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Analytical Digest of Cases: Common Law Courts.

403

to pay the deposit of 27. 12s. 6d. per share plicants for more than the 120,000 shares. At thereupon, and to sign the parliamentary con- that meeting the plaintiff opposed the resotract and subscribers' agreement when re-lutions to continue the concern, and moved as quired. To this letter she received an answer, an amendment that the deposits should be resigned by the secretary, stating that the com- turned; but the chairman declined to put the mittee of management had allotted to her 30 amendment to the meeting. Subsequently the shares, and requesting her to pay the deposit scheme was abandoned, and the plaintiff of 2l. 12s. 6d., amounting to 781. 15s., into one brought his action against a member of the of certain banks on or before a day mentioned. managing committee to recover back the The plaintiff accordingly paid into one of those amount of his deposits. banks, in due time, the deposit of 787. 15s., and received the banker's receipt for the same. She afterwards presented the receipt to the company, and made several fruitless applications to the committee for scrip, and at length was informed that the directors had come to the resolution not to issue any scrip, and that the greater part of the deposits had been expended, and the balance would be rateably divided. It appeared that the directors, finding it impossible to go to parliament in the ensuing session, had determined not to issue any scrip; and that, of the entire number of 80,000 shares, 70,000 were allotted, but deposits were paid on 4,000 only, producing altogether the sum of 10,500l. In an action by the plaintiff to recover back from a member of the managing committee the sum of 781. 15s., so paid by her as deposits on the shares allotted to her: Held, 1st, That there was sufficient evidence of the final abandonment of the project.

2ndly, That, on its abandonment, under the circumstances above stated, the plaintiff was entitled to recover back, as money had and received to her use, the whole sum so paid by

her.

Held, First, that the application for shares and the letter of allotment constituted no binding contract. Secondly, that the advertisement amounted to a fraudulent misrepresentation, and having been so found by the jury, as also that it was a material inducement to the plaintiff to sign the subscribers' deed, as well as to pay his money, formed a good ground of action, to which the terms of the deed were no answer. Thirdly, that the plaintiff's conduct at the subsequent meeting did not amount to any waiver of his right to recover. And fourthly, that the omission to direct the jury as to whether or not there was a binding contract was no ground Wontner v. Shairp, 34 L. O. for a new trial.

156.

4. Action for deposits.-A. applied to the provisional directors of a railway company for an allotment of shares, and 40 were afterwards allotted to him. Between the time of the appli

cation for shares and the letter of allotment several names had been withdrawn from the provisional committee and additional names had

been added.

A managing committee was appointed from among the provisional directors, and by them an action was commenced to recover from A. the amount of the deposits to be paid on the shares allotted to him.

An association of this nature does not amount to a partnership. Walstabb v. SpottisHeld, that inasmuch as the shares were not woode, 15 M. & W. 501. allotted to A. by the persons to whom the ap Cases cited in the judgment: Pitchford v. Davis, 5 M. & W.2; Nockells v. Crosby, 3 B. & C. plication for shares was made, the evidence

814; 5 D. & R. 751.

3. Invalid contract.· -Fraudulent misrepresentation.-Recovery of deposits.-The prospectus of a railway company stated the capital to be 3,000,000l., in 120,000 shares. On the plaintiff's application by letter, sixty shares were allotted to him, and the letter of allotment was headed in the same manner as the prospectus, and stated further what was not to be found in the letter of application, namely, that the allotment was upon condition that the deposit be paid on or before a given day on pain of forfeiture, and the shares being disposed of to others. Eleven days before the given day the managing committee advertised that they had completed the allotment of shares, and there was some evidence of the plaintiff's having seen the advertisement. On the third day after the given one he paid his deposits, and in a fortnight afterwards executed the usual parliamentary contract and subscribers' agreement. In the following month a meeting was holden, the plaintiff being present, and it was then made known that at the date of the advertisement the committee had in fact only allotted 58,000 shares, although there were ap

failed to support the contract alleged in the declaration, and the plaintiffs were nonsuited. Woolmer and others v. Toby, 34 L. O. 302.

5. Inspection of documents.—In an action by an allottee of railway shares against a member of the provisional committee, to recover back his deposit, the court ordered that the plaintiff should have an inspection and copy of the subscribers' agreement and parliamentary contract, which both the plaintiff and the defendant had signed, and which were in the hands of the solicitors of the company; the plaintiff's affidavit stating that an inspection of them was necessary to him for the purpose of framing his case, and the defendant not showing that they were not within his power or control. Steadman v. Arden, 15 M. & W. 587.

Case cited in the judgment: Morrow v. Sanders, 3 Moore, 671.

ALTERATION OF LINE.

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404

Analytical Digest of Cases: Common Law Courts.

Judgment.--Irregularity.-In an action against the members of a joint-stock company the managing director authorised an attorney to accept service of process for all the defendants. The case proceeded, and after notice of trial, the same attorney, by the authority of the managing director, consented to a judge's order for payment of debt and costs. The money not having been paid, final judgment was signed, and execution levied on the goods of a defendant who had no notice of the proceedings. The court set aside the judgment as irregular.

In such case, if a defendant has had notice of the proceedings, the court will not interfere, unless the attorney be insolvent, when they will relieve the defendant on equitable terms. If the attorney be solvent, the court will leave him to his remedy against the attorney. Bayley v. Buckland and others, 34 L. O. 279.

2. Costs. In a hostile suit between the directors of a railway company: Held, that the solicitor of a company would be liable for the costs of an interlocutory application, in case it should appear that he had acted without the authority of the company. Exeter and Crediton Railway v. Buller, 34 L. O. 180.

BROKER.

DEPOSIT.

See Allottee, 1, 2, 3, 4.

EJECTMENT.

Service of declaration, in ejectment against a railway company, upon the secretary of the company, is good, by stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, s. 135. Doe d. Bayes v. Roe, 16 M. & W. 98.

EVIDENCE.

See Provisional Committee, 4.

LIABILITY.

See Provisional Committee, 1, 2, 4.

PARTNERSHIP.

Provisional committee.-Contract.-Agent.The mere fact of a party having agreed to be a provisional committee-man, is no evidence of an authority to make contracts on his behalf.

The association of persons as provisional committee-men for the purpose of carrying out a scheme, is not in law a partnership, nor is there any implied agency on the part of one or more of the provisional committee to bind the others by his or their contracts.

Where a party has authorised his name to be inserted as a provisional committee-man in a prospectus, in which certain persons are described as the acting committee, and the prospectus has been publicly circulated, it is a question for the jury as to the inference to be drawn from the paper, and must depend upon the terms of each particular prospectus. Reynell v. Lewis, Wyld v. Hopkins, 33 L. O. 115.

PROMOTER.

Purchase of Railway scrip.-The defendant, a shareholder, bought for the plaintiff scrip certificates, which were sold in the share-market, at a premium, as "Kentish Coast Railway Scrip," and were signed by the secretary of the railway company. The genuineness of this scrip was afterwards denied by the directors, who alleged that it was issued by the secretary without authority. In an action to recover back from the defendant the price paid to him by the plaintiff for this scrip, and for his commission, on the ground of its not being genuine: 1. Liability. The defendant, in answer to Held, that the proper question for the jury was, an application from the secretary of a railway whether what the defendant intended to buy company to allow his name to be placed on the was that which was sold in the market as Kent-provisional committee, wrote to him consenting ish Coast Railway scrip. Lamert v. Heath, 15

M. & W. 486.

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See Action.

PROVISIONAL COMMITTEE.

to do so, and, stated that "he concluded his liability would be limited to the amount of his shares." His name was accordingly published in the newspapers as one of the provisional committee, and on one occasion he attended and acted as chairman at a meeting of the committee: Held, that he was liable for the price of stationery supplied by the plaintiff, on the order of the secretary, and used by the committee, after the date of his letter to the secretary. Barnett v. Lambert, 15 M. & W. 489.

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2. Liability. The mere fact of a person agreeing to become a member of the provisional committee of an intended railway company amounts to no more than a promise that he will act with other persons, appointed or to be appointed, for the purpose of carrying the scheme into effect. Therefore, in an action against a provisional committee-man for goods supplied on the order of the solicitor of the company, it was held, that the law could not imply, from the mere fact of his agreeing to be a member of such committee, an authority from him to the other members of it to make contracts by himself or by the solicitor, nor an authority to the solicitor to make them on be

Analytical Digest of Cases: Courts of Common Law.

405

Semble, that any authority given by the terms of a prospectus is not to be considered as derived solely from the provisional committee. Dawson and others v. Morrison, 34 L. O. 230.

PURCHASE OF LAND.

half of the committee. If the party not only cumstance of the defendant's being a member consents to be a provisional committee-man, of a railway provisional committee, it was proved but authorises his name to be inserted and that the published prospectus stated, that until published in a prospectus which merely states an act of parliament should be obtained the the names of the members of the provisional committee of management was to have the concommittee, and nothing more, that fact does trol of the company's affairs, and to apply the not alter the liability. If it state the names of funds, &c.: Held, that no authority, either exan acting or managing committee also, it is a press or implied, was given to the managing question for the jury to say, whether it means committee to contract on the credit of the prothat the latter are to take upon themselves the visional committee. whole management of the concern, or that the former have constituted the latter their agents to manage it on their behalf, in which case the former would be liable for the contracts of the latter. Or, if the solicitor's name were mentioned in it, the question for the jury would be, whether it meant that he was to be employed Expiration of powers given by a railway act. by those of the committee who acted, or that-Injunction.-Where a power for the compulhe was already appointed by all whose names sory purchase of land is given by act of parliawere mentioned, as their solicitor, to do all so- ment for the space of three years, and before licitor's work on their behalf; and further, the expiration of the three years a jury meet to what was the business then usually transacted assess the value of certain land, but do not find by solicitors in such undertakings on behalf of a verdict until after the expiration of the three the company. And the same as to the se- years: Held, that such verdict went for nothing, cretary. and an injunction granted to restrain the comWhere there is also evidence that the defend-pany from proceeding to take possession of the ant has acted with relation to the proposed Brocklebank v. Whitehaven Railway scheme, it is a question for the jury, whether Company, 34 L. O. 381. by his consent and acts, he has authorised the solicitor, or secretary, or any member of the committee, to pledge his credit for the necessary and ordinary expenses to be incurred in forming such a company; and if so, whether the work was done, and the credit given, on the faith of his being liable.

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3. Decision of a co-ordinate court. Court of Exchequer having decided the same point as that sought to be raised on showing cause against a rule nisi to enter a nonsuit, this court refused to hear the arguments, holding that the Exchequer decision was to be considered as binding until reversed by a court of

error.

land.

REINVESTMENT OF RAILWAY MONEY.

9 & 10 Vict. c. 20.-Application to allow the under an order of the court to be changed, resecurity on which money had been invested the act 9 & 10 Vict. c. 20. fused, there being no authority for doing so in In re Harwich Railway, 34 L. O. 104.

See Broker.

SCRIP.

SECRETARY.

Assumpsit.-A. and B. were provisional directors of a projected railway scheme, and A. was afterwards, with the consent of B. and the other directors, appointed secretary to the company, and B. attended meetings of the company whilst A. acted as secretary. The scheme was afterwards abandoned.

Held, that 4. could maintain an action against B. for services rendered, and that B. by his own conduct was estopped from taking the objection that 4. having been once jointly interested in the undertaking with him, could not divest himself of that liability so as to support the action. Day v. Sharpe, 32 L. O. 543.

SHAREE OLDER.

Barker v. Stead, 33 L. O. 455. 4. Attendance at Meeting.-Evidence of identity. In order to establish the identity of the defendant as having been present at a meeting of a railway provisional committee of which he was a member, for the purpose of making a resolution passed at such meeting admissible in evidence against him, it is not enough to produce the minute book of the proceedings copied from a previous rough draft, and containing, shares in a proposed railway from "Dublin to Calls.-Alteration of line-A. applied for amongst those present, a similar name to the Mullingar and Athlone," and signed the subdefendant's, and to show that the defendant was the only person bearing that name on the pro- the scrip. scription contract, and shortly afterwards sold visional committee, and that he had been sum-tained an act of parliament enabling the comThe directors subsequently obmoned to attend it. Giles and another v. Cornpany to make a railway from "Dublin to Mulfoot, 33 L. O. 13. lingar and Longford," and there was a clause requiring the company to purchase a canal. In an action against A. for calls, held, first, that he was the shareholder and not the vendee of the scrip; secondly, that he was not discharged from liability by reason of the alteration in the'

See Action by Promoter: Partnership; Pro. spectus, Construction of.

PROSPECTUS, CONSTRUCTION OF. Provisional committee.-Authority of managing committee. Where, in addition to the cir

406

Analytical Digest.-Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor.-Rolls.

line sanctioned by parliament, or the obligation its leave to permit the plaintiff to remove an to purchase the canal. The Midland Great Western Railway Company v. Gordon, 34 L. O.

14.

[The other sections of the Analytical Digest in the present volume are:

1. Law of Attorneys, pp. 8, 224, 376.
2. Law of Costs, pp. 31, 224, 377.
3. Law of Wills, p. 56.

approved next friend and substitute another who may be a pauper.] This suit would not be stayed, as there is already a subsisting next friend; it is, therefore, merely an exercise of a judicious discretion to refuse the application of the plaintiff, as it would deprive the defendant of the security now possessed for the payment of the costs. This is not a case of appointing a next friend in the first instance. Dowden v. Hook, 8 Beav. 399; Pennington v.

4. Law of Property and Conveyancing, Aloin, 1 Sim. & Stu. 264; Anon. 1 Atk. 570,

p. 74.

5. Construction of Statutes, p. 101.

6. Principles of Equity, p. 127.

7. Equity Pleadings, p. 148.

8. Equity Practice, p. 173.

9. Evidence, p. 199.

10. Privy Council Appeals, p. 247.

11. Court of Review,-Bankruptcy, p. 269. 12. Criminal Law, p. 294.

13. Law of Nisi Prius, p. 321.

14. Poor Law and Magistrates' Cases, 350. 15. Law of Railways, 402.

Our readers will thus be enabled readily to refer to each part of the Digest. This division of the points decided into the general subjects to which they belong, is evidently more convenient for reference both by the Practitioner and the Student, than the miscellaneous alphabetical arrangement usually adopted.]

and Drinan v. Mannix, decided by Lord Chancellor Sugden in 3 Dru. & War. 154.

Mr. Collins, who was with Mr. Teed, referred to Melling v. Melling, 4 Mad. 261; Lawley v. Halpen, in Bunb. 310, cited in Daniel's Chancery Practice, p. 120 (Headlam's Edn)

Mr. Bell, contrà, supported his honour's order. [Lord Chancellor. You must show a case where a plaintiff, a married woman, is at liberty to come at any time and change her next friend as of course.] Not aware of any such case, but authorities are equally divided on the subject, whether a feme coverte is or not compellable to procure a solvent person for her next friend. In Dowden v. Hook, suprà, the Master of the Rolls remarks, that there are two cases in which she has been allowed to sue by a next friend in formá pauperis, viz., Collier v. Young, 25th October, 1743, and Valentine v. Walker, 19th May, 1834.

The Lord Chancellor. The question as to the plaintiff's right to nominate any person as her next friend in the first instance, is not

RECENT DECISIONS IN THE SUPE- raised in the present case. There is a next

RIOR COURTS.

REPORTED BY BARRISTERS OF THE SEVERAL COURTS.

Lord Chancellor.

Jones v. Fawcett. July 19, 1847. SUBSTITUTION OF A NEW NEXT FRIEND BY

PLAINTIFF, A MARRIED WOMAN.

The substitution of a new next friend by plaintiff, a married woman, is not a proceeding as of course, and therefore the court will not change a substantial next friend for a person who is insolvent or a pauper. Mr. Teed, for the defendant in this suit, moved to discharge an order of Vice-Chancellor Knight Bruce, made on the 3rd of March last, appointing one Mr. S. to be the next friend of Mrs. Jones, the plaintiff, in the room of Mr. Gregory, the latter paying the costs of the application, and giving security for such as had then been incurred. The grounds of the present motion were, that the proposed next friend was not in solvent circumstances, and that having procured a friend to accept certain bills of exchange for him, he had absconded without taking them up when due. [Lord Chancellor. The question is whether you can prevent the plaintiff from going on with the suit, or, in other words, whether the court can withhold

friend with whom the defendant is satisfied. It is clearly not a matter of course to change the next friend at the will of the plaintiff, for if it were, it would be unnecessary to bring the other side here. It is a matter of indulgence to be granted in the discretion of the court. Therefore, the interests of the defendant and not those of the plaintiff, must be consulted. The proposed substitute is evidently not a fit person to be appointed. Facts which are not contradicted are sworn in an affidavit impugning his honesty and solvency-both important circumstances in the matter of security for costs. I therefore think that the order of the Vice-Chancellor must be discharged.

Rolls Court.

Moore v. Claghorn. July 13 and 27.

EQUITABLE FEE.-JOINT TENANCY.

Held that a devise to trustees in fee in trust for the use and benefit of A. B. and C., the rents to be paid for their maintenance, and the survivors and survivor of them share and share alike, created an equitable estate in fee in A. B. and C., as joint tenants. THE questions in this suit turned upon the effect to be given to a decree of copyholds to trustees "in trust for the use and benefit of the

Superior Courts: Rolls.-Vice-Chancellor.

407

three illegitimate children of the testator, the was, first to obtain the general order, then an rents to be paid for their maintenance, and the order specifying some limited time, then the survivors and survivor of them, share and share four-day order, and then the order to commit. alike." Three different constructions were contended for by different parties.

Mr. Turner and Mr. Pitman, for parties claiming under the survivor of the three children, maintained that the devise created an equitable joint tenancy in fee. The whole legal interest being given to the trustees, the whole equitable interest passed to the cestui que trusts. They cited Knight v. Selwyn, 3 Scott, N. R. 409; and the cases referred to in Jarman on Wills, ii. 177, 178, especially Bacon v. Roach.

Mr. Lloyd, for an assignee of one of the other children, contended that the devise passed the equitable fee to the three cestui que trusts as tenants in common.

Mr. Purvis, for one of the heirs at law of the testator, contended that the cestui que trusts took estates for life only. There must be a clear intention upon the will to create a trust; but here there was nothing to show that the testator intended to pass the whole interest. He referred to Barr v. Swindles, 4 Russ. 283; Esdaile v. Vaughan, 1 R. & M. 504; Vaughan v. Esdaile, 8 Bing. 323; Doe d. Lean v. Lean, 1 Q. B. Rep. 229.

Mr. Schomberg, for another of the heirs at law, took the same view, and urged that there was a good reason here for giving the estate to trustees in order to escape any risk of forfeiture, which distinguished this case from those cited by Mr. Turner. He cited Roe d. Miers v. Jeffries, 7 Durn. & E. 589.

Lord Langdale said, that the testator gave the whole legal interest in the copyhold estates to the trustees, and then declared that these estates were to vest in them for the use and benefit of his three children. He thought that no trust resulted to the testator or his heirs, but that the devise made the children joint equitable tenants in fee. If the words "survivors and survivor, share and share alike," had been introduced into the original gift to the cestui que trusts, he thought that they would have created a tenancy in common, but that in the place where they were introduced they applied only to the direction for maintenance.

Re David Taylor. July 18th, 1847.

ORDER TO COMMIT. - NON DELIVERY OF

DOCUMENTS,

The course of practice to enforce the delivery up of documents is, to obtain first the general order for delivery, then an order specifying some limited time, then the four-day order, and lastly the order to commit.

Vice-Chancellor of England.

Varty v. Duncan. July 10, 1847.

MISTAKE.-ISSUE PRO CONFESSO.

Where a defendant had obtained an order that plaintiff should proceed to trial of an issue by a certain time, or that in default, the issue should be taken pro confesso as against the plaintiff, and the plaintiff omitted through mistake to give notice in time of the trial, an order to take the issue pro confesso refused.

In this case it appeared, that on the 9th Feb. last, an order was taken by the defendants without opposition, that the plaintiffs at the Midsummer sittings after Trinity Term then next, should proceed to a new trial of the issue at law, directed by an order in the cause dated Nov. 4, 1846, and in default thereof, that the issue might be taken pro confesso in favour of the defendant Duncan. No notice of trial of the issue had been served on Duncan, and the last day for setting down the issue for trial in pursuance of the said order, was the 14th of June last, and plaintiffs not having set it down,

Mr. Walker and Mr. Elmsley now moved on behalf of defendant Duncan, that the issue might be taken pro confesso in favour of him, as against all the plaintiffs, citing Casborne v. Barsham, 5 Myl. & Cr. 113.

Mr. Bethell and Mr. Schomberg, contrà, urged, that the omission on the part of the plaintiff's solicitor to give notice of trial was an oversight on the part of his clerk, he not being aware at the time of the order of 9th Feb. 1847. That the plaintiff had immediately applied to a judge at chambers for leave to enter the issue nunc pro tunc and offering to pay the defendants the costs incurred-that the defendant Duncan had refused, and although plaintiffs had endeavoured in every way to rectify the mistake, Duncan had tried to prevent them from doing so that the case of Casborne v. Barsham, though cited by the other side, was really in favour of plaintiff. They cited Hood v. Pimm, 4 Sim. 101.

The Vice-Chancellor said, that this was a common case of a mistake, and he mentioned before him about a twelvemonth since where a this particularly, because there had been a case clerk had made a slip, and he refused to relieve, not because there had been a mistake, but because there had been gross negligence. In the present case it seemed there was a mistake, In this case Mr. Rogers moved for an order coupled with an intention which existed on the to commit Mr. Taylor for not having delivered part of the plaintiffs so long ago as the 9th Feb. up certain deeds and papers, in compliance last, to go on and execute the order of the with an order dated the 22nd of April, which court. There was no opposition offered to the ordered their delivery within a week, and which motion, and the order was made on a mere had been preceded by an order of the 23rd of March, directing the delivery generally.

But Lord Langdale said, that he was not entitled to the order for committal. The course

affidavit of service, but the thing slipped out of the mind of the parties who ought to have served the notice of trial. They were wrong in not being more alive to their duty; but when

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