IN THIS ISSUE... Published monthly at Coast Guard Head- quarters, Washington, D.C. 20591, under the auspices of the Merchant Marine Coun- cil, in the interest of safety at sea. Spe- cial permission for republication, either in whole or in part, with the exception of copyrighted articles or pictures, is not re- quired provided credit is given to the Pro- ceedings of the Merchant Marine Council. Use of funds for printing this publication FRONT COVER: Tows like this move in excess of 154 million tons of petroleum and petroleum products annually on United States Inland Water- ways. Photo courtesy American Waterways Operators Inc. BACK COVER: Safety cartoon by G. Seal, Pacific Maritime Association. Rear Admiral A. C. Wagner, USCG Chief, Office of Boating Safety, Member T. A. DeNardo, Acting Editor Unified Rules, Radiotelephones, and Towboat Legislation MARINE CASUALTIES PREVENTION THROUGH LEGISLATION Commander John S. Lipuscek, USCG Chief, Casualty Review Branch, Merchant Vessel Inspection Division, Headquarters THE STUDY OF marine casualties provides us with invaluable information in identifying programs which should ultimately lead to legislation designed to make our navigable waterways safer. Three Coast Guard supported bills introduced in the last session of Congress promise to reduce several primary causes of vessel collisions. The proposed legislation dealing with the Unification of the Rules of the Road, Required Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Communication and Towboat Requirements, will attempt in certain areas and under certain circumstances to avert (1) meeting or passing without mutual agreement, (2) failure to communicate with another vessel by available means and (3) a number of other personnel faults. While not designed to eliminate personnel error, the bills nevertheless would require swift and, in the case of towboat operators, more knowledgeable communication and agreement between approaching vessels. The significance of the pending legislative proposals as tools in reducing vessel casualties is best emphasized by looking at some recent disasters on the Mississippi River. While it is true that some problems are peculiar to the Mississippi, they nev From an address before the 1970 Marine Section, of the National Safety Congress and Exposition. Commander Lipuscek, a 1943 graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York, began his seafaring career with the Alcoa Steamship Co. and in 1953 joined the U.S. Coast Guard. He served aboard two Coast Guard Cutters and was attached to several marine inspection offices-Boiler and Hull Inspector and Investigating Officer in New York, Executive Officer of the Merchant Marine Detail in Yokohama, Japan, and Inspector and Investigating Officer in San Francisco. Following these assignments he became Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, San Juan, Puerto Rico. In 1968, he assumed his present duty as Chief, Casualty Review Branch, Merchant Vessel Inspection Division at Coast Guard Headquarters. ertheless manifest themselves on all waterways in a variety of situations. UNIFICATION OF RULES OF THE ROAD The United States has three separate sets of rules governing navigation. on the Great Lakes, the Western Rivers, and other inland waters. Although similar, these rules nevertheless contain significant variations among themselves and differ pointedly from the more recent International Rules. H.R. 214 takes this into consideration, and contains rules conforming to the International Rules. The only exception is the inclusion of special rules designed to meet local conditions where necessary. The 200 miles of highly congested waterway between Baton Rouge and the Head of Passes on the Mississippi River has undergone an unprecedented growth in recent years. Ever increasing amounts of hazardous materials are being shipped by water, and the vessels transporting them continue to increase in number, size, and speed. With heavy traffic a growing problem, dangerous complications result in this zone where the deep draft ocean freighter meets the conventional river tow. When the entire Mississippi River was governed by the Western Rivers Rules, which allow ascending and descending vessels to pass on either hand at the option of the downbound vessel, a custom was long judicially recognized that upbound vessels "took the points" and downbound vessels "took the bends". Recognition of the cus Shortly after colliding with the barge pushed ahead by the Warren J. Doucet, the flames from the Union Faith cast their deathly glow over the doomed vessel. (The outline of the Greater New Orleans Bridge is barely visible in the upper left corner). tom was easy, because there is no narrow channel rule on the Western Rivers; and the "head and head rule" was modified as to vessels ascending and descending to allow, as mentioned, the descending vessels to choose the mode of passing whatever the relative aspects of the vessels were on first sighting. In 1948 the River below the Huey P. Long Bridge was placed under the Inland Rules, which do have a narrow channel rule and do not have a special rule for vessels ascending and descending rivers as a qualification to the "head and head" rule. The "Points and Bends Custom" is a necessity for many vessels in order to safely navigate the river. This is particularly apparent during times of high current velocity when a vessel using "Points and Bends" makes maximum use of the river current in this way. What happens is this: An ascending vessel comes up on the point or the inside of the bend. The current is at its weakest here and eddies flowing in the opposite direction often assist the vessel. A descending vessel entering a bend stays on the outer or bend side of the river. The flow of current tends to set a vessel across the river towards the bend; and with the following current a relatively high speed over the ground is realized, as well as an increased turning circle and increased difficulty in holding to the point. Assuming that half of the river bends are "bends to the right" and half are to the left, we are presented with a hazardous condition 50 percent of the time if two approaching vessels are expected to accomplish a "normal" port-to-port passing. We can dramatically demonstrate the danger of collisions by showing a descending vessel approaching a bend to the right. If she is required to pass port to port she must hold to the point and attempt to overcome the forces of the current which are setting her across the river toward the bend and toward the ascending vessel which is keeping to her side of the channel under Article 25 of the Inland Rules. Under Western Rivers Rules vessels are permitted to pass starboard to starboard or port to port providing they can do so safely. Article 25 of the Inland Rules, however, requires that "in a narrow channel every vessel shall, when it is safe and practicable, keep to that side of the fairway or midchannel which lies on the starboard side of such vessel." This in effect calls for vessels to normally pass port to port. Confusion, therefore, does result when an ocean going freighter meets a river towboat pushing barges ahead in the area of New Orleans above and below the Huey P. Long Bridge; because here lies the demarcation point of Western Rivers Rules and Inland Rules. Rules for navigation in this area must reflect the common sense and good seamanship of the "points and bends custom". This principle is recognized and allowed in the proposed revision of Article 25 of the existing Inland Rules of the Road. In the pending revision vessels in narrow channels, proceeding with the current, will have the right of way and elect on which side to pass. The following description of a collision between two vessels, taken from the record of the Marine Board of Investigation, will demonstrate the need for legislation on Rules of the Road Unification. Incidentally, this casualty also indicates the value of bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone communication capability. In April of 1969 the New Orleans waterfront was the scene of an explosion and fire following a collision between the freighter Union Faith and the barge IOC No. 7, which was one of three loaded tank barges being pushed ahead by the tug Warren J. Doucet. The casualty occurred on a clear, dark night. At approximately 1730 it was found that the Warren J. Doucet, bound for Baton Rouge, could not make sufficient speed up the river to continue alone. The tow was turned around above the Harvey Canal about 3 miles above the Greater New Orleans Bridge at 1830. The vessel proceeded downstream at a speed of 41⁄2 miles per hour maintaining a course which favored the right descending bank. At approximately one-half mile above the Greater New Orleans Bridge the course changed to cross the river toward the bridge abutment located nearer the left descending side. was At 1840 the Union Faith weighed anchor and departed the General Anchorage about 5 miles below the January 1971 Faith was making good about 10 miles per hour favoring the right descending side in order to come up under Algiers Point. Before rounding Algiers Point the Union Faith met and passed the M/V Mama Lear and tow starboard to starboard. After rounding Algiers Point the Union Faith agreed by radiotelephone and whistle signals with the ferry Crescent and M/V Sassafras to a starboard-tostarboard meeting. The master of the Sassafras had called the master of the M/V Toni Ann, whose tow was about 1,000 feet astern, advising that the Union Faith would pass starboard to starboard if agreeable. The Toni Ann acknowledged and found this meeting agreeable. The Toni Ann, as she cleared the Greater New Orleans Bridge, sighted the lights of the Union Faith coming around Algiers Point. After meeting the Toni Ann, the Union Faith altered course towards the left descending bank of the river. The radiotelephone possessed by the pilot on the Union Faith operated on channel 13, 156.65 MHz, and therefore was unable to communicate with the Warren J. Doucet, which had radiotelephone capabilities on frequency of 2738 KHz. However, there are no regulations requiring bridge-to-bridge radio communication capability. The lights of the Union Faith were first sighted at a distance of 12 miles by the Warren J. Doucet. Shortly thereafter the Warren J. Doucet blew a two-blast The Warren J. Doucet. signal for a starboard-to-starboard passing which was not answered. She then blew another two-blast whistle signal while maintaining her course and speed across the river. No answer was heard. The collision occurred at about 1915 just upstream of the Greater New Orleans Bridge. Twenty-five persons lost their lives in this collision, and the two vessels sank. BRIDGE-TO-BRIDGE RADIO TELEPHONE Provisions for whistle signals have been in existence for a long period of time to show the intent of vessels when sailing on the inland waters of the United States. However, our statistics reveal that the failure to communicate and mutually agree upon the method of passing between vessels is one of the major factors contributing to collisions. Approximately one half of the vessels involved in collisions did not attempt to exchange whistle signals as required by national rules, thereby demonstrating personnel error in itself as a primary cause of collisions. The failure to arrive at an early passing agreement through whistle signals and voice radio inevitably results in the failure to make timely decisions which are essential if collisions are to be avoided. Three problems plaguing the use of and response to sound signals are: (1) The failure to understand them, (2) the failure to hear or respond to them, and (3) the failure to establish correctly the direction and nature of their source. The noise level and wind velocity and direction will frequently create a sound barrier to persons on the bridge. However, it is difficult to understand the reasons for the failure to respond to signals when heard and understood. Perhaps a reason for our current problems with whistle signals lies in the increased size and speed of ships entering inland waters. Coupled with periods of poor visibility, these increases make the effective use of whistles extremely difficult. Το remedy this situation legal requirements for direct radio communica tion between the pilot houses, or bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone, have been proposed in, and are currently pending action by the Congress. These requirements are essential for safer navigation and, have the full support of the Coast Guard. The collision previously described between the Union Faith and the tank barge IOC No. 7, being pushed ahead by the towing vessel Warren J. Doucet, showed the need for legislation covering unification of rules of the road as well as bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone. Another case on the lower Mississippi River which dramatically demonstrates the need for bridge-to-bridge radiotelephone legislation occurred during the early morning of 16 March 1968. It involved the SS African Star and the barge Intercity No. 11 (one of two loaded tank barges being pushed |