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FROM GENERAL THOMAS.
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Nov. 25, 1863-12 Midnight.

sion last night, taking four guns, two caissons, and many prisoners. Hooker reports his arrival at Ringgold at nine a.m. to-day; found the road strewn with caissons, limbers, and ambulances. He commenced skirmishing with enemy at eleven A. M., in Railroad Pass or Gap, near Ringgoldabout half Osterhaus's and third Geary's division engaged, and forced the enemy to abandon the position he had taken in the passes. Both divisions suffered severely, the enemy making obstinate resistance. On the morning of the

To Major-General H. W. Halleck, General-in-twenty-fourth, I sent Colonel Long, commanding Chief:

Second brigade, Second cavalry division, across The operations of to-day have been more sucSouth-Chickamauga to make raids on East-Tencessful than yesterday, having carried Missionary nessee and Georgia Railroad. He returned this Ridge from near Rossville to the railroad tunnel, evening, bringing two hundred and fifty prisonwith a comparatively small loss on our side, cap- ers, and reports he has destroyed the railroad turing about forty pieces of artillery, a large from Tyner's Station to the Hiawassee, and ten quantity of small arms, camp and garrison equip miles south-west of Cleveland. He also deage, besides the arms in the hands of the prison-stroyed eighty wagons and large quantity comWe captured two thousand prisoners, of whom two hundred were officers of all grades,

ers.

from colonels down.

We will pursue the enemy in the morning. The conduct of the officers and troops was every thing that could be expected. Missionary Ridge was carried simultaneously at six different points. GEO. H. THOMAS,

Major-General.

missary stores and other supplies at Cleveland.
The prisoners we have taken since the twenty-
third now sum up more than five thousand.
GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General Commanding.

GENERAL GRANT'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE
MISSISSIPPI, IN FIELD,
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Dec. 23, 1963.
Colonel J. C. Kelton, Assistant-Adjutant Gen-
eral, Washington, D. C.:
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Nov. 26, 1863-11 P.M.

FROM GENERAL THOMAS.

Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief:
General Davis, commanding division, Four-
teenth corps, operating with General Sherman,
gained possession of Chickamauga depot at half-
past twelve to-day. My troops having pursued
by the Rossville and Greysville road, came upon
the enemy's cavalry at New-Bridge, posted on east
side of creek. They retired on the approach of
our troops. The column will be detained for a
few hours to rebuild the bridge, but Hooker
thinks he can reach Greysville, and perhaps Ring-
gold, to-night. Many stragglers have been picked
up to-day, perhaps two thousand. Among the
prisoners are many who were paroled at Vicks-
burgh.
GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Major-General.

FROM GENERAL GRANT. CHATTANOOGA, TENN., 1 A.M., Nov. 27, 1863. Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief: I am just in from the front. The rout of the enemy is most complete. Abandoned wagons, caissons, and occasionally pieces of artillery, are everywhere to be found. I think Bragg's loss will fully reach sixty pieces of artillery. A large number of prisoners have fallen into our hands. The pursuit will continue to Red Clay in the morning, for which place I shall start in a few U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

hours.

FROM GENERAL THOMAS.
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Nov. 27, 1863-12 P.M.
Major-General H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief:
General Palmer reports Johnson's division,
Fourteenth corps, surprised A. P. Stewart's divi-

COLONEL: In pursuance of General Orders No. 337, War Department, of date Washington, October sixteenth, 1863, delivered to me by the Secretary of War at Louisville, Kentucky, on the eighteenth of the same month, I assumed command of the "Military Division of the Mississippi," comprising the departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and telegraphed the order assuming command, together with the order of the War Department referred to, to Major-General A. E. Burnside, at Knoxville, and to Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, at Chattanooga.

My action in telegraphing these orders to Chattanooga in advance of my arrival there, was induced by information furnished me by the Secretary of War of the difficulties with which the army of the Cumberland had to contend in supplying itself over a long, mountainous, and almost impassable road from Stevenson, Alabama, to Chattanooga, Tennessee, and his fears that General Rosecrans would fall back to the north side of the Tennessee River. To guard further against the possibility of the Secretary's fears, I also telegraphed to Major-General Thomas, on the nineteenth of October, from Louisville, to hold Chattanooga at all hazards, that I would be there as soon as possible. To which he replied, on same date: "I will hold the town till we starve."

Proceeding directly to Chattanooga, I arrived there on the twenty-third of October, and found that General Thomas had, immediately on being placed in command of the department of the Cumberland, ordered the concentration of Major

General Hooker's command at Bridgeport, prepar- river, and the almost inaccessible heights rising atory to securing the river and main wagon-road from Lookout valley, at its outlet to the river, between that place and Brown's Ferry, immedi- and below the mouth of Lookout Creek, were ately below Lookout Mountain. The next morn-secured.

ing, after my arrival at Chattanooga, in company By ten o'clock A.M., an excellent pontoonwith Thomas and Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, bridge was laid across the river at Brown's FerChief-Engineer, I made a reconnoissance of ry, thus securing to us the end of the desired Brown's Ferry and the hills on the south side of road nearest the enemy's forces, and the shorter the river and at the mouth of Lookout valley. Af-line over which to pass troops if a battle became ter the reconnoissance, the plan agreed upon was inevitable. Positions were taken up by our for Hooker to cross at Bridgeport to the south side troops from which they could not have been of the river, with all the force that could be spared driven except by vastly superior forces, and then from the railroad, and move on the main wagon-only with great loss to the enemy. Our artillery road by way of Whitesides to Wauhatchie in was placed in such position as to completely Lookout valley. Major-General J. M. Palmer was command the roads leading from the enemy's to proceed by the only practicable route north of main camp in Chattanooga valley to Lookout the river, from his position opposite. Chatta- valley. nooga to a point on the north bank of the Tennessee River, and opposite Whitesides, then to cross to the south side to hold the road passed over by Hooker.

In the mean time, and before the enemy could be apprised of our intention, a force under the direction of Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief-Engineer, was to be thrown across the river, at or near Brown's Ferry, to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout valley, covering the Brown's Ferry road, and orders were given accordingly.

On the twenty-eighth, Hooker emerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie, by the direct road from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides to Chattanooga, with the Eleventh army corps under Major-General Howard, and Geary's division of the Twelfth army corps, and proceeded to take up positions for the defence of the road from Whitesides, over which he had marched, and also the road leading from Brown's Ferry to Kelly's Ferry, throwing the left of Howard's corps forward to Brown's Ferry.

The division that started, under command of It was known that the enemy held the north Palmer, for Whitesides, reached its destination, end of Lookout valley with a brigade of troops, and took up the position intended in the original and the road leading around the foot of the plan of this movement. These movements, so mountain from their main camp in Chattanoo- successfully executed, secured to us two comparga valley to Lookout valley. Holding these ad- atively good lines by which to obtain supplies vantages, he would have had little difficulty in from the terminus of the railroad at Bridgeport, concentrating a sufficient force to have defeated namely, the main wagon-road by way of Whiteor driven him back. To remedy this, the seizure sides, Wauhatchie, and Brown's Ferry, distant of the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout but twenty-eight miles, and the Kelly's Ferry valley, and covering the Brown's Ferry road, and Brown's Ferry road, which, by the use of was deemed of the highest importance. This, the river from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry, by the use of pontoon-bridges at Chattanooga reduced the distance for wagoning to but eight and Brown's Ferry, would secure to us, by the miles. north bank of the river across Moccasin Point, a shorter line by which to reënforce our troops in Lookout valley than the narrow and tortuous road around the foot of Lookout Mountain afforded the enemy for reënforcing his.

The force detailed for this expedition consisted of four thousand men, under command of General Smith, Chief-Engineer, one thousand eight hundred of which, under Brigadier-General W. B. Hazen, in sixty pontoon boats, containing thirty armed men each, floated quietly from Chattanooga past the enemy's pickets, to the foot of Lookout Mountain, on the night of the twenty-seventh of October, landed on the south side of the river at Brown's Ferry, surprised the enemy's pickets stationed there, and seized the hills covering the ferry, without the loss of a man killed, and but four or five wounded. The remainder of the forces, together with the materials for a bridge, were moved by the north bank of the river across Moccasin Point to Brown's Ferry, without attracting the attention of the enemy; and before day dawned, the whole force was ferried to the south bank of the

Up to this period, our forces at Chattanooga were practically invested, the enemy's lines extending from the Tennessee River, above Chattanooga, to the river at and below the point of Lookout Mountain, below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river picketed to near Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in Chattanooga valley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout valley. True, we held possession of the country north of the river, but it was from sixty to seventy miles, over the most impracticable roads to army supplies.

The artillery horses and mules had become so reduced by starvation that they could not have been relied upon for moving any thing. An attempt at retreat must have been with men alone, and with only such supplies as they could carry. A retreat would have been almost certain annihilation, for the enemy, occupying positions within gunshot of, and overlooking, our very fortifications, would unquestionably have pursued retreating forces. Already more than ten thousand animals had perished in supplying half

rations to the troops by the long and tedious your showing, you had better give up Kingston route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chatta-at the last moment, and save the most producnooga over Waldrous Ridge. They could not have been supplied another week.

The enemy was evidently fully apprised of our condition in Chattanooga, and of the necessity of our establishing a new and shorter line by which to obtain supplies, if we would maintain our position; and so fully was he impressed of the importance of keeping from us these lines-lost to him by surprise, and in a manner he little dreamed of that, in order to regain possession of them, a night attack was made by a portion of Longstreet's forces on a portion of Hooker's troops (George's division of the Twelfth corps) the first night after Hooker's arrival in the valley. The attack failed, however, and Howard's corps, which was moving to the assistance of Geary, finding that it was not required by him, carried the remaining heights held by the enemy west of Lookout Creek. This gave us quiet possession of the lines of communication heretofore described south of the Tennessee River. Of these operations I cannot speak more particularly, the sub-reports having been sent to Washington without passing through my hands.

By the use of two steamboats-one of which had been left at Chattanooga by the enemy and fell into our hands, and one that had been built by us at Bridgeport and Kelly's Ferry-we were enabled to obtain supplies with but eight miles of wagoning. The capacity of the railroad and steamboats was not sufficient, however, to supply all the wants of the army, but actual suffering was prevented.

Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching Longstreet from the front and moving him in the direction of Knoxville, Tenn., evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity of some move that would compel him to retain all his forces and recall those he had detached, directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge, with a view to carrying it and threatening the enemy's commu nications with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside by telegraph on the seventh of Novem

ber.

After a thorough reconnoissance of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the inadequacy of our forces and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga; and I was forced to leave Burnside, for the present, to contend against superior forces of the enemy until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the mean time, reconnoissances were made, and plans matured for operations. Despatches were sent to Sherman, informing him of the movement of Longstreet, and the necessity of his immediate presence at Chattanooga.

On the fourteenth of November, I telegraphed to Burnside as follows:

"Your despatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With VOL. VIII.-Doc. 13

tive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same time; and, together, it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and from there rush a force on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from Whitesides to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from Whitesides to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout valley.

"Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only reach there on the sixteenth. This will bring it to the nineteenth as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself till that time. I can hardly conceive of the enemy_breaking through at Kingston, and pushing for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely out of the question to send for ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how could they be fed after they got one day east of here? "U. S. GRANT, "Major-General.

"To Major-General A. E. BURNSIDE."

On the fifteenth- having received from the General-in-Chief a despatch of date the fourteenth, in reference to Burnside's position, the danger of

his abandonment of East-Tennessee unless immediate relief was afforded, and the terrible misfortune such a result would be to our arms; and also despatches from Mr. C. A. Dana, Assistant staff, sent at the instance of General Burnside, Secretary of War; and Colonel Wilson of my informing me more fully of the condition of affairs as detailed to them by him-I telegraphed him

as follows:

CHATTANOOGA, November 15, 1863.

I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on to East-Tennessee in strong enough terms. According to the despatches of Mr. Dana and Colonel Wilson, it would seem that you should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville and that portion of the valley you will necessarily possess holding to that point. Should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on that stream even if it sacrificed half the cavalry of the Ohio army.

By holding on, and placing Longstreet between the Little Tennessee and Knoxville, he should

not be allowed to escape with an army capable ever, the general plan, you understand, is for of doing any thing this winter. I can hardly Sherman, with the force brought with him, conceive the necessity of retreating from East- strengthened by a division from your command, Tennessee. If I did at all, it would be after losing most of the army, and then necessity would suggest the route. I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat. Kingston, looking at the map, I thought of more importance than any one point in East-Tennessee.

to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River, just below the mouth of the Chickamauga, his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights of the north bank of the river, (to be located by your Chief of Artillery,) and to secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will cooperate with Sherman.

But my attention being called more closely to it, I can see that it might be passed by, and Knoxville and the rich valley about it possessed, "The troops in Chattanooga valley should all ignoring that place entirely. I should not think be concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the it advisable to concentrate a force near Little necessary force to defend fortifications on the right Tennessee to resist the crossing, if it would be and centre, and a movable column of one division in danger of capture; but I would harass and in readiness to move whenever ordered. This diembarrass progress in every way possible, reflect- vision should show itself as threateningly as posing on the fact that the army of the Ohio is not sible on the most practicable line for making an the only army to resist the onward progress of attack up the valley. Your effort, then, will be the enemy. U. S. GRANT, to form a junction with Sherman, making your Major-General. advance well toward the northern end of MisTo Major-General A. E. BURNSIDE. sionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneousPrevious reconnoissances made, first by Bri-ly with him as possible. The junction once gadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief-Engineer, and formed, and the ridge carried, connections will afterward by Thomas, Sherman, and myself, in be at once established between the two armies company with him, of the country opposite Chat- by roads on the south bank of the river. Furtanooga and north of the Tennessee River, extend- ther movements will then depend on those of ing as far east as the mouth of the South-Chicka- the enemy. Lookout valley, I think, will be easily mauga and the north end of Missionary Ridge, so held by Geary's division, and what troops you far as the same could be made from the north bank may still have there belonging to the old army of of the river without exciting suspicions on the part the Cumberland. of the enemy, showed good roads from Brown's Ferry up the river and back of the first range of hills opposite Chattanooga, and out of view of the enemy's positions. Troops crossing the bridge at Brown's Ferry could be seen, and their numbers estimated by the enemy; but not seeing any thing further of them as they passed up in rear of these hills, he would necessarily be at a loss to know whether they were moving to Knoxville, or held on the north side of the river for further operations at Chattanooga. It also showed that the north end of Missionary Ridge was imperfectly guarded, and that the banks of the river from the mouth of South-Chickamauga Creek, eastward to his main line in front of Chattanooga, was watched only by a small cavalry picket. This determined the plan of operations indicated in my despatch of the fourteenth to Burnside.

Upon further consideration-the great object being to mass all the forces possible against one given point, namely, Missionary Ridge, converging toward the north end of it-it was deemed best to change the original plan, so far as it contemplated Hooker's attack on Lookout Mountain, which would give us Howard's corps of his command to aid in this purpose; and on the eighteenth the following instructions were given Thomas:

"Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and then held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations, in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition, on the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek. U. S. GRANT, Major-General. "To Major-General GEORGE H. THOMAS." A copy of these instructions was furnished

Sherman with the following communication:

Inclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Major-General Thomas, for, having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with "All preparations should be made for attack- the South; but being confronted by a large force ing the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how Saturday at daylight. Not being provided with this is to be effected until the result of our first a map giving names of roads, spurs of the moun- effort is known. I will add, however, what is tain, and other places, such definite instructions not shown in my instructions to Thomas, that a cannot be given as might be desirable. How-brigade of cavalry has been ordered here, which,

if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the
Tennessee above Chickamauga, and may be able
to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts.
U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

south of it. These points were fortified during the night, and artillery put in position on them. The report of this deserter was evidently not intended to deceive, but he had mistaken Bragg's movements. It was afterward ascertained that one division of Buckner's corps had gone to join Longstreet, and a second division of the same corps had started, but was brought back in consequence of our attack.

On the night of the twenty-third of November,

To Major-General W. T. SHERMAN. Sherman's forces were moved from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides-one division threatening the enemy's left front in the direction of Trenton -crossing at Brown's Ferry, up the north bank of the Tennessee to near the mouth of South-Sherman, with three divisions of his army, Chickamauga, where they were kept concealed strengthened by Davis's division of Thomas's from the enemy until they were ready to form a corps, which had been stationed along the north bank of the river, convenient to where the crosscrossing. Pontoons for throwing a bridge across the river were built, and placed in North-Chick-ing was to be effected, was ready for operations. amauga, near its mouth, a few miles further up, bank of the river, just below the mouth of SouthAt an hour sufficiently early to secure the south without attracting the attention of the enemy. Chickamauga, by dawn of day, the pontoons in It was expected we would be able to effect the crossing on the twenty-first of November; but, the North-Chickamauga were loaded with thirty owing to heavy rains, Sherman was unable to armed men each, who floated quietly past the enget up until the afternoon of the twenty-third, emy's pickets, landed, and captured all but one and then only with Generals Morgan L. Smith's, of the guard, twenty in number, before the enJohn E. Smith's, and Hugh Ewing's divisions of my was aware of the presence of a foe. The the Fifteenth corps, under command of Major- Steamboat Dunbar, with a barge in tow, after General Frank P. Blair, of his army. having finished ferrying across the river the The pontoon-bridge at Brown's Ferry having horses procured from Sherman, with which to been broken by the drift consequent upon the move Thomas's artillery, was sent up from Chatrise in the river, and rafts sent down by the en-tanooga to aid in crossing artillery and troops; and by daylight of the morning of the twentyemy, the other division-Osterhaus's-was retained on the south side, and was, on the night fourth of November, eight thousand men were of the twenty-third, ordered, unless it could get in rifle-trenches. on the south side of the Tennessee, and fortified across by eight o'clock the next morning, to report to Hooker, who was instructed, in this event, to attack Lookout Mountain, as contemplated in the original plan.

the Tennessee and the Chickamauga were laid, By twelve o'clock M., the pontoon-bridges across

and the remainder of Sherman's forces crossed A deserter from the rebel army, who came into over, and at half past three P.M. the whole of the our lines on the night of the twenty-second No-northern extremity of Missionary Ridge, to near the railroad tunnel, was in Sherman's possession. vember, reported Bragg falling back. The following letter, received from Bragg by flag of During the night he fortified the position thus truce on the twentieth, tended to confirm this secured, making it equal, if not superior, in strength to that held by the enemy. report:

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IN THE FIELD, November 20, 1863.

By three o'clock of the same day, Colonel Long, with his brigade of cavalry, of Thomas's

Major-General U. S. Grant, Commanding Uni- army, crossed to the south side of the Tennessee ted States Forces at Chattanooga:

GENERAL: As there may still be some noncombatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, BRAXTON BRAGG,

and to the north of Chickamauga Creek, and made a raid on the enemy's lines of communication. He burned Tyner's Station, with many stores, cut the railroad at Cleveland, captured near a hundred wagons and over two hundred prisoners. His own loss was small.

Hooker carried out the part assigned him for this day equal to the most sanguine expectations. With Geary's division (Twelfth corps) and two brigades of Stanley's division (Fourth corps) of Thomas's army, and Osterhaus's division (Fifteenth corps) of Sherman's army, he scaled the western slope of Lookout Mountain, drove the enemy from his rifle-pits on the northern extremity and slope of the mountain, capturing many prisoners, without serious loss.

General Commanding. Not being willing that he should get his army off in good order, Thomas was directed, early on the morning of the twenty-third, to ascertain the truth or falsity of this report, by driving in his pickets and making him develop his lines. This he did, with the troops stationed at Chattanooga and Howard's corps, (which had been brought into Chattanooga because of the apprehended Thomas having done on the twenty-third, with danger to our potoon-bridges from the rise in the his troops in Chattanooga, what was intended river and the enemy's rafts,) in the most gallant for the twenty-fourth, bettered and strengthened style, driving the enemy from his first line, and his advanced positions during the day, and pushsecuring to us what is known as "Indian Hill,' ,"ed the Eleventh corps forward along the south "Orchard Knoll," and the low range of hills bank of the Tennessee River, across Citico Creek,

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