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to the case. These rules were: “A neutral government is bound, first, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting-out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a power with which it is at peace, and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel inter.ded to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction to warlike use. Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men. Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties."
The British commissioners followed up the acceptance of these three rules by a saving clause, declaring that the Eng. lish Government could not assent to them as a "statement of principles of international law which were in force at the time when the claims arose;" but that, “in order to evince its desire of strengthening the friendly relations between the two countries, and of making satisfactory provision for the future,” it agreed that in deciding the questions arising out of the claims these principles should be accepted, “and the high contracting parties agree to observe these rules between themselves in future, and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and to invite them to accede to them." The treaty then went on to provide for the settle.ment of the Alabama claims by a tribunal of five arbitrators, one to be appointed by the Queen, and the others respectively by the President of the United States, the King of Italy, the President of the Swiss Confederation, and the Emperor of Brazil. This tribunal was to meet in Geneva,
and was to decide by a majority all the questions submitted to it. The treaty further provided for a tribunal to settle what may be called individual claims on either side, and another commission to meet afterward at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and deal with the Fishery Question, an old outstanding dispute as to the reciprocal rights of British and American subjects to fish on each other's coasts. It referred the question of the norther boundary between the British North American territories and the United States to the arbitration of the German Emperor. It also opened the navigation of the St. Lawrence and other rivers.
Some delay was caused in the meeting of the tribunal of arbitration at Geneva by the sudden presentation on the part of the American Government of what were called the indirect claims. To the surprise of everybody, the American case when presented was found to include claims for vast and indeed almost limitless damages, for indirect losses alleged to be caused by the cruise of the Alabama and the other vessels. The loss by the transfer of trade to English vessels, the loss by increased rates of insurance, and all imaginable losses incident to the prolongation of the war, were now made part of the American claims. It was clear that if such a principle were admitted there was no possible reason why the claims should not include every dollar spent in the whole operations of the war and in supplying any of the war's damages, from the first day when the Alabama put to sea. No one could undertake to say as a matter of certainty that the Southern confederates might not have submitted at once it only the Alabama had been seized and detained, and therefore indirect claims might just as well be stretched out at once so as to cover all the subsequent expenses of the war. In truth, the indirect claims were not only absurd, but even monstrous, and the English Government had not for one moment the slightest idea of admitting them as part of the case to be laid before
the arbitrators at Geneva. The bare suggestion seemed more like a rude practical joke than a statesmanlike proposition. Even men like Mr. Bright, who had been devoted friends of the North during the war, protested against this insufferable claim. It was at last withdrawn. We now know on the best possible authority that the American Government never meant to press it. Mr. John Russel Young's interesting account of his journey “ Around the World with General Grant" gives an account of a conversation he had with the late President of the United States on the subject of the indirect claims. Mr. Young assures his readers that ail his reports of statements made by General Grant have been submitted to General Grant's own revision. General Grant told Mr. Young that he was personally opposed to the presentation of the indirect claims, and that his Secretary of State, Mr. Fish, was also opposed to them. “I," said General Grant, “never believed in the presentation of indirect claims against England. I did not think it would do any good. I knew England would not consider them, and that it would complicate our meritorious case by giving her something to complain about." Mr. Fish agreed in this view, but was of opinion that Mr. Sumner had to be considered. Mr. Sumner was the chairman of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Affairs, a formidable man at such a time. He was not cordial to the treaty, and was displeasei because General Grant and Mr. Fish had already overuleu one of his suggestions, “that the first condition of peace with England should be the withdrawal of her flag from the North American continent." That suggestion General Grant rightly described as a declaration of war, and “I wanted peace, not war." Mr. Sumner had laid great stress on indirect claims, and not to offend him, and not to leave an opening for future complaints on the part of " demagogues," it was thought by Mr. Fish that the best way of getting rid of the indirect claims would be to let them go to the Geneva
arbitration. General Grant allowed himself to be convinced against his will. “But neither Mr. Fish nor myself expected any good from the presentation. It really did harm to the treaty by putting our Government and those in England who were our friends in a false position. It was a mistake, but well intended. It is a mistake ever to say more than you mean, and as we never meant the indirect claims, washould not have presented them, even to please Mr. Sumner.” It was indeed a profound mistake. It was a stroke of policy which no statesman should ever have stooped to sanction. The arbitration was on the point of being broken off. The excitment in England was intense. The American Government had at last to withdraw the claims. The Geneva arbitrators of their own motion declared that all such claims were invalid and contrary to international law. The mere fact of their presentation went far to destroy all the credit which the United States would have obtained by the firm maintenance of their just demands and their recognition by the Court of Arbitration.
The decision of the Geneva tribunal went against Eng. land. The court was unanimous in finding England respon. sible for the acts of the Alabama. A majority found her responsible for the acts of the Florida and for some of those of the Shenandoah, but not responsible for those of other vessels. They awarded a sum of about three millions and a quart. er sterling as compensation for all losses and final settlement of all claims including interest. Sir Alexander Cockburn. who attended the sittings of the court as the representative of England, presented a long and eloquent protest against a great part of the finding of the tribunal. While admitting the decision in the case of the Alabama, and recommending' submission to the general award, Sir Alexander Cockburn made a sort of historical vindication, or apologia, of the conduct of the English Government during the civil war. It was an eloquent, patriotic, ana impassioned plaidoyer, which
seemed oddly out of place in the somewhat dry and businesslike records of the tribunal's transactions. It occupied 250 pages of the London Gazette. Many readers admired it; some smiled at it. The great majority of Englishmen did aot read it. It was not so much preserved as entombed in the ponderous pages of the official journal.
The German Emperor was left to decide as to the owner. ship of the small island of San Juan, near Vancouver's Island, a question remaining unsettled since the Oregon Treaty, and already explained in this work. The Emperor decided that the American claim to the Island was just. San Juan had for years been in a somewhat hazardous condition of joint occupation by England and the United States. It was evacuated by England, in consequence of the award, at the close of November, 1873.
The principle of arbitration had not thus far worked in a manner calculated greatly to delight the English people. In each case the award had gone decidedly against them. No doubt it had gone against them because the right of each case was against them; and those who submit to arbitration have no business to complain because the decision is not given in their favor. England had in any case gained much by the policy which submitted the dispute to a peaceful tribunal. She had saved her own people and her opponents as well from the terrible ordeal of a war in which victory would have been only one degree better than defeat. She had avoided all the legacy of reciprocal hate which is the inevitable penalty of war. She had done her part toward the establishment of a great principle for the benefit of all coming generations. Yet it would be impossible to say that the feeling of the English people was one of unmixed satisfaction. The bulk of a population is not made up of moral philosophers; and what most of the English people saw wac that England had been compelled in homely phrase, to