ed. Nothing could be more simple. Denmark gave up everything she had been fighting for, and agreed to bear part of the expense which had been entailed upon the German powers by the task of chastising her. The duchies were surrendered to the disposal of the allies, and nothing more was heard of the claims of the heir of Augustenburg. That claimant only got what is called in homely language the cold shoulder when he endeavored to draw the attention of the Herr von Bismarck to his alleged right of succession. A new war was to settle the ownership of the duchies, and some much graver questions of German interest at the same time.

It was obviously impossible that the conduct of the English government should pass unchallenged. They were quite right, as it seems to us, in not intervening on behalf of Denmark; but they were not right in giving Denmark the least reason to believe that they ever would intervene in her behalf. It would have been a calamity if England had succeeded in persuading Louis Napoleon to join her in a war to enable Denmark to keep the duchies; it could not be to the credit of England that her ministers had invited Louis Napolecn to join them in such a policy and had been refused. We cannot see any way of defending Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell against some sort of censure for the part they had taken in this transaction. It would have

been a discredit to England if she had become the means of coercing the duchies into subjection to Denmark, supposing such a thing possible in the long run; but her ministers could claim no credit for not having done so. They would have done it if they could. They had thus given Europe full evidence at once of their desire and their incapacity. Their political opponents could not be expected to overlook such a chance of attack. Accordingly, in the two houses of Parliament notices were given of a vote of censure on the government. Lord Malmesbury, in Lord

Derby's absence, proposed the resolution in the House of Lords, and it was carried by a majority of nine. The government made little account of that; the Lords always had a Tory majority. As Lord Palmerston himself had put it on a former occasion, the government knew, when they took office, that their opponents had a larger pack of cards in the Lords than they had, and that whenever the cards came to be all dealt out the Opposition pack must show the greater number. In the House of Commons, however, the matter was much more serious. On July 4th, 1864, Mr. Disraeli himself moved the resolution condemning the conduct of the government. The resolution invited the

house to express its regret that "while the course pursued by her Majesty's government has failed to maintain their avowed policy of upholding the integrity and independence of Denmark, it has lowered the just influence of this country in the capitals of Europe, and thereby diminished the securities for peace." Mr. Disraeli's speech was ingenious and telling. He had a case which even a far less capable rhetorician than he must have made impressive; but he contrived more than once, by sheer dexterity, to make it unexpectedly stronger against the government. Thus, for example, he went on during part of his opening observations to compare the policy of England and of France. He proceeded to show that France was just as much bound by the Treaty of Vienna, by the London convention, by all the agreements affecting the integrity of Denmark, as England herself. Some of the ministry sitting just opposite the orator caught at this argument as if it were an admission telling against Mr. Disraeli's case. They met his words with loud and emphatic cheers. The cheers meant to say, "Just so; France was responsible for the integrity of Denmark as much as England; why, then, do you find fault with us?" This was precisely what Mr. Disraeli wanted. Perhaps he had deliberately led up to this very point.

Perhaps he had purposely allured his opponents on into the belief that he was making an admissiom in order to draw from some of them some note of triumph. He seized his opportunity now and turned upon his antagonists at once. "Yes," he exclaimed, "France is equally responsible; and how comes it then that the position of France in relation to Denmark is so free from embarrassment and so dignified;that no word of blame is uttered anywhere in Europe against France for what she has done in regard to Denmark, while your position is one of infinite perplexity, while you are everywhere accused and unable to defend yourselves? How could this be but because of some fatal mistake, some terrible mismanagement?" In truth it was not difficult for Mr. Disraeli to show mistakes, in abundance. No sophist could have undertaken to defend all that ministers had done. Such a defence would involve sundry paradoxes; for they had in some instances done the very thing to-day which they had declared the day before it would be impos sible for them to do.

The government did not make any serious attempt to justify all they had done. They were glad to seize upon the opportunity offered by an amendment which Mr. Kinglake proposed, and which merely declared the satisfaction with which the house had learned "that at this conjuncture her Majesty had been advised to abstain from armed interference in the war now going on between Denmark and the German powers. This amendment, it will be seen at once, did not meet the accusations raised by Mr. Disraeli. It did not say whether the ministry had or had not failed to maintain their avowed policy of upholding the integrity and independence of Denmark; or whether their conduct had or had not lowered the just influence of England in the capitals of Europe, and thereby diminished the securities for peace. It gave the go-by to such inconvenient questions, and simply asserted that the house was, at all events, glad to hear

there was to be no interference in the war. Many doubted at first whether the government would condescend to adopt Mr. Kinglake's amendment, or whether they would venture. upon a distinct justification of their conduct. Lord Palmerston, however, had an essentially practical way of looking at every question. He was of O'Connell's opinion that, after all, the verdict is the thing. He knew he could not get the verdict on the particular issues raised by Mr. Disraeli, but he was in good hope that he could get it on the policy of his administration generally. The government therefore adopted Mr. Kinglake's amendment. Still the controversy was full of danger to Lord Palmerston. The advanced Liberals disliked him strongly for his lavish expenditure in fortification schemes, and for the manner in which he had. thrown over the Reform Bill. They were not coerced, morally or otherwise, to support him merely because he had not gone into the war against Germany; for no responsible voice from the Opposition had said that the Conservatives, if in office, would have adopted a policy of intervention. On the contrary, it was from Lord Stanley there came during the debate the most unwarlike sentiment utterred during the whole controversy Lord Stanley bluntly declared that ⚫ to engage in a European war for the sake of these duchies would be an act, not of impolicy, but of insanity." There were members of the Peace Society itself. probably, who would have hesitated before adopting this view of the duties ot a nation. If war be permissible at all, they might have doubted whether the oppression of a small people is not as fair ground of warlike intervention as the grievance of a numerous population When, however, such sentiments came from a leader of the party proposing the vote of censure, it is clear that the men who were for non-intervention as a principle were left free to vote on one side or the other as they pleased. Mr. Disraeli did not want to pledge them to warlike action any more than Lord

Palmerston. Many of them would, perhaps, rather have voted with Mr. Disraeli than with Lord Palmerston it they could see their way fairly to such a course; and on the votes of even a few of them the result of the debate depended. They held the fate of Lord Palmerston's ministry in the hollow of their hand.

Lord Palmerston seems to have decided the question for them. His speech closing the debate was a masterpiece not of eloquence, not of political argument, but of practical parliamentary tactics. He spoke, as was his fashion, without the aid of a single note. If was a wonderful spectacle that of the man of eighty, thus in the growing morning pouring out his unbroken stream of easy effective eloquence. He dropped the particular questions connected with the vote of censure almost immediately, and went into a long review of the whole policy of his administration. He spoke as if the resolution before the house were a proposal to impeach the government for the entire course of their domestic policy. He passed in triumphant review all the splendid feats which Mr. Gladstone had accomplished in the reduction of taxation, he took credit for the commercial treaty with France, and for other achievements in which at the time of their accomplishment he had hardly even effected to feel any interest. He spoke directly at the economical Liberals-the men who were for sound finance and freedom of international commerce. The regular Opposition, as he well knew, would vote against him; the regular support. ers of the ministry would vote for him. Nothing could alter the course to be taken by either of these parties. The advanced Liberals, the men whom possibly Palmerston in his heart rather despised as calculators and economists— these might be affected one way or the other by the manner in which he addressed himself to the debate. To these and at these he spoke. He knew that Mr. Gladstone was the one leading man in the ministry whom they regarded with