76TH CONGRESS 3d Session } SENATE { REPORT No. 1845 PER DIEM COMPENSATION TO MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF STEAM AND OTHER OPERATING ENGINEERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JUNE 13 (legislative day, MAY 28), 1940.-Ordered to be printed Mr. HUGHES, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany H. R. 8815] The Committee on the District of Columbia, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 8815) to grant per diem compensation to the appointed members of the Board of Steam and Other Operating Engineers of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass. The purpose of this legislation is to provide adequate compensation for the members of the Board of Steam and Other Operating Engineers of the District of Columbia. When the Steam Engineers Act was passed in 1887, provisions were made for each member of the Examining Board to receive $300 per year as compensation, which at that time included the boiler inspector as he was not a paid District of Columbia employee. The number of applicants before the Board were very few as the regulations only called for three grades compared to seven grades today. During the depression, the compensation for the Board was cut to $150 and has never been restored. At the present time the boiler inspector is employed by the District of Columbia and does not receive any compensation for time engaged in the work of the Board. The revenue received through the Board last year was approximately $4,000. An average of 32 applicants is examined each night and the members are actually engaged in the work of the Board an average of 7 hours each night. In view of these circumstances, the committee feel that more adequate compensation should be provided. O 76TH CONGRESS 3d Session } SENATE { REPORT No. 1846 AMENDING AND CLARIFYING THE ACT KNOWN AS THE JUVENILE COURT ACT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JUNE 13 (legislative day, MAY 28), 1940.-Ordered to be printed Mr. HUGHES, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany H. R. 9804] The Committee on the District of Columbia, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 9804) to amend and clarify section 6, subsection 2, of the act approved June 1, 1938, known as Juvenile Court Act of the District of Columbia, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill do pass. The purpose of this bill is to clarify certain general expressions contained in section 6 of the said new Juvenile Court Act. Reference to section 6 of the act of June 1, 1938, will disclose that the second paragraph of subsection 2 thereof, contains the following language: The court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia in all cases involving children arising under the Act entitled "An Act making it a misdemeanor in the District of Columbia to abandon or willfully neglect to provide for the support and maintenance by any person of his wife, or of his or her minor children in destitute or necessitous circumstances, approved March 23, 1906." (D. C. Code, title 6, sec. 270-273.) The italicized words "in all cases involving children," as appearing in the foregoing excerpt, seem to have the effect of qualifying the jurisdiction previously enjoyed by the juvenile court to hear and determine cases against adults for nonsupport of wives and minor children which had been heretofore conferred upon the court under the act of Congress approved March 23, 1906. Under the act of March 23, 1906 (34 Stat. at L. 86, ch. 1131), as amended June 18, 1912 (37 Stat. at L. 136, ch. 171), title 6, sections 270 et seq., District of Columbia Code (1929), Congress declared it to be a misdemeanor for a parent, whether mother or father, to willfully neglect to provide for the support and maintenance of minor children under the age of 16 years; also, it was a misdemeanor for a husband to willfully neglect to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife. Under the terms of the amendment of June 18, 1912, supra, jurisdiction in these matters was conferred upon the juvenile court, and since June 18, 1912, to date said court has exercised that jurisdiction. Regardless of the fact that concurrent jurisdiction was at the same time given to the present District Court of the United States, to enforce the nonsupport provisions, the juvenile court has assumed jurisdiction in the great majority of the cases, leaving the district court to exercise its jurisdiction only in cases of removal or rendition where the offender has absconded to a place beyond the jurisdiction. And this was apparently the reason for creating the concurrent jurisdiction. Since 1912 in exercising its jurisdiction in nonsupport cases the juvenile court has not alone heard those cases involving children's needs, but likewise the needs of destitute wives. In fact, most of the cases were of such a nature that the wife usually complained on her own behalf as well as on behalf of the children. Čommon sense would indicate that ordinarily if the children were in need so would the mother be in need. The act of March 23, 1906, contemplated such a situation and expressly provided for both types of cases. Even after the enactment of the new Juvenile Court Act on June 1, 1938, the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia continued to hear cases of wives and children, feeling that it still had jurisdiction to do so. However, on February 21, 1940, in the case entitled, "In the Matter of Walter B. Wilson, Habeas Corpus No. 2060." Hon. F. Dickinson Letts, Justice of the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, in a written opinion, decided that the foregoing words "In all cases involving children" had the effect of restricting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to the extent that a wife alone could not bring her case to the juvenile court. And this, even though she be destitute and otherwise a proper complaining witness under the terms of the original nonsupport proceedings. Any relief for such a person must be before the United States District Court. It is felt that under the circumstances Justice Letts' decision was justified, but still the result thereof materially affects the proper administration of said nonsupport provisions and presents a matter of importance to the District of Columbia. Amendatory action of the Congress of the United States is therefore sought by the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia. The concomitant of the decision rendered by Justice Letts presents this situation, viz: that a destitute wife must proceed before the district court, and because of the fact that she generally complains for herself as well as the children, would include the children in that complaint. Thus practically the entire jurisdiction of the juvenile court over such matters is in effect destroyed and transferred to the district court. The only alternative to prevent such a transfer of jurisdiction would be to have the wife 'complain in one court and the children in another. This would be a burdensome and cumbersome procedure entailing duplication of work and a waste of public funds. The records of the juvenile court disclose that most of the nonsupport complaints consist of destitution on the part of wife and children and but few are received where the wife or the children alone complain. It is felt that all of the departments of the juvenile court developed since 1912 for the handling of nonsupport matters must be abandoned and likewise all of the experience and knowledge acquired by the juvenile court over a period of years go for naught in the face of the present condition of the statute unless an amendatory action is taken by Congress. A study of the foregoing matter indicates that the facilities of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia are not adequate to carry the burden brought about by the transfer, and conferences with members of the United States attorney's staff disclose a desire on their part that the juvenile court retain the jurisdiction previously exercised prior to Mr. Justice Letts' opinion. An examination of the House and Senate reports, debates in Congress, and other sources of information disclose that the foregoing amendments are in nowise contrary to the purposes and intentions of Congress which it entertained in passing the act of June 1, 1938. On the contrary, it is felt that these amendments carry out the purposes contemplated by Congress. Inquiries likewise disclose that the amendments are in accord with the purposes intended by those organizations pressing for the enactment of the new juvenile court law of 1938. GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Hon. WILLIAM B. BANKHEAD, EXECUTIVE OFFICE, Washington, May 13, 1940. Washington, D. C. MY DEAR MR. SPEAKER: The Commissioners of the District of Columbia have the honor to submit herewith a draft of a proposed bill amending the new Juvenile Court Act of the District of Columbia, approved June 1, 1938. The purpose of this bill is to clarify certain general expressions contained in section 6 of the said new Juvenile Court Act. Reference to section 6 of the act of June 1, 1938, will disclose that the second paragraph of subsection 2 thereof, contains the following language: "The court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia in all cases involving children arising under the act entitled 'An act making it a misdemeanor in the District of Columbia to abandon or willfully neglect to provide for the support and maintenance by any person of his wife or of his or her minor children in destitute or necessitous circumstances, approved March 23, 1906.'" (D. C. Code, title 6, secs. 270-273.) The italicized words "in all cases involving children," as appearing in the foregoing excerpt, seem to have the effect of qualifying the jurisdiction previously enjoyed by the juvenile court to hear and determine cases against adults for nonsupport of wives and minor children which had been heretofore conferred upon the court under the act of Congress approved March 23, 1906. Under the act of March 23, 1906 (34 Stat. L. 86, ch. 1131), as amended June 18, 1912 (37 Stat. L. 136, ch. 171), title 6, sections 270 et seq., District of Columbia Code (1929), Congress declared it to be a misdemeanor for a parent, whether mother or father, to willfully neglect to provide for the support and maintenance of minor children under the age of 16 years; also, it was a misdemeanor for a husband to willfully neglect to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife. Under the terms of the amendment of June 18, 1912, supra, jurisdiction in these matters was conferred upon the juvenile court, and since June 18, 1912, to date said court has exercised that jurisdiction. Regardless of the fact that concurrent jurisdiction was at the same time given to the present district court of the United States, to enforce the nonsupport provisions, the juvenile court has assumed jurisdiction in the great majority of the cases, leaving the district court to exercise its jurisdiction only in cases of removal or rendition where the offender has absconded to a place beyond the jurisdiction. And this was apparently the reason for creating the concurrent jurisdiction. Since 1912 in exercising its jurisdiction in nonsupport cases the juvenile court has not alone heard those cases involving children's needs, but likewise the needs of destitute wives. In fact, most of the cases were of such a nature that the wife usually complained on her own behalf as well as on behalf of the children. Common sense would indicate that ordinarily if the children were in need so would |