hurled at the serried ranks of the rebels. Our gunners could distinctly see the swathes which their missiles cut in those regiments advancing in solid mass. Benjamin, Roemer, Buckley, Gettings, Henshaw, all had full play upon the foe with their pet guns. As might be expected, the rebels gave way under this severe fire, but in admirable order, and, falling back again to the cover of the timber, which, in addition, was beyond ordinary range, made their disposition for the renewal of the attack. Heretofore they had fought without artillery. They now brought three batteries into position, and opened from the tops of the knolls, while the infantry deployed upon our flanks once more. It was now late in the afternoon, the trains had obtained a good start on the road, and so far, General Burnside had obtained his object. It was unnecessary, therefore, to hazard, in his present position, the result of the attack to which the rebels were returning with renewed vigor, while a better position was afforded in his rear. He accordingly fell back about half a mile, to another series of commanding hills, where our batteries again came into position, and the fight was renewed. The second engagement, like the first, was marked by the same stubborn fighting on either side. Our forces contested the ground successfully until night terminated the battle, and left them in their chosen position. As the end for which General Burnside had given battle was attained, namely, the checking of the enemy's progress, until our trains were out of danger, and as he was not desirous of risking another engagement until he reached the fortifications at Knoxville, the retreat began once more, and it is reasonable to suppose, as the enemy gave no pursuit until the morning, that they were unaware of the movement, and expected a renewal of the fight on the ground of yesterday. Despite the briskness and energy with which the fight was carried on, our loss is very small. It will not exceed three hundred, and General Burnside estimated it as low as two hundred. The enemy have lost far more in comparisonthe result of the severe artillery fire to which they were exposed; and one thousand is not far from their number. I cannot finish my account without alluding to Colonel Chapin's brigade, of the Twenty-third corps, which fought with distinguished valor, and which, though not so long in the service as many of their veteran confrères, has well earned a place by their side. Doc. 14. BATTLES AT CHATTANOOGA, TENN. DESPATCHES TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT. FROM GENERAL GRANT. [Received 6.40 P.M., Nov. 23, 1863.] CHATTANOOGA, TENN., 8 P.M., Nov. 23, 1863. Major-General II. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief: GENERAL THOMAS's troops attacked the ene my's left at two P.M. to-day, carried first line of rifle-pits, running over the knoll one thousand two hundred yards in front of Wood's Fort and low ridge to the right of it, taking about two hundred prisoners, besides killed and wounded; our loss small. The troops moved under fire with all the precision of veterans on parade. Thomas's troops will intrench themselves, and hold their position until daylight, when Sherman will join the attack from the mouth of the Chickamauga, and a decisive battle will be fought. U. S. GRANT, Major-General. FROM GENERAL THOMAS. CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Nov. 24, 1868-12 M. Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief: Palmer's corps, supported by Howard's, were Yesterday, at half-past twelve, Granger's and advanced directly in front of our fortifications, drove in the enemy's pickets, and carried his first line of rifle-pits between Chattanooga and Citico Creeks. We captured nine commissioned officers and about one hundred and sixty enlisted men. Our loss, about one hundred and eleven. To-day, Hooker, in command of Geary's diviteenth corps, and two brigades Fourteenth corps, sion, Twelfth corps, Osterhaus's division, Fifcarried north slope of Lookout Mountain, with small loss on our side, and a loss to the enemy of five hundred or six hundred prisoners; killed and wounded not reported. o'clock until after night, but our troops gallantly There has been continuous fighting from twelve repulsed every attempt to retake the position. this morning, at the mouth of South-ChickamauSherman crossed the Tennessee before daylight ga, with three divisions of the Fifteenth corps, one division Fourteenth corps, and carried the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge. in the morning. Our success so far has been General Grant has ordered a general advance complete, and the behavior of the troops admira ble. GEO. H. THOMAS, DOCUMENTS. FROM GENERAL THOMAS. sion last night, taking four guns, two caissons, and many prisoners. Hooker reports his arrival at Ringgold at nine a.m. to-day; found the road strewn with caissons, limbers, and ambulances. He commenced skirmishing with enemy at eleven A. M., in Railroad Pass or Gap, near Ringgoldabout half Osterhaus's and third Geary's division engaged, and forced the enemy to abandon the position he had taken in the passes. Both divisions suffered severely, the enemy making obstinate resistance. On the morning of the To Major-General H. W. Halleck, General-in-twenty-fourth, I sent Colonel Long, commanding Chief: Second brigade, Second cavalry division, across The operations of to-day have been more sucSouth-Chickamauga to make raids on East-Tencessful than yesterday, having carried Missionary nessee and Georgia Railroad. He returned this Ridge from near Rossville to the railroad tunnel, evening, bringing two hundred and fifty prisonwith a comparatively small loss on our side, cap- ers, and reports he has destroyed the railroad turing about forty pieces of artillery, a large from Tyner's Station to the Hiawassee, and ten quantity of small arms, camp and garrison equip miles south-west of Cleveland. He also deage, besides the arms in the hands of the prison-stroyed eighty wagons and large quantity comWe captured two thousand prisoners, of whom two hundred were officers of all grades, ers. from colonels down. We will pursue the enemy in the morning. The conduct of the officers and troops was every thing that could be expected. Missionary Ridge was carried simultaneously at six different points. GEO. H. THOMAS, Major-General. missary stores and other supplies at Cleveland. GENERAL GRANT'S REPORT. HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE FROM GENERAL THOMAS. Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief: Major-General. FROM GENERAL GRANT. CHATTANOOGA, TENN., 1 A.M., Nov. 27, 1863. Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief: I am just in from the front. The rout of the enemy is most complete. Abandoned wagons, caissons, and occasionally pieces of artillery, are everywhere to be found. I think Bragg's loss will fully reach sixty pieces of artillery. A large number of prisoners have fallen into our hands. The pursuit will continue to Red Clay in the morning, for which place I shall start in a few U. S. GRANT, Major-General. hours. FROM GENERAL THOMAS. COLONEL: In pursuance of General Orders No. 337, War Department, of date Washington, October sixteenth, 1863, delivered to me by the Secretary of War at Louisville, Kentucky, on the eighteenth of the same month, I assumed command of the "Military Division of the Mississippi," comprising the departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and telegraphed the order assuming command, together with the order of the War Department referred to, to Major-General A. E. Burnside, at Knoxville, and to Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, at Chattanooga. My action in telegraphing these orders to Chattanooga in advance of my arrival there, was induced by information furnished me by the Secretary of War of the difficulties with which the army of the Cumberland had to contend in supplying itself over a long, mountainous, and almost impassable road from Stevenson, Alabama, to Chattanooga, Tennessee, and his fears that General Rosecrans would fall back to the north side of the Tennessee River. To guard further against the possibility of the Secretary's fears, I also telegraphed to Major-General Thomas, on the nineteenth of October, from Louisville, to hold Chattanooga at all hazards, that I would be there as soon as possible. To which he replied, on same date: "I will hold the town till we starve." Proceeding directly to Chattanooga, I arrived there on the twenty-third of October, and found that General Thomas had, immediately on being placed in command of the department of the Cumberland, ordered the concentration of Major General Hooker's command at Bridgeport, prepar-river, and the almost inaccessible heights rising atory to securing the river and main wagon-road from Lookout valley, at its outlet to the river, between that place and Brown's Ferry, immedi- and below the mouth of Lookout Creek, were ately below Lookout Mountain. The next morn- secured. ing, after my arrival at Chattanooga, in company By ten o'clock A.M., an excellent pontoonwith Thomas and Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, bridge was laid across the river at Brown's FerChief-Engineer, I made a reconnoissance of ry, thus securing to us the end of the desired Brown's Ferry and the hills on the south side of road nearest the enemy's forces, and the shorter the river and at the mouth of Lookout valley. Af-line over which to pass troops if a battle became ter the reconnoissance, the plan agreed upon was inevitable. Positions were taken up by our for Hooker to cross at Bridgeport to the south side troops from which they could not have been of the river, with all the force that could be spared driven except by vastly superior forces, and then from the railroad, and move on the main wagon-only with great loss to the enemy. Our artillery road by way of Whitesides to Wauhatchie in was placed in such position as to completely Lookout valley. Major-General J. M. Palmer was command the roads leading from the enemy's to proceed by the only practicable route north of main camp in Chattanooga valley to Lookout the river, from his position opposite. Chatta-valley. nooga to a point on the north bank of the Tennessee River, and opposite Whitesides, then to cross to the south side to hold the road passed over by Hooker. In the mean time, and before the enemy could be apprised of our intention, a force under the direction of Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief-Engineer, was to be thrown across the river, at or near Brown's Ferry, to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout valley, covering the Brown's Ferry road, and orders were given accordingly. On the twenty-eighth, Hooker emerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie, by the direct road from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides to Chattanooga, with the Eleventh army corps under Major-General Howard, and Geary's division of the Twelfth army corps, and proceeded to take up positions for the defence of the road from Whitesides, over which he had marched, and also the road leading from Brown's Ferry to Kelly's Ferry, throwing the left of Howard's corps forward to Brown's Ferry. The division that started, under command of It was known that the enemy held the north Palmer, for Whitesides, reached its destination, end of Lookout valley with a brigade of troops, and took up the position intended in the original and the road leading around the foot of the plan of this movement. These movements, so mountain from their main camp in Chattanoo- successfully executed, secured to us two comparga valley to Lookout valley. Holding these ad-atively good lines by which to obtain supplies vantages, he would have had little difficulty in from the terminus of the railroad at Bridgeport, concentrating a sufficient force to have defeated namely, the main wagon-road by way of Whiteor driven him back. To remedy this, the seizure sides, Wauhatchie, and Brown's Ferry, distant of the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout but twenty-eight miles, and the Kelly's Ferry valley, and covering the Brown's Ferry road, and Brown's Ferry road, which, by the use of was deemed of the highest importance. This, the river from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry, by the use of pontoon-bridges at Chattanooga reduced the distance for wagoning to but eight and Brown's Ferry, would secure to us, by the miles. north bank of the river across Moccasin Point, a shorter line by which to reenforce our troops in Lookout valley than the narrow and tortuous road around the foot of Lookout Mountain afforded the enemy for reënforcing his. Up to this period, our forces at Chattanooga were practically invested, the enemy's lines extending from the Tennessee River, above Chattanooga, to the river at and below the point of Lookout Mountain, below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river picketed to near Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in Chattanooga valley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout valley. True, we held possession of the country north of the river, but it was from sixty to seventy miles, over the most impracticable roads to army supplies. The force detailed for this expedition consisted of four thousand men, under command of General Smith, Chief-Engineer, one thousand eight hundred of which, under Brigadier-General W. B. Hazen, in sixty pontoon boats, containing thirty armed men each, floated quietly from Chattanooga past the enemy's pickets, to the foot of Lookout Mountain, on the night of the twenty-seventh of October, landed on the south The artillery horses and mules had become so side of the river at Brown's Ferry, surprised the reduced by starvation that they could not have enemy's pickets stationed there, and seized the been relied upon for moving any thing. An athills covering the ferry, without the loss of a tempt at retreat must have been with men alone, man killed, and but four or five wounded. The and with only such supplies as they could carry. remainder of the forces, together with the ma- A retreat would have been almost certain anniterials for a bridge, were moved by the north hilation, for the enemy, occupying positions bank of the river across Moccasin Point to within gunshot of, and overlooking, our very Brown's Ferry, without attracting the attention fortifications, would unquestionably have purof the enemy; and before day dawned, the sued retreating forces. Already more than ten whole force was ferried to the south bank of the thousand animals had perished in supplying half rations to the troops by the long and tedious your showing, you had better give up Kingston route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chatta-at the last moment, and save the most producnooga over Waldrous Ridge. They could not have been supplied another week. The enemy was evidently fully apprised of our condition in Chattanooga, and of the necessity of our establishing a new and shorter line by which to obtain supplies, if we would maintain our position; and so fully was he impressed of the importance of keeping from us these lines-lost to him by surprise, and in a manner he little dreamed of that, in order to regain possession of them, a night attack was made by a portion of Longstreet's forces on a portion of Hooker's troops (George's division of the Twelfth corps) the first night after Hooker's arrival in the valley. The attack failed, however, and Howard's corps, which was moving to the assistance of Geary, finding that it was not required by him, carried the remaining heights held by the enemy west of Lookout Creek. This gave us quiet possession of the lines of communication heretofore described south of the Tennessee River. Of these operations I cannot speak more particularly, the sub-reports having been sent to Washington without passing through my hands. By the use of two steamboats-one of which had been left at Chattanooga by the enemy and fell into our hands, and one that had been built by us at Bridgeport and Kelly's Ferry-we were enabled to obtain supplies with but eight miles of wagoning. The capacity of the railroad and steamboats was not sufficient, however, to supply all the wants of the army, but actual suffering was prevented. Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching Longstreet from the front and moving him in the direction of Knoxville, Tenn., evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity of some move that would compel him to retain all his forces and recall those he had detached, directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge, with a view to carrying it and threatening the enemy's commu nications with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside by telegraph on the seventh of Novem ber. After a thorough reconnoissance of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the inadequacy of our forces and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga; and I was forced to leave Burnside, for the present, to contend against superior forces of the enemy until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the mean time, reconnoissances were made, and plans matured for operations. Despatches were sent to Sherman, informing him of the movement of Longstreet, and the necessity of his immediate presence at Chattanooga. On the fourteenth of November, I telegraphed to Burnside as follows: "Your despatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With VOL. VIII.-Doc. 13 tive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same time; and, together, it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge, and from there rush a force on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from Whitesides to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from Whitesides to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout valley. "Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only reach there on the sixteenth. This will bring it to the nineteenth as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself till that time. I can hardly conceive of the enemy_breaking through at Kingston, and pushing for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely out of the question to send for ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how could they be fed after they got one day east of here? "U. S. GRANT, "Major-General. "To Major-General A. E. BURNSIDE." On the fifteenth- having received from the General-in-Chief a despatch of date the fourteenth, in reference to Burnside's position, the danger of his abandonment of East-Tennessee unless immediate relief was afforded, and the terrible misfortune such a result would be to our arms; and also despatches from Mr. C. A. Dana, Assistant staff, sent at the instance of General Burnside, Secretary of War; and Colonel Wilson of my informing me more fully of the condition of affairs as detailed to them by him-I telegraphed him as follows: CHATTANOOGA, November 15, 1863. I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on to East-Tennessee in strong enough terms. According to the despatches of Mr. Dana and Colonel Wilson, it would seem that you should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville and that portion of the valley you will necessarily possess holding to that point. Should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on that stream even if it sacrificed half the cavalry of the Ohio army. By holding on, and placing Longstreet between the Little Tennessee and Knoxville, he should not be allowed to escape with an army capable ever, the general plan, you understand, is for of doing any thing this winter. I can hardly Sherman, with the force brought with him, conceive the necessity of retreating from East- strengthened by a division from your command, Tennessee. If I did at all, it would be after losing most of the army, and then necessity would suggest the route. I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat. Kingston, looking at the map, I thought of more importance than any one point in East-Tennessee. to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River, just below the mouth of the Chickamauga, his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights of the north bank of the river, (to be located by your Chief of Artillery,) and to secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will cooperate with Sherman. But my attention being called more closely to it, I can see that it might be passed by, and Knoxville and the rich valley about it possessed, "The troops in Chattanooga valley should all ignoring that place entirely. I should not think be concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the it advisable to concentrate a force near Little necessary force to defend fortifications on the right Tennessee to resist the crossing, if it would be and centre, and a movable column of one division in danger of capture; but I would harass and in readiness to move whenever ordered. This diembarrass progress in every way possible, reflect- vision should show itself as threateningly as posing on the fact that the army of the Ohio is not sible on the most practicable line for making an the only army to resist the onward progress of attack up the valley. Your effort, then, will be the enemy. U. S. GRANT, to form a junction with Sherman, making your Major-General. advance well toward the northern end of MisTo Major-General A. E. BURNSIDE. sionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneousPrevious reconnoissances made, first by Bri-ly with him as possible. The junction once gadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief-Engineer, and formed, and the ridge carried, connections will afterward by Thomas, Sherman, and myself, in be at once established between the two armies company with him, of the country opposite Chat- by roads on the south bank of the river. Furtanooga and north of the Tennessee River, extend- ther movements will then depend on those of ing as far east as the mouth of the South-Chicka- the enemy. Lookout valley, I think, will be easily mauga and the north end of Missionary Ridge, so held by Geary's division, and what troops you far as the same could be made from the north bank may still have there belonging to the old army of of the river without exciting suspicions on the part the Cumberland. of the enemy, showed good roads from Brown's Ferry up the river and back of the first range of hills opposite Chattanooga, and out of view of the enemy's positions. Troops crossing the bridge at Brown's Ferry could be seen, and their numbers estimated by the enemy; but not seeing any thing further of them as they passed up in rear of these hills, he would necessarily be at a loss to know whether they were moving to Knoxville, or held on the north side of the river for further operations at Chattanooga. It also showed that the north end of Missionary Ridge was imperfectly guarded, and that the banks of the river from the mouth of South-Chickamauga Creek, eastward to his main line in front of Chattanooga, was watched only by a small cavalry picket. This determined the plan of operations indicated in my despatch of the fourteenth to Burnside. Upon further consideration-the great object being to mass all the forces possible against one given point, namely, Missionary Ridge, converging toward the north end of it-it was deemed best to change the original plan, so far as it contemplated Hooker's attack on Lookout Mountain, which would give us Howard's corps of his command to aid in this purpose; and on the eighteenth the following instructions were given Thomas: "Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and then held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations, in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition, on the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek. U. S. GRANT, Major-General. "To Major-General GEORGE H. THOMAS." A copy of these instructions was furnished Sherman with the following communication: Inclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Major-General Thomas, for, having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with "All preparations should be made for attack- the South; but being confronted by a large force ing the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how Saturday at daylight. Not being provided with this is to be effected until the result of our first a map giving names of roads, spurs of the moun- effort is known. I will add, however, what is tain, and other places, such definite instructions not shown in my instructions to Thomas, that a cannot be given as might be desirable. How-brigade of cavalry has been ordered here, which, |