Liddle agt. Thatcher. Special Term, March, 1856. REMOVAL of cause to circuit court of the United States. George C. GoddARD, for plaintiff. HOFFMAN, Justice. The defendant has presented his petition for a removal of this cause into the circuit court of the United States, and has brought himself fully within the provisions of the statute to entitle him to the order. The plaintiff, however, asks that it be made part of the order, that the injunction granted in the cause do remain until it shall be dissolved by this court, or by the circuit court of the United States. The statute is peremptory, that when its requisitions are complied with, the cause is removed by its own force, and it is the duty of the state court to proceed no further. All subsequent proceedings in it are void, as being coram non judice. (Gorden agt. Longret, 16 Peters', 97; Kanouse agt. Martin, 15 Howard, 198.) It would seem that any attempt to enforce the injunction would be unavailable. Again: The statute provides for continuing the security of special bail, where special bail was originally requisite; and it also provides for the continuance of any attachment which has been issued in the state court, and that is to hold the goods. in the same manner as it would have done, had the final judgment been rendered in the state court. No provision is made for the continuance in force of any other preliminary or provisional remedy known in the state courts. Besides, the attachment is regarded in most states as the mode of commencing a suit. To insert such a clause as is proposed, upon the hypothesis of the cause being properly removed, which is admitted to be the case here, would seem superfluous. But it may well be urged, that cases have been remanded from the circuit court; and in such instances it would seem anomalous that the process Liddle agt. Thatcher. should have lost its effect in the interval, when the case was wrongly removed. In Ward agt. Arendondo, (1 Paine, C. C. R. 410,) for example, the cause was remanded-and in other instances. It must be that the cause comes back in the same position as when it was transferred. The party's rights would otherwise be greatly prejudiced. · There is another consideration. It may be that the cause, when removed, carries with it the injunction in full force. That the circuit court would recognize it as in existence. I speak of course with great hesitation upon this point. But the theory is, that the case goes to the circuit court in its actual position. If it is urged that there is no provision for enforcing the injunction, the answer may be, that there is no provision for enforcing a state attachment. Yet, as the statute preserves it, the court must have some mode of making that preservation available. I am inclined, therefore, to think that it may be made part of the order, that it shall not operate of itself to dissolve the injunction. In case, then, the cause is remanded, the defendant would be liable for a violation in the interim. He is subject to that risk. In case the circuit court can hold the injunction transmitted with the action, the conclusion that the state court deemed it ipso facto dissolved, will be excluded. The defendant cannot be prejudiced by the clause. Order accordingly. Roosa agt. The Saugerties & Woodstock Turnpike Road Co. SUPREME COURT. SOLOMON ROOSA agt. THE SAUGERTIES & WOODSTOCK TURNPIKE ROAD COMPANY. The report of a referee (whose integrity was not questioned) was set aside, as against public policy, on these facts: Nearly two years before finally deciding the case, the referee received his fees from the defendants, assuring them that the decision was to be in their favor; afterwards, without informing the other party of what had occurred, he first promised him that he would suspend a decision until the determination by the court of another cause, (supposed to involve the same question,) and after such decision repeatedly assured him, and his attorneys, that the report should be made in his favor; and then again, as late as four or five days before the report was actually made, promised both parties that he would re-examine the case, which he did, and made a report in favor of the defendants. It is important that the conduct of those to whom the pure and impartial administration of the law is entrusted, should be such as to furnish to those who litigate no just grounds of suspicion. (See Dorlon agt. Lewis, 9 How. Pr.R. 1.) Albany Special Term, July, 1855. MOTION to set aside report of referee. The action was brought to recover a balance of account alleged to be due from the defendants to the plaintiff. It was tried before a referee. The case was finally submitted to the referee for decision on the 18th of May, 1853. On the 13th of July in the same year, the referee informed the agent of the defendants that he had made up his mind to decide the case in favor of the defendants, and was then paid $25 for his fees as referee, for which he gave a receipt. On the 11th of June, 1855, the referee delivered to the defendants' attorney his report, to the effect that the plaintiff should be nonsuited. The grounds of the motion to set aside the report sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court. E. COOKE, for plaintiff. HENRY HOGEBOOM, for defendants. Roosa agt. The Saugerties & Woodstock Turnpike Road Co. HARRIS, Justice. Although the referee had announced to the agent of the defendants his intention to decide the case against the plaintiff, and had received his fees, which he was only entitled to receive from the prevailing party, and from him only upon completing the discharge of his duty as referee; yet, according to the statement of the referee himself, he subsequently promised the plaintiff that he would not decide the case until a decision should be made by the general term of the supreme court in another cause which was supposed to involve similar questions. It is evident, that when he made this promise he did not regard himself as having finally disposed of the case. The referee further states, that about November, 1854, he was informed by the plaintiff that the decision of the supreme court, in the other case, had been made in his favor, and he then told the plaintiff that, if such was the case, he would decide this case in his favor also, and promised to make his report at an early day. Mr. Bruyn, one of the plaintiff's attorneys, states, that some time in the fall of 1854, the referee volunteered to say to him, without being spoken to or inquired of on the subject, that he had made up his mind to give a report in this case in favor of the plaintiff, and had promised him that he would draw up a report for him. Mr. Cooke, the other attorney for the plaintiff, states, that during the session of the circuit court, held at Kingston in November, 1854, the referee came to him, and voluntarily told him that he had examined the case, and had concluded to decide it in favor of the plaintiff, and that he would hand to him, or the plaintiff, the report before the opening of the court the next morning, adding, that he then had it partly made out, and would finish it that evening. The referee does not deny having made these statements, but he alleges that he did so, relying upon what the plaintiff had told him in relation to the decision of the supreme court; that it was his intention, before making his report, to examine the decision in the other case, and, upon such examination, he found that, although the court had granted a new trial to the Roosa agt. The Saugerties & Woodstock Turnpike Road Co. plaintiff, it had not pronounced upon the validity of the plaintiff's claim.. The plaintiff further states, in his affidavit, that about the first of June, 1855, he again called the attention of the referee to the subject, and was then told that the agent of the defendants had been at him about the report, and that he would decide it soon. The referee states, upon this point, that some four or five days before he made the report, both the plaintiff and the defendants' agent called on him, and inquired about the report; that he stated to them why it had not been made before, and then again promised to re-examine and decide the case that week; that he did accordingly re-examine the case, and on the Monday following made his report, and delivered it to the defendants' attorney. Upon a state of facts like this, I feel constrained to set aside the report. In doing so, I am gratified to be able to say that the grounds upon which I put the decision do not, in any respect compromise the integrity of the referee. There is nothing in the case, even as it is made by the papers in support of the motion, which would justify the conclusion that the referee had, in the least degree, intended to swerve from an honest discharge of duty. But, as in the case of Dorlon agt. Lewis, (9 How. 1,) where the referee was a man whose integrity was above all suspicion, the report was set aside upon considerations of public policy, so here, while I see nothing in the facts which leads one to doubt that the referee intended, from the first, to do what he believed to be right in the case, yet the kindness of his temper and the simplicity of purpose, by which he has been actuated, have led him to a course of indecision and vacillation tending very greatly to impair the respect to which his decision would otherwise have been entitled. The fact, that nearly two years before finally deciding the case, he should have received his fees from one of the parties, assuring him that the decision was to be in his favor, and that afterwards, without informing the other party of what had occurred, he should first promise him that he would suspend a decision until the determination of another cause, and then should assure him, and his attorneys, |