On the twenty-second of May, Major-General Stanley made a raid upon Middleton, capturing eighty prisoners, three hundred horses, six hundred stand of arms, and other property. On the fourth of June, the rebel General Forrest made a raid on Franklin, and on the eleventh attacked Triune. His losses in these unsuccessful skirmishes were estimated at over one hundred, while ours was only seventeen killed and wounded. tude of this army. I therefore counsel caution and Major-General. To Major-General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. WASHINGTON, June 12. At While General Grant was operating before Vicksburgh, information, deemed reliable, was received from captured rebel correspondence, that large detachments were being drawn from Bragg's army to reenforce Johnston in Mississippi. Reenforcements were sent to General Grant from other armies in the West, but General Rosecrans's army was left intact, in order that he might take GENERAL: Your telegram of yesterday is just advantage of Bragg's diminished numbers, and received. I do not understand your application drive him back into Georgia, and thus rescue loyal of the military maxim: "Not to fight two great East-Tennessee from the hands of the rebels, an battles at the same time." It will apply to a object which the Government has kept constant-single army, but not to two armies acting indely in view from the beginning of the war. I pendently of each other. Johnston and Bragg therefore urged General Rosecrans to take ad-are acting on interior lines between you and vantage of this opportunity to carry out his Grant, and it is for their interest, not ours, that long projected movement, informing him that they should fight at different times so as to use General Burnside would cooperate with his the same force against both of them. It is for force, moving from Kentucky to East-Tennessee. our interest to fight them, if possible, while diFor various reasons he preferred to postpone his vided. If you are not strong enough to fight movements until the termination of the siege Bragg with a part of his force absent, you will of Vicksburgh. In order to avoid any misunder- not be able to fight him after the affair at Vicksstanding of the orders given to General Rose-burgh is over and his troops return to your front. crans on this subject, I submit the following correspondence: MURFREESBORO, TENN., June 11, 1863. There is another military maxim, that councils of war never fight. If you say that you are not prepared to fight Bragg, I shall not order Your despatch of to-day is received. You re- you to do so, for the responsibility of fighting or member, I gave you, as a necessary condition of refusing to fight at a particular time or place success, an adequate cavalry force; since that must rest upon the general in immediate comtime I have not lost a moment in mounting our mand. It cannot be shared by a council of war, dismounted cavalry as fast as we could get nor will the authorities here make you fight horses-not more than three hundred remain to against your will. You ask me to counsel them be mounted. The Fifth Iowa, ordered up from caution and patience. I have done so very often. Donaldson, arrived to-day. The First Wiscon-But after five or six months' inactivity, with sin will be here by Saturday. My preliminary your forces all the time diminishing, and no infantry movements have nearly all been com- hope of any immediate increase, you must not pleted, and I am preparing to strike a blow that be surprised that their patience is pretty well will tell. But to show you how differently exhausted. If you do not deem it prudent to things are viewed here, I called on my corps risk a general battle with Bragg, why can you and division commanders and generals of caval-not harass him, or make such demonstrations as ry for answers in writing to these questions: to prevent his sending more reënforcements to First. From your best information, do you think the enemy materially weakened in our front? Second, Do you think this army can advance, at this time, with reasonable prospect of fighting a great and successful battle? Third, do you think an advance advisable at this time? the first, eleven answered no; six yes, to the extent of ten thousand. To the second, four yes, with doubts; thirteen no. To the third, not one yes; seventeen no. To Not one thinks an advance advisable until Vickburgh's fate is determined. Admitting these officers to have a reasonable share of military sagacity, courage, and patriotism, you perceive that there are graver and stronger reasons than probably appear at Washington, for the atti Johnston? I do not write this in a spirit of fault- Major-General ROSECRANS, Murfreesboro, Tenn. HEADQUARTERS Department oF THE CUMBERLAND, MURFREESBORO, June 21. GENERAL: In your favor of the twelfth instant, you say you do not see how the maxim of not fighting two great battles at the same time applies to the case of this army and Grant's. Looking at the matter practically, we and our opposing forces are so widely separated, that for Bragg to materially aid Johnston he must abandon our front substantially, and then we can move to our ultimate work with more rapidity and less waste of material on natural obstacles. If Grant is defeated, both forces will come here, and then we ought to be near our base. The same maxim that forbids, as you take it, a single army fighting two great battles at the same time-by the way a very awkward thing to do would forbid this nation's engaging all its forces in the great West at the same time, so as to leave it without a single reserve to stem the current of possible disaster. This is, I think, sustained by high military and political considerations. We ought to fight here if we have a stronger prospect of winning a decisive battle over the opposing force, and upon this ground I shall act. I shall be careful not to risk our last reserve without strong ground to expect success. W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General. Major-General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. When General Rosecrans finally determined to advance, he was permitted to select, without restriction, his own line of operations by which to reach Chattanooga, only being directed to connect his left, so far as practicable, with the army of General Burnside, and to report daily by telegraph his movements till he crossed the Tennessee River. General Burnside was also ordered to connect his right, as much as possible, with General Rosecrans's left, so that if the enemy should concentrate upon either army, the other could move to its assistance. General Rosecrans, on the twenty-fifth of June, commenced a forward movement upon the enemy, well intrenched at Tullahoma, covered in front by the defiles of Duck River, a deep, narrow stream, with few fords or bridges, and a rough, rocky range of hills, which divides the "barrens" from the lower level of Middle Tennessee. Bragg's main force occupied a strong position north of Duck River, from Shelbyville, which was fortified to Wartrace, all the gaps on the roads leading thereto being held in force. General Rosecrans determined to render useless their intrenchments, by turning on their right and moving on their communications at the railroad bridge on Elk River, thus compelling a battle on our own ground, or driving them on a disadvantageous line of retreat. By admirable combined movements he deceived the enemy by a threatened advance in force on their left at Shelbyville, while the mass of his army in reality, seized Hoover's, Liberty, and the other gaps, by hand-fighting, and moved on Manchester, thus turning the right of the enemy's defences of Duck River, and directly threatening Bragg, who was compelled to fall back to Tullahoma, hotly pursued by Granger, who had brilliantly carried Shelbyville. Dispositions were immediately made to turn Tullahoma and fall upon the en emy's rear, but Bragg abandoned to us his intrenched camp, and rapidly fell back toward Bridgeport, Alabama, pursued as far as practicable by our forces. In the words of General Rosecrans's official report: "Thus ended a nine days' campaign, which drove the enemy from two fortified positions, and gave us possession of Middle Tennessee. Conducted in one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee at that period of the year, over a soil that became almost a quicksand, our operations were retarded thirtysix hours at Hoover's Gap, and sixty hours at and in front of Winchester, which alone prevented us from getting possession of his communications, and forcing the enemy to a very disastrous battle. These results were far more successful than was anticipated, and could only have been obtained by a surprise as to the direction and force of our movements. Our losses in these operations were eighty-five killed, four hundred and sixty-two wounded, and thirteen missing, making in all five hundred and eighty. The killed and wounded of the enemy is unknown, but we took one thousand six hundred and thirty-four prisoners, of which fifty-nine were commissioned officers. We captured, besides, six pieces of artillery, many small arms, considerable camp equipage, and large quantities of commissary and quartermaster's stores. After the expulsion of his rebel army from Middle Tennessee, Bragg retreated across the Cumberland Mountains and Tennessee River upon Chattanooga, which he fortified, and threw up defensive works at the crossings of the river as far up as Blythe's Ferry. Having put the railroad to Stevenson in condition to forward supplies, Rosecrans on the sixteenth of August commenced his advance across the Cumberland Mountains, Chattanooga and its covering ridges on the south-east being his objective point. To command and avail himself of the most important passes, the front of his movement extended from the head of Sequatchie Valley, in East-Tennessee, to Athens, Alabama, thus threatening the line of the Tennessee River from Whitesburgh to Blythe's Ferry, a distance of one hundred and fifty miles. The Tennessee River was reached on the twentieth of August, and Chattanooga shelled from the north bank on the twenty-first. Pontoon boat, raft, and trestle bridges were rapidly prepared at Caperton's Ferry, Bridgeport, mouth of Battle Creek, and Shellmount, and the army, except cavalry, safely crossed the Tennessee in face of the enemy. By the eighth of September, Thomas had moved on Trenton, seizing Frick's and Stevens's Gaps, on the Lookout Mountain. McCook had advanced to Valley Head, and taken Winston's Gap, while Crittenden had crossed to Wauhatchie, communicating on the right with Thomas, and threatened Chattanooga by the pass over the point of Lookout Mountain. The first mountain barrier south of the Tennessee being successfully passed, General Rosecrans decided to threaten the enemy's communication with his right, while his centre and left seized the gaps and commanding points of the mountains in front. General Crittenden's reconnoissance on the ninth developed the fact that the enemy had evacuated Chattanooga on the day and night previous. While General Crittenden's corps took peaceable possession of Chattanooga, the objective point of the campaign, General Rosecrans, with the remainder of his army, pressed forward through the difficult passes of the Lookout and Missionary Mountains, apparently directing his march upon Lafayette and Rome. On ascertaining these facts, and that General Burnside was in possession of all East-Tennessee above Chattanooga, and hearing that Lee was being rapidly reënforced on the Rapidan, it seemed probable that the enemy had determined to concentrate his forces for the defence of Richmond, or a new invasion of the North. The slight resistance made by him in East-Tennessee, and his abandonment without defence of so important a position as Chattanooga, gave plausibility to the reports of spies and deserters from Lee's army, of reinforcements arriving there from Bragg. Fearing that General Rosecrans's army might be drawn too far into the mountains of Georgia, where it could not be supplied, and might be attacked before reënforcements could reach him from Burnside, I sent him, on the eleventh, the following telegram: HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, General Burnside telegraphs from Cumberland Gap that he holds all East-Tennessee above Loudon, and also the gaps of the North-Carolina mountains. A cavalry force is moving toward Athens to connect with you. After holding the nountain passes to the west of Dalton, or some other point on the railroad, to prevent the return of Bragg's army, it will be decided whether your army shall move further south into Georgia and Alabama. It is reported here by deserters that a part of Bragg's army is reënforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. To Major-General ROSECRANS, Chattanooga. On the twelfth, General Rosecrans telegraphed that, although he was sufficiently strong for the enemy then in his front, there were indications that the rebels intended to turn his flanks and cut his communications. He, therefore, desired that Burnside should move down his infantry toward Chattanooga, on his left, and that Grant should cover the Tennessee River, toward Whitesburgh, to prevent any raid on Nashville. He was of opinion that no troops had been sent east from Bragg's army, but that Bragg was being reenforced by Loring, from Mississippi. On the night of the thirteenth, General Foster telegraphed from Fort Monroe that "trains of cars had been heard running all the time, day and night, for the last thirty-six hours, on the Petersburgh and Richmond road," evidently indicating a movement of troops in some direction; and on the morning of the fourteenth, that Longstreet's corps was reported to be going south through North-Carolina. General Meade had been directed to ascertain, by giving battle, if necessary, whether any of Lee's troops had left. It was not till the fourteenth he could give me any information on this point, and then he telegraphed: "My judgment, formed of the variety of meagre and conflicting testimony, is, that Lee's army has been reduced by Longstreet's corps, and perhaps, by some regiments from Ewell's and Hill's." HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., September 13, 1863. It is important that all the available forces of your command be pushed forward into East-Tennessee; all your scattered forces should be concentrated there. So long as we hold Tennessee, Kentucky is perfectly safe. Move down your infantry as rapidly as possible toward Chattanooga, to connect with Rosecrans. Bragg may merely hold the passes of the mountains to cover On the same day the following telegram was Atlanta, and move his main army through Northsent to General Burnside: HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, I congratulate you on your success. Hold the gap of the North-Carolina mountains, the line of the Holston River, or some point, if there be one, to prevent access from Virginia, and connect with General Rosecrans, at least with your cavalry. General Rosecrans will occupy Dalton, or some point on the railroad, to close all access from Atlanta, and also the mountain passes on the west. This being done, it will be determined whether the movable force shall advance into Georgia ern Alabama to reach the Tennessee River and turn Rosecrans's right, and cut off his supplies. In this case he will turn Chattanooga over to you, and move to interrupt Bragg. Major-General BURNSIDE, Knoxville. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 18, 19 3. There is no intention of sending General Burnside into North-Carolina. He has orders to move down and connect with you. Should the enemy attempt to turn your right flank through In addition to General Burnside's general in purport as the above were sent to him. I think, from all accounts, that Steele is suffi-structions, a number of despatches of the same ciently strong. All your available forces should be sent to Corinth and Tuscumbia to operate against Bragg, should he attempt to turn Rosecrans's right and recross the river into Tennessee. Send to General Sherman, at Vicksburgh, for reenforcements for this purpose. General Grant, it is understood, is sick in New-Orleans. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. On the fourteenth, the following telegrams were sent to Generals Foster, Burnside, and Hurlbut: HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 14, 1868. Information received here indicates that part of Lee's forces have gone to Petersburgh. There are various suppositions for this. Some think it is intended to put down Union feeling in NorthCarolina; others, to make an attempt to capture Norfolk; others, again, to threaten Norfolk, so as to compel us to send reenforcements there from the army of the Potomac, and then to move rapidly against Meade. Such was the plan last spring, when Longstreet invested Suffolk. It will be well to strengthen Norfolk as much as possible, and closely watch the enemy's move ments. I think he will soon strike a blow some- Major-General FOSTER, Fort Monroe. HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 14, 1864. There are good reasons why troops should be sent to assist General Rosecrans's right with all possible despatch. Communicate with Sherman to assist you, and hurry forward reënforcements as previously directed. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. Major-General HURLBUT, Generals Schofield and Pope were directed to send forward to the Tennessee line every available man in their departments, and the commanding officers in Indiana, Ohio, and Kentucky, were ordered to make every possible exertion to secure General Rosecrans's lines of communication. General Meade was urged to attack General Lee's army while in its present reduced condition, or at least prevent him from sending off any more detachments. It seemed useless to send any more troops into East-Tennessee and Georgia, on account of the impossibility of supplying them in a country which the enemy had nearly exhausted. General Burnside's army was on short rations, and that of the Cumberland inadequately supplied. General Rosecrans had complained of his inadequate cavalry force, but his stables were overcrowded with animals, and the horses of his cavalry, artillery, and trains were dying in numbers for want of forage. As three separate armies were now to operate in the same field, it seemed necessary to have a single commander, in order to secure a more perfect coöperation than had been obtained with the separate commands of Burnside and Rose crans. General Grant, by his distinguished services the West, seemed entitled to this general comand his superior rank to all the other generals in mand. But, unfortunately, he was at this time in New-Orleans, and unable to take the field. Moreover, there was no telegraphic communication with him, and the despatches of the thirteenth, directed to him and General Sherman, did not reach them until some days after their dates, thus delaying the movements of General Grant's forces from Vicksburgh. General Hurlbut, however, had moved the troops of his own corps, then in East-Tennessee, with commendable promptness. These were to be replaced by reënforcements from Steele's corps, in Arkansas, which also formed a part of Grant's army Hearing nothing from General Grant, or from General Sherman's corps, at Vicksburgh, it was determined, on the twenty-third, to detach the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from the army of the Potomac, and send them by rail, under the command of General Hooker, to protect General Rosecrans's line of communication from Bridge port to Nashville. It was known that these In other words, Hooker's command was to temporarily perform the duties previously assigned to the reënforcements ordered from Grant's army. We will now return to General Rosecrans's army, the main body of which we left on the fourteenth in the passes of Pigeon Mountain, with the enemy concentrating his forces, near La Fayette, to dispute its further advance. Bragg's threatened movements to the right and left were merely cavalry raids to cut off Rosecrans's line of supplies, and threaten his communications with Burnside. His main army was probably only awaiting the arrival of Longstreet's corps to give battle in the mountains of Georgia. was Of the movements of this corps, so well known to the enemy, we could get no reliable information. All we knew positively was, that one of Longstreet's divisions had arrived in Charleston to reënforce that place. It was said that other divisions had gone to Mobile, to protect it from an attack by Banks's army, but as there was no real danger of such an attack at that moment, it more probably on its way to reenforce Bragg's army. But the time of its arrival was uncertain, as we had no reliable information of its departure from Richmond. We knew Bragg had been reënforced, by troops sent by Johnston from Mississippi, and it was afterward ascertained that the rebel authorities had falsely declared as exchanged, and released from parole, the prisoners of war captured by Grant and Banks at Vicksburgh and Port Hudson. This shameless violation of the cartel and of the wellestablished usages of civilized warfare, was resorted to by the enemy in order to swell the numbers of Bragg's army in the approaching conflict. General Rosecrans's troops were, at this time, scattered along in an extended line from Gordon's Mills to Alpine, a distance of some forty miles. By the seventeenth, they were brought more within supporting distance, and on the morning of the eighteenth a concentration was begun toward Crawfish Spring, but slowly executed. the enemy, when, according to General Rosecrans's report, General Wood, overlooking the direction "to close upon Reynolds," supposed he was to support him, by withdrawing from the line, and passing in the rear of General Bran non. By this unfortunate mistake, a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which the enemy took instant advantage, and, striking Davis in the flank and rear, threw his whole division into confusion. General Wood claims that the orders he received were of such a character as to leave him no option but to obey them in the manner he did. Pouring in through this break in our line, the enemy cut off our right and right centre, and attacked Sheridan's division, which was advancing to the support of our left. After a gallant but fruitless effort against this rebel torrent, he was compelled to give way, but afterward rallied a considerable portion of his force, and by a circuitous route joined General Thomas, who now had to breast the tide of battle against the whole rebel army. Our right and part of the centre had been completely broken, and fled in confusion from the field, carrying with them to Chattanooga their commanders, Generals McCook and Crittenden ; also, General Rosecrans, who was on that part of the line. His Chief of Staff, General Garfield, however, made his way to the left and joined General Thomas, who still remained immovable in his position. His line had assumed a crescent form with its flanks supported by the lower spurs of the mountain, and here, like a lion at bay, he repulsed the terrible onsets of the enemy. About half-past three P.M. the enemy discovered a gap in the hills, in the rear of his right flank, and Longstreet commenced pouring his massive column through the opening. At this critical moment, Major-General Gordon Granger, who had been posted with his reserves to cover our left and rear, arrived upon the field. He knew nothing of the condition of the battle, but, with the true instincts of a soldier, he had marched to the sound of the cannon. General Thomas merely pointed out to him the gap through which the enemy was debouching, when, quick as thought, he threw upon it Steadman's brigade of cavalry. The battle of Chickamauga commenced on the In the words of General Rosecrans's official morning of the nineteenth, McCook's corps form-report: "Swift was the charge and terrible the ing on the right of our line of battle, and Crit- conflict, but the enemy was broken. A thousand tenden's the centre, and Thomas's the left. The of our brave men, killed and wounded, paid for enemy first attacked our left, with heavy masses, endeavoring to turn it, so as to occupy the road to Chattanooga. But all their efforts proved abortive. The centre was next assailed, and temporarily driven back, but being promptly reenforced, maintained its ground. As night approached the battle ceased, and the combatants rested on their arms. The attack was furiously renewed on the morning of the twentieth, against our left and centre. Division after division was pushed forward to resist the attacking masses of its possession, but we held the gap. Two of Longstreet's corps confronted the position: determined to take it, they successively came to the assault. A battery of six guns, which played into the gorge, poured death and slaughter into them. They charged to within a few yards of the pieces, but our grape and canister and the leaden hail of musketry, delivered in sparing but terrible volleys, from the cartridges taken, in many instances, from the boxes of their fallen companions, was too much even for Longstreet's |