alone can exercise the power of eminent domain within its limits, finds no support in the numerous treaties with the Cherokee Indians, or in the decisions of this court, or in the acts of Congress defining the relations of that people with the United States.' It is true, as declared in Worcester v. Georgia (6 Pet. 515; 8 L. ed. 483), that the treaties and laws of the United States. contemplate the Indian Territory as completely separated from the States and the Cherokee Nation as a distinct community, and (in the language of Mr. Justice McLean in the same case, p. 583), that in the executive, legislative, and judical branches of our government we have admitted, by the most solemn sanction, the existence of the Indians as a separate and distinct people, and as being vested with rights which constitute them a State, or a separate community.' But that falls far short of saying that they are a sovereign State, with no superior within the limits of its territory."

In Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, decided in 1902, the provisions of the Act of 1898, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe regulations for the leasing of mineral lands in the tribal districts of the plaintiffs for the purpose of making these lands productive and of securing therefrom an income for the benefit of the tribe, was held valid.

In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, decided in 1903, was questioned the constitutionality of an act of Congress of 1900 providing for allotment in severalty of lands held in common within certain Indian reservations and purporting to give an adequate consideration for the surplus lands not allotted or reserved for their benefit. In its opinion, upholding the validity of the act, notwithstanding its alleged incongruity with previous treaties, the court say: "Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, and not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government. The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty,

33 187 U. S. 294; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; 47 L. ed. 183. 34 187 U. S. 553; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 216; 47 L. ed. 299,

though presumably such power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so."

In United States v. Rickert,35 decided in 1903, it was held that lands allotted in severalty to Indians under the Act of 1887, and held in trust for them by the United States for twenty-five years, are not taxable by the State in which situated, nor are the improvements upon them, or the cattle or other property furnished the allottees by the United States. The court in its opinion say: "To tax these lands is to tax an instrumentality employed by the United States for the benefit and control of this dependent race, and to accomplish beneficent objects with reference to a race of which this court has said that from their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.' United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1109; 30 L. ed. 228."

With reference to the permanent improvements on the lands in question, the court say: "Looking at the object to be accomplished by allotting Indian lands in severalty, it is evident that Congress expected that the lands so allotted would be improved and cultivated by the allottee. But that object would be defeated if the improvements could be assessed and sold for taxes. The improvements to which the question refers were of a permanent kind. While the title to the land remained in the United States, the permanent improvements could no more be sold for local taxes than could the land to which they belonged. Every reason that can be urged to show that the land was not subject to local taxation applies to the assessment and taxation of the permanent improvements. It is true that the statutes of South Dakota, for the purpose of taxation, classify all improvements made by per35 188 U. S. 432; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 478; 47 L. ed. 532.

sons upon lands held by them under the laws of the United States,' as personal property. But that classification cannot apply to permanent improvements upon lands allotted to and occupied by Indians, the title to which remains with the United States, the occupants still being wards of the nation, and as such under its complete authority and protection. The fact remains that the improvements here in question are essentially a part of the lands, and their use by the Indians is necessary to effectuate the policy of the United States."

With reference to the personal property provided the allottees, the court declare: "The answer to this question is indicated by what has been said in reference to the assessment and taxation of the land and in the permanent improvements thereon. The personal property in question was purchased with the money of the government, and was furnished to the Indians in order to maintain them on the land allotted during the period of the trust estate, and to induce them to adopt the habits of civilized life. It was, in fact, the property of the United States, and was put into the hands of the Indians to be used in execution of the purpose of the government in reference to them. The assessment and taxation of the personal property would necessarily have the effect to defeat that purpose."

Finally, with reference to the question whether the United States had a sufficient interest in the matter to entitle it to bring suit, the opinion declares: "In view of the relation of the United States to the real and personal property in question, as well as to these dependent Indians still under national control, and in view of the injurious effect of the assessment and taxation complained of upon the plans of the government with reference to the Indians it is clear that the United States is entitled to maintain this suit. No argument to establish that proposition is necessary."

In Re Hoff,36 decided in 1905, however, the court held that an Indian to whom an allotment under the Act of 1887 had been made, and who, by that act, had been granted the privilege of citizenship, and given the benefit of, and subjected to, the civil 36 197 U. S. 488; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506; 49 L. ed. 848.

and criminal laws of the State in which he resided, was a member of the citizen body of that State, and no longer under such federal control as to empower Congress, under the Commerce Clause, to penalize the sale within the State of liquor to him.37

37 After a review of the recent legislation of Congress dealing with the Indian, and a consideration of the police powers reserved to the States, the court say: 'But it contended that, although the United States may not punish under the police power the sale of liquor within a State by one citizen to another, it has power to punish such sale if the purchaser is an Indian. And the power to do this is traced to that clause of § 8, Art. 1, of the Constitution which empowers Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.' It is said that commerce with the Indian tribes includes commerce with the members thereof, and Congress, having power to regulate commerce between the white men and the Indians, continues to retain that power, although it has provided that the Indian shall have the benefit of and be subject to the civil and criminal laws of the State, and shall be a citizen of the United States, and therefore a citizen of the State. But the logic of this argument implies that the United States can never release itself from the obligations of guardianship; that, so long as an individual is an Indian by descent, Congress, although it may have granted all the rights and privileges of national, and therefore state, citizenship, the benefits and burdens of the laws of the State, may at any time repudiate this action and reassume its guardianship, and prevent the Indian from enjoying the benefit of the laws of the State and release him from obligations of obedience thereto. Can it be that because one has Indian, and only Indian, blood in his veins, he is to be forever one of a special class over whom the General Government may, in its discretion, assume the rights of guardianship which it has once abandoned, and this whether the State or the individual himself consents? We think the reach to which this argument goes demonstrates that it is unsound. But it is said that the government has provided that the Indian's title shall not be alienated or encumbered for twenty-five years, and has also stipulated that the grant of citizenship shall not deprive the Indian of his interest in tribal or other property; but these are mere property rights, and do not affect the civil or political status of the allottees. But the fact that property is held subject to a condition against alienation does not affect the civil or political status of the holder of the title. Many a tract of land is conveyed with conditions subsequent.

But it is unnecessary to pursue this discussion further. We are of the opinion that, when the United States grants the privileges of citizenship to an Indian, gives to him the benefit of, and requires him to be subject to, the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State, it places him outside of police regulations on the part of Congress; that the emancipation from federal control is not affected by the fact that the lands it has granted to the Indian are granted subject to a condition against alienation and encumbrance, or the further fact that it guarantees to him an interest in tribal or other property."

The last acts of Congress in this history of its purpose to assimilate the tribal Indians into the general citizen body of the nation are two statutes enacted in 1906.

By an act approved April 26, 1906, provision is made for the final disposition of the affairs of the Five Civilized Tribes in the Indian Territory. In this statute rules are laid down for determining tribal membership; the removal of chiefs for non-performance of duties prescribed by the act; the transfer of tribal schools to the control of the Secretary of Interior; for the collection of tribal revenues by officers appointed by the Secretary; the abolishment of tribal taxes; the disposition of tribal buildings and other property; the sale of unallotted lands; the per capita distribution of tribal funds; the prohibition for a period of twenty-five years of the sale or encumbering by Indians of lands allotted to them (though leases may be entered into, except homesteads, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior); that all lands, thus restricted, shall be exempt from taxation as long as the title remains in the original allottee.

38 Sections 27 and 28 provide as follows:

"Sec. 27. That the lands belonging to the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, or Seminole tribes, upon the dissolution of said tribes, shall not become public lands nor property of the United States, but shall be held in trust by the United States for the use and benefit of the Indians respectively comprising each of said tribes, and their heirs as the same shall appear by the rolls as finally concluded as heretofore and hereinafter provided for: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall interfere with any allotments heretofore or hereafter made or to be made under the provisions of this or any other Act of Congress.

"Sec. 28. That the tribal existence and present tribal governments of the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole tribes or nations are hereby continued in full force and effect for all purposes authorized by law, until otherwise provided by law, but the tribal council or legislature in any of said tribes or nations shall not be in session for a longer period than thirty days in any one year: Provided, That no act, ordinance, or resolution (except resolutions of adjournment) of the tribal council or legislature of any of said tribes or nations shall be of any validity until approved by the President of the United States: Provided further, That no contract involving the payment or expenditure of any money or affecting any property belonging to any of said tribes or nations by them or any of them or by any officer thereof, shall be of any validity until approved by the President of the United States."