The human, The divine, and The social. Human virtue consists in behaving ourselves suitably to the state and capacity of mere rational animals. Divine virtue consists in behaving ourselves suitably to the condition of rational animals related to God. Social virtue consists in behaving ourselves suitably to the capacity of rational animals related to their fellow-creatures, but especially to rational creatures that are of the same class and society with ús. That I may therefore proceed more distinctly in this argument, I shall endeavour to shew what those virtues of the Christian life are, which are proper to a man in each of those capacities; and how much each of those virtues contributes to the happiness of heaven. SECT. I. Concerning those human virtues which belong to a man as he is a reasonable animal shewing that they are all included in the heavenly part of the Christian life, and that the practice of them effectually conduces to our future happiness. FIRST, we will consider man in the capacity of a mere rational animal, that is, compounded of contrary principles, viz. spirit and matter, or a rational soul and human body; by which composition he is, as it were, the buckle of both worlds, in whom the spiritual and material world are clasped and united together; and partaking, as he does, of both extremes, of spirit and of matter, of angel and brute, there arise within him, from those contrary natures, contrary propensions, viz. rational and sensual, or angelical and brutish; and in the due subordination of these, his sensual to his rational propensions, consists all human virtue. For his reason, being the noblest principle of his nature, must be supposed to be implanted in him by God, to rule and govern him, to be an eye to his blind and brutish affections, to correct the errors of his imagination, to bound the extravagancies of his appetites, and regulate the whole course of his actions, so as that he may do nothing that is destructive or injurious to this excellent frame and structure of his nature. But now, in this compounded nature of man, there are his concupiscible and irascible affections; with the first of which he desires and pursues his pleasures, and with the second he shuns and avoids his dangers: and there are also bodily appetites, such as hunger, thirst, and carnal concupiscence; and, together with these, a self-esteem and valuation; all which are the natural subjects of his reason, and indeed the only subjects upon which it is to exercise its dominion: so that in the well and ill government of these consists all human virtue and vice. To the perfect well-governing therefore of a man's self, there are five things indispensably neces sary. 1. That he should impartially consult his reason, what is absolutely best for him, and by what means it is best attainable; and then constantly pursue what it proposes and directs him to. For, so far as he is wanting in this, he casts off the government of his reason. 2. That he should proportion his concupiscible af fections to the just value which his reason sets upon those things which he affects: for every degree of affection which exceeds the merit of things is irrational, and consequently injurious to our rational na ture. 3. That he should not suffer his irascible affections to exceed those evils and dangers which he would avoid for if he doth, they will prove greater evils to him, than those evils or dangers are which raise and provoke them. 4. That he should not indulge his bodily appetite to the hurt and prejudice of his rational nature: for if he does, he will violate the nobler for the sake of the viler part of himself. And, 5. That upon the whole he should maintain a modest opinion of himself; and not think better of his own conduct and management of himself than it deserves for by so doing, he will be apt to overlook his own misgovernments, and so incapacitate himself for any farther improvements. And in these five particulars consists all that virtue which belongs to a man, considered merely in the capacity of a rational animal : The first is the virtue of prudence; The second is the virtue of moderation; The fourth is the virtue of temperance; All which, as I shall shew, are essential parts of the I. Prudence. And this is the root and groundwork of all other virtues; it is this that gives law and scope to all our motions, that proposes the ends, and prescribes the measures of our actions. For prudence consists in being guided and directed by right reason, as it proposes to us the worthiest ends, and directs us to the fittest and most effectual means of obtaining them. So that to live prudently is to live in the constant exercise of our reason, and to be continually pursuing such ends as right reason proposes, by such means as right reason directs us to, which is the proper business of all the virtues of religion. And hence religion, in the scripture, is frequently called by the name of wisdom or prudence; The fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, saith Job; and to depart from evil, that is understanding, Job xxviii. 28. and, The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, saith David, Psal. cxi. 10. where the fear of the Lord comprehends all the acts of religion; which are therefore wise and prudent, because they are the fittest means to those worthiest ends which right reason proposes. So that to exercise our reason in the search and discovery of what is absolutely best for us, and to follow our reason in the pursuit and acquest of what it discovers to be so, is that virtue of prudence whereunto we stand obliged, as we are rational animals. For our reason being the noblest principle of our nature, that by which we are raised above the level of brutes, yea, by which we are allied to angels, and do border upon God himself, ought, upon that account, to be submitted to, as the supreme regent and directress of all our other powers, and to be looked upon as the rule of our will and the guide of all our animal motions. And when, to gratify our sensual appetites or unreasonable passions, we either neglect those ends which our reason proposes to us, or pur sue them by such means as our reason disallows of, we reverse the very order of our natures, and tread antipodes to ourselves; and while we do so, it is impossible we should be happy, either here or hereafter: for every thing, you see, is diseased, while it is in an unnatural state and condition, while its parts are displaced, or put into a disorder, or distorted into an unnatural figure. And so it is with a man, who, while he preserves his faculties in their natural station and subordination to each other, while he keeps his affections and appetites in subjection to his will, and his will to his reason, he is calm and quiet, and enjoys within himself perpetual ease and tranquillity: but when once he breaks this order, and suffers his passions or his appetites to usurp the place of his reason; to impose contrary ends to it, or prescribe contrary means; his faculties, like disjointed members, are in perpetual anguish and anxiety. And hence it is, that in the course of a wicked life we feel such restless contentions between our spirit and flesh, between the law in our minds and the law in our members; because our nature is out of tune, and its faculties are displaced and disordered, and that sovereign principle of reason, which should sway and govern us, is disposed and made a vassal to our appetites and passions for in all our evil courses we choose and refuse, resolve and act, not as reason directs us, but as sense and passion biasses us; and our reason having nothing to do in all this brutish scene of action, either sleeps it out, without minding or regarding, or else sits by as an idle spectator of it, and only censures and condemns it. And it is this that causes all that tumult and contest that is in our natures; and till, by the exercise of prudence, our faculties |