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Looking at the matter practically, we and our
opposing forces are so widely separated, that for
Bragg to materially aid Johnston he must aban-
don our front substantially, and then we can
move to our ultimate work with more rapidity
and less waste of material on natural ob-
stacles. If Grant is defeated, both forces will
come here, and then we ought to be near our
base. The same maxim that forbids, as you
take it, a single army fighting two great battles
at the same time-by the way a very awkward
thing to do would forbid this nation's engag-
ing all its forces in the great West at the same
time, so as to leave it without a single reserve to
stem the current of possible disaster. This is, I
think, sustained by high military and political
considerations. We ought to fight here if we
have a stronger prospect of winning a decisive
battle over the opposing force, and upon this
ground I shall act. I shall be careful not to
risk our last reserve without strong ground to
expect success.
W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief.

emy's rear, but Bragg abandoned to us his intrenched camp, and rapidly fell back toward Bridgeport, Alabaina, pursued as far as practicable by our forces.

In the words of General Rosecrans's official report: "Thus ended a nine days' campaign, which drove the enemy from two fortified positions, and gave us possession of Middle Tennessee. Conducted in one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee at that period of the year, over a soil that became almost a quicksand, our operations were retarded thirtysix hours at Hoover's Gap, and sixty hours at and in front of Winchester, which alone prevented us from getting possession of his communications, and forcing the enemy to a very disastrous battle. These results were far more successful than was anticipated, and could only have been obtained by a surprise as to the direction and force of our movements.

Our losses in these operations were eighty-five killed, four hundred and sixty-two wounded, and thirteen missing, making in all five hundred and eighty.

The killed and wounded of the enemy is unknown, but we took one thousand six hundred and thirty-four prisoners, of which fifty-nine were commissioned officers. We captured, besides, six pieces of artillery, many small arms, considerable camp equipage, and large quantities of commissary and quartermaster's stores. After the expulsion of his rebel army from Middle Tennessee, Bragg retreated across the Cumberland Mountains and Tennessee River upon Chattanooga, which he fortified, and threw up defensive works at the crossings of the river as far up as Blythe's Ferry. Having put the railroad to Stevenson in condition to forward supplies, Rosecrans on the sixteenth of August commenced his advance across the Cumberland Mountains, Chattanooga and its covering ridges on the south-east being his objective point. To command and avail himself of the most important passes, the front of his movement extended from the head of Sequatchie Valley, in East-Tennessee, to Athens, Alabama, thus threatening the line of the Tennessee River from Whitesburgh to Blythe's Ferry, a distance of one hundred and fifty miles.

When General Rosecrans finally determined to advance, he was permitted to select, without restriction, his own line of operations by which to reach Chattanooga, only being directed to connect his left, so far as practicable, with the army of General Burnside, and to report daily by telegraph his movements till he crossed the Tennessee River. General Burnside was also ordered to connect his right, as much as possible, with General Rosecrans's left, so that if the enemy should concentrate upon either army, the other could move to its assistance. General Rosecrans, on the twenty-fifth of June, commenced a forward movement upon the enemy, well intrenched at Tullahoma, covered in front by the defiles of Duck River, a deep, narrow stream, with few fords or bridges, and a rough, rocky range of hills, which divides the "barrens" from the lower level of Middle Tennessee. Bragg's main force occupied a strong position north of Duck River, from Shelbyville, which was fortified to Wartrace, all the gaps on the roads leading thereto being held in force. Gen- The Tennessee River was reached on the tweneral Rosecrans determined to render useless tieth of August, and Chattanooga shelled from their intrenchments, by turning on their right the north bank on the twenty-first. Pontoon and moving on their communications at the rail- boat, raft, and trestle bridges were rapidly preroad bridge on Elk River, thus compelling a pared at Caperton's Ferry, Bridgeport, mouth of battle on our own ground, or driving them on a Battle Creek, and Shellmount, and the army, exdisadvantageous line of retreat. By admirable cept cavalry, safely_crossed the Tennessee in combined movements he deceived the enemy by face of the enemy. By the eighth of September, a threatened advance in force on their left at Thomas had moved on Trenton, seizing Frick's Shelbyville, while the mass of his army in real- and Stevens's Gaps, on the Lookout Mountain. ity, seized Hoover's, Liberty, and the other gaps, McCook had advanced to Valley Head, and taken by hand-fighting, and moved on Manchester, thus Winston's Gap, while Crittenden had crossed to turning the right of the enemy's defences of Wauhatchie, communicating on the right with Duck River, and directly threatening Bragg, who Thomas, and threatened Chattanooga by the was compelled to fall back to Tullahoma, hotly pass over the point of Lookout Mountain. The pursued by Granger, who had brilliantly carried first mountain barrier south of the Tennessee beShelbyville. Dispositions were immediately ing successfully passed, General Rosecrans demade to turn Tullahoma and fall upon the en- cided to threaten the enemy's communication

with his right, while his centre and left seized the gaps and commanding points of the mountains in front. General Crittenden's reconnoissance on the ninth developed the fact that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga on the day and night previous. While General Crittenden's corps took peaceable possession of Chattanooga, the objective point of the campaign, General Rosecrans, with the remainder of his army, pressed forward through the difficult passes of the Lookout and Missionary Mountains, apparently directing his march upon Lafayette and Rome.

and Alabama, or into the valley of Virginia and
H. W. HALLECK,
North-Carolina.
General-in-Chief.

Major-General BURNSIDE,
Cumberland Gap.

On the twelfth, General Rosecrans telegraphed that, although he was sufficiently strong for the enemy then in his front, there were indications that the rebels intended to turn his flanks and cut his communications. He, therefore, desired that Burnside should move down his infantry toward Chattanooga, on his left, and that Grant should cover the Tennessee River, toward Whitesburgh, to prevent any raid on Nashville. He was of opinion that no troops had been sent east from Bragg's army, but that Bragg was being reënforced by Loring, from Mississippi.

On ascertaining these facts, and that General Burnside was in possession of all East-Tennessee above Chattanooga, and hearing that Lee was being rapidly reënforced on the Rapidan, it seemed probable that the enemy had determined to concentrate his forces for the defence of Richmond, On the night of the thirteenth, General Foster or a new invasion of the North. The slight re- telegraphed from Fort Monroe that "trains of sistance made by him in East-Tennessee, and his cars had been heard running all the time, day abandonment without defence of so important a and night, for the last thirty-six hours, on the position as Chattanooga, gave plausibility to the Petersburgh and Richmond road," evidently indireports of spies and deserters from Lee's army, cating a movement of troops in some direction; of reinforcements arriving there from Bragg. and on the morning of the fourteenth, that Longstreet's corps was reported to be going south through North-Carolina. General Meade had been directed to ascertain, by giving battle, if necessary, whether any of Lee's troops had left. It was not till the fourteenth he could give me any information on this point, and then he telegraphed "My judgment, formed of the variety of meagre and conflicting testimony, is, that Lee's army has been reduced by Longstreet's corps, and perhaps, by some regiments from Ewell's and Hill's."

Fearing that General Rosecrans's army might be drawn too far into the mountains of Georgia, where it could not be supplied, and might be attacked before reenforcements could reach him from Burnside, I sent him, on the eleventh, the following telegram:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., September 11.

General Burnside telegraphs from Cumberland Gap that he holds all East-Tennessee above Loudon, and also the gaps of the North-Carolina mountains. A cavalry force is moving toward Athens to connect with you. After holding the nountain passes to the west of Dalton, or some other point on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be decided whether your army shall move further south into Georgia and Alabama.

It is reported here by deserters that a part of Bragg's army is reenforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., September 13, 1868. It is important that all the available forces of your command be pushed forward into East-Tencentrated there. So long as we hold Tennessee, nessee; all your scattered forces should be conKentucky is perfectly safe. Move down your infantry as rapidly as possible toward Chattanooga, to connect with Rosecrans. Bragg may merely hold the passes of the mountains to cover

On the same day the following telegram was Atlanta, and move his main army through Northsent to General Burnside:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., September 11, 1865.

I congratulate you on your success. Hold the gap of the North-Carolina mountains, the line of the Holston River, or some point, if there be one, to prevent access from Virginia, and connect with General Rosecrans, at least with your cavalry.

General Rosecrans will occupy Dalton, or some point on the railroad, to close all access from Atlanta, and also the mountain passes on the west. This being done, it will be determined whether the movable force shall advance into Georgia

ern Alabama to reach the Tennessee River and turn Rosecrans's right, and cut off his supplies. In this case he will turn Chattanooga over to you, and move to interrupt Bragg.

Major-General BURNSIDE,

Knoxville.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 14, 1863.

Alabama, Chattanooga should be turned over to Burnside, and your army, or such part of it as may not be required there, should move to preThere are reasons why you should reënforce vent Bragg from reëntering Middle Tennessee. General Rosencrans with all possible despatch. General Hurlbut will aid you all he can, but most It is believed that the enemy will concentrate to of Grant's available force is west of the Missis- give him battle, and you must be there to help him. H. W. HALLECK, sippi. H. W. HALLECK, Major-General BURNSIDE,

Major-General ROSECRANS,

Chattanooga.

General-in-Chief.

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 13, 1863.

It is possible that Bragg and Johnston will move through Northern Alabama to the Tennessee River, to turn General Rosecrans's right, and cut off his communication with General Grant. Available forces should be sent to Memphis, thence to Corinth and Tuscumbia, to cooperate with General Rosecrans, should the rebels attempt that movement. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. Major-Gen. GRANT, or Major-Gen. SHERMAN, Vicksburgh.

On the fourteenth, the following telegrams were sent to Generals Foster, Burnside, and Hurlbut:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 14, 1863. Information received here indicates that part of Lee's forces have gone to Petersburgh. There are various suppositions for this. Some think it is intended to put down Union feeling in NorthCarolina; others, to make an attempt to capture Norfolk; others, again, to threaten Norfolk, so as to compel us to send reenforcements there from the army of the Potomac, and then to move rapidly against Meade. Such was the plan last spring, when Longstreet invested Suffolk. It will be well to strengthen Norfolk as much as possible, and closely watch the enemy's move

ments. I think he will soon strike a blow somewhere. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

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Knoxville.

General-in-Chief.

In addition to General Burnside's general instructions, a number of despatches of the same purport as the above were sent to him.

Generals Schofield and Pope were directed to send forward to the Tennessee line every available man in their departments, and the commanding officers in Indiana, Ohio, and Kentucky, were ordered to make every possible exertion to secure General Rosecrans's lines of communication. General Meade was urged to attack General Lee's army while in its present reduced condition, or at least prevent him from sending off any more detachments. It seemed useless to send any more troops into East-Tennessee and Georgia, on account of the impossibility of supplying them in a country which the enemy had nearly exhausted.

General Burnside's army was on short rations, and that of the Cumberland inadequately supplied.

General Rosecrans had complained of his inadequate cavalry force, but his stables were overcrowded with animals, and the horses of his cavalry, artillery, and trains were dying in numbers for want of forage.

As three separate armies were now to operate in the same field, it seemed necessary to have a single commander, in order to secure a more perfect coöperation than had been obtained with the separate commands of Burnside and Rose

crans.

General Grant, by his distinguished services the West, seemed entitled to this general comand his superior rank to all the other generals in mand. But, unfortunately, he was at this time in New-Orleans, and unable to take the field. Moreover, there was no telegraphic communication with him, and the despatches of the thirteenth, directed to him and General Sherman, did not reach them until some days after their dates, thus delaying the movements of General Grant's forces from Vicksburgh.

General Hurlbut, however, had moved the troops of his own corps, then in East-Tennessee, with commendable promptness.

These were to be replaced by reënforcements from Steele's corps, in Arkansas, which also formed a part of Grant's army

Hearing nothing from General Grant, or from General Sherman's corps, at Vicksburgh, it was determined, on the twenty-third, to detach the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from the army of the Potomac, and send them by rail, under the command of General Hooker, to protect General Rosecrans's line of communication from Bridge

port to Nashville. It was known that these
troops could not go immediately to the front.
To send more men to Chattanooga, when
those already there could not be fully supplied,
would only increase the embarrassment, and
probably cause the evacuation of that place.

In other words, Hooker's command was to temporarily perform the duties previously assigned to the reënforcements ordered from Grant's army.

We will now return to General Rosecrans's army, the main body of which we left on the fourteenth in the passes of Pigeon Mountain, with the enemy concentrating his forces, near La Fayette, to dispute its further advance. Bragg's threatened movements to the right and left were merely cavalry raids to cut off Rosecrans's line of supplies, and threaten his communications with Burnside. His main army was probably only awaiting the arrival of Longstreet's corps to give battle in the mountains of Georgia.

was

Of the movements of this corps, so well known to the enemy, we could get no reliable information. All we knew positively was, that one of Longstreet's divisions had arrived in Charleston to reënforce that place. It was said that other divisions had gone to Mobile, to protect it from an attack by Banks's army, but as there was no real danger of such an attack at that moment, it more probably on its way to reenforce Bragg's army. But the time of its arrival was uncertain, as we had no reliable information of its departure from Richmond. We knew Bragg had been reënforced, by troops sent by Johnston from Mississippi, and it was afterward ascertained that the rebel authorities had falsely declared as exchanged, and released from parole, the prisoners of war captured by Grant and Banks at Vicksburgh and Port Hudson. This shameless violation of the cartel and of the wellestablished usages of civilized warfare, was resorted to by the enemy in order to swell the numbers of Bragg's army in the approaching conflict.

General Rosecrans's troops were, at this time, scattered along in an extended line from Gordon's Mills to Alpine, a distance of some forty miles. By the seventeenth, they were brought more within supporting distance, and on the morning of the eighteenth a concentration was begun toward Crawfish Spring, but slowly executed.

the enemy, when, according to General Rosecrans's report, General Wood, overlooking the direction "to close upon Reynolds," supposed he was to support him, by withdrawing from the line, and passing in the rear of General Bran

non.

By this unfortunate mistake, a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which the enemy took instant advantage, and, striking Davis in the flank and rear, threw his whole division into confusion.

General Wood claims that the orders he received were of such a character as to leave him no option but to obey them in the manner he did.

Pouring in through this break in our line, the enemy cut off our right and right centre, and attacked Sheridan's division, which was advancing to the support of our left. After a gallant but fruitless effort against this rebel torrent, he was compelled to give way, but afterward rallied a considerable portion of his force, and by a circuitous route joined General Thomas, who now had to breast the tide of battle against the whole rebel army.

Our right and part of the centre had been completely broken, and fled in confusion from the field, carrying with them to Chattanooga their commanders, Generals McCook and Crittenden ; also, General Rosecrans, who was on that part of the line. His Chief of Staff, General Garfield, however, made his way to the left and joined General Thomas, who still remained immovable in his position. His line had assumed a crescent form with its flanks supported by the lower spurs of the mountain, and here, like a lion at bay, he repulsed the terrible onsets of the enemy. About half-past three P.M. the enemy discovered a gap in the hills, in the rear of his right flank, and Longstreet commenced pouring his massive column through the opening. At this critical moment, Major-General Gordon Granger, who had been posted with his reserves to cover our left and rear, arrived upon the field. He knew nothing of the condition of the battle, but, with the true instincts of a soldier, he had marched to the sound of the cannon. General Thomas merely pointed out to him the gap through which the enemy was debouching, when, quick as thought, he threw upon it Steadman's brigade of cavalry.

The battle of Chickamauga commenced on the In the words of General Rosecrans's official morning of the nineteenth, McCook's corps form-report: "Swift was the charge and terrible the ing on the right of our line of battle, and Crit- conflict, but the enemy was broken. A thousand tenden's the centre, and Thomas's the left. The of our brave men, killed and wounded, paid for enemy first attacked our left, with heavy masses, endeavoring to turn it, so as to occupy the road to Chattanooga. But all their efforts proved abortive. The centre was next assailed, and temporarily driven back, but being promptly reenforced, maintained its ground. As night approached the battle ceased, and the combatants rested on their arms. The attack was furiously renewed on the morning of the twentieth, against our left and centre. Division after division was pushed forward to resist the attacking masses of

its possession, but we held the gap. Two of Longstreet's corps confronted the position: determined to take it, they successively came to the assault. A battery of six guns, which played into the gorge, poured death and slaughter into them. They charged to within a few yards of the pieces, but our grape and canister and the leaden hail of musketry, delivered in sparing but terrible volleys, from the cartridges taken, in many instances, from the boxes of their fallen companions, was too much even for Longstreet's

men. About sunset they made their last charge, when our men, being out of ammunition, rushed on them with the bayonet, and they gave way to return no more."

Cumberland, and Major-General Sherman of that of the Tennessee.

As the supply of the army at Chattanooga demanded prompt attention, he immediately reIn the mean time the enemy made repeated at-paired to that place. By bringing up from tempts to carry General Thomas's position on the left and front, but were as often driven back with loss. At nightfall, the enemy fell back beyond the range of our artillery, leaving Thomas victorious on his hard-fought field.

As most of the corps of McCook and Crittenden were now in Chattanooga, it was deemed advisable, also, to withdraw the left wing to that place. Thomas, consequently, fell back during the night to Rossville, leaving the dead and most of the wounded in the hands of the enemy. He here received a supply of ammunition, and during all the twenty-first offered battle to the enemy, but the attack was not seriously renewed.

On the night of the twenty-first he withdrew the remainder of the army within the defences of Chattanooga.

The enemy suffered severely in these battles, and on the night of the twentieth was virtually defeated, but being permitted to gather the trophies off the field on the twenty-first, he is entitled to claim a victory, however barren in its results.

Bridgeport the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, under Hooker, and throwing a force from Chattanooga, under General W. F. Smith, on the south side of the river, at Burns's Ferry, the points of Lookout Mountain commanding the river were recaptured on the twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ninth of October. This important success restored his communications with his dépôts of supplies. It is not my province, even if I had the means of doing so, to speak of the brilliant exploits of our navy in the western waters. It may be proper, however, to remark, that General Grant and his department commanders report that Admirals Farragut, Porter, and their officers, have rendered most valuable assistance in all their operations.

GENERAL REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

printed and badly arranged as to be almost useless as historical documents.

It has not been possible, in the foregoing summary, to refer to all the engagements which our troops have had with the enemy during the past His loss, in killed, wounded, and missing, as year, as no official accounts or reports of some reported in the rebel papers, was eighteen thou- of them could be found, and the details given sand. Our loss in these battles was one thou- have been compiled from telegrams, despatches, sand six hundred and forty-four killed, nine and reports scattered through the various buthousand two hundred and sixty-two wounded, reaus of the War Department. I respectfully and four thousand nine hundred and forty-five recommend that all these official documents and missing. If we add the loss of the cavalry, in reports, received since the beginning of the its several engagements, about five hundred, we war, be collected and published in chronological have a total of sixteen thousand three hundred order under the direction of the Adjutant-Genand fifty-one. We lost, in material, thirty-six eral's Department. Some have already been pubguns, twenty caissons, eight thousand four hun-lished by Congress, but they are so incorrectly dred and fifty small arms, five thousand eight hundred and thirty-four infantry accoutrements. We captured two thousand and three prisoners. After General Rosecrans retreated to Chattanooga, he withdrew his forces from the passes of Lookout Mountain, which covered his line of supplies from Bridgeport. These were immediately occupied by the enemy, who also sent a cavalry force across the Tennessee, above Chattanooga, which destroyed a large wagon train in the Sequatchie Valley, captured McMinsville and other points on the railroad, thus almost completely cutting off the supplies of General Rosecrans's army. Fortunately for us, the line of the railroad was well defended, and the enemy's cavalry being successfully attacked by Colonel McCook, at Anderson's Cross-Roads, on the second October; by General Mitchell, at Shelbyville, on the sixth; and by General Crook, at Farmington, on the eighth, were mostly captured or destroyed.

Major-General Grant arrived at Louisville, and on the nineteenth, in accordance with the orders of the President, assumed general command of the Departments of the Tennessee, Cumberland, and Ohio. In accordance with his recommendation, Major-General G. W. Thomas was placed in the immediate command of the department of the

The rebel armies live mainly upon the country through which they pass, taking food and forage alike from friend and foe. This enables them to move with ease and great rapidity. Our commanders, operating in the rebel States, generally find no supplies, and in the Border States it is difficult to distinguish between real friends and enemies. To live upon the country passed over often produces great distress among the inhabitants, but it is one of the unavoidable results of war, and is justified by the usages of civilized nations. Some of our commanders have availed themselves of this right of military appropriation, while others have required too large supply trains, and have not depended, as they might have done, upon the resources of the country in which they operated. General Grant says in his official report:

"In the march from Bruinsburgh to Vicksburgh, covering a period of twenty days before supplies could be obtained from the Government stores, only five days' rations were issued, and three of these were carried in the haversacks at the start, and were soon exhausted. All other subsistence was obtained from the country through which we passed, The march

was

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