Local and Personal Acts, declared Public, and to be Judicially Noticed. promoters of the society by as large a number as possible. "Union is strength." Each stick separated from the bundle is easily broken: Tied together no force on earth can prevail. LOCAL AND PERSONAL ACTS, DECLARED PUBLIC, AND TO BE JUDICIALLY NOTICED. [Continued from p. 509.] 188. An Act for enabling the London and North-western Railway Company to make a branch line of railway from Portobello to Wolverhampton; and for other purposes. 189. An Act to empower the South Staffordshire Railway Company to make divers branch railways; and for other purposes. 190. An Act to incorporate the Manchester and Lincoln Union Railway and Chesterfield and Gainsborough Canal Company with the Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company. 191. An Act to enable the Midland Railway Company to purchase the Mansfield and Pinxton Railway, and to alter the same, and to make a railway from the Erewash Valley Railway to the Nottingham and Mansfield Railway, with branches to Mansfield, and also to the Alfreton Ironworks. 563 200. An Act for making perpetual the provisions of an act passed in the last session of parliament, intituled "An Act for the Regulation of the Legal Quays within the Port of London." 201. An Act for better supplying with gas the town of Ashton-under-Lyne in the county palatine of Lancaster, and the neighbourhood thereof. 202. An Act for better supplying with water the city of Edinburgh and places adjacent. 203. An Act to enable the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of the borough of Manchester in the county of Lancaster to construct waterworks for supplying the said borough and several places on the line of the said intended works with water; and for other purposes. 204. An Act for supplying with water certain parts of the Staffordshire Potteries and the town of Newcastle-under-Lyme, and several townships and places adjoining or near thereto. 205. An Act for building a bridge across the river Ouse in the city of York, with approaches thereto, and for widening, altering, and improving certain streets or thoroughfares within the said city; and for other purposes. 206. An Act for the more effectually assessing, collecting, and levying the poor and other rates in the city and county of the city of Norwich, and liberties of the same. 207. Án Act for amending the acts relating to the police and improvement of the burgh of Kilmarnock; and for other purposes in relation thereto. 192. An Act to vest in the Edinburgh and Northern Railway Company the undertaking of the low-water pier at Burntisland, and of the ferry between the same and Granton, and to 208. An Act for extending the municipal enable the said company to extend and improve boundaries of the burgh of Inverness; esta the said pier. blishing a general system of police therein, and 193. An Act to empower the Boston, Stam-regulating the petty customs; and for other ford and Birmingham Railway Company to purposes relating to the said burgh. make a branch railway from the Stamford and 209. An act for deepening, enlarging, imWisbech Line of the Boston, Stamford, and proving, and maintaining the port and harbour Birmingham Railway at Wisbech to Wisbech of Inverness, and the navigation of the river Harbour, and to construct certain works at Ness, and the quays and piers and other works Wisbech Harbour. connected therewith; for regulating the anchorage and shore dues of the said port and harbour; and for other purposes relating thereto. 194. An Act to authorize an alteration in the line of the Cork and Bandon Railway, and an extension thereof into the city of Cork, and to amend the act relating to the said railway. 195. An Act to consolidate the Aberdeen and Great North of Scotland Railway Companies. 196. An Act for improving, regulating, and maintaining the haven of Sandwich in the county of Kent. 197. An Act to enable the mayor, aldermen, and burgesses of the borough of Wisbech, to raise a sum of money; and for other purposes. 198. An Act for amending two acts of parliament, passed respectively in the 4th year of the reign of his late Majesty King George the 4th, and the 4th and 5th years of the reign of his late Majesty King William the 4th, for erecting a bridge across the river Shannon, and a floating dock and other works for the improvement of the port of Limerick. 199. An Act for better supplying with gas the parish and neighbourhood of Wakefield in the West Riding of the county of York. 210. An Act for enabling the Leeds and Thirsk Railway Company to deviate the line of their railway in Crimple Valley, to alter the proposed junction with the York and Newcastle Railway, and to divert the Leeds, Wortley, and Stanningley Turnpike Road. 211. An Act to confirm an agreement between the Treasurer and Masters of the Bench of the Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn in the county of Middlesex and the joint vestry of the joint parishes of Saint Giles-in-the-Fields and Saint George Bloomsbury in the same county and the rector and vestry of the separate parish of Saint Giles-in-the-Fields. 212. An Act for incorporating the Landowners Drainage and Inclosure Company, and for enabling the owners of settled estates, drained, irrigated, inclosed, and improved by the said company, to charge the same for the purposes of such drainage, inclosure, and improvement. 213. An Act for repairing and keeping in re 564 Altercation at the Quarter Sessions. Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor. pair the turnpike roads in the county of Ayr; coming excitement of manner displayed. for making and maintaining new roads, and We unaffectedly regret, therefore, if realtering and improving existing roads; for marks, meant to have a general application, rendering turnpike certain parish roads; and for regulating the statute labour and bridge money in the said county. [To be concluded in our next.] ALTERCATION AT THE QUARTER although suggested by a particular trans action, have been supposed to reflect on any individual. RECENT DECISIONS IN THE SUPE- REPORTED BY BARRISTERS OF THE SEVERAL Lord Chancellor. Jones v. Mitchell. Aug. 4, 1847. RIGHT TO BEGIN. Where both parties petition for a re-hearing, the original petitioner will be allowed to commence at the subsequent re-hearing. BOTH sides being dissatisfied with the judg ment of Lord Lyndhurst on this case, (1 Phil. 710), petitioned for a second re-hearing before the present Lord Chancellor. It is scarcely necessary to say, on the part of this journal, that the several gentlemen of both branches of the profession who are engaged in contributing to its pages, have but one main object,-the general and permanent good of the whole profession. For the most part, our duty is confined to the collection of the earliest and most useful information on all legal subjects, but occasionally it is incumbent upon us to give utterance to such observations as the interests of the profession may require. With the greatest respect for the Bench and regard for the Bar, we are bound as faithful chroniclers to notice any deviation either of the one or the other, hearing. from that high course which each has been accustomed to pursue. We have always endeavoured to exercise our functions with moderation. An unguarded word may have escaped, but the general scope of our strictures are shaped, we think, with due courtesy and measured language. Mr. Stuart said, that his client was dissatisfied with a portion only of the former decree, which part alone he wished to re-argue, and he thought he was entitled to begin, as he had first presented a petition for this second re whole decree, and claimed the right to comMr. J. Parker applied for a re-hearing of the titioners for a re-hearing by Lord Lyndhurst, mence, as his clients were the original peof the decree in the court below, and now wished to re-open that petition. The Lord Chancellor thought, that the obvious course was for the original petitioner to begin. Chadwick. Knill v. We are informed that the observations in a former number, relating to an altercation at the Middlesex Sessions, are supposed to have had a personal application, which certainly was not intended, and have [In the report of this case in our last numthereby inflicted pain in a quarter emi-ber, (p. 545), the following note was inadvertnently entitled to deference and respect. Lord Chancellor's judgment in which his ently omitted. It refers to that part of the Our remarks were founded altogether upon Lordship observes,-"Now, it has been dethe assumption that the newspaper report cided in numerous cases, and, I think, first by of what was alleged to have occurred at Sir John Leach, that if one entire case is made the Middlesex Sessions was correct, al-out against one defendant, another defendant though from internal evidence we ventured connected only with part of it cannot demur for to doubt its complete accuracy, and exmultifariousness."] pressed our confidence that it would turn out to be exaggerated. We have since learned that the newspaper report was incorrect in some material particulars, and does not give a faithful representation, on the whole, of what actually took place. We are assured, upon authority in which we place implicit confidence, that no expression of a coarse or offensive character was ad 'ressed from the bar to the bench, on the occasion alluded to, and no unbe His Lordship probably alluded to the case of Salvidge and others v. Hyde and others, 5 have expressed himself thus :Madd. 146, where his honour is reported to : "In order to determine whether a suit is multifarious, or in other words, contains distinct matters, the inquiry is not as this defendant supposes, whether each defendant is connected with every branch of the cause, but whether the plaintiff's bill seeks relief in respect and distinct. If the object of the suit be simple, of matters which are in their nature separate but it happens that different persons have se Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor Rolls.-Vice-Chanpellor.-V.C. Knight Bruce. 565 parate interests in distinct questions which arise out of that single object, it necessarily follows that such different persons must be brought before the court, in order that the suit may conclude the whole subject." The demurrer in this case was subsequently allowed by Lord Eldon, (S. C. Jac. 153,) but his lordship's judgment does not impugn the principle laid down by Sir John Leach. Several cases on this subject are collected in a note to Mr. Jacob's Report. Kolls Court. Egg v. Devey. July 23, 1847. PARTIES. -SUPPLEMENTAL SUIT.-EXECUTORS. To a supplemental suit for the purpose of bringing before the court the representatives of a residuary legatee, the executors are necessary parties though parties to the original bill. In this case the original bill was filed by A., one of the children of four residuary legatees of B., all of whom were represented in the suit except one, with whom it was alleged that a settlement had been made, and who was said to be dead, without having any legal representative. Subsequently to the institution of the original suit, administration was taken out to this legatee, and the administrator had been brought before the court by a supplemental bill, to which none of the defendants to the original bill were parties. Mr. Kindersley and Mr. Hallett objected, that to a supplemental bill for such a purpose, the executors must be parties, and cited Jones v. Howells, 4 Hare, 341. They suggested, that the proper course would have been to have amended the original bill by striking out the allegation that there was no administrator, and making the administrator a party, since it would be enough if the letters of administration were granted before the hearing. Lord Langdale expressed his opinion, that a party who was called upon to account, had a right to know to whom he was to account; but the cause proceeded, on an understanding that the costs of the supplemental suit should be thrown on the estate. Biddles, so commonly called or known." She also gave and bequeathed all the rest, residue, and remainder of her monies, securities for money, and personal estate and effects of what nature or kind wheresoever, and whether in possession or expectancy, unto and equally between her four natural and dear children, namely, T. H. Biddles, M. Biddles, G. Biddles, and the said Frederick Biddles, or so commonly known or called. The will then contained directions for investing the residue for the benefit of her children. The question now argued before the court was, whether the 1,000l. legacy was to T. Biddles absolutely, or whether he only took it in trust for Frederick Biddles. Mr. Rolt and Mr. Boyle contended, that T. Biddles took the legacy absolutely, citing Thorp v. Owen, 2 Hare, 607; Benson v. Whittam, 5 Sim. 22. Mr. Webb, for Frederick Biddles, urged that T. Biddles could be considered merely as a trustee for him of the fund. The Vice-Chancellor said, that if F. Biddles had died in the lifetime of the testator, the legacy would not have lapsed. The testatrix evidently meant to give money for the maintenance of her children, she had expressly done so in a subsequent portion of her will, and it was impossible to make out a trust of this 1,000l. for Frederick, especially as he took a share of the residue. Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce. INFANTS.-STAYING PROCEEDINGS. A reference to the Master to inquire which of two suits it will be most for the benefit of the infants shall be prosecuted, does not, as of course, stay the proceedings in the suits pending the reference, but the matter is in the discretion of the court. Two suits were instituted in the name of infants for similar purposes, and a reference was made to the Master to inquire which of the two suits was most for the benefit of the infants to be prosecuted. Pending the reference, a motion was made on behalf of the plaintiffs in one of the suits, which was opposed on the ground of irregularity, the reference being a stay to all proceedings in both suits. Mr. Cooper, Mr. Russell, Mr. Lee, Mr. Torriano, Mr. Haldane, Mr. Steere, and Mr. Schomberg, for the several parties. The Vice-Chancellor having directed inquiry to be made among the registrars on the point, whether the common form of order referring it to the Master to inquire which of the two suits is most for the benefit of the infants has the effect, as of course, of staying proceedings in both suits pending the reference, Mr. E. D. Colville, jun., certified that he had inquired of several of the registrars, including Mr. Colville, and all agreed that it did not, although, doubtless, as a matter of prudence, it generally had that effect, and it was open to the court to entertain any application it may think fit, or to 566 Superior Courts: Common Pleas. direct it to stand over until the report is made. act releases from a rate made for that purpose, In Sullivan v. Sullivan, 2 Mer. 40, the Lord Chancellor refers to the practice. He, Mr. E. D. C., had looked at the entry of that order in the Report Office: it did not contain any direction to stay proceedings, nor does the common order. The practice is, after report made, to apply for an order to stay proceedings in the defeated suit. Common Pleas. Richardson v. Tubbs. Easter Term, 1847. HIGHWAY RATE. EXEMPTION UNDER LOCAL AND PERSONAL ACT.-TRESPASS ACT. TRESPASS AGAINST JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. A local and personal act, providing that the plaintiff, amongst others, being rated under it, within a certain district, should be "released and free from all rates and assessments towards the paving and lighting any other street," &c., does not exempt the plaintiff from liability to be assessed for a rate mude under the General Highway Act, on the whole parish. The circumstance that part of the latter rate might be applied to paving as well as lighting, is not sufficient for that purpose, and does not render a magistrate issuing a distress warrant liable in an action of trespass. THIS was a special case. The plaintiff's goods had been seized under a distress warrant under the hand and seal of the defendant, acting as a justice of the peace, in order to satisfy certain arrears of a highway rate for the parish of St. Mary, Kensington, the plaintiff having been rated in respect of the occupation of a house forming part of the Norland estate, in that parish. The payment of the rate was objected to by the plaintiff on the ground that by the provisions of the local and personal act, 6 Vict. c. 33, entitled, "An Act for the improvement of the Norland estate, in the parish of St. Mary Abbotts, Kensington, in the county of Middlesex," he was exempt from being rated to the highway rate in question. The act, after providing for paving and lighting the Norland estate, and levying the necessary rates by the 83rd section, enacts "that every inhabitant or owner who shall be assessed for the rates made under this act for any lands or tenements within the limits of this act, shall be released and free from all rates and assessments towards the paving and lighting any other street, road, or place within the parish of St. Mary Abbotts, Kensington, in respect of such lands or tenements." The plaintiff had been assessed under the local and personal act, 6 Vic. c. 33, and at the trial at Westminster, after Michaelmas Term 1845, had obtained a verdict in the action of trespass, subject to the present case. Channell, Sergeant, for the plaintiff. The rate under the General Highway Act is applicable to paving, and the local and personal nor can it make any difference that the rate exempted from is one for paving and lighting. There could have been no appeal against the rate in dispute, as it was rated as against the parish inhabitants, with the exception of those on the Norland estate; an action of trespass, therefore, was the only proper remedy to try the validity of the rate. Pashley, for the defendant. Some portion of the rate being applicable to paving cannot make it a rate for paving and lighting; the exemption, therefore, was not made out. Besides the defendant acting as a justice of the peace, cannot be made liable in an action of trespass for the subsequent application of the rate raised. (He was then stopped by the court.) Channell, Serjeant, was heard in reply, and referred to the case of The Governors of Bristol v. Wait, 1 Ad. & El. 267. Wilde, C. J. I think the exemption claimed by the plaintiff has not been made out. Here is a general act which imposes a general liability repair of the roads made for the convenience of on the several parishes in England for the the public in general, and whatever local liabilities arise in that way in the parish in question are by that act imposed upon its inhabitants at large; and thus throws upon them the onus of establishing any exemption they may claim from such liabilities. The question then in the present case is, whether or not the plaintiff has shown that he is not liable to be rated to the rates which form the subject of the action. Now, the ground on which he claims an exemption in that respect is, that he has before been assessed under the local and personal act, 6 Vict. c. 33, the 83rd section of which releases him from "all rates and assessments towards paving and lighting any other streets, roads, or places in the parish of St. Mary Abbots, Kensington;" it being contended that the rate in question may, under certain authorities, be in part applied to lighting and paving. Under the General Highway Act, authority is given for imposing rates for the repairs of the highways within that act. Three rates are to be made out by the surveyor, afterwards allowed by the justices, and a certain sum by that means raised, the application of which is under the control of quite another authority. At the time, therefore, that such rate is raised non constat to what purposes it will be applied, and it is impossible to say that because the rate may possibly be devoted to purposes not legally within the act, or a portion of it may be applicable to paving and lighting, there can be any bare anticipated exemption of the plaintiff in this case. The objection to the application of the rate to particular purposes is not an objection on which the plaintiff can ground an exemption from being included in such rate. On the whole, therefore, I think the rate was well made, that the plaintiff was exempt from it, and that the ground of the present action has completely failed. Coltman, J., concurred. Superior Courts: Common Pleas-Exchequer. 567 Cresswell, J. The judgment of the court to whom these shares are allotted is requested ought to be for the defendant. The plaintiff to attend immediately at the office of the comhad property in Kensington, which but for pany, No. 7, St. Martin's Lane, Trafalgar the 6th Vict., c. 33, would clearly be liable Square, with this receipt, to sign the parlia to the highway rates, and the onus of making mentary contract, when the receipt will be exout an exemption lies on him. In order to changed for the shares. Monday the 8th Feb. do this, the 83rd section of the 6th Vict. is is the last day for such attendance." relied upon, the words of which are 66 released The above document was given in evidence and free from all rates and assessments to- by the plaintiff, stamped with an agreement wards the paving and lighting any other street, stamp, and was objected to by the defendant, road," &c. Now this is not a rate " towards on the ground that it ought to have had a rethe paving and lighting," or towards the pav-ceipt stamp. The plaintiff also gave in evidence ing or lighting, and it is not contended that two letters, one of the 8th Feb. 1842, in which the local and personal act altogether exempts he requested to have his money returned, as he the inhabitants of the Norland estate from had not received the shares; the other of the rates. The surveyor, therefore, had made a 17th Feb., from the secretary of the company, proper rate in the ordinary form, and the in answer, in which he stated, that every effort justice had nothing to do with the application was being made to go to parliament that sesof the rate after it was made. There was sion. The plaintiff did not give in evidence nothing at the time to show in what way the rate would be applied, and how then can an action of trespass lie in the present case for enforcing that rate? the letter of allotment, and it was objected that it ought to have been produced, as it contained the terms upon which the money was deposited. The learned judge thought, that the letter of the 17th Feb. was an admission, that the deposit was to be returned if the project was not proceeded with in that session of paliament, and he directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff for 1007. A rule having been obtained to enter a nonsuit, Martin and Willis showed cause. The acknowledgment by the bankers of the receipt of the deposit did not require a stamp. The money was not paid in discharge of a debt, but Tomkins v. Ashby, 6 B. & was only a deposit. The case comes within the exemption of the C. 541; Huxley v. O'Connor, 8 Car. & P. 204. Stamp Act, 55 Geo. c, 184, schedule H., « Receipt," which exempts from duty receipts for money deposited in the hands of any banker to be accounted for on demand. Secondly, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to give in evidence the letter of allotment. The scheme having been abandoned, the plaintiff was entitled to recover as upon a failure of considera tion. Walstabb v. Spottiswoode, 15 M. & W. 501. Nockels v. Crosby, 3 B. & C. 814. At the trial before Pollock, C. B., it appeared that the plaintiff sought to recover the sum of Gurney and Ogle in support of the rule. The 1007., being the amount of deposits paid upon result does not come within the exemption of an allotment of shares in the London and the Stamp Act, as the money was not deposited Westminster Water Company. The action was with the bankers "to be accounted for on debrought on the authority of Walstab v. Spottis- mand," Catt v. Howard, 3 Stark. N. P. C. 3. woode, 15 M. & W. 501, the scheme having Secondly, the plaintiff was bound to produce been abandoned. The plaintiff had applied the letter of allotment, as it was the only evifor shares in the company, and had received a dence of the terms upon which the money was letter in reply, allotting him 20 shares, request- deposited. ing him to pay the deposit into the bank of Jones, Lloyd and Co. On the 8th June 1841, the plaintiff accordingly paid 100%., being the amount of the deposit into that bank, and took the following receipt. "London and Westminster Water Company. "London, Feb. 8, 1841. "Received one hundred pounds, to be placed to the account of W. Chaplin, J. Devear, J. P. Dougall, J. Worlsman, and J. P. Clarke. "For Messrs. Jones, Lloyd & Co., 1007. "This receipt not transferrable. The party Pollock, C. B. We will take time to consider the point as to the letter of allotment. With respect to the other point, I think a receipt stamp was not necessary. Alderson, B. I am of the same opinion. The money was to be accounted for on demand, for the defendant might have drawn it out at any time. Rolfe and Platt, B. concurred. Rule discharged as to that point: as to the |