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istration. Lord Palmerston acted sincerely on the opinion which he expressed in a short letter to Mr. Cobden, that "man is a fighting and quarrelling animal." Assuming it to be the nature of man to fight and quarrel, he could see no better business for English statesmanship than to keep this country always in a condition to resist a possible attack from somebody. He differed almost radically on this point from two at least of his more important colleagues-Mr. Gladstone and Sir George Cornewall Lewis. Mr. Evelyn Ashley, in his "Life of Lord Palmerston," has published some interesting letters that passed between Palmerston and these statesmen on this general subject. Palmerston wrote to Sir George Lewis on November 22d, 1860, arguing against something Lewis had said, and which Palmerston hopes "was only a conversational paradox, and not a deliberately adopt. ed theory." This was a dissent on the part of Lewis from the maxim that in statesmanship prevention is better than cure. Each had clearly in his mind the prevention which would take security against the perils of war; Lord Palmerston therefore goes on at once in his letter to show that in many cases the timely adoption of spirited measures by an English government would have actually prevented war. Lewis argues that "if an evil is certain and proximate, and can be averted by diplomacy, then undoubtedly prevention is better than cure ;" but that "if the evil is remote and uncertain, then I think it better not to resort to preventive measures, which insure a proximate and certain mischief." The purpose of the discussion is made more clear in Lewis's concluding sentence: "It seems to me that our foreign relations are on too vast a scale to render it wise for us to insure systematically against all risks; and if we do not insure systematically we do nothing." On April 29th, 1862, Lord Palmerston writes to Mr. Gladstone about a speech that the latter had just been making in Manchester, and in which, as Lord Palmerston puts it, Mr. Gladstone seems

"to make it a reproach to the nation at large that it has forced, as you say it has, on the Parliament and the govern ment the high amount of expenditure which we have at present to provide for." Palmerston does not "quite agree' with Mr. Gladstone "as to the fact;" "but admitting it to be as you state, it seems to me to be rather a proof of the superior sagacity of the nation than a subject for reproach." Lord Palmerston goes on to argue that the country, so far from having, as Cobden had accused it of doing," rushed headlong into extravagance extravagance under the influence of panic," had simply awakened from a lethargy, got rid of "an apathetic blindness on the part of the governed and the governors as to the defensive means of the country compared with the offensive means acquired and acquiring by other powers." "We have on the other side of the Channel a people who, say what they may, hate us as a nation from the bottom of their hearts, and would make any sacrifice to inflict a deep humiliation upon England. It is natural that this should be so. They are eminently vain, and their passion is glory in war. They cannot forget or forgive Aboukir, Trafalgar, the Peninsula, Waterloo, and St. Helena. Well then at the head of this neighboring nation, who would like nothing so well as a retaliatory blow upon England, we see an able, active, wary, counsel-keeping but ever-planning sovereign; and we see this sovereign organizing an army which, including his reserve, is more than six times greater in amount than the whole of our regular forces in our two islands, and at the same time laboring hard to create a navy equal, if not superior, to ours. Give him a cause of quarrel, which any foreign power may at any time invent or create, if so minded; give him the command of the Channel, which permanent or accidental naval superiority might afford him, and then calculate if you can-for it would pass my reckoning power to do so the disastrous consequences to the British nation

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which a landing of an army of from one to two hundred thousand men would bring with it. Surely even a large yearly expenditure for army and navy is an economical insurance against such a catastrophe." The reader will perhaps be reminded of one of the most effectivc arguments of Demosthenes. Consider, he says, what even a few days of the occupation of the country by a foreign enemy would mean, and then say whether, as a mere matter of economy, it would not be better to spend a good deal of the resources we have in striving to avert such a calmity. There is a great difference, however, in the purpose and the application of the two arguments. Demosthenes puts the case in a way that is, from its point of view, perfect. He is speaking of a danger that lies at the gates; of an enemy who must be encountered one way or another; and he is pleading for instant and offensive war. It is a very different think to argue for enormous expenditure on the ground that somebody who is now professing the most peaceful intentions may possibly one day become your enemy and try to attack you. In such a case, the first thing to be considered is whether the danger is real and likely to be imminent, or whether it is merely speculative. Even against speculative dangers a wise people will always take precautions; but it is no part of wisdom to spend in guarding against such perils as much as would be needed to enable us actually to speak with the enemy at the gate. It is a question of proportion and comparison. As Sir George Lewis argues, it is not possible for a nation like England to secure herself against all speculative dangers. France might invade us from Boulogne or Cherbourg, no doubt. But the United States might at the same time assail us in Canada. Russia might attack, as she once thought of doing, our Australian possessions, or make an onslaught upon us in Asia. Germany might be in alliance with Russia; Austria might at the same time bein alliance with France. These are ali possibilities; they might

all come to pass at one and the same time. But how could any state keep fleets and armies capable of insuring ne against serious peril from such a combination? It would be better to make up our minds to wait until the assault really threatened, and then fight it out the best way we could. Lord Palmerston seemed to forget that in the cam. paign against Russia it did not prove easy for France to send out an army very much smaller than his "one or two hun. dred thousand men ;" and that Louis Napoleon was glad to finish up prematurely his campaign in Lombardy, even though he had won in every battle. He had also made the mistake of assuming that all these military and naval insurances must insure. If he had lived to 1870 he would have seen that a sovereign may engage himself for years in the preparing of an immense armament, that it may be the armament of a people "eminently vain," and whose "passion is glory in war;" and yet that the armament may turn out a vast failure, and may prove at the hour of need a defence like Rodomonte's bridge in Ariosto, which only condunts its owner to ignominious upset and fall. All the resources of France were strained for years, and by one who could do as he pleased, for the single purpose of creating a great overmastering army; and when the time came to test the army, it proved to be little better than what Prince Bismarck called "a crowd of fighting persons." This is surely a matter to be taken account of when we are thinking of going to vast annual expense for the purpose of maintaining a great armament. We may go to all the expense, and yet not have the armament when we fancy we have need for it. That Lord Paimerston would doubtless have said, is a risk we must run. Mr. Gladstone and Sir George Lewis would no doubt have thought problematic invasion a risk more safe to run. That had been the view of Sir Robert Peel.

Whatever may be thought of the merits of the argument on

either side-and the decision will be made more often probably by temperament than by reasoning-the controversy will serve to illustrate the sort of difference that was gradually growing up between Lord Palmerston and some of his own colleagues. Lord Palmerston had of late fallen again into a policy of suspicion and distrust as regards France. We are convinced that he was perfectly sincere; and as has been said already in these pages, we do not think there was any inconsistency in his conduct. He had for a long time believed in the good faith of the Emperor of the French; but the policy of the Lombardy campaign, and the consequent annexation of Savoy and Nice, had come on him as a complete surprise, and when he found that his friend Louis Napoleon could keep such secrets from him, he possibly came to the conclusion that he could keep others still more important. Lord Palmerston made England his idol. He loved her in a pagan way. He did not much care for abstract justice where she was concerned. He was unscrupul ous where he believed her interests were to be guarded. Nor had he any other than a purely pagan view of her interests. It did not seem to have occurred to him that England's truest interest would be to do justice to herself and to other states; to be what Voltaire's Brahmin boasts of being, a good parent and a faithful friend, maintaing well her own children and endeavoring for peace among her neighbors. Palmerston's idea was that England should hold the commanding place among European states, and that none should even seem to be in a position to do her scathe.

Lord Palmerston's taste for foreign affairs had now ample means of gratification. England had some small troubles of her own to deal with. A serious insurrection sprang up in New Zealand. The tribe of the Waikatos, living near Auckland, in the Northern Island, began a movement against the colonists, and this became before long a gen

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