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a moment to almost every eye that a crisis had arrived, and that a new chapter of the Eastern Question was to be opened. It is not less Turkey's misfortune than her faultcertainly not less her fault than her misfortune-that her way of governing her foreign provinces had been the cause of so much trouble to Western Europe. Fate has given to the most incapable and worthless government in the world a task which would strain the resources of the loftiest public spirit and the most accomplished statesmanship. Turkey has to rule over a great variety of nationalities and of creeds all more or less jumbled together within a comparatively limited area.
These different sects and races agree in hardly anything but in their common detestation of Ottoman rule. Among themselves their rivalries are unceasing and bitter. Again and again Turkey has made it her plausible excuse for maintaining a system of stern repression in the south-east of Europe, that if she lifted a strong hand from these populations they would be found carrying on something like an internecine struggle among themselves. The Slav dreads and detests the Greek. The Greek despises the Slav. The Albanian objects alike to Slav and to Greek. The Mohammedan Albanian detests the Catholic Albanian. The Slav are drawn toward Russia by affinity of race and of religion. But this very fact, which makes in -one sense their political strength, brings with it a certain condition of weakness, because by making them more formidable to Greeks and to Germans it increases the dislike of their growing power, and the determination to oppose it. It would, indeed, take a very wise, far-seeing, and a flexible system of administration to enable a central government to rule with satisfaction and with success all these differing and contending races, The Turkish Government managed the matter worse than it might seem possible for a govern. ment to do which had been brought for centuries within the action of European civilization. Turkish rule seems to exist only in one or two extremes. In certain places it means entire relaxation of authority; in others it means the most rude and rigorous oppression. The hand of the statesman at Constantinople is absolutely unfelt in some of the remoter provinces supposed to be under Turkish sway. The warlike inhabitants of some highland region live their wild and lawless lives,levying blackmailon travellers and preying on the peaceable commerce of their neighbors with as much indifference to the officials of Stamboul as to the remonstrances of western statesmanship. But it may be that not far from their frontier-line there is some hapless province whose people feel the hand of Turkey strong and cruel on their necks at every moment of their lives. It happend, as is not unnatural in such a system, that the repression is heaviest where it is least needed, and that in the only cases where severity and rigor might be excused there is an entire relaxation of all central authority. In the condition of things thus hastly sketched out, it is natural that there should be con stant upheavings of political and social rebellion. To the Slav populations the neighborhood of Russia has all the disturbing effect which the propinquity of a magnet might have on the works of some delicate piece of mechanism, or which the neighborhood of one great planet has on the movement of another. The settlement made by the Crimean War has since that time been gradually breaking down. Servia was an independent state in all but the name. The Danubian provinces, which were to have been governed by separate rulers, came to unite themselves, first under one ruler and then into one complete system, and at last emerged into the sovereign state of Roumania under the Prussian Prince, Charles of Hohenzollern. Thus the result which most of the European Powers at the time of the Congress of Paris endeavored to prevent was successfully accomplished, in spite of their inclinations. The efforts to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina in quiet subjcction to the Sultan proved a miserable failure. The insurrection which now broke out in Herzeguvina spread with rapidity. The Turkish statesmen insisted that it was receiving help not only from Russia but from the subjects of Austria, as well as from Servia and Montenegro. An appeal was made to the English Govern. ment to use its influence with Austria in order to prevent the insurgents from receiving any assistance from across the Austrian frontier. Servia and Montenegro were appeal. ed to in a similar manner. Lord Derby seems to have acted with indecision and with feebleness. He does not appear to have appreciated the immediate greatness of the crisis, and he offended popular feeling, and even the public conscience, by urging on the Porte that the best they could do was to put down the insurrection as quickly as possible, and not allow it to swell to the magnitude of a question of European interest. Lord Derby knew the anxiety existing among many of the European Powers to interfere on behalf of the Christian populations of Turkey, and it almost seemed as if he dreaded the sort of public scandal this must occasion more than the possibility of Turkey using her repressive powers with an excess of vigor.
The insurrection continued to spread, and at last it was determined by some of the Western Powers that the time had come for European intervention. Count Andrassy, the Austrian minister, drew up a note which was to be addressed to the Porte. In this note Austria, Germany, and Russia, united in a declaration that the promises of reform made by the Porte had not been carried into effect, and that some combined action by the Powers of Europe was necessary to insist on the fulfilment of the many engagements which Turkey had made and broken. The note declared that if something of the kind were not done, the governments of Servia and Montenegro would be compelled, by the enthusiasm of their populations, to support the insurrection in the Turkish provinces, and that the only
mears of preventing a general outbreak was a firm resoulution on the part of the Western Powers to compel Turkey to redress the grievances of which the Christian populations complained. This note was dated December, 30th, 1875, and it was communicated to the Powers which had signed the Treaty of Paris. France and Italy were ready at once to join in it, but England delayed. In fact, Lord Derby held off so long that it was not until he had received a dispatch from the Porte itselt requesting his Government to join in the note that he at last consented to take part in the remonstrance. The Turkish Government seem to have de. sired the presence of England in this movement as one desires the presence of a secret allay. Rightly or wrongly, the statesmen of Constantinople had got it into their heads that England was their devoted friend, bound by their own interests to protect them against whatever opposition. Instead, therefore, of regarding England's co-operation in the Audrassy note as one other influence brought to compel them to fulfil their e gagements, they seem to have accepted it as a secret force working on their side to enable them to escape from their responsibilities. Lord Derby joined in the Andrassy note. It was sent to the Porte. The Ottoman Government showed some cleverness in their way of meeting the difficulty. They accepted politely all or nearly all the demands addressed to them, expressed in cool and pleasant terms their entire satisfaction with the kindly suggestions made to them, declared themselves rather gratified than otherwise to have their attention called to any little omissions on their part, and promised to carry out in the readiest manner the suggestions which the note contained.
Turkey did nothing more than promise. She took no step to meet the demands made by the European Powers. After a few weeks it became perfectly evident that she had not only done nothing, but had never intended to do anything. Russia, therefore, proposed that the three Imperial
Ministers of the Continent should meet at Berlin and consider what steps should be taken in order to make the And. rassy note a reality. A document, called the Berlin Memorandum, was drawn up, in which the three Powers pointed out the increasing danger of disturbance in the south-east of Europe, and the necessity for at once carrying into effect the objects of the Andrassy note. It was proposed that arms should be suspended for two months between the Porte and the insurgent provinces, and that meanwhile peace should be negotiated, and that the consuls and the delegates of the European Powers should watch over the carrying out of the proposed reforms. The memorandum ended by a significant intimation that, if the period of suspension of arms were allowed to pass without the desired objects being attained, or at least approached, there must be an agreement among the Powers as to the further measures which might be called for in the interest of the general peace. The meaning of all this was perfectly clear. The Andrassy note had invited Turkey's attention to her unfulfilled engagements. Turkey had admitted her deficiencies, and promised to supply them. The Berlin Memorandum now proposed to consider the measures by which to enforce on Turkey the fulfilment of her broken promises. It was distincly implied that, should Turkey fail to comply, force would be used to compel her. But, on the other hand, it is clear that this was a menace which would of itself have thought of resisting the concerted action of England, France, Austria, Germany, Russia, and Italy. The threat of combined action was in itself the surest guarantee of peace. The situation was described very effectively by Lord Granville a year or two after. A man is making a disturbance in the street pif one peaceful inhabitant remonstrates and interferes, it is very likely that his intervention will only lead to further violence; but if half a dozen policemen come up it is more than probable that the disturber