SALLUST. Doc. 15. MOVEMENTS ON THE RAPIDAN. NEW-YORK TRIBUNE ACCOUNT. Ar half-past six, on the morning of November twenty-sixth, (Thanksgiving,) the Second corps, Major-General G. K. Warren, left its camp on forded the stream. This force was crossed in this way simply to guard against any sudden surprise movement of the enemy, as well as to protect the crossing of the main body of our troops. The ford was a difficult one to cross, and many of the troops were up to their necks in icy water, so that their rations were saturated, and it required almost superhuman exertions to keep their muskets from being immersed. The artillery and ambulances experienced great difficulty in crossing the ford. Captain Mendell, of the Engineer corps, who had charge of the laying of the pontoon-bridge, was delayed over an hour by finding that there was not a sufficient number of boats to span the stream. He finally succeeded in constructing a temporary trestle which answered every purpose. This inexcusable blunder in not sending enough boats to meet any contingency, occurred both at Culpeper and Germania Fords, and caused dangerous delays. Captain Mendell was not responsible for this carelessness, and, in justice to him, it is but fair to say that to his industry and ingenuity the safe crossing of our entire army was indebted. As soon as the infantry and artillery crossed the river, they were marched out on the plankroad, about two and a half miles, and encamped for the night on Flat Run. At daybreak on the twenty-seventh, the Second corps moved out on the plank-road, and marched to the old macadamized turnpike. From this point, the Second corps, with General Terry's division of the Sixth corps, marched rapidly toward Old Verdiers |