1168

legally qualified voters in any State or Territory."

816

But, Mr. President, there is another view which seems to have been lost sight of entirely by those who have drawn both the House bill and the bill now pending before the Senate, and from which we apprehend very much danger. It is this: the oppression of citizens because of having voted in a particular way, or having voted at all. It may often happen, as it has happened up to this time already, that upon the close of an election colored persons will be discharged from employment by their employers. They may be subjected to outrages of various kinds because they have participated in an election, and cast their votes in a particular way. That is not done for the purpose of punishment so much as for the purpose of deterring them from voting in any succeeding election, or from voting in a way that those who perpetrate these outrages do not desire them to do. I find that branch of the subject is entirely left out of view in the bill.

There is another feature of my amendment which I deem of some importance. It is this:

"That if in the act of violating any provision in either of the two preceding sections any other felony, crime, or misdemeanor shall be committed, the offender may be indicted or prosecuted for the same in the courts of the United States."

I think the most effective mode of preventing this intimidation and these attempts at coercion, as well as the outrages which grow out of these attempts, would be found in making any offense committed in the effort to violate them indictable before the courts of the United States. As was said before, in the discussion of the Georgia question in the Senate, the juries in the communities where these outrages are committed are often composed of men who are engaged in them, or of their friends, or of those who connive at them, or of persons

383 U.S. 815

It

are intimidated by them, and in many instances they dare not bring in a true bill when there is an attempt to indict, or if a true bill be found, they dare not go for conviction on the final trial. is for that reason that I believe it will be better, it will be the only effective remedy, to take such offenders before the courts of the United States, and there have them tried by a jury which is not imbued with the prejudices and interests of those who perpetrate the crimes.

These are the principal features of the amendment which I have drawn in the effort to perfect this bill; and there is another one to which I will call the attention of the Senate. It is that in regard to calling out the military forces of the United States. I find that in the civil rights bill, as in the bill which has been introduced by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the President is authorized, either by himself or by such person as he may empower for that purpose, to use the military forces of the United States to enforce the act. There in both instances it stops. It has been objected to here that the expression, "or such other person as he may empower for that purpose," should not be in the bill; that it may be subject to abuse. I think it would have no good effect to keep that language in. The President may send his officers and he may empower whomsoever he pleases to take charge of his forces without any such provision.

But there is a use for these forces which seems not to have been adverted to in either the civil rights bill or in the bill that is now pending before the Senate. It is the holding of these offenders for examination and trial after they are arrested. Their confederates, if they are put in the common prisons of the State, will in nine cases out of ten release them. But more important still is it to use these forces to compel the attendance of witnesses; for a subterfuge resorted to is to keep witnesses away

818

817

who

from the trial. In many instances witnesses are more or less implicated

in the commission of the offense. In other cases the witnesses are intimidated and cannot be obtained upon the trial. So in the amendment which I have prepared I have proposed that these forces may be used to enforce the attendance of witnesses both upon the examination and the trial. My purpose in introducing this was to perfect the Senate bill. I think, as I said yesterday, that that bill is liable to less objection than the House bill. I think it is more efficacious in its provisions. I think it is better that the Senate should direct its attention to perfecting that bill, in order that it may be made, when perfected, a substitute for the bill that came from the House.

That much being said upon the purpose of perfecting the bill and making it efficacious, I have very little more to say. I did not intend when I rose to say much upon the general power, which has been questioned here, to pass any law at all. I think it is better to do nothing than to do that which will not have the proper effect. To do that which will not accomplish the purpose would be worse than doing nothing at all. That the United States Government has the right to go into the States and enforce the fourteenth and the fifteenth amendments is, in my judgment, perfectly clear, by appropriate legislation that shall bear upon individuals. I cannot see that it would be possible for appropriate legislation to be resorted to except as applicable to individuals who violate or attempt to violate these provisions. Certainly we cannot legislate here against States. As I said a few moments ago, it is upon individuals that we must press our legislation. It matters not whether those individuals be officers or whether they are acting upon their own responsibility; whether they are acting singly or in organizations. If there is to be appropriate legislation at all, it must be that which applies to individuals.

819

I believe that the United States has the right, and that it is an incumbent duty upon it, to go into the States to

86 S.Ct.-74

1169

enforce the rights of the citizens against all who attempt to infringe upon those rights when they are recognized and secured by the Constitution of the country. If we do not possess that right the danger to the liberty of the citizen is great indeed in many parts of this Union. I think this question will come time and again as years pass by, perhaps before another year, in different forms before the Senate. It is well that we should deal with it now and deal with it squarely, and I hope that the Senate will not hesitate in doing so.

Mr. President, the liberty of a citizen of the United States, the prerogatives, the rights, and the immunities of American citizenship, should not be and cannot be safely left to the mere caprice of States either in the passage of laws or in the withholding of that protection which any emergency may require. If a State by omission neglects to give to every citizen within its borders a free, fair, and full exercise and enjoyment of his rights it is the duty of the United States Government to go into the State, and by its strong arm to see that he does have the full and free enjoyment of those rights.

Upon that ground the Republican party must stand in carrying into effect the reconstruction policy, or the whole fabric of reconstruction, with all the principles connected with it, amounts to nothing at all; and in the end it will topple and fall unless it can be enforced by the appropriate legislation, the power to enact which has been provided in each one of the great charters of liberty which that party has put forth in its amendments to the Constitution. Unless the right to enforce it by appropriate legislation is enforced stringently and to the point, it is clear to my mind that there will be no efficacy whatever in what has been done up to this time to carry out and to establish that policy.

820

I did not rise, sir, for the purpose of arguing the question very much in detail.

1170

I did not rise for the purpose of making any appeals to the Senate; but more for the purpose of asserting here and arguing for a moment the general doctrine of the right of the United States to intervene against individuals in the States who attempt to contravene the amendment to the Constitution which we are now endeavoring to enforce, and for the purpose of calling attention to the defects in the bill and offering a remedy for them.

KEY NUMBER SYSTEM,

383 U.S. 745

UNITED STATES, Appellant,

V.

Herbert GUEST et al.

No. 65.

Argued Nov. 9, 1965.

Decided March 28, 1966.

Prosecution for alleged conspiracy against rights of citizens. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, Athens Division, sustained defendants' motions to dismiss indictment, 246 F.Supp. 475, and the government appealed. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Stewart, held that dismissal of portion of indictment charging conspiracy to deprive Negroes of right to full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of motion pictures, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation, on ground that it was not alleged that defendants' acts were motivated by racial discrimination was not reviewable under Criminal Appeals Act; but that portion of indictment charging conspiracy to deprive Negroes of right to

383 U.S. 820

equal utilization of state owned, operated or managed facilities wherein it was expressly alleged that one of means of accomplishing object of conspiracy was "by causing the arrest of Negroes by means of false reports that such Negroes had committed criminal acts" contained allegation of state involvement sufficient to require denial of motion to dismiss; and that portion of indictment charging conspiracy to deprive Negroes of right to travel to and from state and to use state's interstate commerce facilities and instrumentalities charged offense under statute pertaining to conspiracy against rights of citizens, since right to travel from one state to another is constitutionally protected.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in part.

1. Courts 385(11⁄2)

Where United States District Court's judgment dismissing first paragraph of indictment was based at least alternatively upon its determination that paragraph was defective as matter of pleading, Supreme Court review of judgment on that branch of indictment was precluded, even though Court might have jurisdiction over appeal as to other paragraphs of indictment. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731.

2. Courts 385(12)

Dismissal of portion of indictment charging defendants with conspiracy to deprive Negroes of right to full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of motion pictures, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation, on ground that it was not alleged that defendants' acts were motivated by racial discrimination, was not reviewable under Criminal Appeals Act. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 201(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (a); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 241, 3731.

330

2. Stanton Construction Company is the principal debtor and its rights will be adjudicated in the within proceedings so that it is an indispensable party plaintiff.

3. Rockwood Equipment Leasing Company is allegedly the assignor of the claims for rental of equipment to Westinghouse as assignee, and its rights will be adjudicated in the within proceedings so that it is an indispensable party plaintiff.

The wherefore clause in the motion seeks a dismissal of the complaint or, in the alternative, to compel plaintiff, Westinghouse, to delete the Borough of Nanty-Glo and Lower Yoder Municipal Authority as named plaintiffs and join Rockwood and Stanton as parties plaintiff.

No affidavits were submitted.

[1] In our opinion, Westinghouse is the real party in interest and therefore the names of the municipalities should be stricken from the caption of the case. Rules 17(a) and 21, Fed.R.Civ.P.

[2] Further, in our opinion, Stanton Construction Company is not an indispensable party plaintiff. An examination of the bonds attached to the complaint discloses that they are contracts of suretyship. We are not aware of any authority nor has the defendant brought any to our attention in which it has been held, or even contended, that the principal as a matter of law is an indispensable party plaintiff in an action against the surety.

[3] Finally, in our opinion, Rockwood Equipment Leasing Company, the assignor of the leases to Westinghouse is not an indispensable party plaintiff. An assignor is generally neither a real party in interest nor an indispensable party. 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 482, pp. 14-19; § 512, pp. 102-104; § 513.2, p. 111; 3 Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 17.09, p. 1339; Wright, Federal Courts, pp. 257-258 (1963).

An appropriate order will be entered.

Evidence as to klan activities was admissible, in suit by United States against a klan for injunction to protect Negro citizens seeking to assert their civil rights. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 14, 15; Civil Rights Act of 1957, § 131 as amended and Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 201, 206, 701, 707, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 2000a, 2000a-5, 2000e, 2000e-6; Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 1 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 et seq.; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1345. 3. Injunction

128

Evidence established that klan and individual klansmen had adopted pattern and practice of intimidating, threaten