Court, and was objected to on the ground of interest. He was part owner of the vessel, appeared as claimant, and put in the answer. He has since assigned his interest, and been released from all contribution by his associate, and indemnified against any damages and costs that may be recovered. I have not looked into the question, as in my judgment his testimony would not change the result. I am satisfied the decree of the Court below is right, and should be affirmed. The decree so affirmed was in favor of the libelant for $2,170.

COMMISSION CASE-LIABILITY OF COMMISSION AGENT.

The following decision, in the County Antrim Assizes, before Judge Jackson, is derived from the Mercantile Journal, published in Belfast, Ireland.

This was an action for assumpsit. The first count in the declaration set forth in agreement, dated 13th July, 1851, whereby the plaintiff agreed to manufacture certain yarns for the defendant. The second count was for goods sold and delivered, work and labor, &c. Defendant pleaded no assumpsit, and gave notice of a set-off.

Plaintiff was to manufacture a quantity of yarn into 4-4th linens; the plaintiff to advance money, the amount of the yarns, less ten per cent, and defendant engaging to refund to plaintiff such deduction as might cover the falling of the price in the market, during the interval of manufacture, the defendant paying to the plaintiff the amount which he had expended in wages, and also a commission of one shilling per web; the yarns to be put in hands at once, and the goods to be delivered in fair and reasonable time.

During the following October and November, the defendant received one hundred and twenty pieces of manufactured cloth from plaintiff; and, according to the agreement to advance money for the purchase of yarns, the plaintiff advanced seven hundred pounds for that purpose. After the first deliveries of the cloth, other portions of yarn were sent to plaintiff, which were manufactured; but repayment of the cash advances not having been made, and plaintiff finding he had on hands a large variety of warps and wefts of the defendant's, which were not suited for the making of linens, refused to deliver any more cloth, as it was the only security he held for the repayment of the advances. It was ultimately agreed, according to the plaintiff's statement, that the plaintiff should do the best he could with the linens under the circumstances. The goods were consequently sold along with linens of the same quality, at the then market price. The sale took place in April 1852. From May to December no objection was made with respect to the sale of the linens, but in December, for the first time, defendant denied the right of plaintiff to sell the goods.

The case for the defendant was, that no authority had been given to sell the goods; and that although the sale took place in April, no advice was given him of the sale till the 10th June, and that a large portion of the linens was made narrower than had been contracted for.

The judge, on charging the jury, stated that the question solved itself into this-was there authority to sell the goods? The plaintiff alledged that words which were equivalent to giving authority to sell were used by Mr. Wood, these words being, "You may do the best you can for me." It appeared to him that these words were of a vague and equivocal character, but that would be for the jury to determine. But if the sale were made for the benefit of the defendant, what could be more natural than that he should at once hand over the documents relating to that sale to the defendant? Why had that not been done, if plaintiff were anxious that the sale should be effected in such a manner as to be conformable with the contract, or with that authority to sell, which would have been tantamount to the proper delivery of the goods?

The evidences of plaintiff and defendant were totally at variance with regard to the question of authority to sell. A verdict was returned for the defendant, with sixpence costs.

COMMERCIAL CHRONICLE AND REVIEW.

COURSE OF THE MONEY MARKET-HISTORY OF THE LATE FINANCIAL REVULSION-ITS CONNECTION WITH RAILROAD PROJECTS, AND EFFECT UPON THEIR SUCCESS-ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE BANKS AND REGULAR TRADERS-CAUSES WHICH PREVENTED SERIOUS EMBARRASSMENT TO A LARGE PORTION OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY-LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE -CONDITION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BANKS-CONDITION OF THE BANKS AT NEW ORLEANSPRODUCTION OF CALIFORNIA GOLD, WITH A STATEMENT OF THE DEPOSITS AND COINAGE AT THE PHILADELPHIA MINT FOR OCTOBER, AND SINCE JANUARY FIRST-FOREIGN IMPORTS AT NEW YORK FOR OCTOBER, AND FOR TEN MONTHS-IMPORTS OF FOREIGN DRY GOODS FOR THE SAME PERIOD -CASH REVENUE FOR THE YEAR-EXPORTS FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN PORTS FOR OCTOBER AND SINCE JANUARY FIRST-COMPARATIVE EXPORTS OF SPECIE FOR FIVE YEARS-EXPORTS OF LEADING ARTICLES OF PRODUCE TO NOVEMBER 19TH-DEMAND FOR OUR BREADSTUFFS ABROAD, AND FUTURE COURSE OF TRADE, &C., &c.

THE pressure in the money market, noticed in our last, has passed away in a measure from the seaboard; but it is still felt at the secondary money centers throughout the interior, where it has caused quite as much distress, in proportion to the scale of business, as in the larger cities. There are few of our foreign readers who can readily understand the peculiar nature of this financial "crisis,' because in no other country in the world could it have been experienced without leaving behind it a more noticeable record of its effects upon the regular trade. The plentifulness of money which succeeded the discovery of gold in California brought about very low rates of interest in this country, which continued with but little interruption for several years. The same state of things was realized abroad, and this induced capitalists there to make large remittances to this country, where the rates were still above those which could be obtained in Europe. While bills were discounted in London at 1 and 2 per cent per annum, 5 or 6 per cent, which was the best rate offered here with good security, seemed large in proportion. The favorite investment, after State and Government stocks became too high, was railroad bonds, and these were readily taken at or about par, whenever there seemed a fair chance of the scheme succeeding. The mode of building new roads was, to secure a subscription on the projected line equal to the right of way, and then issue bonds for the entire construction, and cost of superstructure. In some cases a larger subscription was at first obtained, but in many instances the whole stock actually subscribed was payable in the right of way, labor, &c., without any actual advance of capital. As long as money was so easy, however, no difficulty was experienced, and bonds to any amount could be sold where the negotiation was undertaken by respectable bankers or brokers. We have already spoken of the influx of foreign capital, but the amount of such capital invested in these second-rate securities has been greatly overrated. By far the larger portion of such bonds were carried by parties residing here, without the means of buying them, through the assistance of the banks and private capitalists. There were no schemes so desperate, that, with a reasonable margin, the bonds based upon them could not be hypothecated for money on call, and thus speculators were encouraged in their daring The deposits in the banks had largely increased, and all beyond what was kept as specie, (in most banks far below a safe amount,) was either used as capital, upon which a regular discount

business was transacted, or loaned out on call, with stocks or bonds as collateral securities. Every clerk who could raise “a margin" was the owner of a little adventure in stocks or bonds, which were carried for him in most cases by his broker through temporary loans for which they were pledged; while some houses held three times their real capital in bonds paying 7, 8, or 9 per cent interest upon their cost, which they carried by means of call loans. A variety of causes combined to bring about the revulsion. The political difficulties in Europe were used as a watchword for caution; but London bankers saw the diversion of capital to this country at a time when the importation there of large quantities of breadstuffs would create naturally an unusual demand for it. The large amounts remitted from hence to England to settle our balances with all parts of the world had to be forwarded, and this added to the outward current from thence, and enhanced the pressure already well defined. The rate of interest was raised, and this increased the difficulty. Confidence was partially lost, and money, instead of being deposited or circulated, was hoarded. This led to a check in the facili ties given to borrowers from this side, and a demand for a return of a portion of the previous loans. We had imported an amount unprecedented in the annals of the trade, and were owing large sums on this account. The recall of capital borrowed added to the amount we were called upon to pay. At the same moment our receipts of foreign goods were very large, and the duties accruing must be met. Unfortunately for our importers, there was a large accumulation of specie in the sub-treasury, (or Government vaults,) and the duties paid in specie were so much taken from the means of the banks, and dropped into a reservoir which gave forth no returning stream. The banks then became alarmed, and contracted their discounts. Specie had begun to flow out with our exports, and the receipts from California came forward with less promptness. The loans on call, which the banks had relied upon with so much confidence, proved the most unavailable of their assets. At first, it is true, borrowers returned the amounts called for, shifting the loan from one creditor to another, but when the demand became universal they were compelled to give up the attempt. The banks tried the alternative of selling out the securities hypothecated, but there were no buyers. The market value had been previously maintained because the purchaser could pay a small margin on the cost out of his own means, but when the credit system would answer no longer, the securities could not be placed, and the banks were obliged to retain them until a more favorable season would relieve them of the unwelcome load. Meanwhile merchants and traders doing a regular business were much less disturbed than has been generally supposed. Those who were importing largely were a little pinched, but the jobbers, as a class, stood up nobly, being borne out by the facility with which they obtained their dues from the interior. The very causes which had contributed so largely to the revulsion were the means of bearing this class of dealers harmless. The schemes of internal improvement, however recklessly managed, had distributed money plentifully through the interior, which now flowed into the coffers of the merchant, and back again to its starting point. The demand for breadstuffs, which created such alarm in Europe, sent a golden harvest to our farmers throughout the country, and thus facilitated the process of distribution and payment without which the markets must have been overstocked and glutted with foreign goods. Owing to

these happy coincidences, there have been few mercantile failures; and, as far as we know, not one where the parties, really solvent, have become involved in their regular business. As we have before hinted, the severest point of the pressure is apparently passed. The large exports of breadstuffs and other produce (hereinafter noticed) have limited the demand for specie; the banks, having attained a very strong position, are now discounting more liberally; and the subtreasury has been relieved of a portion of its accumulation through the redemption of Government stocks, offers for which, by the Secretary of the Treasury, at a liberal premium, we noticed in former numbers.

The lessons which have been taught by the recent course of financial affairs are plain enough; but we have no great faith in the teachings of experience. For a while, the banks,--having found that a business note with an honorable signature, would bring the money as surely as the day of its maturity dawned, while "loans on call," with abundant collaterals, were asked for in vain,--will be a little less partial to the reckless financier, and a little more courteous to the mercantile customer. But unless the various State Legislatures pass laws prohibiting the banks from making loans for less than a certain specified or limited period, the temptation to renew the old system will be too great to be withstood. Many have thought that the financial revulsion would be so complete as to result in a general breaking up of the various railroad projects not yet passed the point of success. This does not seem probable. A few will, of course, be abandoned; and yet others will struggle on under difficulties and embarrassments. But where the projected improvement is a link in an important chain, or continuous line, it will find means of advancement and ultimate completion. The check will be a salutary one in its operation upon speculative pursuits generally; but we have no hope that it will prove more than a check, soon to be forgotten. We have already stated that the position of the banks is a very strong one: the following summary of the weekly averages of the New York city banks, where the pressure has been most severe, will fully confirm this assertion:

It will be seen that the amount of specie, since the date embraced in our for

mer statement, has increased nearly three-and-a-half million of dollars.

The following is the statement of the banks of New Orleans for the month of October, 1853.

Comparing this statement with that of the month preceding, we find in the aggregate, not including the Bank of New Orleans, that the discounts have increased for the past month $1,961,291; the circulation reduced $102,000; the deposits increased $300,000; while they owe to distant banks and exchange collected $452,000.

The product of gold from California is again increasing. The following will show the deposits and coinage at the Philadelphia mint:—