J. Treadwell Richards for appellants.
Andrew J. Perry for respondent.
FINCH, J., reads for affirmance.
All concur, except RAPALLO, J., absent. Judgment affirmed.
HELENA M. HART, Respondent, v. THE VILLAGE OF PORT JERVIS, Appellant.
(Argued March 21, 1881; decided March 25, 1881.)
Samuel Hand for appellant.
John W. Lyon for respondent.
Agree to affirm without opinion. All concitr.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHN H. PULESTON et al., Appellants, v. FRANCIS B. WALLACE
(Argued March 14, 1881; decided March 25, 1881.)
Samuel Hand for appellants.
S. W. Fullerton for respondents.
Agree to affirm without opinion.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.
ANDREW S. WHEELER, Respondent, v. PETER A. YOUNGS, Appellants, et al.
(Argued November 19, 1880; decided March 25, 1881.)
Joshua M. Van Cott for appellant.
William E. Osborne for respondent.
RAPALLO, J., reads for reversal.
All concur, except MILLER, J., dissenting, and reading opinion for affirmance.
1. It seems that the right of a debtor of the United States government, when sued by it, to interpose a counter-claim or counter-credits, rests in all cases upon the provis- ions of the act of Congress grant- ing and regulating it (Act of March 3,1797, §§ 3 and 4); and while, un- der said act, a defendant, upon com- plying with its conditions, may give in evidence any counter-claim he may have in his own right, which is a proper subject of set-off, such counter-claim is available only to the extent necessary to de- feat the claim of the government, and no affirmative judgment for any excess can be rendered against it. People v. Dennison. 272
2. The provision of the Federal Con- stitution (art. 4. § 2), requiring the surrender, on demand of the exec- utive authority of a State, of fugi- tives from justice "charged with treason, felony, or other crimes" who are found in another State, and the provision of the U. S. Stat- utes giving practical effect thereto (U. S. R. S., 5278), embrace every criminal offense and every act for- bidden and made punishable by the law of the State where the act was committed. People ex rel. Jourdan v. Donohue. 438
1. Plaintiffs having title to land bounded by the waters of a bay at ordinary high-water mark made an allotment, under which defendant claimed, bounded westerly by "the cliff" At the time of the allotment there was a strip of land between the cliff and high-water mark. In an action of ejectment to recover this strip, defendant claimed by ad- verse possession. It appeared that fences on the sides of defendant's premises, extending across the strip in question to or near low- water mark, had been maintained by him and his grantors for more than twenty years, those portions across the beach being taken away in winter to prevent their being carried away by the ice and tides; there was no fence along the cliff, the land on that side being open to the sea. Held, that the evidence was sufficient to authorize the sub- mission to the jury of the question as to whether there was a sub- stantial inclosure within the mean- ing of the statute. Trustees, etc.. East Hampton v. Kirk.
2. Also held, that the fact that de- fendant and his predecessors in title had gathered sea-weed from the premises, while not alone evi- dence of adverse possession, was such evidence taken in connection with the fact that they claimed to prevent other freeholders of the town from gathering, and that they did so under claim of exclusive right as owners, which claim was known to plaintiffs. Id.
3. It appeared that R., a former own- er of defendant's land, brought an
action for trespass against one who had gathered sea-weed upon the beach. R. discontinued the action under an agreement with the town and agreed not to sue again. Held, that this did not entitle plaintiffs to a charge to the jury that R. thereby relinquished his adverse possession; that it was at most evi- dence bearing upon that question for the consideration of the jury. İd.
2. Judgment was rendered in this ac- tion upon the report of referees in favor of plaintiff. This was re- versed by the General Term. The attorney-general on appeal to this court gave the required stipulation for judgment absolute. Held, that this was not an assent to an affirma- tive judgment on a counter-claim set up in the answer; that it waived no legal objection to the counter- claim, or immunity of the State from such a judgment. People v. Dennison. 272
Twenty years' user, under a license, of a drain across the lands of another does not give a prescriptive 3. right to the easement, as the possession is by consent and not adverse. See Wiseman v. Lucksinger.
1. This action was brought by plaint- iff, as committee of the estate of a lunatic, to obtain an accounting of the rents and profits of real estate owned in common by the lunatic and by defendant's testator, re- ceived by the latter and of per- sonal property belonging to them jointly, which the complaint al- leged had been fraudulently ap- propriated by said testator, the de- fendant, and her former husband, in pursuance of a conspiracy be- tween them in fraud of the rights of the lunatic. Held, that the ac- tion being for an accounting was referable; that the allegations of fraudulent conspiracy did not change its character; and that an order of reference was not reviewa- ble here. Harrington v. Bruce.
Where plaintiff fails to prove the cause of action set up in his com- plaint, and the objection is raised upon the trial, and no amendment of the pleading is asked for or or- dered, a judgment in plaintiff's favor, upon a cause of action en- tirely separate and distinct from that alleged, cannot be sustained on appeal. Southwick v. First Nat. Bk. 420
5. Where a summons was served upon a sheriff by delivery to his deputy at his office, held, that an omission to prove the filing of no- tice on the trial, if required, was cured by the bringing of the notice to the General Term, on appeal from judgment against the sheriff. Dunford v. Weaver
6. An omission in proof
of record may be supplied on ap- peal to sustain a judgment, where the record cannot be answered or changed.
7. It seems that, assuming the court has power in a foreclosure suit to compel the owner of the equity of
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